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PREFACE
“The Lord said to Moses... you shall not defraud or rob your neighbor. ”

"Where large sums ofmoney are involved, it is advisable to trust nobody."

—Leviticus 19:1,13
—Agatha Christie

Fraud is estimated to cost the North American economy more than $400 billion annually,
according to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. This figure may even be conservative
when it is considered that insurance fraud alone costs U.S. industry $120 billion annually, as
reported by Conning & Company, a prominent research and investment firm.
Despite these loud numbers, fraud is primarily a silent problem. Fraud experts estimate that more
than 75 percent of frauds are undetected, and many that are detected are not reported. Firms do
not disclose their losses resulting from fraud for many reasons, including that they are embarrassed
that they have been defrauded, or they want to keep the bad news from clients and customers.

Perhaps because fraud is so underreported, many companies think it will never happen to them.
Unfortunately, a firm unwilling to consider that its personnel, agents or vendors could act
dishonestly is a fraudster’s dream. What better environment to exploit than one in which the guard
is down?
The purpose of this Handbook is to provide CPAs with practical information and resources to help
them identify and respond to fraud in the workplace, with an emphasis on prevention rather than
investigation. Although it is impossible to eliminate the risk of fraud completely, effective
prevention policies can reduce opportunities for fraud to occur. At the same time, sophisticated
detection methods can help uncover fraud in the early stages, minimize losses, and enable those
affected by fraud, particularly CPAs or financial managers responsible for fraud prevention, to
react to fraud in a way that could solve or mitigate the problem rather than contributing to it.

Handbook Overview
The primary focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention. Since prevention cannot be realized
without understanding how fraud is perpetrated and concealed, the material in this Handbook has
been written to explain to CPAs the nature and extent of fraud and to familiarize them with general
fraud prevention techniques. In addition to the core topics of fraud prevention and methods of
combating specific kinds of fraud, two chapters are devoted to computer security and the unique
kinds of crimes and criminals related to computer crimes.
The contents of the Handbook are summarized below, in brief synopses of each chapter, to provide
readers an overview of the material.
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Chapter Contents

Managing the Risk of Fraud
Chapter 1, “Managing the Risk of Fraud,” describes the concept of fraud risk: understanding it and
guarding against the threat posed by it. The specific factors that affect fraud risk are addressed,
including the key internal controls—basic, supervisory and audit—that help prevent fraud. Since
detecting and preventing fraud in books of account is key to any prevention strategy, there is a
section devoted exclusively to this topic, with fraud and AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 82, Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.
1, AU sec. 316) discussed in relation to fraud auditing. A comprehensive and practical risk
management checklist is included at the end of the chapter.

Promoting an Ethical Environment
Because an ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy, chapter 2,
“Promoting an Ethical Environment,” describes the various steps that can be taken to promote an
ethical environment within an organization, and thereby reduce the risk of fraud. A sample code of
ethics and business conduct, which can be reproduced and/or adapted for use in any organization,
is included, along with an ethical environment checklist.

Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance
Risk management is a key component of fraud awareness and is essential for providing protection
against potentially catastrophic risks, including fraud-related losses. Chapter 3, “Risk Financing
and Fidelity Insurance,” examines the concept of risk financing. The chapter gives a description of
the kinds of fidelity insurance policies that are available—including some of the more typical policy
clauses and the insured’s responsibilities—and the factors that enter into the fidelity insurance
purchase decision. A practical checklist is included at the end of the chapter.

Computer Security and System Recovery
Adequate computer security is an indispensable fraud prevention tool. Chapter 4, “Computer
Security and System Recovery,” provides a comprehensive overview of computer security,
including physical security, logical security, and system recovery. A checklist is also included with
this chapter.

Internal Fraud
Chapter 5, “Internal Fraud,” addresses the various ways fraud is committed against an organization
by a perpetrator from within that organization, meaning, by officers, managers, or employees—the
most common form of fraud. Frauds are classified according to the various accounting cycles to
which they relate: sales and collection, acquisition and payment, payroll and personnel, inventory
and warehousing, and capital acquisition and repayment. Since cash is the focal point of most
entities, a separate section is devoted to cash misappropriation.
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External Fraud for Personal Gain
Fraud can also be committed against organizations by suppliers, professional con artists and other
outside perpetrators. Chapter 6, “External Fraud for Personal Gain,” is a discussion of the various
ways frauds are committed against small businesses and individuals, the government, and financial
institutions, such as banks and insurance companies. Case studies are included to clarify the
various kinds of fraud perpetrated by outsiders.

Commercial Crime
In addition to being victimized by fraud, organizations can also be the perpetrators of fraud.
Chapter 7, “Commercial Crime,” provides an overview of the various forms of commercial crime
and methods of preventing them. The crimes considered include false advertising, industrial
espionage and trade secret theft, insider trading, securities fraud, organizational bribe giving.
Interesting and informative case studies are included to exemplify the different kinds of
commercial crime.

Computer Crime and Computer Criminals
Although it has resulted in very few genuinely “new” frauds, the computer has dramatically
changed the environment in which fraud is committed. Chapter 8, “Computer Crime and
Computer Criminals,” is a description of the nature of computer-related crime and computer
criminals and the control considerations that affect the risk of fraud in a computer environment,
and provides selected computer crime case studies.

Addressing a Known or Suspected Fraud
Despite the best prevention strategies, an actual crisis may strike. Chapter 9, “Dealing With a
Known or Suspected Fraud,” focuses on crisis management and, more particularly, forensic
accounting. A comprehensive checklist is included at the end of the chapter.

Appendices
A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector
This comprehensive section outlines a breakdown of fraud in the different sectors, complete with
checklists and fraud vulnerability grids for each of the following sectors:
• Construction

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Financial services
Government
High technology
Manufacturing
Media and communications
Nonprofit
Professional services
Real estate
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• Recreation
• Natural resources
• Retail
• Small business
• Transportation
• Wholesale

B—Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
A complete text version of SAS 82 is provided as Appendix B for reference.
Bibliography

This alphabetical listing of the most current and relevant sources of information, including a
separate section for Web sites and books, pertaining to fraud, commercial crime, and other closely
related topics for further reading.
Glossary

The comprehensive glossary is an effective quick-reference tool which provides an alphabetically
arranged listing of definitions and explanations for all fraud-related terms and kinds of fraud.
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CHAPTER 1:
Managing the Risk of Fraud
1.1 The Nature and Extent of Fraud

1.1.1 Definitions
The key word used in most dictionaries to define fraud is deception. In the broadest sense of
the word fraud, this definition may be sufficient. However, in the context of this Handbook,
a slightly more restrictive definition is appropriate: fraud is criminal deception intended to
financially benefit the deceiver. Both of the qualifiers in this definition are necessary—that is,
the deception must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.
Criminal Deception
The qualifier criminal is necessary to exclude certain deceptions that may financially benefit
the deceiver—for example, the mild overstatement of one’s skills on a job application;
however, this kind of transgression will not be examined in this Handbook. While such an
overstatement could be labeled fraudulent in the broadest sense of the word, it can hardly be
described as criminal.
Note that, for purposes of this definition, the word criminal is not used in a strict legal sense.
Rather, it refers to a seriously “wrong” action taken with malicious intent. Thus, even if
perpetrators of fraud are able to avoid successful criminal prosecution—for example,
because a particular jurisdiction has lax laws or enforcement, or because of some legal
technicality—their actions are still considered “criminal” for purposes of this Handbook.

Financial Benefit
The qualifier financial benefit is necessary in order to exclude certain types of criminal
deception that we do not commonly think of as fraud and therefore, are not dealt with in
this Handbook—for example, a wealthy bigamist failing to disclose a previous marriage.
The financial benefit accruing to the fraudster from an action need not be direct for that
action to be considered fraudulent. Indirect financial benefits are also possible, for example,
environmental criminals (fraudsters) who dump toxic waste into rivers to avoid higher
disposal costs and falsify records to conceal their actions.

1.1.2 Magnitude of the Threat
Because the essence of fraud is deception, determining its prevalence is problematic. Many
frauds go undetected—probably more than 75 percent—and many frauds that are detected
are not reported. It is virtually impossible to compile reliable statistics under these
circumstances.
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Simply based on the largest reported frauds—for example, the U.S. savings and loan
scandal, BCCI, Boesky and Milken—it is safe to say that fraud in the United States runs in
the billions of dollars. If one assumes that fraud represents about 3 percent of gross national
product (GNP)—conservative by some estimates—then the total cost in the United States
would be about $300 billion.

Macro statistics are not particularly meaningful, however, even if you could obtain accurate
statistics. The fact is that the threat of fraud depends largely on the circumstances, that is,
the environment in which it takes place. Let’s begin with a view of personal integrity, as
illustrated by Figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1. One View of Personal Integrity

One View of Personal Integrity

Views of commitment to personal integrity vary, and the percentage figures shown are not
definitive. Some views suggest a more even split between the three categories, while others
state that the honest and dishonest categories may be as low as ten percent each. However,
all of these views point to one important conclusion: exclusive reliance on the honesty of
individuals is the surest way to be victimized. Over half the population—and probably
more than two thirds—is quite capable of committing dishonest acts in the right (or should
we say wrong?) environment.

The importance of creating an environment that discourages fraud brings us back to the
question “What is the magnitude of the threat?” Answer: the threat offraud is as big as it is
allowed to be.
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1.1.3 Sources of the Threat
The magnitude of the fraud threat is only one dimension contributing to the extent of the
problem. The breadth of the fraud threat—that is, the various sources of fraud—must also
be considered. A truly comprehensive prevention strategy must address the full spectrum of
fraud sources.

You can classify the sources of the fraud threat as either internal or external collusion. A
brief description of each classification follows.
Internal Sources
Internal opportunities to commit fraud differ from company to company. Some typical
examples, which illustrate the broad nature of these internal opportunities, include the
following.

• Officers of a company create false financial reports to improve their own performance
measurement.
• Managers inflate their expense accounts or turn a blind eye to supplier fraud in
exchange for kickbacks.
• Other employees commit fraud such as embezzlement, cash skimming, or accounts
receivable lapping.
• Corporate directors defraud a company’s shareholders through stock market
manipulation or insider trading.
External Sources
Typical examples of external opportunities to commit fraud include the following.

• Suppliers falsify or duplicate invoices.
• Competitors victimize a company through industrial espionage or price fixing.

• Con artists defraud a company with schemes involving products, services, or investment
opportunities that never materialize.
• Customers commit fraud through false credits posted to their accounts or through rebate
coupon frauds.

See figure 1-2 for a depiction of the various internal and external sources of fraud.

1.1.4

The Causes of White Collar Crime

The theory of differential association is undoubtedly the best known among all explanations
offered to account for crime. Although it applies to all forms of crime—not just white collar
crime—it is nevertheless useful for the purposes of this Handbook.
This theory first appeared in 1939 in the third edition of Edwin H. Sutherland’s Principles of
Criminology. Later, Sutherland would make his best-known contribution to criminology by
coining the phrase white-collar crime and writing a monograph on the subject.

Based on nine concepts or points, the theory of differential association begins by asserting
that criminal behavior is learned. Expanding on that assertion, Sutherland specifies as a
second point that criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other people in a process
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of communication. If individuals acquiring criminal habits or propensities were exposed to
situations, circumstances, and interactions totally of a criminal nature, it would be relatively
easy to comprehend how this process of communication operates. In view of the enormous
variation in standards and personalities to which any individual in our society is exposed, it
becomes exceedingly difficult to discern the elements that induce criminal behavior without
some additional principles.

Sutherland’s third point is that criminal behavior is acquired through participation within
intimate personal groups. This suggests that the roots of crime are in the socializing
experiences of the individual. Unfortunately, the process of socialization is far from
adequately understood. Sutherland’s fourth point indicates that the criminal learning

Figure 1-2. How a Company Can Be Victimized

How a Company Can Be Victimized
Supplier

(false invoicing)

Competitors
Con Men

(profit fixing)

(false sale of ad products)

Customers
Officers

(false credits)

(false financial reporting)

Managers

Externally

internally

(kickbacks, expense accounts)

Other Employees (cover up asset theft)
Directors

(manipulate share prices)

process includes not only techniques of committing crime but also the shaping of motives,
drives, rationalizations, and attitudes. Crime techniques often can involve a high degree of
skill: picking pockets (and not getting caught at it) demands considerable adroitness.
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Fifth, Sutherland stipulates that legal codes define the specific direction of motives and
drives as favorable or unfavorable.

Sixth, Sutherland establishes the principle of differential association. According to this
postulate, a person becomes criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to
violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law. Sutherland states in
his seventh point that differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and
intensity. But he does not suggest which of these elements is apt to be more important than
the others.

Sutherland’s eighth point is that learning criminal and delinquent behavior involves all the
mechanisms that are involved in any other learning. As his next to last proposition
Sutherland stresses that learning differs from pure imitation.
The last point is a worthwhile reminder that while criminal behavior is an expression of
general needs and values, it is not explained by these general needs and values because
noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values. This means that the
generalizations sometimes employed to account for crime—that people steal because they
crave “esteem” or are “greedy” or kill because they are “unhappy”—have little scientific
merit.
In other words, much of the same needs and values motivate criminals and noncriminals
alike. People become or do not become criminals on the basis of their unique responses to
common drives for prestige, happiness, success, power, wealth, and other human
aspirations. One person with a pressing need for money may take an extra weekend job
pumping gas, or try to borrow from a friend. Another person, feeling the same need, may
hold up a fast food outlet.

1.1.5 Understanding the Risk
Of the two available ways to combat fraud—prevention and detection—a prevention
strategy is obviously the preferred approach. Such a strategy can be either general or
specific in its objective. General prevention techniques for risk management involve two
main elements: understanding the risk and guarding against the threat.

Fraud Versus Theft

Resolved: fraud is not the same as theft.
In a debate, most people would choose to defend the above statement. They might win by
arguing that—

• Theft is like robbing a bank; fraud is like cooking the books to cover up petty cash theft.
• People committing theft do so at night, wearing masks; people committing fraud do so
during the day, wearing suits.
• Theft is direct; fraud is indirect.
• Theft is what lower-class criminals commit; fraud is what upper-class criminals commit.

Few people, if any, however, will point out what is perhaps the most important difference
between fraud and theft: the risk of fraud is much greater.
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With an increasingly high media profile given to crime, particularly in large cities, most
people are acutely aware of the need to protect themselves against crime’s overt forms. In a
bad neighborhood, for example, you would not leave the keys in your car or the doors
unlocked. In fact you probably would not want to be there at all. In this case the risk of
theft, a more overt and direct form of criminal act than fraud, is easy to assess and deal
with.
Now consider a different scenario: if you were to leave your wallet briefly on your desk at
work, you would also be exposing yourself to a risk. However, assuming that access to your
workplace is restricted to other employees, in all likelihood, you would consider this risk to
be a very small one. Presumably the people you work with aren’t criminals and would
never pick up your wallet in a direct act of theft. The risk of being detected, as perceived by
a perpetrator, would be relatively high. You would certainly know that your wallet had
been stolen and a thorough investigation would ensue, possibly implicating a coworker.

Herein lies the first of two pillars on which the greater threat of fraud is built. One pillar is
based on the premise that most people believe that those who are relatively close to them—
their friends and coworkers—are basically honest. Potential victims may rationalize about
those around them: “They would never steal. As long as we lock the doors at night to keep
out the ‘real crooks,’ we’ll be safe.”
The other pillar is based on the perception that fraud is in some sense an indirect form of
theft. Although a criminal act, people who perpetrate fraud will in many cases rationalize
their behavior, believing that because it’s indirect, it’s victimless. Alternatively, the
perpetrator may rationalize that the victim deserves it, or where the amount involved in the
fraud is low in relation to the total assets available, that the victim can afford it and—or
won’t—even miss it. And so the second pillar is formed from the rationalizations of most
fraudsters—the denial that the fraud is morally wrong: “No one will be hurt by this. The
company won’t even miss it. Besides, they deserve it for the lousy way they treat me.”

These two pillars—low perception of the threat of fraud by potential victims, and a high
degree of rationalization by potential perpetrators—combine to make fraud a much more
insidious threat than ordinary theft. A further illustration of this greater risk: according to
FBI statistics, by the early 1980s losses suffered by banks from computer fraud alone were
about ten times the amount lost to bank robberies. By 1985, fraud losses were twenty-six
times that of robberies.
Generic Versus Individual Risk Factors
A large number of factors can impact the risk of fraud. This Handbook contains an
approach—a system of categorization—that facilitates the understanding of fraud risk and
the development of an appropriate strategy to manage it.

The literature is filled with many different systems of categorizing fraud risk. The system
developed for this Handbook splits the risk factors into two groups: generic and individual.
Generic risk factors remain relatively constant in their impact on any subject individual or
group of individuals. They are largely within the control of the organization or entity that is
protecting itself, and largely outside the control of potential perpetrators. Because these risk
factors apply in the same way to any employee, they can be set and manipulated by an
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organization without considering individual differences among employees. Employee
turnover has virtually no effect on these risk factors.
Individual risk factors change from person to person and can even change for the same
individual over time. They are only partially within the control of the organization or entity
that is protecting itself, and this control is more difficult to exercise because it applies to
each individual separately. Whenever turnover occurs, the individual risk factors change
and must be managed. Even worse, whenever an individual’s personality, state of mind,
circumstance, or motivation changes—which, after all, is a constant process—the associated
risk factors may also change.
See sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of generic and individual risk
factors.

1.1.6 Guarding Against the Threat
On understanding the risk of fraud, you must develop an appropriate strategy and
implement policies to guard against the threat. The main elements of this process are:
• Choosing acceptable risk levels

• Developing and implementing internal controls
• Promoting an ethical environment
• Arranging appropriate risk financing (insurance)
• Ensuring adequate computer security

Choosing Acceptable Risk Levels
The risk of fraud can never be completely eliminated. Even if this were possible, it would
probably not be desirable because of prohibitive costs and extremely tight controls that
would stifle creativity and make employee morale suffer. The first step in a fraudprevention strategy is to determine the acceptable level of risk.
Choosing acceptable risk levels intertwines with assessing the various risk factors. For
example, one of the generic risk factors is the opportunity risk available to potential
perpetrators. Assessing this opportunity risk enables you to make other decisions—such as:
“Do we need to lower this risk, and if so, by how much?”
Developing and Implementing Internal Controls
Internal controls—consisting of basic controls, supervisory controls, and audit—represent
the cornerstone of any fraud prevention strategy.

To ensure complete and accurate reporting an internal control system must be designed
and implemented regardless of the risk of fraud. However, a system should never disregard
the risk of fraud; such disregard would amount to a virtual invitation to potential
perpetrators.
See section 1.3 for a detailed discussion of internal controls.
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Promoting an Ethical Environment

Promoting an ethical environment is another key element in a prevention strategy. In
particular implementing a formal code of ethics and business conduct helps set the tone for
all employees within an organization. See chapter 2 for further discussion.
Arranging Appropriate Insurance

Recognizing that there will always be some risk of fraud, organizations must finance this
risk either externally and explicitly (fidelity insurance) or internally and implicitly (self
insurance). See chapter 3 for further discussion.

Ensuring Adequate Computer Security
Computers and information technology play an increasingly important role in business and
society in general. The pervasive nature of these technologies demands that adequate
computer security be an integral part of any prevention strategy. Although computer
security may be considered a subset of internal control, it is still an important aspect. See
chapter 4 for details.

1.2

Fraud Risk Factors
Several factors contribute to the risk of fraud. Organizations use various systems for
categorizing these factors; however, under most systems, the elements that combine to
determine fraud risk are largely the same.

For example, one classification system is known as the GONE theory, an acronym for
Greed, Opportunity, Need, and Exposure. Under this system, the Greed and Need factors relate
largely to the individual (that is, the potential perpetrator), while the Opportunity and
Exposure factors relate largely to the organization (that is, the potential victim). The four
elements of the GONE theory interact to determine the level of fraud risk, and no one
factor is universally more important than another. Each of the factors is unfavorable, to
some extent, in virtually all situations. However, an organization that allows a sufficiently
unfavorable or an out-of-balance combination of all four factors may face serious troubles.
As one fraud investigator observed, “You can consider your money GONE.”
In this Handbook we use a slightly different system that groups the risk factors into generic
or individual, as previously defined. However, as described below, many of the same
elements of the GONE theory apply under this system as well.

1.2.1 Generic Risk Factors
Generic risk factors—those largely under the control of the organization or entity that is
protecting itself—include:
• The opportunity given to potential perpetrators.
• The likelihood of discovering a fraud that was committed.
• The nature and extent of the punishment a perpetrator will receive once the fraud is
uncovered and the perpetrator is caught.
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Note that the first factor corresponds to the “O” or Opportunity in the GONE theory, while
the second and third factors correspond to the “E” or Exposure risk element. The Exposure
risk under the GONE theory is a product of two generic factors: the likelihood of getting
caught and the subsequent consequences. The product of both must be low for there to be
any risk to the organization. For example, if the likelihood of getting caught is 0 percent,
then the exposure risk is 100 percent. Similarly, if the consequences of getting caught are
insignificant, then the Exposure risk is high.

A brief description of each generic risk factor follows.

Opportunity to Commit Fraud
The opportunity to commit fraud refers primarily to allowing a potential perpetrator access
to the assets of the organization or object of the fraud. No organization can completely
eliminate opportunity; experts consider such attempts uneconomical and
counterproductive. As long as organizations have assets of value and these assets flow, are
traded or come under the control of others—such as employees, customers and suppliers—
the opportunity to commit fraud will always exist.
For organizations the challenge in fraud prevention is ensuring that the opportunity risk
level is minimal under the circumstances, that is:
1. Assign, either explicitly or implicitly, to each employee an appropriate maximum
opportunity level. For example, limit a junior clerk’s opportunity level to certain smaller
fixed assets not bolted down in the office. Allow a more senior clerk’s maximum
opportunity level to include an additional $500 petty cash fund, or the day’s cash
receipts. Allow a senior executive an additional $5,000 check-signing limit.
2. Prohibit catastrophic opportunity levels. The definition of a catastrophic level depends
on the circumstances—in particular, the size of the organization. For example, a small
business with $50,000 in cash should probably not allow anyone but its owner(s) access
to the full amount.
Likelihood of Discovery
If an opportunity to commit fraud exists, making the chances of discovery high reduces the
risk. In fact, even the perception that the chances of discovery are high can act as a deterrent.
Of course, if a fraud does occur, discovery may result in recovery of some of the lost assets.

The likelihood of discovery stems primarily from the system of internal controls. While
these controls can never be so tight as to preclude any fraud from taking place, ideally they
should be sufficient to prevent most material frauds from going undetected for any length of
time.
See section 1.3 for a closer look at internal controls.

Nature and Extent of Punishment
Discovery of a fraud is, in itself, insufficient to act as a deterrent against future fraud.
Organizations must put in place some adverse consequences for potential perpetrators,
who, most important, must perceive these adverse consequences.
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Although research has not provided proof, conventional wisdom holds that the nature and
extent of punishment has a deterrent impact. The occurrence of theft in countries governed
by Islamic law is extremely low compared to Western countries. Presumably this is due, at
least in part, to the severity of the punishment (amputation of one or both of the hands).
Can anyone doubt that the occurrence of theft in North America would diminish if
perpetrators knew they would face the same punishment? Of course, the reality is that the
punishment must “fit the crime” and be consistent with a society’s justice system.
Organizations or entities wishing to protect themselves from fraud should have clear
policies regarding the nature and extent of the consequences of getting caught; for
example—

• Anyone who commits a fraud will be dismissed.
• All frauds will be reported to the authorities and charges will be laid.

1.2.2 Individual Risk Factors
Individual risk factors—those that vary from employee to employee, largely outside the
control of the organization or entity that is protecting itself—fall into two categories:

1. Moral character
2. Motivation

Moral character corresponds to the “G” or Greed factor in the GONE theory, while
motivation is equivalent to the “N” or Need factor. Each of these categories is described
below.

Moral Character (Greed Factor)
Greed represents broad concepts, such as ethics and moral character, or the lack thereof.
Moreover greed and ethics essentially relate to the internal or personality attributes of an
individual, as do character, integrity, honesty, and the like. You cannot know whether an
individual possesses these attributes without the ability to read that individual’s mind. Even
if this were possible, personal interpretation would still come into play.
Social values also have an impact on moral character. Many sociologists lamented a trend
in Western societies during the 1980s, namely the pursuit of wealth as an overriding
objective. The Me Generation and the Decade Of Greed were phrases coined in connection
with this trend, which was perhaps best epitomized by the memorable speech of Michael
Douglas’ Gordon Gecco character in the 1987 movie, Wall Street: “Greed is right. Greed is
good.. .”

In fact, Gordon Gecco’s philosophy may hold some element of truth. A certain amount of
greed, tough-mindedness, and competitive instinct could greatly enhance the chances of
success for an organization or an individual in a free enterprise society. Regardless of one’s
own value judgment, there is no doubt that these attributes do exist in society. This poses a
problem, however, because, while greed may not necessarily preclude the existence of
ethics and good moral character, if left unchecked or promoted to a great extent, it can
have an adverse impact vis-a-vis the risk of fraud.
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This leads to the essential question at issue here: What can or should an organization do to
minimize the risk of fraud posed by greed and other negative human attributes? Consider
the following.

• Corporate Mission Statement: Set the goals of an organization in a corporate mission
statement, and communicate it to all managers and other employees. The primary goal
of most businesses is to maximize profits, presumably over the long-term in order to
survive. Other objectives might include maintaining either a high market share,
leadership in an industry, or both. However, businesses must pursue these goals in a
manner consistent with good corporate citizenship and standing in the community. This
emphasis on corporate responsibility sets the tone for management and employees, and
encourages personal responsibility. Conversely, business should discourage
irresponsible actions—and by extension, fraud.
• Written Codes ofBusiness Conduct: “Good moral character” means different things to
different people; an organization must define this term and relate it to particular types of
behavior. For example, does your organization consider it moral and ethical for its
employees to accept gifts from customers and, if so, is there a specified value or limit? A
written code of ethics and business conduct can help translate the relative concepts of
greed, ethics, and morality into more specific behaviors that are either acceptable or
unacceptable.
• Management Style and Role Models: Management must set the right example for employees
by acting responsibly and living up to the spirit of the corporate mission statement and
code of business conduct. Moreover, it must clearly and visibly appear to do so in its
dealings and communications with employees. Policy statements mean nothing when
undermined by management’s actions. In fact, such a situation may be worse than
having no policy at all because management’s failure to adhere to its own guidelines
would foster a kind of cynicism and “rules are made to be broken” philosophy that
might potentially encourage fraud and commercial crime.
• Hiring Practices: Regardless of corporate mission statements, codes of business conduct,
and good role models, moral character ultimately depends on the individual employee.
To the extent possible set hiring practices that weed out prospects with low moral
character. See chapter 3 for further discussion.

Motivation (Need Factor)
Why do people commit fraud? There is obviously no single, specific answer. People
commit frauds for a variety of reasons.

Probably the most common group of fraud motivations relates to economic need. For
example, the perpetrator may be experiencing an actual or perceived cash emergency: a
mortgage to pay, drugs to purchase to satisfy an addiction, or gambling losses to win back.
Alternatively, there may be no emergency but simply an unchecked desire for the good life:
expensive restaurants, clothes, furs, jewelry, vacations, cars, homes, and summer cottages.

Less frequently, there might be other reasons, such as, disenchantment, revenge, or simply
the fact that everyone else seems to do it. Even more rarely, the motives could be eccentric:
a sense of challenge or thrill. Finally, the cause may be some form of psychological illness:
compulsion, anxiety, paranoia, or outright psychosis.
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What can be done about all of these complex motives, seemingly locked up in the
Pandora’s box of an employee’s mind? Admittedly, the options are limited but they
include—

• A Favorable Environment: Creating the right environment can reduce the motivation
among employees to commit fraud. In an unfavorable environment, morale suffers and
feelings of disenchantment—even hate and the desire for revenge—may take hold. Try
to promote the right environment by treating employees fairly, keeping communication
lines open, and providing mechanisms for discussing and resolving grievances.
• Performance Appraisal and Reward Systems: Measure each employee’s work fairly by
implementing a performance appraisal and reward system.
• Employee Assistance Programs: Many enlightened employers provide free counseling and
other assistance to employees facing personal problems, for example, alcohol and drug
abuse. From the point of view of fraud prevention, this approach is preferable to keeping
these problems “bottled up.” This approach helps prevent resentment that could
ultimately lead to the commission of fraud.
• Employee Testing and Screening: As part of their hiring practices and sometimes on a
regular basis thereafter, some employers use testing and screening procedures to identify
and weed out high risk individuals, or form the basis for remedial action, or both.
Procedures include psychological testing, drug testing, and even honesty testing in the
form of lie detector tests where not prohibited by law. Highly controversial, these tests,
in some instances, could cause more harm than good, for example, to employee morale,
the organization’s reputation among prospective employees, and so on. Nevertheless, in
especially sensitive occupations or circumstances, employers might find this testing
appropriate and even necessary.
• Common Sense and a Watchful Eye: While motives are not observable, the product of
certain motives often is. An employee with a drug or gambling problem may not be able
to keep it a secret. And beware the $25,000-a-year bookkeeper who comes to work
driving a Mercedes or who, wary of getting caught, never takes a vacation.
Profiles of Fraud Perpetrators
While external pressures do play a major role in whether or not an individual commits
fraud, internal characteristics can affect a potential fraud perpetrator as well. Gwynn Nettler
in his book, Lying, Cheating and Stealing, makes the following observations:

• People who have experienced failure are more likely to cheat.
• People who are disliked and who dislike themselves tend to be more deceitful.
• People who are impulsive, distractible, and unable to postpone gratification are more
likely to engage in deceitful crimes.
• People who have a conscience (fear, apprehension, and punishment) are more resistant
to the temptation to deceive.
• Intelligent people tend to be more honest than ignorant people.
• The easier it is to cheat and steal, the more people will do so.
• Individuals have different needs and therefore different levels at which they will be
moved to lie, cheat, or steal.
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• Lying, cheating, and stealing increase when people are under great pressure to achieve
important objectives.
• The struggle to survive generates deceit.
The highly publicized cases in recent years of computer hackers committing high-tech
crimes have resulted in a public perception that individuals who are highly knowledgeable
about computers are more likely to commit fraud; however, there is no evidence to support
this premise.

1.2.3 High Fraud-Low Fraud Environments
Employee fraud, theft, and embezzlement are more likely to occur in some organizations
than others. The most vulnerable organizations are usually hampered by weak management
and inadequate accounting and security controls. Solutions often proposed include:

• Tight accounting and audit controls
• Thorough screening of applicants for employment
• Close supervision and monitoring of employee performance and behavior
• Explicit rules against theft, fraud, embezzlement, sabotage, and information piracy
Other considerations also affect the likelihood of employee crime. See table 1.1 for a
comparison of the environment and culture of organizations with high fraud potential and
organizations with low fraud potential.

Table 1.1

Environmental and cultural comparison of those organizations with
HIGH FRAUD POTENTIAL AND THOSE WITH LOW FRAUD POTENTIAL.

Variable

High Fraud Potential

Low Fraud Potential

1. Management style

a. Autocratic

a. Participative

2. Management orientation

a. Low trust

a. High trust

b. Power-driven

b. Achievement-driven

3. Distribution ofauthority

a. Centralized, reserved by top
management

a. Decentralized, dispersed to
all levels, delegated

4. Planning

a. Centralized

a. Decentralized

b. Short range

b. Long range

5. Performance

a. Measured quantitatively and
on a short term basis

a. Measured both
quantitatively and
qualitatively
and on a long term basis

6. Business focus

a. Profit-focused

a. Customer-focused

7. Management strategy

a. Management by crisis

a. Management by objectives

8. Reporting

a. Reporting by routine

a. Reporting by exception
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Variable

High Fraud Potential

Low Fraud Potential

9. Policies and rules

a. Rigid and inflexible, strongly
policed

a. Reasonable, fairly
enforced

10. Primary management
concern

a. Capital assets

a. Human, then capital and

11. Reward system

a. Punitive

a. Generous

b. Penurious

b. Reinforcing

c. Politically administered

c. Fairly administered

a. Critical

a. Positive

b. Negative

b. Stroking

13. Interaction mode

a. Issues and personal differences
are skirted or repressed

a. Issues and personal
differences are confronted
and addressed openly

14. Payoffs for good
behavior

a. Mainly monetary

a. Recognition, promotion,
added responsibility,
choice assignments, plus
money

15. Business ethics

a. Ambivalent, rides the tide

a. Clearly defined and
regularly followed

16. Internal relationships

a. Highly competitive, hostile

a. Friendly, competitive,
supportive

17. Values and beliefs

a. Economic, political, self
centered

a. Social, spiritual, groupcentered

18. Success formula

a. Works harder

a. Works smarter

19. Human resources

a. Burnout

a. Not enough promotional
opportunities for all the

12. Feedback on
performance

technological assets

talent
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b. High turnover

b. Low turnover

c. Grievances

c. Job satisfaction

20. Company loyalty

a. Low

a. High

21. Majorfinancial concern

a. Cash flow shortage

a. Opportunities for new
investment

22. Growth pattern

a. Sporadic

a. Consistent

23. Relationship with
competitors

a. Hostile

a. Professional
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Variable

High Fraud Potential

Low Fraud Potential

24. Innovativeness

a. Copy cat, reactive

25. CEO characteristics

a. Swinger, braggart, self
a. Professional, decisive,
fast- paced, respected by
interested, driver, insensitive to
peers, secure risk-taker,
people, feared, insecure,
thoughtful, generous with
gambler, impulsive, tight-fisted
numbers- and things-oriented,
personal time and money,
profit-seeker, vain, bombastic,
people- products- and
market-oriented, builder
highly emotional, partial,
helper, self-confident,
pretend to be more than they
composed, calm,
are
deliberate, even
disposition, fair, know
who they are, what they
are and where they are
going

26. Management structure, systems
and controls

a. Bureaucratic

a. Collegial

b. Regimented

b. Systematic

c. Inflexible

c. Open to change

d. Imposed controls

d. Self-controlled

e. Many-tiered structure, vertical

e. Flat structure, horizontal

f.

27. Internal communication

28. Peer relationships

a. Leader, proactive

Everything documented, a rule f.
for everything

Documentation is
adequate but not
burdensome, some
discretion is afforded

a. Formal, written, stiff, pompous, a. Informal, oral, clear,
friendly, open, candid
ambiguous
a. Hostile, aggressive, rivalrous

a. Cooperative, friendly,
trusting

1.3 Internal Controls and “Fraudproofing”
Developing an understanding of the various factors that contribute to the risk of fraud is
only the first step in a fraud prevention strategy. Following this, it is necessary to implement
policies that will help to reduce the threat.

Some of the measures that can guard against the threat of fraud were explained previously
in this chapter. Consider what is perhaps the main, and certainly the most common,
prevention tool: a good system of internal controls.
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1.3.1 Defining Internal Control Objectives
In recent years, fraudproofing has appeared in the literature and some seminars. This term is
somewhat misleading, however, because no internal control system can completely
eliminate the risk of fraud. What fraud proofing should do, in theory, is reduce the risk of
fraud to an acceptable level.

The risk of fraud is not the only factor in defining internal control objectives; for example,
management information and reporting requirements are important considerations as well.
However, the acceptable levels of risk and opportunity, as defined in section 1.1.6 should
also be considered. This means effectively combining the three levels of internal control—
basic, supervisory, and audit (see sections 1.3.2-1.3.4)—to limit the risk of fraud to
acceptable levels.

1.3.2

Basic Controls

A variety of basic controls exist in a typical system of internal controls. The most relevant
basic controls are grouped into three categories: physical access, job descriptions, and
accounting reconciliations and analyses.
Physical Access

Most people acknowledge the need to control physical access to valuable assets including
intangible assets such as information. Measures to control physical access include the
obvious practice of locking doors, desks, and file cabinets so that unauthorized personnel,
either within or outside the organization, cannot gain access. Other measures include
employee IDs and passwords, computerized security systems (for example, access cards
that record time of entry and exit), and electronic surveillance systems.

As a general rule, organizations should restrict physical access to those who require it to
perform their job function. Of course, controlling physical access in this way will not
completely reduce the risk of fraud. However, it will help to reduce the risk in the following
ways:
• Many frauds require that the perpetrator come into physical contact with either the asset
being misappropriated, or the related asset records, in order to conceal the fraud.
Reducing physical access reduces opportunity.
• Physical access controls are often the most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong
controls in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the
system. Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
• Access controls that do not prevent fraud often assist in the fraud investigation process
(for example, determining what actually happened and narrowing down suspects).
Job Descriptions
Formal, specific job descriptions are a very effective fraud prevention tool. These
descriptions should spell out exactly what is expected of each employee. Generally,
employees should not perform duties outside their job description. Those who do,
represent a significant red flag.

Create job descriptions that reflect the important principle of division of duties. For
example, employees with physical control over an asset should not also keep the records
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relating to that asset (this will only make it easier for them to cover up the fraud). Segregate
all other especially sensitive duties—for example purchasing and check signing.
The need for job descriptions goes beyond the widely recognized concept of segregating
duties, although it is certainly one of the important consequences of job descriptions. Some
cases may result in an entirely appropriate duplication of duties, for example, double
signing checks. Specify in the job description that all employees must take annual vacations
(another well known fraud prevention tool, because an employer can more likely discover
perpetrators running an ongoing fraud scheme when they’re removed from the scene).
Thus, it is apparent that employers must approach the process of formulating job
descriptions for their employees in an integrated fashion. From an internal-control and
fraud-prevention perspective, different tasks performed by different individuals may be
interrelated; therefore, an appropriate job description for one employee will often depend
on the job descriptions of others, and vice versa.

Employers often ignore or underestimate the need for formal job descriptions, writing them
off as “more useless paper.” At other times, employers create job descriptions but then
ignore them. This attitude invites trouble. As one leading fraud investigator put it: “When
people begin to do things outside their job description, you have reason to be concerned. If
it goes unrewarded, they begin to develop a justification to steal. It’s very important that job
descriptions are clear, agreed upon, and adhered to.”

Accounting Reconciliations and Analyses
After access controls and job descriptions, accounting reconciliations and analyses are the
third most important group of basic controls. An essential ingredient of a successful fraud is
successful concealment. Regular, appropriately performed accounting reconciliations and
analyses often make such concealment difficult or impossible.
Perform accounting reconciliations regularly (for example, monthly basis) including:

• Bank reconciliations, for all accounts

• Accounts receivable reconciliations (both month to month and general ledger to
subledger)
• Accounts payable reconciliations (again, both month to month and general ledger to
subledger)
The exact nature of the accounting analyses performed depends on the nature of the
organization’s operations. Analyses relevant for most organizations include:

• Variance analysis of general ledger accounts (budget to actual, current year versus prior
year, and so on)
• Vertical analysis of profit and loss accounts (that is, calculation of expenses as a
percentage of sales, and comparison of these percentages with historical standards, or
budgets, or both)
• Detailed sales and major expense analyses (for example, by product line or territory)
Of course, organizations often undertake accounting reconciliations and analyses with other
purposes in mind—for example, to make management decisions or to ensure the accuracy
of the accounting records, or both. Nevertheless, this process also can highlight
discrepancies that point to fraud.
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1.3.3 Supervision
Supervision represents the second level of internal control. From a fraud prevention
perspective, strong supervision is vital—especially in small businesses that may have
difficulty achieving segregation of duties.

Note that active supervision most definitely differs from supervisory or management
override, in which a manager or supervisor actually takes charge of or alters the work of a
subordinate. In fact, override itself is a red flag—that is, it suggests that the manager or
supervisor may be engaged in fraud or the concealment of one. Allow basic controls to
operate as they were intended, rather than to be circumvented by those at higher levels.

As a fraud prevention mechanism, good supervision consists of:
• Fraud awareness
• Approval, review, double-checking and redoing

Fraud Awareness
Fraud prevention specialists constantly emphasize the need for “fraud awareness,” to the
point that the term has almost become a cliche. However, such awareness is perhaps the
key prerequisite in building any effective fraud prevention strategy, and is especially
important at the supervisory level.

Specifically, supervisors must be alert to the possibility of fraud whenever an unusual or
exceptional situation occurs, such as complaints from suppliers or customers, discrepancies
that don’t make sense, or accounting reconciliations that don’t balance. If a manager’s mind
is closed to the possibility of fraud during an unusual or exceptional situation, the risk of the
fraud continuing unabated greatly increases.
Approval, Review, Double-checking and Redoing
In addition to awareness, fraud prevention demands that supervisors actually supervise.
This means going beyond the typical approval function, such as initialing invoices or
performing other duties of supervisors and managers. A more thorough review, double
checking employees’ work, and redoing some tasks, may be necessary and should be
approached diligently. For example, assign supervisors the responsibility of double
checking important procedures such as the monthly bank reconciliation—that is,
comparing the numbers on the bank reconciliations to those on the bank statements and in
the general ledger, making certain those numbers total correctly, test-checking outstanding
items at the very least, and so on. To simply initial bank reconciliations in a habitual or
reflex-like manner without really reviewing and actually redoing them invites fraud.

For example, the owner of a busy downtown restaurant used the following system of
internal control for sales. Employees entered all prenumbered customer bills into the cash
register, and at least once each day the hostess/bookkeeper batched the customer bills,
listed them on a deposit sheet, and made the related bank deposit. The owner then
matched the totals on the deposit sheet with the amounts shown in the stamped deposit
book, and believed this to be adequate supervision.
The owner’s supervision of the bookkeeper, however, was inadequate especially because
she was responsible for handling the cash (the bank deposit) and related records (customer
bills, cash register tapes, deposit sheets). In fact, over a three-month period, the bookkeeper
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skimmed a portion of each day’s cash receipts by omitting some of the cash sales bills and
pocketing the corresponding amounts. The owner might have uncovered the fraud by using
any one of the following methods:

• Segregating duties: The owner rejected this method because he trusted the bookkeeper
and did not want to incur the cost of an additional employee.
• Accountingfor all prenumbered bills: The owner opted not to use prenumbered bills
because it was too time-consuming. The bookkeeper intentionally did not list the bills in
numbered order on the deposit sheet and prenumbered books were issued out of
sequence to waiters and waitresses.
• Matching daily cash register tapes to the daily cash deposit: The owner rejected this simplest
and most appropriate method; not wanting to check his employee’s work in this way
because the tapes were a messy “dog’s breakfast” kept in a shoe box by the bookkeeper,
entirely by design, of course, to cover up the fraud.
The owner eventually uncovered the fraud when the bookkeeper became too greedy and
withheld a bit too much from what the owner knew was an especially good cash sales day,
which raised his suspicions and lead to an investigation.

This example illustrates the necessity of supervision: often it is the primary defense against
ongoing frauds such as the skimming of cash or the lapping of accounts receivable. The
maximum opportunity level for the bookkeeper in the previous example should have been
the outright theft of the day’s cash receipts—typically less than half of a day’s total receipts
of about $10,000. However, inadequate supervision allowed a smaller amount of cash—
about $700 a day—to be stolen over a period of three months, which amounted to a total
loss of over $60,000.

1.3.4 Audit
From a fraud-prevention perspective, audit represents the third level of an organization’s
internal control system.

Internal Audit
Internal auditors work for the organization and perform the kinds of work defined by senior
management. In this sense, internal auditors are an extension of senior management—they
have the same concerns and deal with the same issues described throughout this chapter.
Therefore, their work might include fraud detection, or developing fraud prevention
mechanisms, or both.
The training programs and available literature for internal auditors—as provided by the
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)—pay specific attention to the issue of fraud prevention
and detection. Historically the perspective of internal auditors differs from that of the
external auditors, which is described below.

External Audit
External auditors are independent of the organization. They report on financial statements
and perform other independent reviews. The restricted role of the external auditor has
evolved over time. During the late 1800s and into the early 1900s, auditors actively looked
for fraud—to be a kind of “bloodhound.” Court rulings redefined their role to that of a
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“watchdog.” Today, auditors are expected to bark if they see something suspicious, but they
are not expected to sniff around for things that might be suspicious.

This watchdog metaphor has persisted throughout most of the twentieth century. In
particular, the concept of materiality has played an important part in the accounting
profession’s view of fraud, which is, specifically, that an auditor’s procedures cannot be
expected to detect immaterial frauds. No audit can be expected to give absolute assurances
in this area, and even limited assurances would require procedures so extensive that the
audit would be uneconomical. If a fraud is material enough to affect the financial statements
of an organization—and an auditor’s opinion on those financial statements—then the
auditor’s procedures may uncover it. However, there is certainly no guarantee of detection.
For example, even when the auditor’s procedures are sound, the perpetrator(s) may go to
extensive lengths to deceive the auditor and hide the defalcation.
In recent years, the public’s expectations has reopened to some extent the bloodhound
watchdog debate primarily because of the perception that auditors should bear
responsibility for detecting significant frauds even when immaterial to the total worth of an
organization.

1.4 Detecting and Preventing Fraud in Books of Account
1.4.1 The Auditor’s Duty to Detect Fraud
Shortly after human beings became rational animals, their thinking skills were enhanced by
the ability to rationalize. Unfortunately, this led to lying and cheating. Today, lying and
cheating are commonly labeled fraud. Accordingly, humans have a long history of both
committing frauds and being victims of fraud.

Accountants and auditors have had to contend with dishonest practices in accounting
records since commerce was first recorded and bookkeeping became a double-entry
process of recording. Since that time, we have needed accountants to make such double
entries and auditors to assure the accuracy of their entries.
In addition to the auditor’s duty to determine whether entries are made accurately,
historically auditors have had a corollary responsibility to determine whether any entries
were false (that is, fraudulent). But not everyone agreed that the latter was the peculiar
province of the auditor. Some found management primarily responsible for detecting fraud
in the accounting records. At its discretion, management could delegate that duty to
auditors.

Most outside auditors do not accept responsibility for detecting fraud in the usual course of
independent audits. But despite their protestations, many courts have suggested that
independent auditors be given such a duty. These precedents were established in cases in
which outside auditors were the targets of regulatory agencies. In these suits, courts have
ruled that outside auditors have a duty to detect fraud in the accounting records, but only to
the point where clients actively have attempted to deceive the outside auditors by
concealing fraudulent transactions or entries. Federal courts seem to hold auditors to a
higher duty of professional care than do State courts. But even State courts tend to impose a
duty to detect fraud under some circumstances. In fact, a large number of professional
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malpractice suits brought against outside auditors in State courts involve allegations of
undetected embezzlement.
Other distinguishing characteristics of the businesses most frequently involved in
malpractice suits include:

•
•
•
•
•

Nonpublic, small, family owned enterprises
One-person, unbonded bookkeeping staff with loose internal controls
Poor prospects of business survival and a chronic cash flow shortage
Inactive or incompetent management and a high rate of turnover of outside audit firms
Engaging an auditor to review or compile rather than to audit.

1.4.2 Fraud and Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Fraud detection is not the primary objective of a financial statement audit. Yet the auditors’
responsibility for detecting fraud is increasingly controversial. This is due, in part, to the
expectation gap.
The expectation gap is the difference between what the public expects auditors do and what
auditors in fact, do. In other words, the public remains ignorant of the extent of the auditors’
responsibilities. This contrasts with the limitations of what auditors can reasonably expect to
achieve. The average person’s exposure to what an accountant or auditor does is usually
limited to the tax season or tax audits. Accordingly, the general public, regardless of the
efforts by the AICPA and other professional groups, still lacks a true perception of the role
of the auditor.
Auditors should be fully aware of their responsibilities under the AICPA’s Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement Audit. This
SAS was issued in February of 1997 and superceded SAS 53, entitled The Auditors
Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities.

According to SAS No. 53, “Since the auditors opinion on the financial statements is based
on the concept of reasonable assurance, the auditor is not an insurer and his report does not
constitute a guarantee.” While auditors agree with this statement, the public, due in large
part to the expectation gap, may not agree.
As stated in SAS No. 82, the auditor should consider the risk that the financial statements
are materially misstated due either to unintentional error or fraud. Accordingly, the auditor
must specifically consider factors that bear on the likelihood of fraud. The level of risk
assessed may affect engagement staffing, extent of supervision, overall strategy, and the
degree of professional skepticism applied.

Auditors' Responsibility
SAS No. 82, in amending SAS No. 53, states, in part: “When considering the auditor’s
responsibility to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from
material misstatement, there is no important distinction between errors and fraud.” In other
words, the auditor is responsible for planning the audit to detect material misstatements due
to fraud. SAS No. 82 does not increase the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of
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material misstatement due to fraud, but rather makes clear the responsibility that previously
existed. According to SAS No. 82, an auditor should do the following:

• Assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud and
consider that assessment in designing audit procedures.
• Inquire of management about its understanding of the risk of fraud and its knowledge of
frauds perpetrated on or within the organization.
• Plan and perform the audit to achieve reasonable assurance of detecting material
misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud.

• Consider whether misstatements detected during the audit are the result of fraud and, if
so, evaluate the implications and communicate the matter to appropriate client
personnel.
• Document the facts that evidence the auditor’s assessment of the risk of fraud and the
auditor’s response to the risks identified.
Types of Fraud
The misstatements most relevant to an audit of financial statements originate from two
types of fraud:

1. Fraudulent financial reporting. The client intentionally misstates the financial statements
through phony accounting records or documents, misrepresentation or omission of
significant information, or misapplication of accounting principles. Fraudulent
management usually directs or performs these activities.
2. Misappropriation ofassets: Client personnel steal entity assets and conceal the theft
through misstatement of financial records. Fraudulent employees usually perform these
activities.

The auditor has no responsibility for detection of misstatements, whether caused by error or
fraud, that are not material to the financial statements. For example, misappropriation of
assets often is not material to the financial statements. However, the client might incorrectly
expect that the auditor should detect all cases of fraud, whether or not the financial
statements are materially misstated.

1.4.3 Fraud Auditing versus Financial Statement Auditing
Financial statement auditing is a methodology for evaluating the level of accuracy,
timeliness and completeness of the recordings of business transactions. However, auditors
do not review all transactions. Auditors use sampling and confirmation techniques to test
accuracy, timeliness and completeness. The purpose of testing is to determine whether
transaction data are free of material error and to confirm that financial statements
accordingly are free of material misstatement.

Fraud auditing, while borrowing many techniques from financial statement auditing, is
more a mindset than a methodology. It relies on creativity (right-brain thinking) as much as
it does on reasoning (left-brain thinking). It requires that the fraud auditor think, but not act,
like a thief by considering the following:

• Where are the weakest links in the chain of controls?
• How can the controls be attacked without drawing attention?
• How can thieves destroy the evidence of their attack?
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• What powers can the thieves enlarge?
• What plausible explanation can thieves give if someone suspects their activities?

• How can fraudsters, if apprehended, explain their conduct?
The more fraud auditors can learn to think like thieves, the more effective their efforts will
be in detecting fraud.
Financial statement and fraud auditing also differ in the degree of concern for evidence of
material error or misstatement. While the materiality rule in financial statement auditing
has its place in a cost-benefit context, materiality is not a guiding principle in fraud auditing.
The amount of a visible fraud may be small, but frauds in books of account can be like
icebergs—the biggest part is below the surface. Discovering even small discrepancies can
reveal large defalcations. That’s one reason why auditors often say they discover fraud by
accident, not by audit plan or design. In truth, the “discovery” of fraud is generally no
accident. It comes from diligent effort and a basic assumption by auditors that if fraud
exists, they will find it.
Are all frauds in the accounting records discovered on the basis of undetected
discrepancies? No. Many frauds surface on the basis of allegations or complaints by
coworkers, coconspirators, customers, competitors, suppliers, or prospective suppliers.

1.4.4 Fraud Auditors versus Financial Statement Auditors
Skills of fraud auditors include:

• Reconstructing financial transactions through third-party sources
• Gathering and preserving accounting evidence for trial
• Testifying as expert witnesses
• Calculating net worth and living expenses

• Inspecting documents for authenticity, alteration, forgery and counterfeiting
• Documenting a fraud case for criminal, civil, and insurance claim purposes
• Designing fraud scenarios, that is, imagining what a criminal might think and do in
situations where internal controls are loose or not enforced and the criminal has certain
powers and authority over assets and accounting records
What distinguishes fraud auditors from financial statement auditors? In most respects, they
are the same. Financial statement auditors are in their element when books and records are
complete and reasonably accurate. Fraud auditors must make order out of what looks like
chaos in books and records. Most of the supporting documents the fraud auditor must
access for confirmation lie in the hands of third parties who might be reluctant to assist in
the audit effort.
Fraud auditors tend to be right-brain thinkers, that is, more creative than rational in their
thought processes. In that context, they may understand the inner workings of the criminal
mind somewhat better because many criminals are not noted for orderly, rational or
systematic thinking. Criminals are often of the “hit and run” variety—neither planning their
crimes thoroughly nor anticipating the consequences of getting caught. They want the “big
score” now. Most embezzlers, however, tend to be left brain thinkers, that is, known for
their reasoning abilities, who will steal small sums over an extended period of time.
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1.4.5 The Risk of Fraud
Some organizations suffer more fraud than others. What increases the risk or exposure to
loss from fraud in any organization? The answer depends on a number of factors. The
incidence of fraud in the accounting records is distributed unevenly. Some industries, some
companies, some occupations, and some individuals are higher risks than others.
High-risk industries are noted for intense rivalry, low profits, and unethical business practices.
Some members of these industries are controlled by underworld figures and may enjoy
sweetheart arrangements with corrupt labor unions. Disputes are often settled by bribes, or,
when necessary, by force.
High-risk companies are noted for poor management, loose controls, loose cash, and loose
business morality.
High-risk occupations provide easy access to cash and accounting records, and are often
characterized by low pay, long hours and job-related stress.
High-risk individuals are financially overburdened people with low self-esteems, addictive
personalities (gambling, substance abuse, high living), are poor managers of their financial
resources, have worked their way into positions of trust, and rationalize their thefts as
“borrowing” or getting even for imagined exploitation. Such people often work long hours
at their own discretion, and take no vacations for fear their defalcations might be
discovered while they are away. A growing number of these thieves also keep elaborate
records of their thefts. The records usually contain dates, amounts, and details of the
conditions in their lives at the time the cash or property was taken. It is believed that such
scrupulous bookkeeping is a defensive ploy. If they get caught, they think they can make a
credible defense of their intention to return the money or property. This defense may cast
doubt on one element of proof needed to convict: the intent to permanently deprive the
owners of their property.

People commit crimes for a number of reasons. The main motives are economic,
egocentric, ideological, and psychotic. The economic motive (need or greed) is the most
common one found for the crimes of fraud, theft, and embezzlement.
In large corporations, with promotional policies and compensation plans geared to short
term bottom-line results and little else, a form of competitive greed can set in at the profit
center management level. Even well managed companies have become victims of their own
compensation designs. Therefore, falsifications of unit profits, revenues and expenses have
become a greater problem in the U.S. corporate landscape.

1.5 Risk Management Checklist
Table 1.2, Risk Management Checklist, is designed to assist CPAs in assessing and
managing the risk of fraud in their organizations and in those of their clients. Generally, all
NO answers require investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be
documented. Use the Ref column to cross-reference any additional documentation to the
appropriate work papers.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist
does not guarantee the prevention or detection of fraud and is not intended as a substitute
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for audit or similar procedures. Those with vital concerns about fraud prevention or who
suspect fraud should seek the advice of a competent fraud practitioner.

Table 1.2 Risk Management Checklist
Risk Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Does the organization have an adequate level
of fraud awareness and are appropriate
policies in place to minimize fraud risk,
specifically:
a.

Generic risk factors
•

Has the organization assigned each employee a
maximum “opportunity level” to commit fraud,
that is, has management asked itself the question,
“What is the maximum amount this employee
could defraud the organization, and does this
represent an acceptable risk?”

•

Has the organization set a catastrophic
opportunity level; that is, has management asked
itself the question, “Have we ensured that no
single employee—or group of employees in
collusion—can commit a fraud that would place
the organization in imminent risk of survival?”

•

Does the organization have a policy of
immediately dismissing any employee who has
committed fraud?

•

Does the organization have a policy of reporting
all frauds to the authorities and pressing charges?

•

b.

____

For all frauds experienced by the organization in
the past, has management evaluated the reasons
that led to the fraud and taken corrective action?

Individual risk factors
•

Does the organization have a corporate mission
statement, which includes as an objective good
citizenship, that is, the maintenance of good
standing in the community?

•

Does the organization have a written code of
ethics and business conduct (see checklist in
chapter 2 for details)?

____

Does the organization conduct ethical and
security training for new employees and periodic
updates for existing employees?

____

•

(continued)

27

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist
•

c.

Does the organization’s culture avoid
characteristics that promote unethical behavior,
for example, high or even hostile competitiveness
within the organization that might push
employees to the point of burnout; pointless rigid
or petty policies, or both; over-centralization of
authority?

•

Do the organization’s hiring policies, to the extent
possible, seek out individuals of high moral
character and weed out those of low moral
character (see checklist in chapter 3)?

•

Does the organization use for especially sensitive
positions screening or testing procedures, or both;
for example, psychological tests, drug tests, or lie
detector tests, or a combination of all three, where
permitted by law?

•

Does the organization provide or encourage
counseling, or both, for employees with personal
problems, for example, alcohol and drug abuse?

•

Does the organization have fair policies in the
area of employee relations and compensation, for
example, salaries, fringe benefits, performance
appraisal, promotions, severance pay, and do
these policies compare favorably with those of
competitors and promote an environment that
minimizes disenchantment and other similar
motives to commit fraud?

•

Does the organization have fair mechanisms in
place for dealing with employee grievances?

No

NA

Ref

—

—

—

Does the organization, as a feedback mechanism
concerning employee relations’ policies, conduct
exit interviews with departing employees?

Overall risk factors
•
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Does management set the right example; that is,
does it follow the organization’s mission
statement, code of ethics and business conduct,
and other policies of the organization, and is it
clearly seen to be doing so by employees?

•

•

Yes

Does the organization exhibit an awareness of
fraud and its possible manifestations, for example,
signs of employee problems such as drug
addictions, the low paid employee who suddenly
appears with the trappings of wealth, and so on?

□

___
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

2. Does the organization have an adequate
system of internal controls, specifically:

a.

Internal control

•

b.

Has the organization explicitly considered the
need for fraud prevention in the design and
maintenance of the system of internal controls?

Control over physical- and logical-access
•

Does the organization have a policy of locking
doors, desks, and cabinets after hours and when
unattended, especially in areas with valuable
assets including files and records, for example,
personnel and payroll, customer and vendor lists,
corporate strategies, marketing plans, research?

•

Does the organization use IDs and passwords, for
example, for computer files?

•

Does the organization state and enforce a policy
that restricts access to those requiring it for job
performance, including a strict policy against
employees allowing access to unauthorized
personnel, for example, by loaning keys or
sharing passwords?

•

Has the organization installed, for especially
sensitive areas, computerized security or
electronic surveillance systems, or both?

•

Does the workplace appear to an impartial
observer to have adequate access controls?

c. Job descriptions
•

Does the organization have written, specific job
descriptions?

•

Are job descriptions adhered to?

•

Does the organization have an organization chart
that reflects and is consistent with the job
descriptions of its employees?

•

Are incompatible duties segregated, for example,
handling of valuable assets—especially cash—and
related records?

—

(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

d.

e.
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•

Does the organization properly segregate the
purchasing functions, that is, ensuring that one
individual cannot requisition goods or services,
approve and make the related payment, and
access accounts payable records?

•

Are especially sensitive duties duplicated, for
example, the double-signing of checks over a
specified amount?

•

Do job descriptions specify that employees must
take annual vacations?

•

Is the overall process of formulating job
descriptions integrated with adequate
consideration to the importance of fraud
prevention?

Regular accounting reconciliations and analyses
•

Are all bank accounts reconciled?

•

Are all accounts receivable reconciled, for
example, month to month, general ledger to
subledger?

•

Are all accounts payable reconciled, for example,
month to month, general ledger to subledger?

•

Has the organization performed a variance
analysis of general ledger accounts, for example,
budget to actual, current year versus prior year?

•

Has the organization performed a vertical analysis
of profit and loss accounts, that is, as a percentage
of sales against historical or budget standards, or
both?

•

Has the organization performed an analysis of
detailed sales and major expenses, for example,
by product line or geographic territory?

Supervision

•

Do supervisors and managers have adequate
fraud awareness, that is, are they alert to the
possibility of fraud whenever an unusual or
exceptional situation occurs, such as supplier or
customer complaints about their accounts?

•

Do supervisors and managers diligently review
their subordinates’ work, for example, accounting
reconciliations, and redo the work when
appropriate?

Yes

No

NA

Ref

Chapter One: Managing the Risk of Fraud
Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

f.

•

Does close supervision adequately compensate
against the increased risk of fraud in smaller
businesses or where an inability to divide duties
exists.

•

Is supervisory or management override, that is, a
manager or supervisor taking charge of, altering,
or otherwise interfering in the work of a
subordinate prohibited, and are others in the
hierarchy alert to this situation as a fraud red flag?

Yes

No

NA

Ref

Audit

•

Is there an internal audit function?

•

Does the internal audit function perform regular
checks to ensure that fraud prevention
mechanisms are in place and operating as
intended?

•

Are external audits performed on a regular basis,
for example, quarterly for larger businesses?

•

Do external auditors receive full cooperation
from management with respect to their work in
general and fraud matters in particular, for
example, through the audit committee?

3. Has the organization specifically addressed
the following fraud prevention issues:
a.

Ethical Environment

b.

Risk Financing

c.

Computer Security
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CHAPTER 2:
Promoting an Ethical Environment

2.1 Ethics: A Framework
An ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy. This chapter
will acquaint you with the field of applied ethics, provide essential tools for promoting an
ethical environment within an organization, and conclude with a diagnostic tool that you
can use when evaluating an organization’s current ethical status.

2.1.1 Overview
Ethics—derived from the Greek ethos, meaning character or custom—is a very broad term
referring to principles or standards of human conduct. Ethics has been, and continues to be,
one of the key concerns of all religions, schools of philosophy, sciences, liberal arts,
professions, and political movements. Moses, Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Kanto, and many
others devoted a great deal of their recorded teachings to the subject of ethics. It is
impossible to engage in any human endeavor, including business, without entering the field
of ethics.

Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the science devoted to the study of the “walk,” rather than the talk, of
ethics. According to Lisa H. Newton, in her text Doing Good and Avoiding Evil: Principles and
Reasoning ofApplied Ethics, “Applied ethics, then, is the field that holds ethical theory
accountable to practice and professional and business practice accountable to theory.” It’s
where the rubber meets the road.
Personal Versus Organizational Ethics
Whose principles and standards should we adopt? There remains much confusion about
this fundamental question. Some believe that ethics are a matter of personal choice.
Therefore, any attempt to establish a code of ethics, or conduct, would result in a narrow
flight of parochial fancy that would be so patently offensive to so many, it would render
itself immediately irrelevant. Others believe that a kind of universal genetic code of ethics
or conduct exists. This theory suggests that we are all born with an inherent sense of right
and wrong. So, any artificial code of ethics is unnecessary and would be flawed in any way
in which it conflicted with the natural code. Both groups believe it would be wrong for any
organization to impose ethical standards on its members, employees, or other stakeholders.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
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It is an organization’s right and duty to clearly communicate its values and expectations
regarding the conduct of its affairs to all its stakeholders. Employees or members may freely
choose to join, or not to join, any given organization. But, once individuals choose to join
an organization, they assume a duty to respect the organization’s values and abide by its
code of conduct.
Ethics and the Law

When confronted about unethical behavior, many people will point out that their actions
were not illegal. This would be roughly analogous to saying that because a person follows
the rules of law, he or she would be an excellent judge. According to the Professional Ethics
for Certified Public Accountants (a publication of the California Certified Public Accountants
Foundation for Education and Research) “Laws and rules establish minimum standards of
consensus impropriety, they do not define the criteria of ethical behavior.”

2.1.2 Ethics at Work
In the Professions
Most, if not all, recognized professions have developed written codes of ethics, professional
conduct, or both. They also have implemented means to assure that members of the
profession abide by these codes. Violators are usually disciplined or expelled, sometimes in
public proceedings, to demonstrate the profession’s commitment to its code and willingness
to effectively police itself.

Some would argue that the professions became interested in ethics for entirely selfish
reasons. They see the rise of successful plaintiffs’ litigation in the 1970s as a key motivator
in the promulgation of professional codes of ethics and conduct They also point out that,
during the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government demonstrated an interest in playing an
increased role, including the actual promulgation of codes of conduct, in the regulation of
professions. The AICPA has written and rewritten its code of professional conduct many
times during the past 100 years or so. In fact, according to Professional Ethics for Certified
Public Accountants, a complete restatement of the code was made in 1973.
Whatever the motivation, professional codes of conduct have been effective. The reason is
simple: if you do not abide by the ethics code of your profession, you lose the right to
practice and earn a living. Coupling this reason with the profession’s corporate interest in
maintaining its standing and authority, thus minimizing its exposure to litigation and
intrusion by the government, demonstrates the steps taken toward promoting an ethical
environment.

But, how do we apply this model to businesses, including professional firms?

Business Ethics
Should business be concerned with ethics? The answer was not always a unanimous yes.
Who hasn’t heard the appropriated maxim: All is fair in love and business. You may recall
Shakespeare’s merchant and Dickens’ Fagan as examples of at least the perception of
business motives in western society. In this country, tales of the robber barons of the
nineteenth century suggest that business ethics were not at the top of the enterprise success
factor list. That was then, but what about now? As recently as the 1970s, mainstream
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economist Milton Friedman said that the only obligation of a business is to make a profit.
This became dogma in American business schools in the 1970s and 1980s.

So, why should business be concerned with ethics today? One could argue that after
November 1991—the effective date of the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations—
business became concerned with ethics in order to guard against huge fines and penalties.
But there are other, pragmatic reasons for business to be concerned with ethics:

Enlightened self-interest. According to the Professional Ethics for Certified Public Accountants, a
business needs to avoid scandals, keep government off its back, protect itself from internal
corruption, avoid fines and penalties, and keep its executives out of jail. Also, there is the
value of a good corporate image, the internal cost of investigations and legal fees, the value
of good employee morale, and the impact of wrongdoing on the share value of public
companies to consider. In fact, ethics may have a great deal more to do with making a
profit than Mr. Friedman imagined.

2.1.3 Promoting an Ethical Environment
The Tone at the Top
You’ve heard it before and it must be said again. The tone of upper management is most
important in the field of ethics. Ethics will not suffer senior management’s clever
rationalization or thinly veiled hypocrisy. Fortunately, or unfortunately, ethics always
comes down to a simple choice of right over wrong. Even the most learned defense of
improper conduct in the executive suite would fail the ethics test. If the bosses aren’t ready
to walk the talk, the process simply will not work.

Senior management must be made aware of this essential element. Some will raise
objections about the cost of an ethics program or its potential negative impact on revenue.
Even today, the best way to communicate the value of an effective ethics program is to
quantify the cost of not having an ethics program. Statistics and examples abound. The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce estimates that more than $100 billion is lost to fraud annually. But,
to bring the point home, you need look no further than your favorite daily business journal.
Virtually every issue contains stories of businesses and other organizations that have been
victimized through fraud and paid dearly for it. Those businesses that allegedly “benefited”
from the fraud end up losing the most.

The Current Situation

All ethics, like all politics, are local. Resist the temptation to run out and “buy” someone
else’s ethics program for your organization. An ethical environment flows from an ethics
program that is tailored to the organization. If you try to develop a rule in advance for
every situation, you will fail. If you try to fix things that are not broken, you will fail.
Finally, if in the process of installing your new, super-deluxe, off-the-shelf ethics program,
you communicate your distrust of employees and other stakeholders to them, they, in turn,
will justify that distrust.
For all of these reasons, begin by analyzing your individual organization. Involve everyone
in the process. Get their input. Develop a brief statement (mission statement) of the
organization’s core values and mission.
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Perform a diagnostic to identify weak and strong areas of ethical conduct within the
organization. You should consider using the Ethical Environmental Checklist at the end of
this chapter, or you could use this checklist as a template to develop a diagnostic tool of
your own. Once you compile the results of your diagnostic exercise, analyze the results,
make any necessary decisions, and begin designing the program.

Designing the Ethics Program

The most important requirement when promoting an ethical environment is having a
written code of ethics and business conduct. A written code helps to set the right ethical
tone within an organization. Figure 2-1 is an example of a written mission statement.
Figure 2-1. A Written Mission Statement

Mission Statement

The Organization’s mission is to provide the highest quality goods and services to its
customers; to strive at all times for market leadership and in so doing, to benefit the
Organization’s shareholders and its employees.
The Organization is committed to a policy of fair dealing and integrity in the conduct of all
aspects of its business. This commitment is based on a fundamental belief in law, honesty
and fairness. The Organization expects its employees to share its commitment to high legal,
ethical and moral standards.
This Code of Business Conduct is mandatory, and the Organization expects full compliance
by all of its employees and by its subsidiaries under all circumstances. The Organization
will monitor compliance, and any violation of the Code may result in disciplinary action
that could include termination of employment.
Employees uncertain about the application of the Code should consult with their superior.
Similarly any employee who becomes aware of, or suspects, a contravention of the Code,
must promptly advise his or her superior, or report the matter directly to Human
Resources, Internal Audit or the Law Department.

Figure 2-2 is an example of an organizational code of conduct, which includes definitions of
what is considered unacceptable, and the consequences of any breaches thereof. Note that
figure 2-2 is only an example. The specific content and areas addressed in your mission
statement and code should flow from your own analysis of your organization.
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Figure 2-2. An Organizational Code of Conduct

Organizational Code of Conduct
The Organization and its employees must, at all times, comply with all applicable laws and
regulations. The Organization will not condone the activities of employees who achieve
results through violation of the law or unethical business dealings. This includes any
payments for illegal acts, indirect contributions, rebates and bribery. The Organization does
not permit any activity that fails to stand the closest possible public scrutiny.

All business conduct should be well above the minimum standards required by law.
Accordingly, employees must ensure that their actions cannot be interpreted as being, in
any way, in contravention of the laws and regulations governing the Organization’s
worldwide operations.
Employees uncertain about the application or interpretation of any legal requirements
should refer the matter to their superior, who, if necessary, should seek the advice of the
Law Department.

General Employee Conduct

The Organization expects its employees to conduct themselves in a businesslike manner.
Drinking, gambling, fighting, swearing and similar unprofessional activities are strictly
prohibited while on the job.
Employees must not engage in sexual harassment, or conduct themselves in a way that
could be construed as such, for example, by using inappropriate language, keeping or
posting inappropriate materials in their work area, or accessing inappropriate materials on
their computer.

Conflicts ofInterest

The Organization expects that employees will perform their duties conscientiously,
honestly and in accordance with the best interests of the Organization. Employees must not
use their position or the knowledge gained as a result of their position for private or
personal advantage. Regardless of the circumstances, if employees sense that a course of
action they have pursued, are presently pursuing or are contemplating pursuing may
involve them in a conflict of interest with their employer, they should immediately
communicate all the facts to their superior.

Outside Activities, Employment and Directorships

All employees share a serious responsibility for an Organization’s good public relations,
especially at the community level. Their readiness to help with religious, charitable,
educational and civic activities brings credit to the Organization and is encouraged.
Employees must, however, avoid acquiring any business interest or participating in any
other activity outside the Organization that would, or would appear to—
(continued)
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Figure 2-2. (continued)

• Create an excessive demand upon their time and attention, thus depriving the
Organization of their best efforts on the job.
• Create a conflict of interest—an obligation, interest or distraction—that may interfere
with the independent exercise of judgment in the Organization’s best interest.

Relationships with Clients and Suppliers
Employees should avoid investing in or acquiring a financial interest for their own accounts
in any business organization that has a contractual relationship with the Organization, or
that provides goods or services, or both to the Organization, if such investment or interest
could influence or create the impression of influencing their decisions in the performance
of their duties on behalf of the Organization.

Gifts, Entertainment and Favors

Employees must not accept entertainment, gifts, or personal favors that could, in any way,
influence, or appear to influence, business decisions in favor of any person or organization
with whom or with which the Organization has, or is likely to have, business dealings.
Similarly, employees must not accept any other preferential treatment under these
circumstances because their position with the Organization might be inclined to, or be
perceived to, place them under obligation.
Kickbacks and Secret Commissions

Regarding the Organization’s business activities, employees may not receive payment or
compensation of any kind, except as authorized under the Organization’s remuneration
policies. In particular, the Organization strictly prohibits the acceptance of kickbacks and
secret commissions from suppliers or others. Any breach of this rule will result in
immediate termination and prosecution to the fullest extent of the law.

Organization Funds and Other Assets
Employees who have access to Organization funds in any form must follow the prescribed
procedures for recording, handling and protecting money as detailed in the Organization’s
instructional manuals or other explanatory materials, or both. The Organization imposes
strict standards to prevent fraud and dishonesty. If employees become aware of any
evidence of fraud and dishonesty, they should immediately advise their superior or the Law
Department so that the Organization can promptly investigate further.
When an employee’s position requires spending Organization funds or incurring any
reimbursable personal expenses, that individual must use good judgment on the
Organization’s behalf to ensure that good value is received for every expenditure.
Organization funds and all other assets of the Organization are for Organization purposes
only and not for personal benefit. This includes the personal use of organizational assets
such as computers.
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Figure 2-2. (continued)

Organization Records and Communications
Accurate and reliable records of many kinds are necessary to meet the Organization’s legal
and financial obligations and to manage the affairs of the Organization. The Organization’s
books and records must reflect in an accurate and timely manner all business transactions.
The employees responsible for accounting and record-keeping must fully disclose and
record all assets, liabilities, or both, and must exercise diligence in enforcing these
requirements.

Employees must not make or engage in any false record or communication of any kind,
whether internal or external, including but not limited to—

• False expense, attendance, production, financial or similar reports and statements
• False advertising, deceptive marketing practices, or other misleading representations
Dealing With Outside People and Organizations

Employees must take care to separate their personal roles from their Organization positions
when communicating on matters not involving Organization business. Employees must not
use organization identification, stationery, supplies and equipment for personal or political
matters.
When communicating publicly on matters that involve Organization business, employees
must not presume to speak for the Organization on any topic, unless they are certain that
the views they express are those of the Organization, and it is the Organization’s desire that
such views be publicly disseminated.
When dealing with anyone outside the Organization, including public officials, employees
must take care not to compromise the integrity or damage the reputation of either the
Organization, or any outside individual, business, or government body.

Prompt Communications
In all matters relevant to customers, suppliers, government authorities, the public and
others in the Organization, all employees must make every effort to achieve complete,
accurate and timely communications—responding promptly and courteously to all proper
requests for information and to all complaints.

Privacy and Confidentiality

When handling financial and personal information about customers or others with whom
the Organization has dealings, observe the following principles:
1. Collect, use, and retain only the personal information necessary for the Organization’s
business. Whenever possible, obtain any relevant information directly from the person
concerned. Use only reputable and reliable sources to supplement this information.

(continued)
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Figure 2-2. (continued)

2. Retain information only for as long as necessary or as required by law. Protect the
physical security of this information.
3. Limit internal access to personal information to those with a legitimate business reason
for seeking that information. Only use personal information for the purposes for which it
was originally obtained. Obtain the consent of the person concerned before externally
disclosing any personal information, unless legal process or contractual obligation
provides otherwise.

When designing your program, implementation strategy and training, remember the
following bit of wisdom:
Give a person a fish and he or she will be able to eat today. Teach a person to fish and he
or she will be able to eat for a lifetime.
If you try to create a rule for every ethical dilemma, your people will focus on how to fit
their decisions to the rules. On this premise, if there is no rule, there is no problem. If you
train your people to make ethical decisions for themselves, however, they will focus on
doing just that.

Training and Communication
After writing your organization’s code of ethics and business conduct, ask everyone to read
it and have them confirm in writing that they have done so and understood the content.
Keep a record of this acknowledgment.
You should consider seminar training for all employees and agents. The training doesn’t
have to be long and complicated. Use the KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) method to develop
your ethics curriculum. Instead of giving them rules, give them tools. These tools can be as
simple as a list of broad principles to follow and questions to ask when making decisions.
In Policies and Persons: A Case Book in Business Ethics, John B. Mathews and coauthors suggest
the following tools.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Avoid harming others.
Prevent harm to others.
Respect the rights of others.
Do not lie or cheat.
Keep promises and contracts.

6. Obey the law.
7. Help those in need.
8. Be fair.
So, when a considered action may raise serious ethical questions, try applying the
generalized criteria. For example, you can use the guidelines above and ask yourself the
following specific questions.
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1. Does the considered action violate any of the following?:
—A criminal law
—A civil law

—A company policy

—A professional code
—An industry code
2.
3.
4.
5.

—My personal values
Is the action fair, just, and equitable to all parties?
Does the action serve the common good and the public’s interest?
Does it provide the greatest good for the greatest number?
Does it do the least harm to the greatest number?

6. Does it cost more than its social benefits?
7. Would you like it if it were done to you (known as “The Golden Rule”)?

8. Would an ethical role model (for example, your parent, priest, or minister) approve of
this act?
Enforcement
As discussed in chapter 1, an effective prevention strategy demands there be some adverse
consequences when an employee is caught committing fraud (for example, dismissal of the
employee and the pressing of charges). Similarly, there also must be some adverse
consequences—commensurate with the severity of the breach—when an employee
contravenes an organization’s stated policies, and in particular its code of ethics and
business conduct For severe breaches, or for repeat offenders, dismissal may be an
appropriate consequence and the organization’s policies should so state.

To ensure that all employees are aware of their responsibilities, organizations should
require that the staff sign an annual declaration stating they are aware of the company’s
code of ethics and business conduct policies, and confirming they have complied in the past
and will continue to do so.
Employee Hiring and Employee Relations
Ultimately, the employees, not the organization’s policies, create a good ethical climate.
Employee hiring practices and employee relations are therefore important fraud prevention
variables. The Ethical Environment Checklist (at the end of this chapter) provides a fairly
comprehensive list of the factors to consider.
Generally, organizations face a balancing act. On the one hand, they must minimize the
risk of fraud and be cost-effective in employee remuneration. On the other hand, they must
promote an open environment in which employee morale and creativity flourish, while
employees feel rewarded for their efforts. Tipping the scale too far to one side or the other
can lead to problems, or reduce the competitiveness of an organization, or both.
Organizations can achieve success at a point somewhere in between and only through the
good judgment of management.
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2.1.4 Ethics and Information Technology
The ever-accelerating information revolution—particularly during the latter half of the
twentieth century—has raised special ethical issues. In particular, makers, distributors,
owners, managers, and users of information resources have ethical responsibilities for the
products and services that they create, own, sell, manage, and use. The ethical issues raised
by information technology include the following:
• Privacy
• Piracy
• Safety and health

• Data security
• Data integrity
• Competence
• Honesty
• Loyalty
• Fairness
Privacy
A myriad of both private-and public-sector organizations collect data for a wide variety of
purposes. The U.S. government alone has gathered and stored four billion records on
individuals. The development of database management software for personal computers
has extended these capabilities to anyone with a few hundred dollars. Although databases
have grown explosively, controls over access and disclosure of confidential data have not
kept pace. Unauthorized access to databases and disclosure of confidential information
contained therein are commonplace.
There are legal constraints on the improper collection and dissemination of personal data in
the United States and Canada, embodied in their respective Constitutions, Supreme Court
decisions, tort law, and in federal and state privacy and consumer rights enactment.
However, these laws and rulings are not sufficiently clear to reach consensus. For example,
on the question of access to personal history databases versus an individual’s right of
privacy, an ethicist might ask the following.

● Who is collecting the data?

● For what use are the data being collected?
● How, to whom, and for what purpose will the data be disseminated?
How well protected is that data against unauthorized access and disclosure?
●
● How accurate, complete, and timely are the data?
● What degrees of confidentiality should be accorded to such disparate data as medical,
psychiatric, credit, employment, school and criminal records?

If medical records were considered the most confidential of the lot, the ethical standard for
the care accorded such data would be higher; that is, medical records should be gathered,
stored, and disseminated with great care and caution.
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Piracy
Software piracy signifies that the creative work of another has been used or duplicated
without permission or payment of royalty, or both. The definition assumes that the
software’s creator has complied adequately with the legal requirements of the federal
copyright law. Therefore, the software pirate commits an act of infringement and may be
civilly sued for damages, criminally prosecuted, or both.
Software piracy is probably the most common breach of ethics in the field of information
technology. For each software program sold, developers claim that another two to five
copies are bootlegged. The lost royalties of developers are staggering. Some thieves
rationalize that software prices are too high and that the developers are large and will not
miss the lost royalties. In reality, the software industry has become increasingly competitive
and losses to piracy can have a serious impact on a company’s viability. Moreover, even the
largest and most profitable developers have a right to seek a fair price and return for their
development efforts, the costs incurred and the risks taken.

Safety and Health
The widespread use of computers in today’s information-driven economy has contributed
to and in some instances created, unique safety issues that can be divided into the following
two distinct categories:
1. Accidents resulting from the use of computer-controlled systems
2. Occupational health and safety problems for users caused by long-term or improper use
of computers, or both
Computer-controlled systems safety issues—The accelerated pace of technological change in this
century has resulted in an exponential increase in new industries with many innovative
products and processes. Dangerous substances and sensitive information are being handled
on an unparalleled scale. New systems are being built—using computers to control them—
that have the capacity to cause extensive destruction of life and the environment. A single
accident could be catastrophic. Computers now control most safety-critical devices and they
often replace traditional hardware safety interlocks and protection systems. Even when
hardware protection devices are retained, software is often used to control them. Because of
the explosive increase in the use of, and reliance on computers, methods to ensure the
safety of computer-controlled systems have not always kept pace with the development of
these very systems. Ethicists recognize there is a serious danger of overreliance on the
accuracy of computer outputs and databases. The nonoccurrence of particular types of
accidents in the past is no guarantee that they will not take place in the future. Software and
hardware developers and information technology professionals alike must recognize their
moral and ethical responsibilities. We can’t wait to learn from experience, but must attempt
to anticipate and prevent accidents before they occur.

Computer-related safety and health issues—Today’s computer operators, particularly heavy
users, may develop problems caused by the repetitive motions used daily in operating their
machines. The most common problem is repetitive stress injury (RSI), in which workers
experience moderate to severe pain in the muscles and joints of the hands, wrists, arms,
shoulders, neck and back. RSI can be caused by carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), irritation of
the nerves leading to the fingers due to the prolonged use of a keyboard while the body is
in an unnatural or strained position. RSI can be completely incapacitating, sometimes
13
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requiring surgery if not treated early. According to Patrick G. McKeown in his text, Living
With Computers, these injuries are epidemic in computer-related jobs; RSI constitutes more
than 60 percent of work injuries and costs employers $20 billion annually. Other healthrelated problems involve radiation emissions from the monitor and eyestrain from watching
the screen for long periods of time without proper lighting or screen glare protection, as
well as noise-induced problems caused by the pervasive low-level noise in today’s computer
environment.

Because of the enormous costs resulting from worker’s health and safety issues, many
organizations are opting for ergonomically designed work environments. Ergonomics, or
human factor engineering, is the science of designing equipment for the workplace to keep
employees safe and healthy while they work, which usually results in fewer physical
complaints, higher employee morale and increased productivity. An ergonomically
designed work area considers the following factors:

• The height and position of the monitor
• The height and angle of the keyboard
• A fully adjustable chair that provides lower back and adjustable arm support and height
adjustment capabilities
• A keyboard that allows users to work with their hands in a natural position
• A mouse designed for either a left- or right-handed user with wrist support
• An anti-glare monitor screen

• Noise reduction measures

• Proper indirect and task lighting
• Adequate ventilation

In addition, employers should emphasize the proper use of equipment, encourage regular
breaks, and provide stress reduction training for employees to further minimize the risk
factors related to RSI and related injuries. In an ethical environment management is
sensitive to the well-being of regular employees and applies the same principles to part-time
workers and support staff.

Data Security
The protection of personal information from unauthorized access, disclosure, and
duplication obligates a database owner to—

• Formulate and enforce standards for the proper use of the data.
• Communicate to, educate, and train users about their responsibility for protecting such
information.
• Plan for likely contingencies.
• Establish adequate security controls.
• Monitor control exceptions.
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Data Integrity
An incorrectly entered arrest report, credit report, insurance rejection, debt default, or lab
test can cause great emotional and financial damage. Yet the error rates of databases with
such sensitive information are often higher than the standards of quality set by the original
designers of these systems. Accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and relevance are what give
information its value. In particular, creators of personal history databases have a special
obligation to compile and process such data accurately and to protect it from the prying
eyes of snoops, browsers, and hackers.

Today people can collect, process and disseminate information at a high speed. If
information is irrelevant to the needs of users or is flawed in logic, assumptions or
conclusions, relying on such specious data can cause catastrophic damage. Therefore,
quality begins with clear objectives, exacting designs, flawless development and proper
training of users. People and organizations involved in software development and database
design are obliged to make products that are fit for their intended uses and have no
fundamental defects.
Competence
The field of information technology is notable for its fast growth and complexity, and the
sweeping social, economic, and political changes it has wrought. At times, change seems
overwhelming. Skills and products become obsolete overnight. Companies must invest
large sums of money in research and product development.

In the race to get new products out of the labs and into the market, people often
compromise quality, safety and security. New products might contain design flaws, software
errors, bugs and glitches, and other impediments to proper functioning. These impediments
can be costly to uninformed and unsophisticated users. Makers and providers of
information technology products—both hardware and software—must take great care and
caution in their work to avoid damage or interruption of service to their users. Providers of
information technology should seek the most competent people available for sensitive
design and product development projects. They should also create an ethical climate in
their firms and foster responsible behavior among all employees.
Honesty
Makers, sellers, dealers, distributors, and installers of information technology products—
like all other business people—must be honest in their dealings with one another. All
parties should use truthful representations, nondeceptive advertising, and accurate labeling,
as well as fulfill contract requirements.

Loyalty
The information technology industry is large, complex, fast changing, and highly
competitive. Some information products—such as chips and PCs—have become
commodities. The relationship between buyers and sellers is changing from one in which
mutual trust, confidence, and faith give way to arms-length transactions. Sellers attract
buyers on the basis of price alone. The service-after-sale element is forgotten.
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These same industry dynamics have also changed the relationship between employers and
employees. Loyalty is supposed to be a two-way street. In today’s competitive environment,
some high-tech, high-talent employees are loyal only to their paychecks thereby blurring
obligations between employers and employees, sellers and buyers, and manufacturers and
suppliers.

Fairness
Normally people conduct business on the basis of mutual faith and trust. You cannot,
however, provide for all contingencies in a formal contract. The writing and execution of a
detailed contract would take too long, thus frustrating the objectives of both parties.

Assuming business ethics are a matter of mutual rights and obligations of the transacting
parties implies that fairness is the rule by which we measure whether a transaction is right
or wrong. In theory, both parties have equal bargaining power in a commercial transaction.
Therefore, ethics should leave the parties to their own negotiations. Often in the
information industry, both parties are not of equal size, competence, skill, knowledge or
experience. In these circumstances, fairness may mean that the more powerful of the two
has an added measure of obligation. The English common law treated buyers and sellers as
equally competent to transact business. Yet in the modern era the notion of caveat emptor (let
the buyer beware) has been diluted. Sellers with superior knowledge, skills, and resources
must be most forthcoming. Fairness may no longer be a 50-50 proposition. Fairness
depends on the relationship between the parties, their relative power positions, and the
context of the business transaction.

2.2 Ethical Environment Checklist
CPAs can use table 2.1, Ethical Environment Checklist to help promote an ethical
environment in their organizations and in those of their clients. No answers may require
investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented. Use the Refcolumn
to cross-reference the checklist to appropriate work papers.

Some sections in this comprehensive checklist may not be applicable or appropriate in
certain instances. For example, most organizations will not conduct the entire employee
screening procedures described in section 4 of the checklist. This checklist is intended for
general guidance and information only. Use of this checklist does not guarantee the
prevention of fraud. If fraud prevention is an especially vital concern or if fraud is suspected,
consider seeking the advice of a knowledgeable fraud practitioner.
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Table 2.1 Ethical Environment Checklist
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Organizational Approach to Ethics

a. Does the organization have a Mission Statement that
emphasizes respect for the law, ethics, and ethical conduct?

b. Does the organization have a written and enforced Code of
Ethics?

c. If the organization or its employees are subject to outside
ethical standards and rules (e.g., industry or professional),
does the organization’s code refer to and emphasize their
importance?
d. Does the organization have—

• Internal auditors?
• Electronic data processing (EDP) auditors?
• At least one Data-Security Officer or Administrator?

• A Corporate-Security or Loss-Prevention Unit?

• An investigative staff?
e. Does the organization, as a matter of written policy, refer
incidents of employee crimes on the job to police or
prosecutorial authorities?
f. If the organization has experienced fraud in the past five
years, has management established the causes and taken
remedial action for any of the following:

• A substantial inventory shortage corporate-wide
• A substantial inventory shortage in a major operating
division
• A major embezzlement involving a loss of more than
$10,000
• A successful penetration of the main office computers by
outsiders
• An accounts payable, accounts receivable, payroll, or
benefit claim fraud of any amount

• A commercial bribery of purchasing or other personnel

2. Situational Approach to Ethics
a. Are ethical considerations a critical element in corporate
policies, tactics, and decision-making?

b. Is there a specific framework—especially for important and
difficult corporate decisions or actions—for addressing the
ethical element, such as a series of questions like those set out
in item 2c (below)?
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist
c. Does the organization, when contemplating actions or
decisions that may raise ethical concerns, consider the
following:
• Does the action violate any law or code to which the
organization is subject?

• Is the action fair, just and equitable to all the parties
involved?
• Does the action serve the common good and the public’s
interest (for example, does it: (i) provide the greatest good
for the greatest number, (ii) do the least harm to the
greatest number, and (iii) yield social benefits that exceed
the cost)?

• Would an ethical purist or role model (for example, the
stereotypical good parent, priest or minister) approve of
the act?

3. Policy Approach to Ethics
a. Does management set the right tone for employees and
demonstrate the organization’s commitment to ethical
conduct (for example, by regularly referring to the
organization’s code of ethics in policy meetings and
communications) ?

b. Do the organization’s policies in all activities,
communications, and transactions reflect a commitment to
the following:
• Honesty and integrity

• Competence and due care
• Commitment to excellence
• Fair and prompt dealings
• Respect for privacy and confidentiality
c. Does the organization have written policies that restrict or
prohibit the following:
• Engaging in outside employment (moonlighting)

• Engaging in conflicts of interest
• Accepting gratuities, expensive gifts or lavish
entertainments from vendors, contractors and suppliers

• Compromising or bribing customers
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Engaging in false advertising and deceptive marketing
practices

• Disclosing company trade secrets to unauthorized persons
• Fixing prices with competitors

• Gambling on the job

• Abusing drugs or alcohol, or both
• Fighting on the job
• Stealing company property, including personal use of
company property (for example, computer time)
• Destroying company property

• Falsifying time or attendance reports
• Falsifying production reports
• Falsifying personal data on a job application
• Falsifying or forging accounting records

• Destroying accounting records
• Falsifying expense accounts
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to confidential
records (for example, payroll and personnel records,
customer and vendor lists, research results, product and
marketing plans)
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to company
buildings or critical work areas

• Loaning company building access identification cards,
badges or door keys to unauthorized persons
• Disclosing computer log-on codes or passwords to
unauthorized persons

• Allowing unauthorized persons use of computer terminals
4. Ethics and Human Resources
a. To the extent necessary, when considering an applicant and
depending on the importance and sensitivity of the position,
does the organization perform reference checks, background
inquiries or investigations, or any combination thereof, to
confirm the applicant’s—

• Identity
• Educational achievements
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

• Credit standing
• Satisfactory past employment history
• Absence of criminal convictions (including name or
fingerprint checks, or both)
• Reputation

• Character

b. Especially for very sensitive positions (for example, those
affecting public safety, the custodianship of large amounts of
cash or securities, the secrecy of important information), and
to the extent allowed by law, does the organization
administer any of the following to employees and
prospective employees:
• Polygraphs

• Paper and pencil honesty tests
• Voice stress analyses

• Handwriting analyses

• Intelligence tests
• Psychological diagnostic tests

• Drug tests
c. Does the organization conduct or provide (or both) any of
the following:

• Security orientation training for new hires
• Ongoing security awareness training programs for all
employees
• Written rules of employee conduct to all employees

• Annual, signed employee declarations acknowledging
awareness of the company’s code of conduct, and past and
future adherence to it
• Hearings for employees charged with punishable offenses
• Employee representation at such hearings

d. Does the organization use or provide any of the following:
• Job descriptions
• Organization charts
• Performance standards

• Performance appraisals
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Coaching and counseling of employees whose work is
unsatisfactory
• Counseling of employees with drug abuse problems
• Technical training programs
• Human resource development programs

• Tuition reimbursement
• Time off for study

• Time off for family emergencies
• Employee involvement programs

• Job enlargement, enrichment or rotation programs
• Exit interviews for departing employees
e. Does the organization compare favorably or at least equally
with other firms in its industry, or areas of operations, or
both, with respect to any of the following:
• Salaries

• Fringe benefits
• Blue-collar turnover
• White-collar turnover

• Absenteeism
• Employee firings
• Promotions from within the company
• Ability to recruit new employees

• Skills of its employees
• Educational level of employees
• Employee attitudes toward their work
• Employee loyalty
5. Ethics and Information Technology

a. Does the organization’s code of conduct specifically address
the importance of using information technology (especially
computers) in an ethical manner?

b. Are the following specific ethical concerns relating to
information technology adequately addressed in the
organization’s code of conduct and in its policies:
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist
• Privacy of information (for example, information related
to employees, customers or clients)
• Prohibition of software piracy
• Safety and health (for example, ergonomically sound
computer workstations)

• Quality standards for information technologies and the
information they process (for example, accuracy, integrity,
security)
© Relationship of technology and human resources (for
example, communication with employees concerning
technological change, adequate training)
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CHAPTER 3:
Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance

3.1

The Concept of Risk Financing
The risk of loss due to fraud and other forms of dishonesty can never be completely
eliminated. Organizations can finance the potential loss either by purchasing fidelity
insurance coverage or by self-insuring the risk, that is, absorbing out of one’s own pocket
any losses incurred. Experts recommend giving serious consideration to purchasing
insurance in situations with significant risk or potential loss. In reality, however, many
organizations choose the self-insurance default because they either fail to assess the risk and
its financial impact or they are simply unfamiliar with fidelity insurance.

Most individuals and businesses would never—or at least should never—consider self
insurance as a viable option in the case of potentially catastrophic risk. Examples of
insuring against potentially catastrophic risks include life and disability insurance for
breadwinners supporting families, fire insurance for homeowners, and liability insurance for
doctors and automobile owners. In some cases, a statute or contractual agreement may
mandate insurance; for example, a mortgage agreement may require fire insurance. The
risk of catastrophic loss due to fraud merits serious consideration for the purchase of fidelity
coverage.
This chapter reviews the kinds of available “dishonesty” insurance including the issues
typically addressed in a policy, policy exemptions and the duties of the insured. The
remainder of the chapter provides some insights into preparing an employee dishonesty
claim.

3.2 Dishonesty Insurance

3.2.1 Overview
Insurance coverage for dishonest acts is known by many names, including fidelity
insurance, commercial crime coverage, blanket bonds and 3D policies (Dishonesty,
Destruction and Disappearance). The desired coverage can be written in standard bond or
policy language, as a rider to other insurance policies, or in a manuscript format, that is,
written for a specific company or organization.
For certain industries there are standard policy-bond forms. For example, there are
standard forms for financial institutions such as banks, brokerages and insurance
companies. For other industries, including manufacturing, health care, retailing,
transportation or service providers, dishonesty coverage is more generic. Regardless of
name, the policies generally follow a similar format. This Handbook uses the term
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commercial crime policy to refer to dishonesty coverage except in discussions of other, specific
kinds of coverage.

3.2.2 The Policy Provisions
When considering the purchase of dishonesty coverage, you should understand what is and
what is not covered under the policy. Generally, you can acquire an understanding from
the four major policy provisions:

1. Insuring agreements that describe what the policy covers

2. Definitions that provide specificity of terms of coverage and effectively limit the scope for
interpretation of coverage

3. Exclusions that enumerate what the policy does not cover
4. Duties of the insured that specify what the insured must do to receive indemnity under a
policy

3. 2.3 Coverage in Insuring Agreements
The first sections of a policy, usually called insuring agreements, specify what types of losses
are covered. Typically, the insuring agreements (and riders when necessary) cover—
• Employee dishonesty

• Loss Inside the Premises
• Loss Outside the Premises
• Money Order Fraud and Counterfeit Paper
• Depositor Forgery
Employee Dishonesty
The generally used employee dishonesty Blanket Coverage Form Insuring Agreement (CR
00 01) is shown in figure 3-1. You should note that coverage applies only to loss of “covered
property.”

Covered property is defined very narrowly in the insuring agreement and, in addition, the
terms used in that agreement are also subject to further specific definitions. Therefore, when
considering filing a claim, one of the first questions that you should answer is whether
covered property was lost. Also, you should make sure to tailor your coverage to your
organization’s specific industry and needs, and to include the kinds of risks your
organization may encounter.
Insuring Agreements and riders are also available to cover losses caused by non-employees.
These include the following:

Loss Inside the Premises
Organizations can insure against loss inside the premises, which is defined in most
agreements and riders as “Losses of money and securities by the actual destruction,
disappearance or wrongful abstraction .. . within the premises ... or banking premises ....
Including loss resulting from safe burglary or robbery with the premises . . . .”
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Loss Outside the Premises
Organizations can insure against loss outside the premises, which is defined in most
agreements and riders as a “Loss of money and securities and other property . . . while
being conveyed by messenger ... or armored car company.”

Figure 3-1. Blanket Coverage Form Insuring Agreement (CR 00 01)

BLANKET COVERAGE FORM
INSURING AGREEMENT
We will pay for loss of and loss from damage to, Covered Property resulting directly from
the Covered Cause of Loss.
1. Covered Property: "Money," "securities," and "property other than money and securities"

2. Covered Cause of Loss: "employee dishonesty"
3. Coverage Extension
Employees Temporarily Outside Coverage Territory: We will pay for loss caused by any
"employee" while temporarily outside the territory specified in the Territory General
Condition for a period of not more than 90 days.

Money Order Fraud and Counterfeit Paper
Organizations can insure against money order fraud and counterfeit paper, which is defined
in most agreements and riders as “Loss due to the acceptance in good faith, in exchange for
merchandise, money ... in the normal course of business of counterfeit currency, money
orders, etc., through the Insured bank account. . . .”

Depositor Forgery
Organizations can insure against depositor forgery, which is defined in most agreements
and riders as “Loss as a result of the Insured having someone process forged checks, money
orders, etc., through the Insured bank account. . . .”
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3.2.4 Riders
Remember you can add riders to the standard policy coverage to provide for the unique
areas of risk not otherwise included. Some riders that you should consider include coverage
for loss from:
• Unauthorized electronic transfers
• Pension plan frauds
• Credit card forgeries
• Computer frauds

• Unauthorized use of telephone services

3.3 Important Clauses in Dishonesty Policies

3.3.1 Policy Definitions
Other policy provisions include definitions of the terms used in the insuring agreements.
Usually, the definitions are used to limit the scope for interpreting the terms of coverage.
For example, the employee dishonesty insuring agreement describes a covered loss as one
resulting from employee dishonesty. This term and the term employee, on which it relies, are
further defined to provide specific qualifications of coverage as to cause. Figure 3-2 contains
a typical policy definition of employee dishonesty.

For coverage to apply, the first requirement is that an employee must commit the covered act.
If the perpetrator were not an employee, coverage would not apply. This requirement
makes it important to determine the identity of the perpetrator(s).
While the policy language specifically defines the term employee, you can request
endorsements to alter the definition and to expand coverage of certain other parties (for
example, volunteer workers and designated agents) as employees.

Because a policy provides a specific definition of dishonesty, it is important for you to
ascertain—
1. That the employee committed the act with the manifest intent to cause the insured to
incur a loss, and
2. That the employee or some intended third party received a benefit. Few other
provisions in a policy have resulted in as much litigation as this one, particularly
concerning the meaning of manifest intent.

Unfortunately, there is no consensus among jurisdictions on the interpretation of manifest
intent, rather, there is a broad spectrum of interpretations. Some courts have found this term
to apply only to those situations where the employee has the intent to gain a benefit for
someone at the expense of the insured. Other courts have found a broader meaning
affording coverage for situations in which the employee acted with such disregard for the
insured that the loss was a substantial certainty. In one case involving the definition of the
term a court ruled, “Such a person is deemed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts.”
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Figure 3-2. Typical Policy Definition of Employee Dishonesty

EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY DEFINITION
"Employee Dishonesty" in paragraph 3.3.1 means only dishonest acts committed by an "employee,"
whether identified or not, acting alone or in collusion with other persons, except you or a partner, with
the manifest intent to:

(1) Cause you to sustain loss; and also
(2) Obtain financial benefit (other than employee benefits earned in the normal course of employment,
including: salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, profits sharing or pensions) for:
a. The "employee," or
b. Any person or organization intended by the "employee" to receive that benefit.

"Employee" means
a. Any natural person:
(1) While in your service (and for 30 days after termination of service); and
(2) Whom you compensate directly by salary, wages or commissions; and
(3) Whom you have the right to direct and control while performing services for you; or
b. Any natural person employed by an employment contractor while that person is subject to your
direction and control and performing services for you excluding, however, any such person while
having care and custody of property.

Consequently, an insured should not necessarily give up on a claim just because the insurer
believes the dishonest individual did not possess the requisite manifest intent. Before
challenging a claim denial, legal counsel should be retained to conduct research to discover
how the applicable jurisdiction interprets this language. Then if favorable case law is found,
you can approach the insurer seeking a reversal of the claim denial.

3.3.2 Policy Exclusions
The policy describes the covered losses and the specific exclusions for losses that it will not
cover. Because insurers tailor each policy with its own list of exclusions, you should read
and understand the terms before purchasing the coverage.
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Although we won’t explore the legal implications of policy provisions, you should consider
the practical problems arising from the exclusions both when purchasing the coverage and
when preparing a proof of loss. Even though the specific exclusions can vary, here are some
examples of typical exclusions found in many standard policies:

Indirect Losses
Commercial crime policies specifically exclude indirect and consequential losses. It is
generally accepted that this exclusion’s original intent was to limit the coverage to direct
losses, thus, excluding consequential losses, such as lost profits, lost business opportunities,
or lost interest on stolen funds. While this exclusion’s intent may seem to be clear, judicial
interpretations remain inconsistent. Clearly, you should discuss this issue with legal counsel,
who can interpret the relevant case law in the applicable jurisdiction(s).

An indirect loss may involve the costs incurred in establishing the insured’s claim. Again,
this provision excludes from coverage the costs of investigating and quantifying a claim. In
today’s market, you can purchase coverage for the costs of establishing a claim. Some
carriers write policies that cover all, or a stated amount, of an investigation’s costs, while
others write policies under which the costs are shared between the insured and the carrier.
Of course, you should evaluate the cost of purchasing this coverage in light of the potential
cost of any investigation. The indirect loss policy provision is excerpted in figure 3-3.

Inventory Loss
The inventory loss exclusion addresses losses of inventory when the insured may catch
dishonest employees with “the goods,” or the employees may confess their dishonesty, but
the insured cannot prove the extent of the dishonest acts and the resulting losses. See figure
3-4 for an example of a standard inventory loss exclusion.
Under this exclusion, an insurer will not accept a shortage of inventory on a comparison of
book to physical quantities as proof of dishonesty nor as verification of the quantum of loss
sustained. Similarly, the insurer will not consider a reduction in profits as proof of
dishonesty or loss because there can be other plausible explanations for either an inventory
shortage or a reduction in profits.
Thieves normally keep few, if any, records, and their veracity, at best, is questionable.
Often, dishonest employees purposely understate, in their confessions, the extent of the
losses in the hopes of avoiding not only prosecution but also any subsequent requirement to
make restitution. Conversely, dishonest employees may overestimate losses in an effort to
appease their employers by supporting a claim for a large insurance recovery. Simply
stated, most dishonest employees do not know how much they have actually stolen.

For example, an employee of an auto parts dealer is caught with a trunk full of stolen
automobile parts. When confronted, the employee confesses to stealing parts for four years
but doesn’t have the slightest idea of how much he actually took. In this situation, an
insured instinctively presents a proof of loss based on an inventory computation.
Essentially, this methodology attempts to blame all shortages, including those in the normal
inventory process, on the dishonest employee. Therefore, if the insured compares the
physical inventory available with the inventory records and discovers a shortage of
$400,000 in automobile parts, the insured may attempt to claim this amount.
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Figure 3-3. Indirect Loss Policy Provision

INDIRECT LOSS EXCLUSION
Indirect Loss: Loss that is an indirect result of any act or
"occurrence" covered by this insurance including but not limited
to, loss resulting from:
a. Your inability to realize income that you would have realized
had there been no loss of, or loss from damage to, Covered
Property...

b. Payment of costs, fees or other expenses you incur in
establishing either the existence or the amount of loss under
this insurance.

The same issues arise for claims based on lost profit calculations. If an insured projected a
profit of $500,000 but achieved a profit of only $200,000, the insured may attribute the
$300,000 difference to the dishonest employee.

Although an insured can use an inventory or profit computation to help support a claimed
loss amount, this method, generally, will not provide sufficient proof for a claim. Unless the
insured can demonstrate, in an irrefutable way, that the only explanation for the shortage
could be through the act of an employee, any claim presented will likely fail.
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Figure 3-4. Standard Inventory Loss Exclusion

INVENTORY SHORTAGES EXCLUSION
Loss, or that part of any loss, the proof of which as to its
existence or amount is dependent upon (1) an inventory
computation; or (2) a profit or loss computation.

Source: Employee Dishonesty Coverage Form (CR 00 01)

Therefore an insured should meticulously outline the method the employee used to
perpetrate the theft to demonstrate that the employee had the necessary access to perform
the dishonest act, and should also present all documents that connect the employee to the
claimed loss. For example, if part of the dishonesty involved the alteration of shipping
receipts, the insured should provide all the altered receipts to the insurer. Although these
documents may not directly support the loss amount, they will connect the employee to the
dishonesty and support the method by which the dishonesty occurred.

Is this documentation enough to assure a full recovery? Maybe not; however, every link
between the employee and the claimed loss strengthens the insured’s claim.
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Figure 3-5. Loan Loss Exclusion

LOAN LOSS EXCLUSION
This bond does not cover... (e) loss resulting directly or
indirectly from the complete or partial nonpayment of, or
default upon, any Loan or transaction involving the Insured as
lender or borrower, or extension of credit, including the
purchase, discounting or other acquisition of false or genuine
accounts, invoices, notes, agreements or Evidence of Debt,
whether such Loan, transaction, or extension was procured in
good faith or through trick, artifice, fraud or false pretense,
except when covered under Insuring Agreement A [Employee
Dishonesty], (d) or (E)...

Loan Loss
This chapter has focused on the standard provisions of a Commercial Crime Policy.
Although not part of a Commercial Crime Policy, the loan loss exclusion is worthy of
special mention. See figure 3-5 for an example of a loan loss exclusion taken from a
Financial Institution Bond.
This language establishes that the bond does not cover all risks; specifically, it avoids
coverage for credit decisions. The bond’s language seems clear, particularly because the
wording even stipulates that loans obtained through “trick, artifice, [or] fraud” are excluded.

You can obtain coverage for loan losses generated by a dishonest employee who had the
manifest intent both to cause a loss and to obtain a financial benefit. In addition, the insurer
may specify in the bond that it will cover those loan losses when an employee was in
collusion with one or more parties to the transaction and the employee received, as a result
of the dishonesty, a financial benefit with a value of at least $2,500.
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Figure 3-6. Insured’s Duties to Insurer in the Event of Loss

3.4 Insured’s Responsibilities in the Event of a Loss

3.4.1 Duties of the Insured
Dishonesty policies typically impose several duties that the insured must fulfill in order to
protect its ability to recover under the terms of the policy once a loss is discovered. In all
cases, the insured should take action to prevent further loss and take the appropriate steps
to mitigate the damage and recover from any loss sustained. These duties include:
• Giving timely notice of potential loss
• Filing a proof-of-loss form

• Cooperating with any insurance investigation

See figure 3-6 for an example of the specific language used in a Commercial Crime Policy
to spell out the insured’s duties.
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Most dishonesty policies typically contain two additional obligations for the insured. The
obligations are (1) agreeing not to prejudice the rights of the insurance carrier and (2)
accepting the procedures for filing a law suit in the event of a claim denial. See section 3.4.2
for more information on these duties.

3.4.2 Handling the Discovery of Employee Dishonesty
It’s a call that all executives dread—internal audit reveals that the controller has been
diverting corporate funds for his or her personal use. The discovery spawns a myriad of
questions and problems, all of which require quick solutions.

Dealing with an allegation of wrongdoing against an employee is never easy. Invariably it
provokes feelings of shock and betrayal within the firm, and often causes a decline in
internal morale and external goodwill. It may also hurt the bottom line, depending on the
extent of the loss and, most critically, whether the loss is covered by fidelity insurance.

You must deal with dishonest acts, whether you report to the police and pursue aggressively
or handle discreetly within the organization. In either case, the actions you take will have a
critical bearing on whether or not you can recover under your fidelity insurance. Therefore,
it is important to know how to respond when allegations of wrongdoing arise. Most victims
(and even most claims adjusters), however, rarely deal with these types of situations, and, as
a result, these claims are often learning experiences for all concerned.
Victims of dishonesty should never forget that it is their property that has been lost. There
can be no relaxed attitude when responding to this kind of incident. You must conduct
yourself as if no insurance existed, including making efforts to minimize or prevent further
loss and initiating proceedings for maximum recovery.
On the issue of recovery, it is important to note the right offirst recovery provisions in fidelity
coverage. Typically, where a loss does not exceed the policy limit and recoveries are made,
the right offirst recovery is to the underwriter and then to the insured, to satisfy any policy
deductible. However, if the loss exceeds the policy coverage amount, the right of first
recovery is to the insured for the amount of the loss in excess of the bond coverage only,
and then the aforementioned rule applies.

3.4.3 A Course of Action
The first decision to make on the discovery of any form of dishonesty is whether or not to
conduct an investigation. Some victims choose not to proceed even when they have fidelity
coverage. They consider the potential cost of an investigation, including the time lost
internally, combined with external investigators’ costs and legal fees, among other costs, to
be prohibitive.
There are many reasons to proceed with an investigation. The loss may be covered under
the fidelity insurance and therefore would be recoverable. In addition, there may be more
to the dishonest scheme than was initially manifest. Failing to investigate and take
appropriate action when the crime is first discovered may prejudice the insurer’s rights and
result in coverage denial when the true extent of the loss surfaces. Similarly, there may be
more people involved than originally believed, which could make any initial corrective
actions ineffective.

13

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

A victim that fails to report a loss or reports a loss late risks the possibility of a subsequent
coverage denial. The typical policy includes the standard requirement for reporting a loss
as soon as possible (see section 3.4.4). In addition, the insurer also immediately cancels
coverage for any employee discovered by the insured (or the insured’s partners, officers, or
directors) to have committed any dishonest act. Therefore, it is extremely risky to continue
the employment of an individual who has defrauded or stolen from the company. If
management determines that the best course is to continue the employment of the
dishonest employee, management should consult with the insurer and request a waiver of
the provision canceling coverage for that employee.
Assuming the organization decides to proceed with an investigation, management should
assign a representative of the firm the responsibility of coordinating the organization’s
efforts to investigate, document, and prepare a proof of loss. In view of the timing
obligations under the policy, this individual should immediately be available to devote
considerable time to the claim. This claim coordinator should have a financial background
and the authority to cross departmental boundaries because the loss investigation will
undoubtedly involve numerous departments. The claim coordinator also must thoroughly
understand the policy before an in-depth investigation can begin. The claim coordinator,
along with legal counsel, should bear responsibility for all communications with the
dishonest employee, the insurer, and its representatives, including the insurance agent.

3.4.4 Notice of Loss
As discussed previously, immediate action after discovery is critical because discovery
triggers the policy’s notice and proof-of loss timing requirements. The policy requires the
insured to notify the insurer as soon as possible after a potential covered-loss situation is
discovered. Notice can be provided by telephone; however, best practice is to send a
written follow-up notification. Although the coverage states “as soon as possible,” sooner is
always better than later, as the date of notification is determined by the circumstances of the
case and can become a question for a jury. One jury found seventeen days to be an
unreasonable delay in notifying the insurer, but in another case, a fifteen-month delay was
not deemed unreasonable.
Some victims opt to allow the dishonest individual to continue his or her wrongdoing in an
attempt to gather evidence. This is not advisable because, as previously discussed, an
insurer will cancel coverage for any dishonest employee immediately upon discovery, and,
therefore, the policy will not cover subsequent losses.
When providing notice, it is not necessary to develop all the facts or even the extent of the
loss. After a more comprehensive investigation, the insured can then provide the details of
the claim in the form of a written, and sworn to, proof of loss. The policy typically requires
that the insured file the proof of loss within 120 days from the time it discovers the covered
act—not from the time the insured gave notice. If it is not possible to comply with the 120day deadline, ask for an extension—in advance—from the insurer, requesting a response in
writing. Most insurers will accommodate this request, thereby providing an extension under
a reservation of rights.
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3.4.5 Supporting Documents
Although insurers value statements made by the dishonest employee, they also require
documentation supporting the claim of dishonesty and the resulting loss amount. Make it a
priority to obtain and secure the relevant documents. Verify what may seem obvious or
conclusive in appearance using the most complete documentation possible. Use discussions
with other employees to determine the existence and importance of the documentation.
Early in the investigation, identify those employees who may be able to assist in the loss
calculation. While there are a myriad of factors that affect the timing and appropriateness of
interviewing these employees, remember that over time memories not only fade but
become selective. Conduct these interviews individually, and take detailed notes.
Whenever possible, the claim coordinator should attend all interviews.
3.5

The Insurer
3.5.1 The Insurer’s Investigation
After receiving the proof of loss, the insurer may send in an independent investigator to
analyze the claim. Start preparing for this investigation by designating one contact person—
usually the claim coordinator. This designated contact should act as liaison for all requests
from and discussions with the insurer’s representative.

3.5.2 Subrogation Rights and Duties
If the insurer pays any portion of the claim, the insurer is subrogated to the insured’s
recovery rights. This is covered under Section B 17 of the crime general conditions policy
form.

Although subrogation is thought of as arising in the context of a resolved claim, subrogation
also imposes a further duty on the insured long before resolution. The insured must, in no
way, jeopardize the subrogation rights of the insurer.
However, if the insured has the opportunity to maximize its recovery as a result of
accepting a settlement offer from the dishonest employee or the employee’s attorney, the
insured could appear to be acting contrary to the language of the subrogation provision. In
this case, the insured should bring the settlement offer to the attention of the insurer and
demonstrate its benefits. Generally speaking, insurers will agree to reasonable settlement
offers. As always, get all such “side agreements” with the insurer in writing.

3.5.3 Response to a Claim Denial
The game is not necessarily over when an insurer denies a claim. Request a detailed,
written explanation for the denial. Ask independent advisers to carefully review the claim
and the rationale for the coverage denial to determine whether the denial is warranted. If
you can make a good argument for coverage and it becomes necessary to file a lawsuit
against the insurer to invoke coverage, the provision form stipulates certain procedures for
the insured to follow (see figure 3-7.)
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Figure 3-7. Legal Action Against Insurer Provision

LEGAL ACTION AGAINST INSURER
PROVISION

You may not bring any legal action against us involving loss:

a. Unless you have complied with all of the terms of this
insurance;
b. Until 90 days after you have filed proof of loss with us; and

c. Unless brought within 2 years from the date you discover the
loss.
Source: Crime General Provisions (CR 10 00)

As stated in the clause in figure 3-7, the insured must give the insurer at least 90 days from
the day the proof of loss was filed, so that the insurer may investigate and make a decision
about the claim, before the insured may file a lawsuit against the insurer. However, the
insured also is limited in the amount of time permitted to bring such an action: within two
years after discovery of the crime.

3.5.4 Summary
Fortunately, most organizations experience few employee dishonesty losses of any
consequence. The strict policy requirements and sensitive nature of the investigation
required to document claims and the entire process of asserting a fidelity coverage claim
can be quite intimidating. If dealt with in a well thought-out and logical manner, however,
you can effectively handle employee dishonesty claims. The process reviewed in this
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Handbook should give risk- and insurance-professionals some guidance for planning a
response.
3.6 Risk Financing Checklist
See table 3.1 for a checklist designed to assist CPAs to address risk financing and fidelity
insurance issues in their organizations and in those of their clients. If necessary, investigate
and follow up No answers and then document the results. Use the Refcolumn is to cross
reference the checklist to any additional documentation.

The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If risk financing is a
concern, seek the advice of a risk management specialist.
Table 3.1 Risk Financing Checklist
Risk Financing Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Purchase of Fidelity Insurance Coverage
a. Has management reviewed operations to determine the nature
and extent of potential losses from fraud and commercial
crime?

b. Has management considered the extent to which the
organization can self-finance this risk (that is, could it survive a
catastrophic loss without insurance)?
c. Has management taken all reasonable steps to remedy any
previously identified vulnerable areas of the business or any
weaknesses in internal controls?
d. Has management established contact with a reputable
insurance broker capable of placing the required fidelity
coverage?
e. Has management assigned an appropriate person the task of
liaising with the broker to determine alternative kinds, levels,
and costs of coverage, and to report back to management on
these alternatives with appropriate recommendations?

f. Are procedures in place to provide for the timely and
appropriate response to circumstances where dishonesty is
identified, suspected or alleged?
g. Prior to finalizing the recommended fidelity coverage, has
management and, if necessary, legal counsel, carefully
reviewed the wording of the policy to ensure the following:

• Definitions, exclusions, and other clauses are acceptable
and consistent with the nature of the business
• When possible, duplication with other insurance (for
example, fire and theft policies) has been avoided
(continued)
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Risk Financing Checklist

h. Prior to signing, has management verified all answers to the
questions on the application for coverage (for example, where
an internal control is indicated, does it exist and is it operating
effectively)?

i. Prior to signing, has management reviewed the wording of the
policy to determine what changes, if any, are required and
which of these changes should be made in the conduct of the
business, including the following:

• Hiring-screening of new employees
• Use of contract employees, who may not be covered
• Bookkeeping and reporting practices

• Internal controls
2. Maintenance of Fidelity Insurance Coverage
a. Is a mechanism in place to ensure that the organization meets
the important terms in the policy in order to keep the policy in
good standing, including the following:

© Paying premiums when due
• Reporting any loss incidents to the underwriter, even those
below the deductible when no loss claim is filed

© Maintaining adequate internal controls and good security
practices (for example, locking safes)
• Reporting changes in the accounting system

• Reporting changes in the nature and scope of operations
that may affect risk
b. Does the organization review its fidelity coverage on at least
an annual basis to ensure that the coverage remains adequate
and continues to meet acceptable cost-benefit criteria?

c. Does the organization assess its risk and its financing through
fidelity insurance on at least an annual basis?
3. Discovery of Dishonesty and Fidelity Insurance Claims

a. Immediately upon suspicion or discovery of a loss incident,
has the organization implemented the following steps:

• Protection of assets from further loss
• Preservation relevant documentation and other evidence

© Notification of the underwriter by hand delivery or
registered (certified) mail (“return receipt requested”)
• Involvement of legal counsel and a claim coordinator
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Risk Financing Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

Never ignore this issue; you must act as if there is no
insurance

b. Internally, or in cooperation with the underwriter (or both),
are adequate resources in place to undertake a thorough and
timely investigation?
c. After establishing reasonable suspicion of a criminal act, has
management called in the police?

d. Has management ensured that no actions are taken to
prejudice the insurance claim, or the underwriter’s ability to
make recoveries, or both (for example, obtain underwriter’s
permission before reaching settlement with third parties or
suspected perpetrators)?
e. Has management considered initiating legal proceedings to
ensure maximum recovery?
f. Are adequate personnel and procedures in place to perform
the following:
0 Document the insurance claim (that is, the Proof of Loss)

• Follow up with the underwriter as required until the claim
is settled
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CHAPTER 4:
Computer Security and System Recovery
4.1 The Role of Computers in Modern Corporations
It is impossible to overstate the importance of computers in the modem corporation.
Computers track all assets, manage accounting, handle word processing, operate phone and
voicemail systems, and control communications. Computers have evolved from large
mainframes to networks of PCs—each of which has capabilities greater than those
mainframes from the sixties and seventies—to provide a wide range of services to the
modern corporation.

If those computers fail or are compromised, whether by accident or by deliberate action,
the company is in trouble. Preventing an incident is infinitely preferable to dealing with
one. If an incident occurs, however, the corporation must have a way of recovering
operations quickly and efficiently. Therefore, the establishment of appropriate computer
security and system recovery is a vital function of any organization.

Make no mistake—computer security is a complex subject that is growing and becoming
more complex every day. Businesses spend many billions of dollars each year on hardware
and software to control access to computers, to secure the data they contain, and to detect
intrusions. They invest hundreds of millions more in systems that permit efficient recovery
should a problem occur. There are firms, some with thousands of employees, specializing in
computer security. Clearly, this is a highly specialized field. One chapter in a Handbook
cannot make you an expert in computer security, and it is not intended to do so.
This chapter orients you to the field of computer security so that you, as a CPA, can be
certain not only to handle computer security and systems recovery appropriately, but also
to consider the major risk factors.
4.2 Management’s Security Issues
In the modern, global business environment, the computer has evolved from being a
number cruncher used by the accounting department and tended by a priesthood of
mathematical geniuses in a glass-fronted fire-protected computer room, to infiltrate virtually
every facet of the corporation. The computer has replaced typewriters with word
processors, adding machines with spreadsheets, and voluminous physical files with
database programs. In many companies, all significant information concerning assets,
transactions and operations are held on one or more computers. Today’s organization likely
makes use of hundreds of computers connected in local area networks (LANs) and wide
area networks (WANs). An organization may have dozens of these networks, each using
servers ranging from PCs to mainframes.
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4.2.1 Components of Security
Data Communications
Businesses do not exist in a vacuum. Increasingly companies are dedicating more resources
to data communications. Many companies—perhaps most, by now—have moved onto the
Internet, both as a way of distributing information (usually on the World Wide Web) and of
transmitting information between people or units: this includes electronic mail (email) and
the use of File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to move files across the Internet. The space on
business cards that formerly held a Telex address now has an email address.

Some companies are developing and fielding what are sometimes called extranets, which
link their suppliers and distributors through Internet connections. Other businesses, seeking
more security than is provided on the global public Internet, have turned to private
network providers who operate worldwide data communications networks that use the
same tools and protocols as the Internet, but are limited in use to subscribers.
Security and System Structure
Before computers, businesses achieved information security by installing locks on file
cabinets and file-room doors, and by restricting access to various files and documents.
During the initial period of centralization, organizations used mainframe computers with
attached terminals; effective access control existed on the central system. Today, the
situation is different. How is it possible to secure computer networks and data
communications structures that are not only complex, but also may exist on a global scale?
As businesses increasingly rely on computers and networks, they have an increased need to
secure their information-processing infrastructure against accidental or deliberate damage
and to provide an efficient, effective and secure system for backup of data and programs on
a regular basis. Organizations need security systems to restore information following an
incident or outage. Systems are virtually impossible to manage and keep secure if they are
not properly organized and structured. As a key aspect of security and recovery, and as a
measure of preventative maintenance, businesses should implement a structure for
organizing and storing information (for example, data files, spreadsheets, word processing
documents, and so on). In developing an effective information storage structure, you should
consider issues, such as file nomenclature and file access privileges.

External Versus Internal Security
As people recognize information to have enormous value, sometimes a value greater than
anything else in the organization, their need to safeguard this information has increased.
However, the risks inherent in the processing, storage and transmission of that data have
also increased, particularly as the Internet has flourished. There have been many
documented cases of industrial and economic espionage designed by organizations
attempting to jump-start their business activities by stealing proprietary information.
Companies have also been victimized because management believed the major risk they
faced was from outside the organization. They spent substantial resources on firewalls and
very little on other forms of security. Unfortunately, every study indicates that where crime
against business is concerned, 80 percent or more of that crime is perpetuated within the
company and hence, from inside the firewall.
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As systems grow more complex, with increasingly greater speed in connecting to the
Internet, it is important when assessing security that you consider a wide range of threats
and a wide range of ways in which to thwart those threats. Although an outsider can hack
into your network to gain access to a specific file, an insider might be able to pick up a
carelessly stored backup tape and walk out with a copy of every file in your system, all
recorded on a tape so small that it can be secreted in a shirt pocket.
Therefore no one should question the need for computer security and the ability to recover
from problems both natural and human-generated. However, it is useful to focus on some
of management’s key concerns.

4.2.2 Management’s Key Concerns
Managers in business and government have recognized the growing importance of
computer processing to their organizations and, over the last few years, have expressed
their concerns in a wide variety of publications. These concerns generally fall into one of
the following three categories.

1. Theft of confidential information
2. Information integrity
3. System availability
Each of these concerns is addressed below.
Theft of Confidential Information
Recognizing that companies increasingly store more information in computer systems,
management must have assurance that this information is well protected and that only
appropriately authorized employees have access.

For example, theft of proposed pay scales prior to labor negotiations could be detrimental
to the process and result in increased production costs. Theft of marketing or pricing plans
might result in a loss of competitive advantage. Similarly, theft of personal or financial
customer information could result not only in embarrassment, but also in a direct loss of
business and possible litigation. The threat of the loss of valuable intellectual property has
become so great that the government has enacted the Electronic Espionage Act, making the
theft of intellectual property a federal crime, punishable with up to ten years imprisonment.
Information Integrity
Because of the large volume of information processed by computers, it is not usually
feasible to confirm the validity or accuracy of processing results. Therefore, management
seeks assurance on the integrity of computer-generated information: that the information is
reasonably protected against unauthorized tampering by employees, computer viruses,
hackers, or other forms of sabotage.

For example, tampering that results in inaccurate reporting of sales figures could, in turn,
cause inappropriate production, excessive inventory levels, and lost product sales.
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Unauthorized altering of the accounts-payable records could result in incorrect mailing
labels or inaccurate shipping amounts, and therefore, direct financial loss.

System Availability
Recognizing their organization’s dependence on the data processing service, management
needs to be reassured, not only that everything has been done to reduce the likelihood of
disruption, but also that there are plans in place for resuming data processing in the
unlikely event of a major catastrophe. The total or partial loss of data processing services
would make it difficult, if not impossible, for most organizations to perform routine business
operations.

4.2.3 Effective Computer Security Systems
An effective computer security program can help to manage and, to an extent, alleviate the
above concerns. The design of an effective computer security program must take into
account the nature of the risk, and the nature and cost of the controls required to reduce
exposure. Note that there is no such thing as 100 percent protection. The growth of
networking and particularly of the Internet has materially increased the risk of computer
crimes and incidents. The following areas are among those that management must address.

Accidental Versus Deliberate Events
The events that result in breaches in confidentiality, integrity or availability may be
accidental or deliberate in nature, and may be the result of actions either internal or
external to an organization.

On a day-to-day basis, management could trace most incidents to internal accidents, such as
an employee entering incorrect data or inadvertently deleting an essential file. Accidents
also include failures arising out of undiscovered program errors, or bugs.

Some systems are composed of software packages procured from manufacturers. Others are
completely custom written. Others—perhaps most these days—are a combination of
procured software and custom code. In any case, the systems that support an organization
may consist of tens or even hundreds of thousands of lines of code. It is virtually impossible
to test every possible condition that might occur in these immensely complex systems.
Program bugs exist in every major system. With the marketplace demanding speedier
program development cycles, manufacturers have converted at least a part of their
traditional testing procedures into beta testing, in which the manufacturers release an
advance version of the software to customers to assess its capabilities.
It is important to understand the difference between beta testing and the more traditional
system testing. In system testing, the software is stressed with deliberate input errors,
processing problems and anything else the testing team can do to cause the software to fail.
In beta testing, the users are not deliberately stressing the system in an attempt to make it
break down. Nonetheless, commercial-software beta testing is valuable, and results in
reports to the manufacturer of hundreds, or even thousands, of potential program bugs.
Regardless of how thoroughly a program is tested, it can still fail, and fail disastrously, as
the result of an accidental bug.
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Prevention, Detection and Recovery Controls
Prevention is the best and most effective way to minimize the impact of an unwanted event
that could affect information confidentiality, integrity or availability. In the case of
deliberate acts, preventive controls will reduce opportunity and thereby remove temptation.
Another important factor in preventive control is the notion of deterrence, which forms a
belief in the mind of would-be perpetrators that they are likely to be caught if they attempt
a computer-related crime.

Preventive controls, however, cannot provide a 100 percent guarantee that a problem will
not occur. As a result, organizations typically use complementary detective controls to
highlight any actual or attempted security violation. For example, existing software features
may prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to data. In these situations, the
software is programmed to produce reports that document all attempts by unauthorized
users—a feature known as detective control.
In addition to preventive and detective controls, organizations must prepare in advance for
recovery from unexpected events. For example, the backup-copy feature used to retrieve a
deleted data file constitutes a recovery control.

A well-designed security program includes elements of all three types of control:
1. Preventive
2. Detective
3. Recovery

The mix of controls used depends on the nature of the information stored on the computer,
combined with the reliance placed on the computer, and management’s willingness to
accept the associated risks. In the rapidly changing global environment in which we work,
with Internet connectivity growing at an unprecedented rate, and new equipment and
software becoming obsolete in months, it is no simple matter to keep security features up to
date with potential threats.
4.3 Physical Security

Physical security is the generic term used to describe the protection of the computing facility.
The controls exercised under the heading physical security are typically preventive and
detective in nature.
Many may think that physical security has become unimportant in the age of the personal
computer, when virtually every employee has a powerful workstation with a fast processor
and access to company networks, which are often equipped with huge local storage disk
drives. But the reality is that mid- to large-size organizations still use midrange computers
(such as the IBM AS400, Digital Vax and Alpha systems, HP 9000s, and similar systems
from other manufacturers) and mainframes (such as the IBM System 390 and large scale
DEC, SUN, HP, and Unisys machines). Even managers at companies that base their
computing on a LAN often realize that they best protect their servers by placing them in a
dedicated and protected operating facility.
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Physical security primarily addresses the accessibility concern, and attempts to minimize
the potential for system loss as a result of equipment damage. To achieve physical security,
consider each of the following areas:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Computer Room Construction
Fire Detection and Suppression
Water Protection
Electrical Power Reliability
Environmental Control
Physical Access Controls
Physical Security for PCs

Details on each of the components of physical security follow.

4. 3.1 Computer Room Construction
The National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) standards provide the most concise
specifications for recommended mainframe, midrange and server computer room
construction. In summary, to provide an appropriate level of protection, computer room
perimeter walls should be constructed to a minimum of a one-hour fire resistance rating.
These walls should extend from concrete ceiling to concrete floor (slab to slab). Obviously,
slab-to-slab walls also serve to protect the facility against unauthorized entry from over a
false ceiling or under a raised floor.

This construction minimizes the possibility of fires originating in general office areas
migrating to the computer room before they can be extinguished. The use of glass partitions
to segregate the computer room from the general office environment usually does not
provide sufficient protection against a migrating fire.

Computer rooms have come full circle. During the sixties and seventies, the only
computers in most organizations were large mainframes kept in presumably secure
computer rooms. As companies changed from central computers to client-server
environments, file servers, which had become the departmental version of a mainframe, did
not need special environments. They were placed anywhere—on the floor, under a table, or
sometimes in a closet. This led to a lot of problems. Often they were accidentally turned off
or damaged. They did not always have power protection, and on more than one occasion,
companies suffered when someone accidentally pulled the server’s plug from the wall. With
servers in a closet or under someone’s desk, backup was sometimes forgotten, and even
when carried out, the backup tapes were often stored adjacent to the server.

4. 3.2 Fire Detection and Suppression
Fire detection and suppression systems are essential in the computer room to protect the
investment in computer equipment and the information stored thereon. These systems are
designed to detect and suppress fire before it advances to a serious state. Security experts
recommend automated detection and suppression systems because these systems reduce the
dependence on manual fire- fighting techniques that may prove either unsatisfactory or late
in arrival.
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The most common fire suppression systems axe water sprinklers and various fire
suppressing gasses. A gas, Halon 1301, formerly the most popular fire suppression gas, is no
longer manufactured because it turned out to be a significant environmental hazard.

Water sprinkler systems may be “wet” or “dry.” Wet systems contain water in the pipes at
all times. Dry pipe systems, also called pre-action systems, do not contain water until an
alarm situation occurs (usually involving a products-of-combustion detection unit), at which
point a valve automatically opens to charge the system. A high-temperature event must also
occur to open a sprinkler head.
Fire detection systems can also provide a direct linkage to other significant support
functions, such as opening fire exits, shutting off equipment and fans, and providing
immediate notification to an alarm company or the fire department via a communications
link.

4.3 .3 Water Protection
Water and electrical systems do not mix, but both are generally found in computer rooms
protected by sprinkler systems. Water can also enter computer rooms through leaks that
may originate on another floor of the building. Therefore, it is vitally important to ensure
that precautions are taken to detect and remove water leakage before it contacts the
electrical supply. Water protection usually involves the provision of:
• Underfloor water detectors, normally in the vicinity of air-conditioning units. Water
detection systems are usually monitored in the same manner as fire alarms.
• Floor drains to remove any water buildup. Unless specified during construction, floor
drains typically are not provided in modem office towers.
• Waterproof equipment covers. Where sprinkler systems or other above-floor water
sources are present, you should have available equipment covers or rolls of plastic that
can be pulled over the equipment in the event of a problem.

4.3 .4 Electrical Power Reliability
Unless suitable precautions are taken, a disruption to the electrical power supply will result
in the loss of computer service. The provision of backup power sources can be expensive,
and it may not be cost justified if the computer center is located in an area where the
electric power supply is reliable. If the electric power supply is unreliable, or the nature of
processing critical, consider using uninterruptible power supply (UPS) and backup
generators.

Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
UPS provides battery backup in the event of power failures or brownouts. The regular
power supply is monitored at all times, and battery power automatically provided when
required. These systems have become increasingly affordable.

Backup Generators
Backup generators are recommended because UPS can only provide battery backup power
for a limited time. In computer centers that provide critical processing services or in areas
where electric power is unreliable, diesel generators that can produce electric power for an
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indefinite period, provided fuel is available, often support UPS systems. Finally, regardless
of the local power supply outage record, it is likely that power conditioners will be used in
larger computer installations, and surge suppressors will be provided for desktop PCs.
Power conditioners and surge protectors monitor the electric power supply and remove
voltage sags and surges.

4. 3.5 Environmental Control
Environmental control is an issue that primarily has been a concern for larger mainframe
computer environments. Even the users of the smaller machines, whose manufacturers
claim can operate in a general office environment, cannot totally ignore the following
environmental issues:
1. Temperature
2. Humidity control

3. Environmental contamination
Temperature Control
Computers cannot operate in extreme temperatures. It is true that the range of operating
temperatures has increased over the years. However, even when the specifications indicate
that the machine will operate in a wide temperature range (for example, 59-90 degrees
Fahrenheit or 15-32 degrees Celsius), it is not advisable to operate these machines near
either the lower or upper limits. Air conditioning is usually installed to reduce the
likelihood of system outage or damage as a result of overheating.

Humidity Control
The computer manufacturers normally indicate a range of humidity that is acceptable for
their machines, for example a 20-80 percent humidity tolerance. Normally the air
conditioning unit provides humidity control.

Environmental Contamination
Dust can cause major problems in a computer environment. If dust gets into a disk pack, it
may cause a head crash, making information on that disk inaccessible. In addition,
accumulations of paper dust from printers are a potential fire hazard. To minimize the
potential for dust contamination, you should regularly vacuum the areas where dust
normally accumulates.

4. 3.6 Physical Access Controls
The importance of physical access controls over all assets and related records is obvious.
Such controls help to reduce the risk of fraud and commercial crime because—

• Physical access controls are often the most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong
controls in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the
system. Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
• Perpetrators of many frauds must come into physical contact with either the asset being
misappropriated or the related asset records in order to cover up the fraud. Reducing
physical access reduces opportunity.
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® Access controls that fail to prevent fraud and commercial crime still often assist in the
investigation process, for example, the determination of what actually happened and the
narrowing of the list of possible suspects.

Physical security over computer installations and equipment is particularly important.
Sometimes white-collar criminals and irate employees can resort to blue-collar crimes, such
as arson and the willful destruction of property. When this happens, these blue-collar
crimes may be classified as commercial or economic in nature.
The only employees who should require access to computer equipment are those
responsible for its operation. Any third party engineers performing maintenance should be
accompanied by operations staff at all times. Providing more access increases the potential
for vandalism, mischief and human error; any of these threats could result in processing
disruptions.
Limiting access to the computer room involves securing the doors and keeping them closed
at all times. There are a variety of devices available for achieving this, the most common
include—
© Key locks: These are the cheapest to install but are usually the least secure because
duplicate keys can be made and distributed without control.
® Cipher locks: These are push button combination devices and are generally more secure,
provided the combination is changed on a regular basis.
® Card access devices: These are probably the most secure mechanisms because cards cannot
be readily duplicated and card distribution can be controlled.

4. 3.7 Physical Security for PCs
Much of the preceding discussion relates to computer systems of any size. Some especially
important measures necessary to physically secure PCs follow:
® Restrict physical access. Lock doors during off hours or when an office is vacant, or
both.
• Use the security features provided on many PCs, such as passwords, which prevent
access by unauthorized individuals.
® Ensure that all employees watch for unauthorized personnel in areas where
microcomputers are located.

4.4 Logical Security

Logical security is the term used to describe the protection of information stored on a
computer system. The controls involved are usually a blend of preventive and detective
controls. Organizations use logical security to address confidentiality and integrity
concerns, and to reduce the potential for inappropriate information disclosure, modification
or deletion.

Achieving an appropriate level of logical security involves giving thought to how the user
gains access to information. In addition to the security controls for the data itself, you
should consider the controls over the software that provide access to the data and to the
system. In so doing, keep in mind the following:
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•
•
•
•
•

Communications security
Data security
Software integrity

Computer operations security
Logical security for microcomputers

A description of each follows.

4.4.1 Communications Security
Communications security focuses on controlling the various methods of access to the
computer system. Of course, communications security primarily serves to ensure that valid
transmissions between computer systems are complete and accurate. As an added benefit,
communications security also presents an obstacle to criminal activity.

Passwords and Administration
A valid user identification (ID) and password is the first line of access control on most
computer systems. The validation of the ID and password by a computer program
represents the preventive part of the control while the rejection and recording of an invalid
ID or password represents the detection control. To be effective, the detective aspect of
password control requires an investigation of all reported access failures.
For effective password controls, procedures should be installed to ensure that—
1. Users choose passwords that are not simplistic in nature; for example, because simplistic
passwords can be readily guessed and the system compromised, never use initials, a
spouse’s name, or other similar personal passwords.
2. Management distributes new user IDs and passwords to users in a controlled manner.

3. Users change passwords regularly, approximately every 30-90 days, depending on the
nature of the information accessed.
4. Management revokes IDs and passwords of users who have left the organization.
Similarly, when users move from job to job within an organization, management
modifies their access rights so they can only access the data required for their current
job.

Network Security Features
The programmed network security features that are available vary from system to system.
Some of the common features include—

• A maximum number of log-on attempts. If the user has not successfully logged on in the
specified number of attempts, the session is terminated and the incident is recorded on a
log for investigation. On some systems, the user’s account is locked to prohibit further
attempts until the operators or the security-officer function takes action. This feature is
designed to prevent unauthorized users from repeatedly attempting to gain access.
• Automatic log-off of inactive terminals. If an employee leaves a terminal logged-on,
anyone who gains access to that terminal has the access rights of the previous user,
thereby breaching password security. Therefore, many systems automatically log off
users when the terminal has been inactive for a defined period of time.
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• Restrictions of users to specific terminals, specific times of the day, or both.

• Echo checking of transmitted information to ensure the information is complete and
accurate. This is achieved by a retransmission of the message to the source terminal for
validation.
• Firewalls to provide the security necessary to control unauthorized access to the system
from the Internet. Ranging from relatively simple hardware or software to complex and
hard-to-maintain packages, firewalls have become a requirement for systems attached to
the Internet. Careful installation is essential to prevent making unintended access points
available to an invader.

Remote-Access Security
Hackers have received considerable publicity in recent years, after successfully gaining
access to numerous computer systems. In response to the problems created by hackers,
several companies have developed and marketed security devices to limit remote access to
authorized employees.

One common device available to help control dial-up computer access is the callback
device. When an employee dials in, the callback device intercepts the call, the employee
enters a special code, and the device then calls back the phone number associated with the
code entered. The communications link is then established and the user ID and password
are entered in the normal way.
For both dial-up access and Internet access, there are a number of devices that provide
security by effectively providing authorized users with a new password for every log-on.
Some systems accomplish this by providing the user with a small key-chain-sized device
called a token, which has a window that displays a new code every minute. The user must
enter this code along with a memorized password to gain access.

Another version looks much like a calculator. When a user requests access, the system
provides a random number (called a challenge) that the user then enters into the special
calculator with a password. The calculator then displays another number (the response),
which is entered into the system to gain access.

Another class of access control, based on biometrics, involves measurement of a physical
characteristic. Currently manufacturers offer devices that can check identity based on
fingerprints, hand geometry, iris or retinal pattern, or facial geometry. Systems based on
voiceprint or signature dynamics are also under development.

4.4.2 Data Security
Unauthorized access to information can result in its disclosure, modification or deletion. To
achieve efficient data security, you should implement a system capable of evaluating the
sensitivity of the data to provide a level of protection commensurate with the nature and
perceived value of the information. Data security addresses the issue of protecting
information stored on computer files, magnetic media, and hard copy reports.
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On-line Data Files
On-line data files are those files stored on disk that users of a computer system can directly
access. Two effective techniques are available to secure on-line data files:

1. Software restrictions. A program, or series of programs, that references established security
tables to determine whether the user is allowed the requested access (for example, read
or write) to the requested data file. If the request is valid, the user will be permitted
access; if not, access is denied and the access violation is reported on a log file for
subsequent investigation. The security software process is illustrated by figure 4-1.

Figure 4-1. The Security Software Process

On some computer systems, the software restriction facility is an integral part of the
operating system, while on others a separate security software product that interfaces with
the operating system is used.

2. Data encryption. This technique scrambles information using a predefined algorithm or
key, so that the information is not meaningful to anyone who gains access to the disk
file. There are a number of mathematical systems (algorithms) in use as the basis of
encryption systems. These systems use keys of various length and complexity. Generally
longer keys provide more security than shorter keys. On the Internet all browsers
provide some level of security through encryption. Some have short-key capabilities
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(generally employing 40-bit keys) that provide a basic level of security, while other
versions (often export-restricted) use much stronger 128-bit keys. Some data encryption
packages (for example, PGP) can provide for even longer keys (often 1,024 bits in
length), which provide incredibly robust security against unauthorized interception.
Companies using the Internet to transmit confidential data should seriously consider
using encryption to protect that information from unauthorized interception.

Off-line Data Files
Off-line data files are information stored in libraries on magnetic tape, exchangeable disks,
and diskettes. Information stored on these media is as readily susceptible to inappropriate
disclosure, amendment, and deletion as on-line data files unless it is properly controlled.
The preventive controls usually applied include—

• Keeping the media library in a physically secure room where the door is locked
whenever authorized staff are not present
• Adhering to media library procedures, which require that the files be issued from the
library only for approved purposes, for example, production use and transport to off-site
storage
The detective controls normally include an investigation of all materials borrowed, but not
returned in a reasonable time, and the performance of periodic inventory checks. However,
many smaller organizations consider the use of comprehensive library procedures
impractical because of limited staff availability. In these situations and in microcomputer
environments, you should regularly back up computer information (on hard disks and
diskettes) and store it in a secure location away from the computers.

Reports and Documents
It is easy to become preoccupied with protecting information on computer systems while
neglecting information printed on input forms and computer reports. Generally, people rely
on internal controls exercised by user departments to ensure that data approved for input is
not modified before it is entered into the computer. Frequently, however, people pay less
attention to securing input documents before and after input. Yet these input documents
contain all of the confidential information ultimately stored on disk.

You should also pay attention to printed output, including—
• Printing control Appropriately destroy any partially printed reports that result from
printer problems.
• Distribution control Ensure that the appropriate staff distribute computer-printed reports,
particularly reports containing sensitive or confidential information, only to authorized
recipients.
• Storage security. Staff should secure computer reports in the user department for after
office hours protection.
• Destruction control. Staff should appropriately destroy all reports when no longer required
(this applies to all offices, not just computer areas). Even when information is outdated,
improper disclosure may still prove embarrassing.
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4.4.3 Software Integrity
The integrity of information depends on the integrity of the programs that produce and use
that information. Information’s integrity also depends on the integrity of the
communications software, transaction processors, file access software, security software, and
operating system—known collectively as the system software, which control the operation
of, and may be used by, application programs. Software integrity refers to the protection of
all system software stored on magnetic media and the migration of programs to production.
On-line Software Libraries

Computer programs are stored on disk files in libraries or software directories. The most
effective means of restricting user access to these libraries is through security software
restrictions as described earlier in the section, On-line Data Files, although library control
software may also assist in restricting user access.
The programming staff require access to copies of the programs to perform their job
functions. They do not, however, require access to the production versions. Providing
programmers with direct access to production versions compromises software control and
increases the possibility that unauthorized changes may be made. In general, only qualified
production librarians should require access to the production programs, and those individuals
should copy only new versions of programs into production, as required.
Off-line Software
Off-line software refers to the backup copies of program libraries or directories stored on
magnetic tape, exchangeable disks, and diskettes. The controls required to secure these
versions of the software are identical to those described earlier in this chapter in the section,
“Off-line Data Files.”

Migration of Programs to Production

If a programmer can gain access to a program and make changes between the program
tests being performed by the user and the program being put into production, the version
used in production may not be the same version that was originally tested and approved.
Changes may be introduced that could impact information integrity and expose the
organization to financial loss. Organizations can address this problem in a variety of ways
including—
• Restricting access to the test version of the program to the users who are running the test
and the individual(s) who are performing the librarian function responsible for the
transfer to production.
• Recording and monitoring the time when the last change was made, provided the
system or library control software retains that information. The date of the last change
should not be later than the date the tests were run and the software approved for use.
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4.4.4 Computer Operations Security
Improper operator intervention also can affect the proper operation of computer programs
and, therefore, the integrity of information. In particular, computer operators can create
problems by—

• Running the incorrect version of a program against the correct data files. This may
introduce errors through the use of untested program code or the possibility of fraud
through the use of unauthorized code.
• Running the correct version of the program against incorrect versions of data files.
Obviously the results produced by this action would be incorrect and could have serious
implications.
To effectively control operator activity, you should consider taking certain measures
including—

• Restricting an operator’s ability to change the Job Control Language. Job Control
Language directs the processing of a program and identifies the program to be run and
the data files to be used.
• Using internal tape, disk-label checking, or both, to ensure use of the correct file.
• Providing detailed operating instructions to reduce accidental error.
• Monitoring operator intervention by reviewing the computer activity-console logs and
investigating unusual activity.
• Reconciling data file totals from run to run, to ensure use of the correct version of the
file.

4.4.5 Logical Security for Microcomputers
Some of the important points to note with respect to logical security for PCs include:
• Be wary of leaving sensitive information on hard disks. Consider using removable disk
cartridge devices.
• Use cryptic passwords, and don’t leave passwords on or near computer workstations.
• Back up hard disks regularly to microcomputer diskettes or tape.
• Remember when erasing a hard disk that the normal erase procedures of some
operating systems leave the file on the disk (that is, it may only remove the file from the
directory). Even reformatting a PC hard drive does not make the data unrecoverable. To
prevent any possible recovery of sensitive files, use the disk-wiping functions provided
by commercial hard-drive utilities programs.
4.5

System Recovery
If properly applied, the preventive and detective controls provided by physical and logical
security will minimize the possibility of problems occurring. However, problems do
occur—either accidental or deliberate. System recovery procedures are intended to assist in
implementing an orderly and controlled return to normal operations, in the event of a
problem.
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You should consider using recovery controls to address any computer related availability
concerns. These controls are necessary in order to address short-term problems as well as
more catastrophic long-term events.

4.5.1 Recovery from Operational Failures
Operational failures are those problems that occur during the performance of day-to-day
processing. Examples include:
•
•
•
•
•

Incorrect file usage
Disk files deletion
Disk files destruction
Job processing failure
Computer equipment failure

Overcoming problems of this nature requires an appropriate combination of backup and
written recovery procedures.

Data File and Software Backup
To protect against accidental or deliberate destruction, for example, by hackers, it is
essential that you and your staff regularly make copies of all data files and software
libraries-directories. How often is regularly? This will vary from installation to installation.
In determining an appropriate backup cycle, you should consider the following factors:
• The frequency at which file managers update the file, library or directory. This will help
managers determine when to make backup files. For example, for system software
libraries that are rarely changed it may be more effective to make backup copies only
after making changes.
• The number of transactions processed each time the file is updated. This total helps
managers determine the amount of effort required to reprocess all transactions entered
since the last available backup was taken.
• The amount of processing time available for backup.
In the past, a backup cycle was often determined on an application-by-application basis.
Today organizations typically take a weekly copy of all files and libraries, and supplement
this with daily incremental backups. Incremental backups take copies of only those files and
libraries that have been updated during the day.

In many firms, employees frequently work off-line from their server, either away from their
office or saving files directly to their local drives. To ensure that all necessary data is
properly backed-up at appropriate times, you should establish guidelines that stress the
importance of the employees moving their work to the server as soon and as often as
possible. This not only provides back-up protection in the advent of a personal computer
failure, but also maintains a complete data record on the server for back-up purposes.
To assist in recovery from day-to-day operational failures, keep a backup copy of the data
files and software—on-site. In addition, send a copy off-site for use in the event of more
catastrophic problems, such as when all on-site material is either unavailable or destroyed.
(See section 4.5.2.).
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Recovery Procedures
In addition to providing backup copies of the files and libraries, provide the required
detailed written instructions for the operators so that they may efficiently and effectively
recover any necessary files. These procedures are described in most computer operational
manuals, and should address issues such as:

• Application failure recovery measures. These measures are normally documented for each
application and for each job step within the application. These measures describe how
operators can restore processing at an earlier point, and reprocess transactions. In some
cases when restoring and reprocessing is not possible, the manual should provide
direction for obtaining programming or technical support to resolve the problem.

• Use of utilities to recover from backup copies. The involvement of operators in recovery
varies from organization to organization. In some installations the operators copy the
files and libraries to a predefined recovery area on disk, and it is a user or support
group’s responsibility to copy them from the recovery area to the production area.
Other organizations will recover directly to the production areas.
• Vendor support for equipment failures or head crashes. Users should document all equipment
failures, including details of the request for vendor assistance and the vendor’s response.

4.5.2 Disaster Recovery Plans
Disaster recovery plans are intended to assist with recovery from a catastrophic event They
are not intended to deal with day-to-day operational failures. The term disaster is used in the
broadest sense—it need not be an act of God. As previously noted, white-collar criminals
can also arrange disasters to cover up their crimes.

Definition
A disaster recovery plan is a documented description of the action to take, resources to use,
and the procedures to follow before, during, and after a disruption of data processing
capability.

Given the business communities current reliance on computers, many executives would
probably find the loss of the computer center for a lengthy period of time inconceivable.
However, the same executive’s organization has probably taken no action on developing a
contingency plan. A survey completed several years ago suggested that less than 50 percent
of the Fortune 1000 companies had disaster recovery plans, and for the companies that had,
only half of the plans were feasible.

Elements of Effective Disaster Recovery Plans
Before disaster occurs, you should take action to ensure that off-site backup is capable of
supporting recovery operations. Keep off-site backup copies of data files and software some
distance from the principal site so that access to these vital records will not be inaccessible
and, therefore, denied in the event of a disaster affecting the local geographic area.
Consider what happened when a train derailed in Mississauga, Ontario (a Toronto suburb)
a number of years ago. In this case, the authorities closed access to a sizable city area for
five days because of a dangerous chemical spill. Any organization housing both its data
center and off-site storage in that geographical area would have had difficulty implementing
its disaster recovery plan.
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In addition to keeping off-site backup copies of data files and software, consider keeping
off-site the supplies of other materials required for processing. Examples include: check
stock files, special invoice forms and forms for laser printers, operations documentation,
and a copy of the recovery plan.

Perhaps documenting detailed recovery procedures and implementing regular tests of the
recovery plan are the most important actions to take before the advent of a disaster.
Disaster recovery operations require the channeling of information to management to assist
in decision making during the chaos of a disaster. Without clearly identifying reporting
channels and decision points in advance, employees may later take inappropriate action.
Similarly, prepare detailed procedures for system recovery because operations staff may not
perform standard procedures as expected when affected by the stress created by a disaster.
Remember that in a disaster personnel who might be expected to participate in the
recovery—either on the operations team or the management team—may be victims of the
disaster, so the plan must make allowances by designating one or more alternates for each
recovery position. Regular testing ensures that the plan is workable, and helps to keep the
plan current.
During the disaster, the staff with recovery responsibilities should follow documented
procedures to—

1. Notify all necessary parties that a problem has occurred.
2. Assess the extent of the damage and the expected period of system outage for
communications to the recovery team.
3. Report to a predetermined emergency control center.

After invoking the disaster recovery plan, the recovery staff should follow the documented
procedures for—
1. Recovering the critical systems at the identified alternative processing location.

2. Operating at the alternative site.
3. Refurbishing or replacing the damaged site.
4. Returning to normal operations once the damaged site has been refurbished.
Most organizations plan to recover only the critical systems at the alternative-processing
site. These are the application systems needed to ensure continued business operations. If
sufficient resources exist at the alternative site to run other systems, do not recover them
until the critical systems are running.
See figure 4-2 for a schematic of an approach to developing a disaster recovery plan.

4. 5.3 Insurance
For most businesses that rely heavily on computer processing, an effective disaster recovery
plan is likely the only effective means of ensuring continued business survival following a
major computer system disruption. However, it is possible to mitigate some of the financial
loss through insurance coverage. Some examples of the kinds of insurance coverage
available include:
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The Disaster Recovery
Planning Process
General Definition of Requirements
Identification of Critical Systems

Detailed Definition of Requirements
Resources Required to Run Critical Systems

Identification of
Processing Alternatives

Selection of
Best Alternative

Contingency Plan
Preparation

Plan Implementation, Testing and
Maintenance

Figure 4-2. The Disaster Recovery Planning Process

• Data processing equipment coverage: These policies assist in defraying the cost of
replacement computer hardware and air conditioning equipment. Some policies also
cover the cost of removing the debris from covered equipment.
• Data, computer programs, and media coverage: These policies cover only data and programs
in computer format, not hard copy. Organizations can take out insurance to cover the
estimated potential loss if data and programs are destroyed.
• Extra expense coverage: These policies cover the extra expenses involved in continuing
data processing operations if the equipment, air conditioning, or building housing the
equipment is damaged.
• Business interruption: These policies cover the business losses incurred following a disaster
in the computer department, subject to limits on the amount to be paid per day and a
total amount payable.
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• Fidelity coverage: These policies may cover costs associated with the unlawful acts of a
dishonest employee. There are various new forms of crime coverage that may extend
cover to certain acts by outsiders as well.

4.5.4 System Recovery for Microcomputers
Equipment failure for microcomputers generally is not a major concern for organizations,
particularly compared with similar situations associated with larger computer systems;
however, considering the dependency of many businesses on PCs and local area networks,
it should be given more attention. If a PC fails, normally another machine is available or
can be obtained with relative ease. Local area network (LAN) file servers and the
communications gear associated with connecting LANs to private and public networks,
including the Internet, may be highly specialized and take one or more days to replace and
reconfigure. The biggest concerns are the potential loss of communications (which would,
for example, cause a loss of electronic mail functions) and the loss of data stored on hard
disk or diskettes.

Good PC and LAN security should be a priority in order to avoid situations requiring
recovery. However, as noted earlier, disasters occur. Therefore, a regular policy of backing
up hard disks is advisable. Consider using Norton Utilities (a system diagnostic-detection
recovery software) or a similar program because under certain conditions this specialized
software enables the recovery of files that have been accidentally erased.

4.6 Management’s Responsibilities in a Security Program
Management is responsible for providing protection for the organization’s assets, including
protection against dishonest employees and outside criminal acts. The information asset,
administered in most organizations by the information systems or computer department, is
as vital and vulnerable as any other asset. Although many organizations have invested
heavily in the development of computerized systems to support their business operations,
they have not invested sufficient effort to establish a security program that would properly
protect that investment. Computer security is often neglected because of pressures to deal
with day-to-day operating needs first, yet security can be fundamental to business survival.
You can implement effective security by identifying—
• The information in your organization that requires protection.
• The level of protection currently provided for that information.
• The risks and exposures that currently make that information vulnerable.

Using this approach, you can achieve a level of security that is appropriate to your
organization’s requirements. The objective is to provide sufficient security without going
overboard and making security more complex than necessary. After taking the steps
outlined in this chapter, your organization can implement a security program to address the
exposures. This program should incorporate the development of policies, standards,
guidelines, and procedures; the assignment of security responsibilities; and the monitoring
of progress.
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4 .6.1 Policy, Standards, Guidelines and Procedures
It is generally unwise to assume that employees will act in a security-conscious manner
particularly if the organization’s expectations in this regard have never been
communicated. Companies can communicate policies through the development and
implementation of policy statements on computer security and should emphasize security
and fraud awareness.
Effective policies must be short and succinct. If policies are too detailed and lengthy, they
probably will not have the desired effect (especially with junior-level employees). For
brevity, simply cross-reference the more-detailed standards, rather than attempting to
include this material in the policy statement itself. The policy, standards, guidelines and
procedures provide a framework for effective security in any organization.
Many organizations, in consultation with legal counsel, have determined that it is important
to have employees sign a security and confidentiality agreement that defines the person’s
responsibility for safeguarding information in all forms. Indeed, many organizations have
also developed agreements to be completed by contractors, vendors and temporary
workers who require access to confidential and proprietary information.

4 .6.2 The Security Function
Having recognized the importance of computer and information security to the
organization, management must assign responsibility for this function. The person
identified to take on the security function will usually be responsible for—

• Assisting in the development of policies, standards, guidelines, and procedures.
• Developing a formal security program to improve the level of security in accordance
with management’s expectations.
• Raising security and fraud awareness.
• Reporting on progress to senior management.
• Liaising with specialists in the event of crisis (for example, police, forensic accountants,
computer forensics experts, and specialists in computer viruses).

Depending on the size of the organization, this may be either a full or part-time
responsibility. Initially setting up the program probably will require a full-time position.

4.6.3 Policing
Once the security program is underway and the policy, standards, guidelines and
procedures are in place, an organization must ensure compliance with expectations on an
ongoing basis. This is a policing function.
Most organizations have an internal audit department that performs the policing function
for controls that operate in other areas of the business. As such, internal audit may be an
ideal candidate to become involved in testing compliance with corporate security
expectations. Alternatively, external auditors or consultants can fill this role.
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4 ,6.4 Evidence Recovery
If a security incident occurs, computer and security personnel may find they have different
objectives. In an actual case in which a company’s electronic mail servers suddenly
reformatted their hard disk drives, the computer operations department saw as its objective
repairing the damage and restoring email services within the company as quickly as
possible. In contrast, the security people regarded the data center as a crime scene, and
wanted to collect evidence to determine if the incident had been a technical accident or the
deliberate act of a perpetrator. The two groups had to work together to ensure that
technical personnel, who were assigned the task of restoring service (including outside
consultants who were quickly brought in), would understand the importance of identifying
any evidence of wrongdoing and call in the security people to gather and secure the
evidence so that it would be admissible in court.
In cases where the crime scene is, in fact, the surface of a hard drive, the collection of
evidence becomes critical. As with any other evidence, it is necessary to ensure that the
process of collecting and safeguarding the evidence also preserves that evidence from any
changes. Courts will not turn a blind eye when recovery technicians have made changes
and later claim that the hard drive bears evidence of a crime. Under these circumstances,
how is it possible to prove that the purported evidence of a crime wasn’t planted to
incriminate an innocent person? In complex or important cases, this task is often assigned
to experts in the field of computer evidence recovery—a discipline known as Computer
Forensics.

4.7 Computer Security Checklist
Table 4.1, Computer Security Checklist is designed to assist CPAs in dealing with computer
security in their organizations and in those of their clients. Generally, all No answers require
investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented. Use the Refcolumn
to cross-reference the checklist to any additional work papers.

The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist
does not guarantee the adequacy of computer security, and it is not intended as a substitute
for audit or similar procedures. If computer security is an especially vital concern or if
computer fraud is suspected, seek the advice of a knowledgeable computer professional.
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Table 4.1 Computer Security Checklist
Computer Security Checklist

Yes

No

NA

• Are adequate fire detection and suppression systems in place
(for example, does the computer room construction have a
minimum one-hour fire resistance rating, in addition to
smoke detectors, fire alarms, and sprinklers)?

| |

| |

| |

• Where sprinkler systems are in use, are adequate systems in
place to protect against water damage (for example,
underfloor water detectors, floor drains, waterproof
equipment covers)?

| |

| |

| |

• Where power supplies are unreliable or the nature of
processing is critical, are suitable precautions in place (for
example, battery-equipped Uninterruptible Power Supplies
(UPS) or backup generators, and surge protectors for PCs)?

| |

□

• Are appropriate environmental controls in place with respect
to temperature, humidity and dust particles?

□

1 1

| |

—

• Is access to especially sensitive computer installations
appropriately restricted (for example, through key locks,
combination or cipher locks, or card access systems, along
with access-control policies and procedures)?

1 1

1 1

| |

__

• Is overall physical computer security on the premises
adequate?

1 1

1 1

1 1

—

• Are PCs and workstations in areas where theft is a threat
secured by cables, locks or other antitheft devices?

1 1

1 1

1 1

—

• Are PCs and workstations secured with screen-saver
programs that require passwords to unlock?

1 1

1 1

1 1

—

Ref

1. Physical Security
a. Computer Room: Most medium and larger organizations
will have dedicated computer rooms for their mainframe
computers or file servers. The following are basic questions to
answer when looking at such a facility.

b. PCs and Workstations

2. Communications Security

a. Is a user ID and password system in place?

1_ 1

1_ 1

1_ 1

b. Is the ID and password system properly administered (for
example, is the distribution of new IDs controlled, and are
terminated users promptly deleted from the system)?

1 1

1 1

1 1

c. Are users aware of the responsibilities associated with their
password (for example, are they required to sign computer-use
and confidentiality agreements, and are they instructed to
maintain password secrecy and not to choose simplistic or
easily guessed passwords) ?

1 1

1 1

1 1

—
—

__
(continued)

25

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist
d. Are passwords changed regularly (for example, every 90
days)?

e. Does the system monitor and control use (for example, by
restricting users to specific terminals or specific times,
automatically logging-out inactive users, limiting the number
of log-on attempts, and recording all usage for later follow-up
and investigation if required)?

f. For especially sensitive systems, is security to control remote
access in place (for example, callback devices or one-time
password devices)?

3. Data Security
a. Is access to on-line data limited to authorized individuals only,
through built-in software restrictions or screening?
b. For extremely sensitive data, has data encryption been
considered as a security measure?

c. Are data files stored on magnetic media (including all
backups) kept in a physically secure location away from the
computers, to which only authorized persons are allowed
access?

d. Are all printed reports subject to appropriate control and
appropriate destruction (for example, shredding) when no
longer required?
4. Software Integrity

a. Is access to production versions of all software tightly
controlled by a production librarian or similar authorized
person?

b. Is access to all software programming code controlled so that
programmers or others cannot subsequently alter tested and
approved software?
c. Are appropriate policies in place to guard against computer
viruses (for example, prohibiting the installation of any copied
or borrowed software, and screening all software with virus
detection programs)?
d. Are controls in place to ensure that the organization is not
using unlicensed (pirated) software?

5. Operations Security
a. Do detailed operator instructions (for example, manuals)
exist?

b. Is computer activity logged and is any unusual operator
activity investigated?
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

c. Are computer-operations personnel prohibited from altering
the program code and the Job Control Language, which
matches the program and data files to be run?
d. Are all software and data storage media clearly and correctly
labeled, including dates, to avoid errors?

e. Are data files reconciled from run to run?
f. Are all data storage media (including hard disk drives) erased
(wiped clean) before being disposed of?

6. System Recovery
a. Are copies of all data files and software made on a regular
basis (for example, weekly, with daily backups of transaction
files)?
b. Are guidelines in place to ensure that all employee work is
saved to the network-server to ensure a complete backup of all
data files?

c. Is at least one backup copy of all data files and software stored
off-site?

d. Has training been provided and do written instructions exist
for the disaster recovery procedures?
e. In the case of catastrophic failure, do alternative processing
arrangements exist?
f. Have the backup plans been tested in a realistic simulation to
provide assurance that they can work if needed?

g. Is adequate insurance in place covering computer equipment,
software, recovery expenses and business interruption?
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CHAPTER 5:
Internal Fraud

5.1 Asset Misappropriation from Within
As difficult as it is to believe, many experts are convinced that the worst threat to business is
from the people who work there. Fraud committed against an organization by a perpetrator
from within that organization is probably the most common form of fraud. Certainly it is
the most widely recognized.

It is estimated that at least one-third of all employees steal to some degree. In retail
organizations, shoplifters are responsible for only thirty percent of retail losses; employees
steal the remainder. Probably the worst case of insider misappropriation is the infamous
U.S. Savings and Loan scandal; the billions of dollars stolen by trusted insiders has no equal
in history.

5.1.1 Classification of Fraud
Regardless of the industry, you can classify internal fraud in several different ways. One
way is by the method of concealment, including on-book and off-book frauds.

On-Book Fraud
On-book fraud principally occurs within a business when an employee creates an audit trail
(which is sometimes obscure) that inadvertently aids the employer in detection. Examples
include phony vendors and ghost employees. On-book fraud is normally detected at the
point of payment.
Off-Book Fraud
Off-book fraud occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit trail is likely to
exist. Examples include bribery and kickbacks. If an employee receives a bribe for selecting
a certain vendor, that payment would be made by the vendor and, therefore, would not be
reflected on the books of the affected company. These frauds are detected in an indirect
manner (that is, responding to other vendor complaints, investigating the life-style of the
person receiving the bribes, and so on). If you suspect that an employee is receiving illicit
payments, examining the employee’s personal finances should prove this.

5.1.2 Cycles
You can classify fraud occurring within the business environment by one of the five cycles
in the accounting system. These cycles are:
1. Sales and collection
2. Acquisition and payment
3
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3. Payroll and personnel
4. Inventory and warehousing
5. Capital acquisition and repayment

All of these cycles flow through the cash account. Accordingly, cash misappropriation is
discussed separately in this chapter. The following sections discuss the more common
frauds occurring within each cycle.

5.2 Sales and Collection Cycle
The sales and collection cycle deals with the billing of goods or services to customers’
accounts receivable and the collection of funds relating to those receivables.

5.2.1 Functions
The functions of the sales and collection cycle include:
• Receiving orders from customers
• Administering credit approvals
• Invoicing customers
• Collecting receivables
• Adjusting sales and receivables for allowances, returns and write-offs

5.2.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Sales revenue on the income statement and accounts receivable and cash on the balance
sheet are affected by the sales and collection cycle.

5.2.3 Perpetration
Frauds in the sales and collection cycle most commonly involve the theft of cash, the theft
of other assets, and kickbacks to customers. It can also involve off-book fraud in a situation
described as front-end fraud, that is, when an employee diverts company revenue before
entering it on the books.

Theft of Cash
By far, the most common sales-cycle fraud is the theft of cash. The main schemes include:
not recording sales, under-ringing sales, lapping, theft of funds from voids and returns,
overbilling and keeping the difference, simple theft of cash, writing off receivables as
uncollectible, and issuing bogus credit memoranda.

For example, in one lapping fraud, a cashier was able to misappropriate cash receipts
totaling over $35,000 and cover the shortage by subsequent receipts. The prelisted receipts
were not compared to the deposits by an independent person, allowing the fraud to go
undetected over time. This scheme was eventually discovered as a result of a CPA
following up on the clearing of deposits in transit listed on the year-end bank reconciliation.
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Theft of Other Assets
These schemes include ordering and shipping company goods to the residence of the
employee, and ordering goods for personal use.
Kickbacks to Customers
The most common schemes for kickbacks to customers include underbilling for
merchandise and splitting the difference, and writing off receivables owed to the company
for a fee.

Front-End Fraud
A front-end fraud occurs when a company’s customers are improperly directed to take their
business elsewhere, thereby depriving the company of profits it could otherwise have made.
Another example is the receipt of a purchase rebate that is misappropriated and not
deposited to the company’s bank account.

5.2.4 Detection
Generally, CPAs can best detect frauds in the sales and collection cycle by analyzing cash
or inventory, or both.

Theft of Cash and Front-End Fraud
Following are some methods for detecting the theft of cash and front-end fraud:

• Investigate customer complaints.
• Insist that customers examine receipts.

• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices.
• Compare receipts with deposits.
• Follow up on deposits in transit at the end of each period.

• Account for consecutive sales orders and cash register transactions.
• Compare volume of credit memos by period.
• Verify independently customers who don’t pay.
• Examine gross margin by product.

• Use a computer to—
— Identify missing invoices by number.
— Match shipping documents, sales invoices and customer orders.
— Verify numerical sequence of documents.
— Analyze sales volume by employee.
— Match daily deposits with customer credits.

For example, in one fraud case, a CPA for a retail client noted a skip in the perpetual
transaction count for one of the cash registers. During a one-year period an employee had
destroyed sections of cash register tapes totaling $17,000. The irregularity was directly
related to the company’s failure to institute and maintain adequate internal controls and
procedures over cash register tapes.
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Theft of Other Assets
You can detect theft of other assets by using the following methods:

• Resolve customer disputes.
• Conduct periodic surprise inventory counts.
• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices, including examining the shipping address.
• Use a computer to—
— Match sales invoices with customer orders.

— Compare customer names and addresses with employee names and addresses.
— Verify delivery addresses against addresses of customers.
Kickbacks to Customers
You can use one or a combination of the following to detect the common schemes in
kickbacks to customers:

• Follow up on customer disputes.
• Conduct statistical sampling of sales invoices by contacting customers regarding prices
and terms.
• Conduct computer analysis of—
— Prices charged by product to customer.
— Credit granting approval versus actual sales to customers.
— Customer balances versus sales.
— Customer balances versus length of time doing business with the customer.

— Receivable write-offs.
— Credit memos to customers.
— Time between order and delivery.
— Discounts to customers in descending volume of purchase.

5.2.5 Prevention
Employers can generally prevent sales and collection frauds by using adequate internal
controls. More specifically, the following methods typically form part of an overall
prevention strategy:

•
•
•
•
•
•
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Honesty Testing
The legality of using certain kinds of honesty testing as part of the hiring process varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, since the advent of the U.S. Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, generally it has been unlawful to require preemployment
polygraphs of prospective employees. A number of companies have turned to pencil and
paper honesty tests, which their designers tout as accurate.

Separation of Duties
Employers can prevent most frauds by properly segregating the custody, authorization, and
record-keeping functions. In the case of sales and collections, it is important to separate the
functions of credit granting and sales. In addition, the functions of sales, record keeping,
and cash handling should also be separate.

Physical Safeguards over Assets
If assets and records have physical safeguards, misappropriation is much more difficult. In
the area of computers, physical safeguards such as restricted access, locks, and similar
controls are especially important.

Proper Documentation
Proper documentation requires adequate records, including prenumbered checks and
invoices, to make fictitious entries more difficult. Documentation in sales and collections
should include the following prenumbered documents:
• Sales orders
• Shipping documents
• Sales invoices
• Credit memos
• Remittance advices

Proper Approvals
Approval should be sought and evidenced before each of the following:

1. Granting credit

2. Allowing write-offs
3. Shipping goods

Independent Checks on Performance
In addition to a necessary independent review of employee adherence to internal controls,
you should make the potential perpetrators aware that their performance is being
monitored. Independent verification steps include reconciling bank accounts, audits and
supervision.
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5.2.6 Sales, Receivables and Receipts System
The sales, receivables and receipts system is the part of the accounting system that records a
company’s sales and revenue collections. Individuals can use false books and supporting
documentation for sales, receivables and receipts to perpetrate a fraud on a company. This
section covers three such methods:

1. Front-end fraud

2. False sales invoices
3. Lapping

Front-End Fraud
As discussed in section 5.2.3, employees may divert company revenues before that money
ever reaches the sales, receivables and receipts system, thus circumventing the accounting
system entirely. This is commonly called front-end fraud.

A front-end fraud occurs when company products are sold for cash, the sale and the receipt
of the cash are not recorded, and the cash is diverted—usually, directly into the pocket of
the perpetrator. A front-end fraud also occurs when a company’s customers are improperly
directed to take their business elsewhere, thus depriving the company of profits. Finally, a
front-end fraud occurs when an employee receives and misappropriates special or unusual
revenues and cost reductions, such as a purchase rebate.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are:

1. Do recorded sales represent all company sales? Where no sale has been recorded, there
is nothing in the sales accounting system to red-flag an unpaid or overdue account. As a
result, unrecorded sales are difficult to detect; however, actual inventory on hand has
been depleted. Therefore, if the company has a good inventory accounting system,
unrecorded sales may be detected.
2. Has the company unexpectedly lost some of its oldest and best customers?
3. Are all revenues recorded? Service businesses, such as parking lots, theatres and movie
houses operate primarily with cash sales and have no inventory systems. Front-end
frauds in these kinds of businesses, therefore, are extremely difficult to detect.
When allowed under local law, a review of a suspected perpetrator’s personal bank
accounts may reveal unexplained cash deposits, which could be important in establishing
circumstantial evidence of front-end cash skimming. Otherwise use of the net worth
approach may be necessary to establish that the suspected perpetrator has benefited.

Investigators should analyze the sales records and other supporting documents of the victim
company for the period both before and after the assumed occurrence date of a front-end
fraud. When possible, the investigators should interview customers as well.
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“Taxes ‘R Us” Case Study

Jane Brown and Jack Smith were cashiers who worked at a county tax office.
Investigation revealed that, over a two-month period in 1997, thirteen individuals
apparently paid tax for vehicle tags and did not receive an official receipt.
On a review of all the official receipts issued during this period of time it was found
that:

1. The numerical continuity of the prenumbered receipts was complete; that is, all
of the issued receipts were accounted for in the bureau’s records.
2. There were no receipts to support the thirteen payments made by those
individuals identified as exceptions.

The county tax office’s banking records were then reviewed for the days on which
people reportedly paid for their tags but did not receive a receipt. The review
disclosed that the amount of cash and checks relating to the tax deposited to the
county bank account totaled only the amount of receipts issued for that date.
Five of the individuals who reportedly paid for their tags, but were not issued an
official receipt, paid by check. In the case of each of these five individuals, the
checks were deposited to the county bank account, but the checks, upon deposit,
were applied to cover actual receipts issued. With respect to those individuals who
were known to have paid for their tags by check, but who did not receive an official
receipt, it was noted that a like amount was included on the county tax office
deposit slip.

During the same period, cash totaling $4,600 was deposited to the known bank
accounts ofJane Brown. The source of that deposited cash was not identified.

Front-end fraud of this type is very difficult to detect. Larger frauds may be uncovered if the
perpetrators become too greedy because the resulting unusually low daily deposits may
highlight the problem. In fact, skimming of small amounts may be detected only through
customer complaints: as in the case study, by the lack of an official receipt. This illustrates
the need to thoroughly investigate similar complaints and any other irregularities.

False Sales Invoices
Employees can alter a company sales invoice to show a lower sale amount than what was
actually received. They can misappropriate the difference between the real sale amount and
the adjusted lower amount without the accounting system showing a redflag.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud include:

1. Are recorded sales amounts the actual sales amounts?
2. Can customers confirm the sales?
3. Are sale amounts reasonable in the circumstances?
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Investigators should obtain and examine all original copies of invoices and all the related
books of original entry. Again, the investigator must become familiar with the accounting
system in effect and understand the accused’s position within that system. Did the accused
have the necessary authority to perpetrate this crime? Did the accused have the
opportunity?

“Ms. Wanda Cash” Case Study
Wanda Cash was the bookkeeper for Anytown Animal Center. She looked after all
customer records including preparing bills and collecting payments. The owners of
the business became suspicious when daily bank deposits were not as high as
expected considering the level of business. Upon investigation by the owners, the
police and forensic accountants, it was discovered that Wanda Cash, through
altering sales invoices, had misappropriated approximately $11,700.
The investigation revealed that:

1. The 183 customer copies of sales invoices showed a total-charge amount higher
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash receipts journal. The customer
copy of sales invoices indicated total charges to be higher by $2,579 than the
amount recorded in the cash receipts journal.
2. The 549 office copies of the sales invoices indicated a total-charge amount higher
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash-receipts journal. The office
copy total-charge amount was higher by $8,941 than the amount recorded in the
cash-receipts journal.
3. Approximately 68 office-copy invoices were apparently altered so that the total
charge after alteration balanced with the total charge recorded in the cash
receipts journal.

To uncover this fraud and measure its magnitude, investigators compared the
following:
• Customer copies of invoices obtained by the investigating officer
• Office or accounting copies of the company’s sales invoices
• Entries in the customer ledger cards and the cash-receipts journal

The result was that the amount of the total charge on the customer copies of sales
invoices exceeded the amount of the total charge recorded in the cash-receipts
journal by an aggregate amount of $2,579. An examination of these documents
disclosed that in 54 separate cases the corresponding office copy of the invoice was
altered so that the altered amount agreed to the total-charge amount recorded in the
cash-receipts journal.
Investigators compared the office copies of the sales invoices with the total charge
recorded for those invoices in the cash-receipts journal and found that the total
charge amount on the office copy exceeded the total charge amount recorded in the
cash receipts journal. In aggregate, the excess was $8,941.

10

Chapter Five: Internal Fraud
This case illustrates the need for close supervision in small businesses, in which adequate
division of duties is difficult to achieve.
Lapping

Lapping occurs when cash receipts from Customer A are misappropriated and the
misappropriation is subsequently concealed by recording the receipt of monies from
Customer B to the credit of Customer A (to the extent of the earlier misappropriation).

The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are as follows:
1. Are the amounts recorded as owing to the company actually still owing to the company?
2. Are deposits from Peter being used to cover Paul’s debts?

To handle these questions, the investigator should understand the organization’s system for
receiving customer payments, making bank deposits, and preparing entries to customer
accounts. The following is a guide to understanding an organization’s account management.

1. Who first received the payments?
2. Who prepared the company bank deposit?

3. Who updated the customer accounts?
4. Has an individual written offany accounts?
5. Who approved the write-offs? (It is also often necessary to contact customers and obtain
their records of payments, including paid checks and remittance advices.)
6. Do the customer’s records show payment of specific invoices that are shown as unpaid
in the victim company’s records?

“Ms. B. A. Lapper” Case Study

Jones Transport Company operated a trucking terminal in Norcross, GA. Their
accounts receivable clerk, Ms. B.A. Lapper, had been a loyal employee for over
eight years. The terminal manager often complimented her for the extra effort she
put into the business, evidenced by the amount of work she frequently took home.
This employee was so loyal that her only time off was attributable to sickness.

Ms. Lapper was responsible for preparing the day’s deposit to the bank and for
preparing input to the computer systems for updating payments on accounts
receivable. (The processing of the sales invoice as an account receivable was outside
her control.) Every month the head office in Atlanta forwarded aged listings of
accounts receivable to the manager’s attention at the terminal. He gave the analysis
to the accounts receivable clerk—Ms. Lapper—satisfied that the aged analysis was
relatively current.

Investigators determined that Ms. Lapper had conducted a lapping scheme over a
period of six years. The lap grew so large during this period that she had to take the
aged receivable analysis home in the evenings, along with the paid and unpaid sales
invoices. There, she would set aside invoices for payment during the next day to
ensure a favorable aged receivable analysis in the following month. As the lap grew,
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the new cash receipts were no longer sufficient to cover the previously
misappropriated funds. Accordingly, Ms. Lapper began to apply checks received
from the larger customers of the company to cover up the already-paid sales
invoices.

Investigators examined the known personal bank accounts of the accused and her
husband. An amount of $35,000 was found deposited to these bank accounts over
and above personal income during the relevant period.
Accounts Receivable Routines: Ms. Lapper’s main function each day was to
balance the cash with the pro-bills (sales invoices) and prepare a cash deposit for the
bank in Norcross and a cash report for processing by the head-office computer. She
would process all incoming checks from charge account customers by matching
checks to the applicable pro-bill control copies and preparing a deposit for the bank
in Norcross and a receivable report for the head office. She would present the
deposit slips and receivable reports to the manager for his signature, along with the
customer’s checks and cash in an envelope.

The supporting documents were always in sealed and stapled envelopes for each
report. The envelopes were not opened and verified by the manager. If the total of
the bank deposit agreed with the total of the receivable report, he would sign the
report. One copy of the report, the bank deposit slip, and pro-bills were then
forwarded to the Atlanta head office, while a second copy of the report and the
remittance copies of pro-bills were retained on file at the Norcross terminal.
Ms. Lapper would work on the company’s Accounts Receivable Aged Analysis, a listing
of all outstanding pro-bills prepared at the Atlanta head office, and would appear to
question certain delinquent accounts for payment. She would often take the analysis
home because she said she was too busy during the day to perform this function.

The Atlanta terminal manager would look at the receivable analysis printout and
tell Ms. Lapper to question certain delinquent customer accounts, which she
appeared to do. She would inform the manager of checks arriving after her contacts
with the customer. For instance, in regard to the Best Quality Cheese account, she
informed the manager that Best Quality was having serious problems converting to
a computer accounting system and as a result had requested that Jones Transport be
patient with the amount of old outstanding receivables.

Jones Transport hired a new person to replace Ms. Lapper when she became
seriously ill. Her replacement began the collection work on the two largest charge
account customers, Best Quality Cheese and Anyco Inc. Successful collection of
these accounts would immediately reduce the analysis’ sixty- and ninety-day totals,
which had become very high.
Customer Best Quality: Best Quality was advised that their pro-bills dated July
and August were still outstanding on the receivable analysis. Ms. Brown asked Best
Quality if they were having computer problems and the response was negative.
Subsequently Best Quality informed Jones Transport that the pro-bills mentioned as
outstanding were all paid by checks issued in July and August.
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Jones Transport then examined copies of the reports around the dates of the Best
Quality checks, together with check stubs and supporting pro-bills. Although the
pro-bills that were paid with the Best Quality checks were all Best Quality, all were
dated April and May. Jones Transport wondered if Best Quality had made an error,
because their August check, which was paying July and August pro-bills, did not
appear to apply to the pro-bills in the deposit that were all dated May and June.
Best Quality responded that there was no error on their part, and they could not
understand how there could be a mistake because they had attached all the
applicable pro-bills with their remittances.
Customer Anyco: Jones Transport then called Anyco Inc. and asked when they
would be paying certain outstanding pro-bills. Anyco indicated that these bills had
been paid by checks that had been issued and received as paid. When Jones
Transport checked their copies of the reports, they found that Anyco checks were
deposited, but that the checks were applied to older Anyco pro-bills and other
customer pro-bills and not to the pro-bills submitted by Anyco with its checks.

The outstanding pro-bills totaled about $47,000 at Best Quality and about $12,000
at Anyco. At this point Jones Transport recognized that the customer checks were
not applied to the pro-bills as intended by the customer. Instead the checks were
applied either to the customer’s older pro-bills or to other customers’ pro-bills.
Further investigation revealed that these other customers were normally cash
paying customers.

Examination of the Amount of Money Due Jones Transport: To determine the
correct amount of money owing to them by all their customers, Jones Transport
communicated directly with each customer, based on their accounts receivable
analysis. For each customer, Jones Transport prepared from their analysis a list of
pro-bills by number, date, and amount that the customers had not paid and
requested verification that the information concerning the outstanding pro-bills was
accurate.
A reply made by all customers indicated that several pro-bills shown in the analysis
of Jones Transport were, in fact, paid and were, therefore, not outstanding. This
finding confirmed the evidence of the samples and the discussion by Jones
Transport with both Best Quality and Anyco, that a customer’s check was applied
not to his current pro-bills as intended by the customer, but rather to a combination
of the customer’s older pro-bills and other customer’s pro-bills that had been paid in
cash.
From the information provided by the customers, the investigators determined that
the dollar value of the pro-bills, which had been paid by these customers, was
$115,132.

Jones Transport fell victim to a fraudulent scheme commonly called lapping. Cash
and checks were received at the Hamilton terminal of Jones Transport and
controlled by Ms. Lapper. The cash was removed from Jones Transport while the
checks were applied to the pro-bills that were to have been paid by the cash.
Consequently, the pro-bills remitted with the checks remained outstanding on the
accounts-receivable analysis published at the end of each month.
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As a result, the amount of the outstanding pro-bills, which Jones Transport found
through direct communication with their customers to have been paid, represented
that amount of the cash that had been misappropriated over the time period under
investigation, that is, $115,132.

Victims most often detect lapping frauds through accounts-receivable reconciliations or
confirmations, or both. Supervision is also important. Organizations can prevent lapping by
appropriately dividing duties (for example, assigning someone other than the accounts
receivable clerk the duty of handling cash receipts). You should also consider establishing a
policy of mandatory vacations, which could be helpful.
5.3 Acquisition and Payment Cycle

The acquisition and payment cycle includes the procurement and payment of all goods and
services except for payroll and capital acquisitions. This cycle is especially vulnerable to
fraudulent transactions because this is the point where funds flow out of an entity.

5.3.1 Functions
The functions of the acquisition and payment cycle include:

• Processing purchase orders and dealing with vendors.
• Receiving and recording goods and services.
• Accounting for the liability of items or services purchased.
• Processing and recording cash disbursements.

5.3.2 Financial Statements Accounts
Balance Sheet
The following balance sheet accounts are affected by the acquisition and payment cycle:
• Cash
• Inventories

• Prepaid expenses
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Buildings
Equipment
Accumulated depreciation
Accounts payable
Deferred taxes
Other payables
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Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the acquisition and payment
cycle:
• Cost of goods sold
• Advertising expenses
• Travel and entertainment expenses
• Miscellaneous expenses
• Income tax expenses

• Professional fees

• All expense accounts
• Gains and losses on sales of assets

5.3.3 Perpetration
By far the most common fraud in the acquisition and payment cycle involves the
purchasing agent (buyer), who is especially vulnerable to the temptation of accepting
kickbacks and gifts from outside vendors.
One study revealed that companies who caught employees accepting small gifts were
hesitant to discharge their employees. Two percent suspended the employees, while only
12 percent fired them. Sixty-six percent reprimanded the employees and made them return
the gifts.
There are three general kinds of acquisition and payment-cycle frauds:

1. The buyer-employee acts alone, and without outside assistance.

2. The vendor acts alone.
3. The buyer acts in collusion with the vendor. As is the case with other methods of
prevention and detection, the collusion between both parties is the most difficult to
prevent and detect.

Buyer Acting Alone
Noncollusive purchasing frauds usually involve the use of a nominee entity, that is, an
apparent third party owned by the buyer. Examples include the use of a nominee entity to
submit fictitious invoices (the most common fraud), or to order goods for personal use.

In one case, a 61-year-old employee of a major department store was indicted for allegedly
stealing $2 million from the company. His responsibilities included leasing buildings to
house the retailer’s stores. On twenty-two leases over a two-year period, through a nominee
company, he altered leases to receive overpayments, and forged invoices billing the
company for fictitious legal and building services.
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In another example, an executive was indicted for defrauding a large cosmetics company of
$1.1 million over four years. During this period, he allegedly approved more than 150
vendor invoices for services that were never rendered in connection with a newsletter the
company was going to publish. The executive (whose salary was $124,000 per year) helped
set up two nominee printing companies, which bilked his employer with the fraudulent
invoices.

Finally, a director of customer-service technology was able to defraud his employer of over
$2 million in one year by taking advantage of defects in internal control. The fraudster set
up a legitimate agreement with a legitimate vendor to provide certain equipment. Then he
set up a fake distributorship and told the vendor the company would purchase only from
this one distributor. The vendor was content to have the business and proceeded to invoice
the distributor. The fraudster, through his nominee distributorship, then inflated the
invoices and billed them to his employer. The fraud was possible because the employee
had the authority to set up the agreement, and to approve invoices for payment. The fraud
was discovered by a manager who thought it was strange that the employee was delivering
the invoices to accounts payable by hand.

Buyer and Vendor in Collusion
Nearly all collusion between buyer and vendor involves some form of secret commission or
kickback from the vendor to the buyer. In these cases, secret benefits are given by a vendor
in order to buy business, or are requested by the buyer for direct financial benefit. Collusion
fraud often involves more than one kind of scheme perpetrated over time. Of course, there
is always the question of who took the initiative, that is, the buyer or the vendor.
For example, one case started out involving inferior goods and later graduated to inflated
invoices. A county purchasing agent was responsible for acquiring a long list of janitorial
supplies, including mops, pails, soap, plywood, rakes, and paper goods. Area paper
jobbers—experienced connivers—approached the purchasing agent with a deal. “Without
changing our invoice price,” they told him, “if you agree, we can deliver a cheaper brand of
paper towels. Half the extra is for us; the other half is for you.” Once the purchasing agent
accepted a lesser brand, the vendor began squeezing for more by raising the price on the
invoice and billing for five times the amount of merchandise actually shipped.

Monetary payments are not the only benefit that can be offered. Other common ways of
corrupting a buyer include products or services; gifts, trips, or sex; promises of subsequent
employment; reduced prices for personal items; and employment of friends or relatives.

Vendor Acting Alone
Common schemes used by vendors include product substitutions, billing for work not
performed or services not provided, undershipping, padding overhead charges, and
courtesy billings.

5.3.4 Detection
Because of the difficulty of detection, fraud awareness and prevention is the best policy, that
is, know your vendors, and have an effective tendering process for all contracts. Fraud in
procurement contracts always poses special problems, and detection is difficult. Common
red flags include sole source contracts, unhappy purchasing agents, significant price
changes or changed orders (especially after a contract is awarded), and vendor complaints.
16
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In one case detected through vendor complaints, a buyer with six years’ seniority obtained
purchase requisitions from various departments at his plant. He then created a nominee
company and placed orders with this firm. The nominee company would place real orders
with a legitimate vendor and have them ship the merchandise to his employer. The
merchandise would be billed through the buyer’s company at 150 percent of the real
amount. The scheme was unraveled when the buyer failed to pay one of the vendors, who
then complained to the buyer’s employer.
Sometimes you can also detect schemes through a computer analysis of the following:

•
•
•
•
•

Timing of bids
Patterns of bids
Amount of work performed by vendors
Patterns of hiring new vendors
Vendors with post-office-box addresses

In an example involving post-office-box addresses, a junior buyer, who had been with his
company for two years, created five nominee companies that he then placed on an
approved vendor list. Thereafter, he did business with these phony companies, placing
various orders with them. The scheme was unraveled when the auditors noticed that these
particular vendors all had post-office boxes for addresses and were not listed in the
telephone book. The amount of money lost was in excess of $250,000 over a period of
more than a year.
If you suspect that a buyer and vendor are in collusion, consider the following items:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Assessment of the tender process, if any
Patterns of business and bids
Noncompetitive pricing
Products of inferior quality
Buying unnecessary goods or services
Lack of competitive bidding

5.3.5 Prevention—Key Controls
As previously noted, prevention of procurement fraud can be achieved best through fraud
awareness, effective tendering and budgeting, and knowledge of your vendors. Other
prevention controls include proper documentation, approvals, and segregation of duties.

Proper documentation includes prenumbered purchase requisitions, purchase orders,
receiving reports, and checks. Proper approvals should include detailed background
information on the vendor; ideally, purchase contracts should include a right-of-audit-access
clause to the vendor’s books. In addition, conduct both irregularly scheduled audits of the
purchasing function as well as assessments of the performance and happiness of the
purchasing agent.

5.3.6 Prevention—Policies
Organizations should have established prevention and detection policies. The following are
some policies to consider implementing.
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Accepting Gifts

The following is a sample policy statement covering the acceptance of gifts and gratuities:
“Employees, and members of their immediate families, should not accept gifts,
favors or entertainment that might create or appear to create a favored position
for someone doing business with the company. Advertising novelties or trinkets
are not considered as gifts and are excluded from these restrictions.

Gifts that are received by an employee should be returned to the donor and may
be accompanied with a copy of this policy. Perishable gifts should be donated to
a charitable organization and the donor notified of the action taken.
It is not the intent of this policy to preclude the acceptance by the company’s
employees of occasional meals or refreshments that are provided in the normal
course of business-work relationships, with other individuals. Discretion must be
used, however, in the limited acceptance of meals, refreshments or incidental
hospitality to avoid situations that could create a conflict of interest or appear to
do so.”
Providing Gifts

The following is a sample policy statement covering the giving of gifts:

“Occasionally, it may be appropriate for employees, acting for the company, to
provide people outside the company with promotional items, meals, refreshments,
transportation, lodgings or incidental hospitality. Expenditures for such purposes
should be moderate and should be done only within the framework of good taste. All
expenditures are subject to the overall company policy that an employee shall avoid
constituting improper influence over others.”

Use of Hotlines
You should study the feasibility of installing hotlines to monitor complaints by employees
and other vendors.
Disposition of Materials
The purchasing department normally should not be in charge of disposing of obsolete
inventory, scrap, or fixed assets.
Rotation of Jobs
Rotate buyers frequently within a department to keep them from getting too close to
vendors. In addition, enforce a mandatory vacation policy.
Competition in Bidding
Ensure that bidding policies and procedures are thoroughly reviewed. Whenever possible,
enforce competitive bidding.

Compensation of Buyers
Buyers should be well paid to reduce the motives and rationalizations for fraud.
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5.3.7 Purchasing, Payables and Collection Systems
The purchasing, payables, and collection systems are part of the accounting systems that
record a company’s purchases and expense payments. Employees can falsify books and
supporting documentation for purchases, payables and collections to perpetrate a fraud on
their employing company. This section covers three categories of perpetrating fraud:
1. False expense reports
2. False supplier invoices
3. Other false information

False Expense Reports
Expense reports prepared and submitted to the company for payment are false if they
include any of the following:

• Overstated items
• Fictitious items
• Duplicate items
An employee could use a company credit card for personal items. If the company pays the
entire amount of an employee’s account, that employee may be committing a fraud.
Ultimately, the answer depends on the first accountability for the disbursements.
Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:

1. Is the expense item an allowable business-related expense? It is necessary to determine
the company’s policy regarding allowable business expenses.
2. Is the expense amount the actual amount incurred? It is necessary to obtain the
suppliers’ copies of the original expense vouchers and compare them with those
submitted in support of the expense report.

3. Is the expense ultimately charged directly to the business? If yes, is there evidence of
any reimbursement?
It is also necessary to understand the approval and payment system in effect. Who
approved the expense reports? How were the expense reports categorized in the accounting
records? Were the expense reports adjusted at a later date to reflect those items of a
personal nature? Was there any pattern in the submission, approval or recording (or any
combination thereof) of the fraudulent expense reports?

“Manny Miles” Case Study

Manny Miles had been the Business Administrator and Secretary-Treasurer for The
County Hospital since shortly after it was formed in 1983. In addition to overseeing
the administration of the hospital and its 145 employees, Miles’ duties included
preparing budgets. He had check-signing authority and payment approval for the
hospital’s annual budget of about $5 million.
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The governing body of the hospital consisted of a board comprised of twelve
members; eight were elected and four were appointed as representatives of the
county. In 1993, the board members hired Dr. Jane Wilson as Medical Officer.
Almost immediately Miles and Wilson developed a severe personality conflict;
accusations and negative feedback caused a division between the personnel of the
hospital and members of the board. Attempts to terminate Dr. Wilson’s services
failed due to the intervention of the hospital board members on her behalf. The
hospital conducted studies to improve conditions but never implemented any
recommendations.

In mid-1996, during its audit, the auditors found irregularities in travel claims
submitted by Manny Miles, and the hospital referred the matter to the police for
investigation. In December 1996, and January 1997, the police executed search
warrants not only on the hospital but also on the residence of Manny Miles. They
seized the hospital’s financial records along with Miles’ personal banking records.
Examination of the records revealed that from 1993 to 1996, Miles had continually
made claims for travel expenses while using a hospital car. Additionally, he claimed
mileage from both the hospital and the county for the same trips. Furthermore
Miles had used his hospital credit card to repair his own vehicle and purchase
numerous personal items, including restaurant meals on weekends, when he was
not working. The card was in Miles’ name but the hospital paid the bills.
As business administrator, Miles could approve his own expenditures and authorize
the checks. To conceal his spending, Miles had authorized the listing of these
expenditures in the hospital’s financial records under other categories. Invoices
were missing for some checks issued and for credit-card expenditures. The financial
records of the hospital did not show any reimbursement by Miles to cover the vast
majority of his personal purchases, although on several occasions he had made
restitution for small purchases on the hospital card.

The Manny Miles case shows that independent approval and division of duties is essential
in the payment of all travel claims and other expenses. Employees should not be able to
approve their own expense reports. In addition, check signers should not be the same
people approving expense reports.
False Supplier Invoices
Suppliers’ invoices prepared and submitted for payment to the company are false if either:

1. No goods have been delivered or services rendered
2. The quantity or value (or both) of the goods are inflated
The delivery of goods or services to a location other than a business location (for the use
and benefit of the perpetrator) is a common technique, as is the payment to a friendly
supplier when no goods or services were actually provided. Payments of inflated amounts
to suppliers often reflect the existence of secret commissions.
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Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Were goods and services actually provided? Find out, first, whether the supplier
company actually exists and next, whether any goods or services were in fact provided.
If they were provided, determine to whom.

2. Did the company receive the benefit? It is often necessary to obtain the bills of lading,
that is, the freight companies’ proof-of-delivery slip, to confirm where the goods and
services were delivered.
3. What was the approval and payment system? As with false expense reports, you should
understand the approval and payment system.

“Credit To You Inc.” Case Study

In January 1993, Jones and Smith signed an agreement to start Smith Construction,
a business that primarily consisted of erecting service stations. It was agreed that
Smith would provide the financing while, for a salary of $600 per week plus
expenses, Jones would manage and operate the business. Smith and Jones were to
share equally any profits from the business. The business progressed well and
showed a profit for the first three years.
Smith did not take an active part in the construction business, as he continued to
operate his own plastering company. Smith Construction operated as a division of
Smith Plastering Corp. Smith initially invested $42,000 as capital to start the
construction business, and as sole signing officer, would attend the Smith
Construction office regularly to sign checks, some of which were blank when
signed.
Jones tendered and obtained contracts, hired subcontractors, hired and fired
employees and purchased the goods necessary to operate the business, without
interference from Smith. Jones could also purchase material he required for himself
through the construction business and charge these amounts to himself on the
business books as a form of salary.

Smith was aware that over the years Jones had erected a barn on his farm,
renovated other buildings including his residence, and continued to operate the
farm. Jones informed Smith that he had obtained a grant from the government of
$300,000 to finance these endeavors.

In 1998, Smith Construction had difficulty paying its suppliers (creditors) and was
eventually forced into bankruptcy by creditors in June 1998. The company’s debts
exceeded $300,000. Jones gave no explanation for the shortage of funds except to
say that he had miscalculated the actual cost of various construction jobs. An
examination of Smith Construction’s books, canceled checks and available
supporting documentation revealed that Jones had defrauded Smith Construction of
$861,000 by various means.
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As general manager, Jones was responsible for the day-to-day operations and in this
capacity, he was afforded a degree of trust. At the same time, Smith, the absentee
owner, retained signing authority over all checks and, thus, thought he had control
over all policy decisions.

In his private life as a farmer, Jones incurred debts with suppliers who also dealt
with him as general manager of Smith Construction. Jones personally owed one of
these suppliers, Credit To You Inc., more than $25,000. In June 1997, Jones
purchased a $12.30 item, documented by the supplier invoice made out in pencil.
Later, the penciled information on this invoice was erased. Information was typed
onto the invoice, indicating instead that the company, Smith Construction, had
purchased $9,500 worth of material for a job then in progress. On the strength of
this typed document, Smith signed a check for $9,500 to the supplier, believing, of
course, that the disbursement was for the benefit of Smith Construction. When the
supplier received the check, on Jones’ instructions, he credited Jones’ personal
account, reducing the debt to $15,500. This altered document was the prelude to a
fraud of more than $861,000.

The alteration of documents (erasures, stricken information, or both) is at times the
only indication of a fraud as it can disclose a change of mind (intent) by the person
making the entry. Such alterations frequently occur in the earlier stages of a fraud as
the perpetrator has yet to perfect the scheme.

Acme Products Inc. invoiced Smith Construction for the sale of roof trusses, with
delivery scheduled for a gas station being built by Smith Construction. However, a
description of the route to Jones’ farm appeared on the back of the invoice. The
building of Jones’ barn required roof trusses. A review of the bill of lading
confirmed the redirection.

Investigators can also review delivery instructions as another technique for identifying
fraudulent transactions.

Other False Information
A business receives vast amounts of information, and subject to the existing systems of
internal control, relies on it in making decisions, initiating, executing and recording
transactions. If this information is false, a business can be deceived, resulting in deprivation
of some sort and hence the company is put at economic risk.
Examples of false information that businesses may rely on include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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False financial statements
Overstated accounts receivable listings
Overstated statements of income and net worth
False general journal entries
Altered internal company records
Fictitious customer credit information
False asset valuations
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Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Is the summary information presented (accounts receivable listings, financial statements)
consistent with the underlying books and records, and are the real assets on hand? It is
necessary to determine the representation made by the person or entity under
investigation and the understanding reached between that person or entity and the
victim. Once accomplished, you can examine the books and records supporting the
summary financial information in question from the appropriate perspective.
2. Have the correct authorities properly approved entries in the general ledger? Are the
entries appropriate and consistent with the facts?

3. Can customers confirm transactions?
To address the second and third questions above, you should understand the accounting
systems in effect. Also, you should contact third parties to review and discuss with them
their books and records, and then compare that information to the victim’s information.

“Ms. I. O. Much” Case Study

Ms. I.O. Much was the office manager of Anyco Inc. from May 1995 to May 1998.
As office manager, Ms. Much, together with the general manager and president of
the company, had check-signing authority for the company payroll account.

While Ms. Much was office manager, the company’s auditors frequently had
difficulty completing their audit work primarily because of the poorly maintained
books and records. Finally, Ms. Much was replaced with a new office manager, who
found irregularities in the company’s bank reconciliations. After the company,
police, and forensic accountants completed an investigation, they determined that
I.O. Much received unauthorized payments from the company totaling at least
$11,195. These payments were covered up in a variety of ways.
After examining banking records for the payroll account of Anyco Inc.,
investigators noted all checks payable to the order of I.O. Much. They found that
eight checks totaling $9,126 were paid to I.O. Much but were not recorded in the
payroll journal.
June 15, 1997: A check dated June 15, 1997, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to
I.O. Much but not recorded. Attached to the December bank statement was a note
dated June 15, 1997, which stated, “This is to certify that I.O. Much received a loan
of $2,500 from Anyco Limited to be repaid before the end of the year.” The bottom
of the note had a legend stating “paid Dec. 28/97.” It appeared that no record had
been made of this apparent loan transaction until December 1997.
A review of relevant accounting records disclosed that on December 28, 1997, a
deposit of $2,500 was made to the Anyco general bank account. The deposit slip for
this $2,500 showed that the deposit consisted of three checks, as follows: $350,
$178, and $1,971. The sources of the three checks noted on the deposit slip
appeared to be as follows:
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1. William Smith—$350: A check was issued to Anyco on the account of William Smith,
dated September 8, 1997. The current office manager at Anyco stated that this check
was a repayment to Anyco as a result of an over-advance of funds to Smith, an Anyco
employee.

2. Anybank—$178: A check was issued from Anybank to Anyco Limited.
3. Bank draft—$1,971: The check was a bank draft purchased from Otherbank. When this
deposit was recorded in Anyco’s records, someone apparently recorded it as a reduction
of the company loan to I.O. Much. This loan was reflected in the books as having been
advanced and repaid in the same month, that is, December 1997.
March 1, 1998: A check dated March 1, 1998, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to
I.O. Much but not recorded in the payroll journal. It appeared that a journal entry
was prepared to record this check. This journal entry suggested that the $2,500 was
paid with respect to five different accounts as follows:

1. Account #99-6, salespeople’s salaries, Boston
2. Account #99-2, salespeople’s salaries, Dallas
3. Account #99-7, salespeople’s salaries, Washington, D.C.
4. Account #199-12, delivery salaries, New York

5. Account #99-8, salespeople’s salaries, Seattle
The journal indicated that this entry was “to record checks cashed but not recorded
or deposited.” The only check apparently not recorded in March 1997 was check
#2000 for $2,500 payable to I.O. Much.

It is significant that the checks paid to I.O. Much in 1997 and 1998, which were not
noted in the payroll journal, were not available in the corporate records.
Investigators obtained copies of these checks from the microfilm files at Anybank.
A review of the payroll records indicated two apparent discrepancies related to I.O.
Much. The April 7, 1997, payroll records indicated “income tax withheld” of $200
more than apparently had been withheld from I.O. Much’s pay. Similarly on
August 11, 1997, payroll records indicated $1,000 more income tax withheld than
apparently had been withheld to date. In that time period an offsetting adjustment
was made to the net pay figure, thereby indicating that the net amount of money
paid to I.O. Much was $1,000 less than apparently had been paid to her at that
time.

The effect of these adjustments was an apparent benefit to I.O. Much of $1,200. Her
W2 for the year ended December 31, 1997, indicated that she paid $1,200 more
income tax than she had actually paid. The Anyco Limited employee deduction
account was not reconciled at the time of the investigation, and thus it was not
readily apparent how the $1,200 tax benefit was accounted for in the company’s
books.
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While the amounts involved were not terribly large, this case points out a number of
internal control weaknesses that can result in fraud, including lack of supervision,
inadequate division of duties, and failure to perform appropriate accounting
reconciliations.
5.4 Payroll and Personnel Cycle
The payroll and personnel cycle handles the hiring, firing, and payment of employees,
along with timekeeping, expense-account and travel reimbursements, and insurance
matters.

5.4.1 Functions
The functions of the payroll and personnel cycle are as follows:
1. Personnel and employment
2. Preparation of timekeeping and payroll

3.
4.
5.
6.

Payment of payroll
Payment of payroll taxes and other withholdings
Reimbursements of expense accounts and travel expenses
Processing and payment of employee insurance, pension withholdings, and other
employee benefits

5.4.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Balance Sheet
The following balance sheet accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle:

1. Cash

2. Salaries payable
3. Payroll taxes payable
4. Other withholdings payable

Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle:

1. Travel and entertainment expenses

2. Salary and commissions expenses
3. Payroll tax expenses
4. Medical and insurance expenses

5. 4.3 Perpetration
Payroll is particularly ripe for internal fraud. Common schemes include nonexistent or
ghost employees, fictitious hours and overtime abuses, overstating expense accounts, and
fictitious or overstated medical claims.
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In one case, approximately one month after the payroll check date, Mr. Smith attempted to
pick up his check from Ms. Doe, who was responsible for all departmental check
distributions. Ms. Doe stated that the check was lost and that she would process the paper
work necessary to obtain a new check. She then entered false payroll data in order to
generate the check. Within a few weeks, Mr. Smith received a new check. However, upon
reviewing his year-to-date earnings, he discovered that the lost check amount was included
in his earned income. When confronted with the situation, Ms. Doe admitted to her
supervisor that she had forged Mr. Smith’s name and cashed the check for personal
reasons. Ms. Doe, who had been with the company for seven years, had her employment
terminated.
Expense accounts are easily and frequently abused. For example, the president of a
subsidiary submitted requests for business travel and entertainment advances with the
parent company. The chief accountant issued the checks for the requested advances. After
one-and-a-half years, the president had not repaid the advances. When pressed, he could
not support the advances with proper business receipts. He confessed that he had none.
The president who had ten years of service, had his employment terminated. The amount
involved was $120,000.

5. 4.4 Detection
Organizations typically discover ghost employees when payroll checks are hand-delivered,
and extra checks are left. For businesses employing vigorous payroll fraud detection
procedures, investigators can perform significant computer and statistical analysis. For
example, time card approvals, which are the same as signatures and endorsements on
checks, can provide items for further investigation. Computer-generated detection methods
could indicate:

• Payments to employees not on the master lists
• Payments to employees versus those not authorized for payment
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•
•
•
•
•

Write-offs of employee accounts

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Employees with no withholding
Each kind of withholding in descending order
Salary expenses in descending order
Hours worked in descending order
Time-card hours versus authorized job orders
Hours worked by employee by pay period
Pay rates in descending order
Dates of employment versus authorized dates of payment
Travel reimbursement by employee overtime
Travel reimbursement compared to other employees

Duplicate payments to employees

Overtime by employee
Password use during vacation
Social security numbers listed in descending or ascending order
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•
•
•
•

Travel reimbursement for specific function by employee
Travel reimbursements by kind of expense, that is, rental car, hotel, airfare, and so on
Date of travel reimbursements compared to dates employee worked
Numerical sequence of employee travel reimbursements

5.4.5 Prevention
Proper Documentation
Proper documentation for payroll purposes includes time cards for appropriate employees,
prenumbered travel reimbursement forms and payroll checks, and verification of medical
services.

Proper Approval
Proper approval includes hours worked and wage rates, hiring and terminations, overtime,
medical benefits, and travel allowances.

Separation of Duties
At a minimum, you should consider separating the following duties to reduce the possibility
of one employee acting alone.

•
•
•
•
•

Accounting for hours worked and processing checks
Processing and distributing paychecks
Hiring and firing from timekeeping
Claims processing, approval, and payment
Travel expense approval and payment

Independent Verification
Independent verification is especially important for preventing payroll and personnel fraud,
and includes the following:
• Using time clocks wherever possible, and verifying the hours worked against the clock
• Ensuring hours worked are approved by someone other than the employee
• Conducting surprise audits of the personnel and payment cycle

5.5 Inventory and Warehousing Cycle

The inventory and warehousing cycle includes functions relating to the purchase and
warehousing of merchandise for manufacture and resale. Because of the volume of activity
and funds involved, fraud represents a significant risk.

27

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

5.5.1 Functions
The functions of the inventory and warehousing cycle include:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Processing purchase requisitions.
Receiving raw materials and finished goods.
Storing raw materials and finished goods.

Cost accounting.

Processing goods for shipment.
Shipping finished goods.

5.5.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Inventories on the balance sheet and cost of goods sold on the income statement are
affected by the inventory and warehousing cycle.

5.5.3 Perpetration
The more common frauds in the inventory and warehousing cycle include: ordering
unneeded inventory, appropriating inventory for personal use, theft of inventory and scrap
proceeds, and charging embezzlements to inventory.

For example, a loading-dock employee and delivery-route driver were able to steal
$300,000 of inventory through collusion over a six-month period. The load sheets at the
dock were either not filled out or inaccurately completed by both employees (control
procedures required the dock employee and route driver to verify the quantities loaded and
sign a load sheet). The products were transported to an independent distributor and
subsequently sold. The defalcation surfaced when outside sources informed the company
that certain products were being stolen as the result of collusion between particular
employees and an independent distributor.
In a case involving a theft of inventory, an inventory records supervisor and a security
guard colluded to steal $400,000 from a jewelry warehouse over a two-year period. The
security guard stole the merchandise, and the supervisor concealed the theft by
manipulating inventory records. An undercover investigator, who was hired because of a
significant increase in year-end inventory shortages, eventually discovered the theft. After
this experience, and following a consultant’s recommendation, the company started to
perform surprise physical inventories at varied times during the year.

5.5.4 Detection
The three primary ways for detecting inventory and warehousing frauds are: statistical
sampling of documents, computer analysis, and physical counts.
Statistical sampling includes looking for inconsistencies and discrepancies in purchase
requisitions, as well as receiving reports, perpetual inventory records, raw material
requisitions, shipping documents, job-cost sheets and similar documents.
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Computer analysis includes identifying the following items:
• Purchases by item
• Purchases by vendor

• Inventory levels by specific kinds
• Inventory shipped by address
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Costs per item over time
Direct labor per inventory item
Direct materials per inventory item
Overhead per inventory item
Disposals followed by reorders

Shortages by inventory item
Shipments by address

5.5.5 Prevention
Prevention is critically important in the case of inventory and warehousing fraud because of
the amounts of money involved and the relative ease with which this kind of fraud can be
concealed. Prevention includes: receiving reports, keeping perpetual records, using
prenumbered and controlled requisitions, raw material requisitions, shipping documents,
and keeping job-cost sheets.

Someone independent of the purchase or warehousing function should handle approvals of
purchasing and disbursement of inventory.

Separation of duties becomes critical in preventing this kind of fraud. Authorization to
purchase should be handled by someone not performing the warehousing function.
Someone other than the individual responsible for inventory should handle the receipt of
inventory.
Independent checks on performance are also important prevention measures. Someone
independent of the purchasing or warehousing functions should conduct the physical
observation of inventory.

Physical safeguards include ensuring that merchandise is physically locked and guarded,
and that entry is limited to authorized personnel.

5.6 Capital Acquisition and Repayment Cycle
The capital acquisition and repayment cycle, sometimes referred to as the financing cycle,
includes borrowing money and accounting for the debt of an entity.

5.6.1 Functions
The functions of the capital acquisition and repayment cycle include: borrowing funds and
accounting for debt, accounting for and paying interest, accounting for and paying
dividends, accounting for stock transactions, and equity financing.
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5.6.2 Financial Statement Accounts
The following balance sheet and income statements are most often associated with the
capital acquisitions and repayment cycle:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Cash
Notes
Mortgages
Accrued interest

Capital stock
Capital in excess of par value

• Retained earnings
• Dividends
• Dividends payable

• Interest expense

5.6.3 Perpetration
The common schemes in this cycle include borrowing for personal use, misapplication of
interest income, and theft of loan and stock proceeds.

In one case, a factoring company obtained a credit facility from a regional bank to fund the
purchase of qualified assets, primarily accounts receivable. The vice president of the
company, in collusion with a customer, purchased fictitious accounts receivables with the
proceeds of the credit facility. Part of the purchase proceeds was wired to offshore bank
accounts beneficially owned by the vice president. The activity was discovered when the
bank manager reviewed the bank account of the factoring company and saw wire transfers
made to Caribbean tax havens. He hired forensic accountants who discovered the bank had
been defrauded of $9.5 million over a two-year period.

5.6.4 Detection
Most frauds in the capital acquisition and repayment cycle involve tracing the proceeds of
loans to ensure that all of the proceeds go to the benefit of the company. This can be
accomplished by tracing loan proceeds to the bank deposits, and tracing authorization for
borrowing from the minutes of the board to the loan ledgers. In addition, a computer
analysis can do the following:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Compare addresses of interest payees.
Match borrowings with repayments.
Check the schedule of late repayments.
Check the schedule of authorization of loan proceeds.
Check the list of loan recipients.
Check the list of addresses where loan proceeds were delivered.
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5.6.5 Prevention
Proper documentation of loan documents, journal entries, interest coupons and stock
certificates can aid in prevention of capital acquisition and repayment frauds.

Proper approvals include receiving approval of the board of directors for: borrowing,
paying dividends and refinancing debt. Physical safeguards include keeping stock
certificates and loan documents under lock and key. Also, conduct independent checks on
the transfer agent and registrar.
Segregation of duties is also important in prevention. The authorization to borrow should
be separate from handling cash and accounting. Authorizations to issue stock should be
separated from the handling of cash; and accounting should be separated from handling
cash, and dividends and interest.

5.7

Cash Misappropriation
Although not a cycle, cash is the focal point of most entities. All other cycles flow through
the cash account. Because there are so many different ways to misappropriate cash, this
section covers cash exclusively.

Most organizations can divide their cash into two major categories: petty cash and demand
deposits. Petty cash consists of cash on hand that is accounted for separately. It is
reimbursed periodically, and the expenditures are then booked to the various accounts.
Demand deposits consist of checking accounts maintained by the entity; savings or interest
bearing accounts; and certificates of deposit and all other liquid investments that can be
easily converted to cash.

5.7.1 Perpetration
Frauds perpetrated on the cash accounts are normally committed in conjunction with other
cycles. The most common are the theft of petty cash and the theft of bank deposits.

Theft of Petty Cash
Petty cash thieves usually forge or prepare fictitious vouchers for reimbursement from petty
cash. As an alternative, perpetrators frequently borrow from the petty cash account and
fraudulently represent that the petty cash account is intact.
For example, the head security officer had custody of petty cash. He had altered legitimate
receipts—primarily for postage—to reflect higher amounts. Postage is an overhead item that
was loosely monitored. At a surprise count of the fund, only about $700 in currency and
receipts were on hand of the $4,000 fund. Polygraph examinations were given to all
security officers, but the head officer resigned before his test. A promissory note for the
approximately $3,300 shortfall was executed by the former head officer. He had been with
the company for seven years. The company estimated the loss at $12,000 but was unable to
prove that this amount had been stolen.
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Theft of Bank Deposits
Many times employees steal cash receipts prepared for deposit. In some instances, they
change the amount reflected on the deposit. In other cases, they make no attempt to
conceal the theft.
In one case, an employee of a food services business received daily receipts from sales
along with the cash register tapes from two or three cashiers. The employee mutilated the
tapes so they could not be read, then prepared the transmittal of funds for the comptroller,
but kept the difference between the amount transmitted and the amount submitted to her
by the cashiers. She sent the mutilated tapes to the comptroller with the deposit. The
comptroller’s office did not compare the deposit with the cash register tapes. The fraud was
detected when one of the cashiers noted that the transmittal to the comptroller was small for
a comparatively busy day. When questioned about tracing the transmittal amount to the
cash register tapes, the perpetrator was unable to show completed tapes. The employee,
who had been with the company two-and-a-half years, was fired but not prosecuted.

Employees, officers, and even outsiders can steal checks, both blank and signed. One case
involved an employee—a grandmother—who was the sole bookkeeper for an electrical
supply company in Omaha, Nebraska. She wrote the company’s checks and reconciled the
bank account. Over a period of five years she stole checks totaling $416,000, which she
spent on herself and her family. In the cash receipts journal, she coded the checks as
inventory; in fact, however, she wrote the checks to herself using her own name. When the
checks were returned with the bank statements, she would simply destroy them. She
confessed after she had a nervous breakdown, caused by continuous guilt from stealing,
which she knew was wrong.

5.7.2 Detection and Prevention
Because cash can be counted exactly, most detection methods involving cash relate to its
timely counting. The proof of cash is a standard audit technique that compares cash in the
bank to reported cash on hand. Properly done, the proof of cash can not only account for
theft, but also show overstatements or understatements by expense classification.
Timely bank reconciliations by a person not responsible for handling cash will frequently
reveal discrepancies. Good reconciliation methods include examining endorsements and
dates.

For example, a misappropriation of funds was detected through a reconciliation of bank
deposits with a collection log, which was normally kept by the accounting clerk, who at the
time of the reconciliation was absent on sick leave. Because the accounting clerk prepared
the collection log, the daily cash report, and the bank deposits, she was able to alter
individual accounts receivable records and misappropriate almost $24,000. She
accomplished this by preparing daily cash reports that reflected fewer cash receipts
collected than were actually received, and depositing the lesser amount in the company’s
bank account. The accounting clerk processed virtually the entire accounting transaction.
After the discovery of missing funds, she was fired, prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and was
sentenced to ten years’ probation. She had been with the company three-and-a-half years.
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Auditors frequently use cutoff bank statements to ensure that expenses and income are
reported in the proper period. Surprise cash counts sometime turn up situations of
employees borrowing or floating small loans. It is critical that these counts be done on an
irregular basis.
Cash thefts are sometimes reported by customers who have either paid money on an
account and have not received credit, or in some instances when they notice they have not
been given a receipt for a purchase.

As an example, a client of a branch of a large bank complained that there had been a
$9,900 forged savings withdrawal from her account. The client indicated that she had
recently made a $9,900 deposit at the branch and suspected that the teller who accepted the
deposit may have been involved. The employee was interviewed and admitted to forging
and negotiating the savings withdrawal. The teller had obtained the client’s mother’s
maiden name and birthplace, fabricated a duplicate savings receipt book, and on an
unscheduled work day went to the domiciling branch and posed as the client. The
employee did not have any identification, yet was persistent enough to obtain an approval
on the savings withdrawal.
Computer analysis of the following categories can sometimes turn up fraud in a cash
account: checks that are missing, checks payable to employees, checks that are void,
comparisons of deposit dates to receivables, and listings of cash advances.

It is absolutely imperative to implement tight control of cash and to maintain the duties of
accounting, authorization, and custody.
In one case a fraud occurred at one of several campus cashier’s offices maintained by a
university for collecting and processing student tuition bills and other related charges. The
perpetrator was employed as a teller for approximately five years before being promoted to
head cashier. This position required reconciling daily cash register receipts to the cash
transmittal and bank deposits, as well as preparing deposits for funds received from outside
departments, such as the bookstore or dining service operations. These deposits involved
substantial amounts of cash. As head cashier, the employee also prepared the initial
accounting documents that served as the input to the various general ledger accounts,
including accounts receivable.

The perpetrator’s extensive knowledge and experience, coupled with the employer’s trust,
resulted in diminishing supervision, particularly of the cash register reconciliations. As a
result, the perpetrator was able to manipulate the documentation and the control
procedures necessary to conceal the continued embezzlement of funds. The employee, who
had six-and-a-half years’ service, was fired and prosecuted for stealing an estimated
$66,000.
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6.1

Fraud Perpetrated by Outsiders
Fraud is not merely the product of internal thieves acting against their employers. Fraud in
the accounting records may originate with outside suppliers and service providers as well.
It is not possible to determine the number of persons and bogus business operators engaged
in crimes of this nature. Suffice it to say that the problem is extensive. By some estimates,
nearly everyone at one time or another has been either a direct victim of such a crime, or
an indirect victim through higher fees or income taxes.

6.1.1 Classification of Internal and External Fraud
As introduced in chapter 1, for the purposes of this Handbook, commercial fraud can
generally be classified into two categories:

1. Internal fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by its employees,
officers, or directors

2. External fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by arms-length parties
(either individuals or corporations) who are outside the organization
Noncommercial fraud and other forms of white-collar crime also exist in which the
fraudster is unrelated or external to the victim (an individual).
The Impact of Collusion
Some forms of external fraud can also be committed with the help of an internal
fraudster—someone internal to inside the organization who is willing to assist the external
fraudster commit his or her crime. Generally, internal personnel would need some form of
an incentive—often in the form of a secret commission, kickback, or bribe—in order to be
induced to assist in this manner.

Fraud involving parties both internal and external to an organization are sometimes
referred to as collusive frauds. Another form of collusive fraud involves fraud committed by a
group of people within an organization. Both kinds of collusive frauds exist because most
internal controls are based on the principle of segregation of duties—this is circumvented
by collusion.

6.1.2 Reasons for Classification
Without some form of classification, the numerous kinds of fraud would overwhelm and
confuse the student of this topic. Learning is enhanced when long lists are grouped and
classified—for instance, students of a foreign language don’t start at a in the English
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translation dictionary. Instead they start by studying the common elements of verb
conjugation, pronouns, nouns and adjectives so that they can grasp a wider cross section of
the language, and then put it all together when they begin to speak it. Of course, languages
have many exceptions to the rules. Similarly, most foreign-language pocket guides present
phrases by topic. For instance, phrases relating to money are separate from phrases relating
to restaurants, travel, shopping and health; however, certain phrases could be applicable to
more than one situation.

Much the same way, this Handbook’s approach to grouping and classifying fraud enhances
the CPA’s ability to learn about the numerous kinds of fraud. As a result, you should have a
greater appreciation for the wide variety of fraud that can occur, and should be better
equipped to recognize the signs of fraud at first sight. However, some frauds are difficult to
classify, fall into more than one category, or don’t exactly fit into any of the established
categories. These instances are mentioned as appropriate within the body of this
Handbook.

6.1.3 Classification of Fraud in this Handbook
In chapter 5, we discussed a restricted group of frauds—those committed against an
organization by its employees, officers or directors—otherwise known as internal fraud.

External frauds cover all remaining forms of fraud and represent a wide variety of frauds.
This chapter covers those external frauds that can be classified by perpetrator. These frauds
include:

1. Fraud committed primarily by individuals against a company, government, or other
individuals; this is referred to as externalfraudfor personal gain.
2. Fraud committed primarily by a company against another company, government, or
individuals; this is referred to as commercial crime.

Note that individuals using a corporate veil could also conduct certain of the frauds
presented in this chapter. Similarly, chapter 7, which primarily covers fraud by
corporations, includes fraud that could be conducted by individuals directly.
6.2

Individuals versus Individuals and Corporations
Individuals can commit many kinds of fraud against other individuals and corporations. Most
of the victims of the crimes described in this section are generally manufacturers, retailers,
wholesalers, service companies or other individuals; however, in some instances, victims
can also include governments, financial institutions, and insurance companies.

6.2.1 Lawyers' Schemes
Overbilling for Time
Lawyers can easily commit fraud, largely because of the nebulous nature of the services
provided. As one commentator indicated: the law lends itself to confidence scams.
Contrasted to a plumber, for example, whose failure to make the contracted repair is
quickly noticed, a lawyer’s performance of an agreed to service is not always discernable. It
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could be merely some advice, a brief phone call or any number of innocuous,
commonplace actions.
The victims of overbilling can include the lawyer’s clients who are unable to assess whether
the time billed by the lawyer is reasonable, and can also include government funded legal
aid programs whose organizers are unable to assess whether the services billed were
actually performed. When in doubt, a lawyer’s invoices can be vetted; that is, they can be
assessed by another lawyer for reasonableness regarding whether the services billed needed
to be performed, and whether the time taken to perform the services was excessive or not.

Misappropriation of Trust Funds
Lawyers have access to funds provided to them by clients in trust to complete transactions.
There are many cases of lawyers borrowing client funds because they are in personal
financial difficulty. The most common crime associated with lawyers’ trust funds is the
misappropriation of client funds held in trust and the use of the money for the lawyer’s
personal purposes (for example, to subsidize a business, pay gambling debts, or support a
life-style).
There are three kinds of misappropriation:
1. Single transaction: Client funds can be traced to an unauthorized disbursement
(one-shot).
2. Several transactions: All trust-account activity is analyzed to determine which clients funds
were used for unauthorized disbursements (lapping).

3. Trust-account chaos: Usually, this kind of misappropriation is caused by poor record
keeping. Actual misappropriation of funds may or may not be found. Is the chaos the
result of poor bookkeeping practices? Are there reasons for the failure to account (such
as bad health, bankruptcy, intent to defraud, or loss of control due to numerous
misappropriations)? The answers to these questions may emerge after a complete
analysis of the trust account’s activity has been made. According to the ethical rules of
most states, if not all states, any use by an attorney of funds held in a trust account other
than that for which the funds were placed in trust is considered a serious breach of
professional conduct that may lead to disbarment, suspension or possible prosecution.
There can never be a legitimate misappropriation of funds that an attorney holds in a
trust account.

To uncover a case involving misappropriation of trust funds, the accountant should realize
that lawyers regularly maintain two sets of bank accounts and related records, consisting of:

1. One or more bank accounts, books of account, and supporting documentation for the
law practice itself.
2. A trust account together with any records reflecting the trust-account activity carried out
on behalf of the lawyer’s clientele. These are the most relevant records for investigating
alleged misappropriation of trust funds. The primary documentation required for trust
account activity consists of bank statements and bank reconciliations for the trust bank
account; the client’s ledger, which outlines all receipts and disbursements made by the
lawyer on behalf of the client concerning a particular transaction; and the client’s file,
which contains evidence of the transactions (for example, correspondence, the lawyer’s
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reporting letter, statement of receipts and disbursements, statement of adjustments,
mortgage documents, out-of-pocket vouchers, and billings).

CPAs conducting an investigation of an attorney’s trust account might also want to review
the financial statements for the law practice. These records can be used to assess the
successfulness of the lawyer’s practice, and are most relevant when the lawyer is a sole
practitioner.
See table 6.1, below, for an example of a misappropriation that would only be uncovered
by a detailed investigation of the banking transactions conducted within a trust account.

Table 6.1 Evidence of a misappropriation of a trust fund.
January 1, 1991

Deposit of $30,000

Agrees with client file

January 5, 1991

Withdrawal of $10,000

Unauthorized by client

January 29, 1991

Deposit of $10,000

Unauthorized by client

January 31, 1991

Balance of $30,000

Agrees with client file

At the end of the month the trust liability to the client, as disclosed in the client file, is
$30,000. However, $10,000 was temporarily removed during the month by an
unauthorized transaction. Thus a misappropriation of the trust fund occurred.

Skip Towne, Esq. Case Study
After twenty years in practice, a lawyer, Skip Towne, Esq., had built up a large
client base, including friends, business people and fellow church-goers. Mr. Smith,
who was selling his home, retained Mr. Towne’s services. At the time the
transaction closed on August 3, 1998, Mr. Towne received $176,574 from the
purchaser’s attorney for deposit into the Skip Towne, Esq. trust account. Mr. Towne
disbursed $5,000 of the funds in his trust account to cover various closing
adjustments including outstanding utilities and tax bills. Mr. Towne also distributed
$21,176 to his own account to cover the legal fees and other disbursements related
to the closing. The balance ($150,398) due to Mr. Smith, as shown in the Closing
Statement, was apparently paid in two distinct disbursements to Mr. Smith: an
initial amount of $65,000 on August 10, 1998, with the balance of $85,398 on
October 13, 1998. This final payment to Mr. Smith was, however, financed by the
deposit into the trust account of funds that Mr. Towne received from new clients
and other nefarious acts.

The specific funds in question, that is, $85,398 on hand as of August 10, 1998—were
not paid to the benefit of Mr. Smith. Between August 10, 1998, and October 13,
1998, Mr. Towne made a payment of $80,000 to himself that he used to invest in his
own real estate venture, and a payment of $5,398 to his other clients, to replace trust
funds that had already been spent on unauthorized disbursements. To keep the ball
rolling, Mr. Towne had to misappropriate funds from a number of other clients in
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order to repay Mr. Smith, in addition to producing false mortgage documents,
forging signatures, and resorting to other acts of deceit.

Ultimately, Mr. Towne cleared out his trust account, abandoned his law practice,
and disappeared, leaving behind at least eighty-five clients who had been
defrauded. He has not been heard from since.

6.2.2 Directory Advertising Schemes
Perpetrators of directory advertising schemes usually target businesses. In this scheme the
fraudster sells advertising in a nonexistent magazine or directory, and absconds with the
proceeds. Many directory advertising schemes are perpetrated out of storefront operations.
A fake (or in some instances, real) directory is presented to the potential victim. The victim
contracts for the display or classified advertising, which will appear some months hence. By
that time, the fraudster has collected the funds and disappeared.

6.2.3 Property Improvement Schemes
Fly-by-night operators, promising repairs to property at bargain rates, are a particular
problem for elderly victims. The typical fraudster is a professional con artist who obtains
business primarily from door-to-door solicitations. The tools of the trade are not hammers
and saws, but bogus business cards and counterfeited or preprinted contracts involving the
payment of up-front money. Note that these property improvement scams are a subset of
procurement fraud, which is covered in more depth in chapter 7. Various forms of this
scheme include substituting products, charging for false labor or overhead charges, and
absconding with retainers and down payments.

Substituting Products
In a product substitution fraud, the fraudster typically promises a property owner a
particular product or brand, and charges him or her for it but then substitutes an inferior
brand without an appropriate price reduction. Thus the perpetrator reaps a windfall profit
through this deception.
Charging for False Labor or Overhead
Many repair contracts call for labor, materials or overhead to be charged at cost, plus a
specified contractor’s profit as a percentage of that cost. Obviously the more the repairs
cost, the more the contractor makes. By fraudulently inflating costs through the addition of
bogus labor charges or overbilling of materials, the fraudster not only increases the profit
but also can keep the difference between the actual and inflated costs.

Absconding With Retainers and Down Payments
The preferred method that seasoned professionals use is to simply negotiate money in
advance, then disappear. This is essentially an advance fee swindle perpetrated specifically
in the property-improvement or repair market. This method is advantageous to the
perpetrator because it requires the least amount of capital: no storefront, props, or other
accoutrements necessary—-just “get the money and run.”
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6.2.4 Personal Improvement Schemes
The term personal improvement fraud covers the many schemes that prey on people’s natural
tendency to want to improve their job skills, appearance, education, or position in life.
Fraudsters in this category primarily use mail order as an integral part of the scheme. Some
common forms of personal improvement fraud are described below.

Vanity- and Song-Publishing Schemes
Vanity- and song-publishing schemes are common, and rely on the victim believing that he
or she has talent in a particular area, such as art or song writing. These schemes are
normally advertised in magazines or by direct mail. They usually offer to evaluate, for free,
the victim’s talent. Of course the victim is told after the evaluation that he or she is the
newest undiscovered artistic genius. And for a hefty fee, the talent company will promote
the artist’s work. The artist then remits the fee, and the fraudster uses the funds for personal
benefit, providing little or no services in the process.

Modeling Schools
Modeling schools appeal to the natural vanity of some people. Typically, the modeling
school tells the student that he or she must have a portfolio of portraits to send to potential
customers, ostensibly to enhance the victim’s potential for getting modeling assignments.
The victim is then charged greatly inflated prices for a photographer to take the pictures for
the portfolio. Many modeling schools are not legitimate. They sometimes tout connections
to famous people, or claim they have placed famous people, when in fact they have not.
These schools get most of their business through mail order or newspaper advertising.
Once a particular area is fleeced, the school pulls up stakes and moves on.

Diploma Mills
For a fee—usually a hefty one—a diploma can be granted to those persons who apply. The
fraudsters usually claim the heavy fee is for processing the application or for verifying the
experience necessary to acquire a degree. The hallmark of a diploma mill is the ease with
which the degree is obtained, and the related cost. Victims usually apply for an advanced
degree to enhance their career skills; however, diploma mills are not accredited, and their
diplomas are therefore essentially worthless. Given the nature of this kind of business, there
is usually some culpability on the part of the so-called victim.

Correspondence Schools
Legitimate correspondence schools offering advanced education do exist. However, there
are also many correspondence schools with the same modus operandi as diploma mills,
providing substandard education at superior prices. They are generally not accredited and
offer little hope of job advancement.

6.2.5 Insider Trading Schemes
Insider trading involves the use of nonpublic information to make stock trades on a
securities or commodities market. It could include purchasing shares prior to a good news
release and can also include selling shares prior to a bad news release. The perpetrators of
such crimes get rich, while other investors are unable to share in the wealth. Some might
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argue that this is a victimless crime, while others would say that the victims are the market
as a group, because each and every trade is part of the market.

Criminal charges for insider trading have become the trademark of economic crime
enforcement efforts during recent years. These efforts seek to encourage the confidence of
investors in the fairness of the markets.

A surge of prosecutions for illegal insider information transactions began in the late 1980s
when stock transactions were first subjected to sophisticated computer review, enabling
investigators to identify unusual stock movements. Soon afterwards, when some meaningful
piece of financial information about a company was released, investigators could quickly
determine who had traded the stock heavily before the news release. If, for instance, a
firm’s president executed a transaction, it seemed likely, (though not assured), that he or she
had acted on the information before it was publicly disseminated. The insider trading laws
require that specified officers or directors of a corporation must report their trading
activities. The fraudster, however, conveniently forgets to file the required information.
Of course, the notable cases of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken remain the most infamous,
and illustrate the staggering sums of money to be made from illegal stock trades. Boesky,
the Wall Street arbitrage king, was sentenced to three years in prison and fined $100
million. In his plea agreement, he gave information that led to the indictments of so-called
junk bond king Michael Milken, who eventually pled guilty to insider trading and was fined
$600 million.

6.2.6 Homicide-for-Profit Schemes
Homicide cases are quite different from white-collar crime cases in that the perpetrator is a
violent criminal, whereas most fraudsters are not violent. The tools of a murderer are guns,
knives, ropes, water (for drowning), fire (for arson) and poison, whereas the tools of a
fraudster are documents, books and records, computers, and calculators. The victim in a
homicide case loses his or her life, whereas a fraud victim generally only loses some money.
But there is one main similarity, particularly when there is a financial motive for the
homicide—the use of forensic accounting in homicide cases is similar to its use in fraud
cases and may involve corporate- or personal-financial assessments, or both.
Generally, forensic accounting may be applied in homicide investigations for one or any
combination of the following three purposes:

1. To analyze and determine a possible financial motive for murder.
2. To analyze financial documentation for possible investigative aids that may assist in
proving murder.
3. To identify possible payments on a contract for murder.

Assessing Financial Motive
In determining a possible financial motive, the investigator must direct the accounting
analysis primarily toward establishing and measuring any financial benefit to the accused as
a result of that person’s association with the murder victim. Benefit may be shown in any
one or combination of the following methods:
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• Payments by the victim to the accused (extortion).

• Assets such as real estate, collectibles, or antiques transferred to the accused.
• Insurance proceeds paid to the accused as a beneficiary under a policy.

• Other benefits, such as obtaining equity in a business or transferring of a partnership
interest to the accused.
• Other motives that don’t equate to a direct financial benefit, such as the imminent loss of
assets, involvement in drug trafficking, or marital infidelity.

Accounting evidence is not generally as significant as viva voce evidence. It may, however,
provide circumstantial evidence of a financial motive.

Assessing Financial Evidence to Assist in Other Ways in the Investigation
When assessing the financial matters of the victim in order to assist in a police investigation,
the forensic accountant may seek to determine:

• The victim’s business and social relationships and the identity of people with whom he
or she had dealings.
• The existence of any debts owed either by or to the victim, and whether evidence exists
to suggest the victim or debtor was resisting payment on them.
• The possibility of eliminating financial matters as a direction in which to pursue in the
investigation.

Investigators should examine business and personal financial records, as well as financialrelated evidence from the local real estate deed-mortgage recording office, lawyers, the will
of the deceased, and insurance policies.

Robert Kilbride Case Study
On March 29, 1998, Mary Kilbride, wife of Robert Kilbride, a veteran police officer, was
found dead outside her condominium complex. She had fallen from the twentieth floor
balcony of their condominium. Eight days later, Robert Kilbride flew to the South Pacific to
join Ms. Cathy Smith, whom he later married in May 1999 in Europe.
Ms. Sleuth, a forensic CPA, was called in to assist with the investigation. The police
suspected Mary’s death was not an accident—there was a $275,000 life insurance policy on
her life that was paid to Robert Kilbride in late September 1998.
By way of background, Ms. Sleuth was told that in July 1997, Kilbride resigned his
position from the police force. Friends and acquaintances said that about this time it
was evident that Robert and Mary Kilbride were having marital problems.
Ms. Sleuth then worked with the investigating officer to determine all she could
about the Kilbrides’ life-style. The primary objective of Ms. Sleuth’s accounting
assistance was to summarize Robert Kilbride’s financial activity for a period of
approximately one-and-a-half years prior to Mary Kilbride’s death, because of the
allegation that Robert had murdered his wife Mary for the insurance proceeds. No
summary books and records were available, a not uncommon situation in
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investigations of personal finances. Therefore, Ms. Sleuth had to reconstruct the
financial facts before they could be interpreted.
The volume of financial documents was considerable. Kilbride had numerous credit
cards, bank accounts and brokerage accounts in the United States, Canada and
Europe. Kilbride was also involved in numerous business deals of varying nature
and purpose.

In order to prove Kilbride’s financial affairs, Ms. Sleuth completed the following:

1. A summary of Kilbride’s financial history.

2. An analysis of the Kilbride’s estimated net worth as of the end of July 1997 and
September 1998, based on bank statements, brokerage statements,
correspondence, contracts, appraisals, loan applications and other financial
documentation.
3. A source and application of funds analysis of Kilbride’s financial activity from
March 1997 to December 1998, primarily based on Kilbride’s banking
documents, credit card statements and brokerage statements.
4. A report on Kilbride’s monthly deficiency based on the information in the
source and application of funds analysis.
5. Graphs showing the cumulative deficiency from just prior to Mary’s death to late
September 1998, when the insurance proceeds were received.
These analyses revealed the following, which the investigating officer corroborated
by viva voce evidence from former coworkers, friends, neighbors and other people
who knew the Kilbrides.
1. When he left the force, Kilbride had no known source of steady income.
2. The Kilbrides’ combined annual salaries were less than $60,000, yet they lived in an
expensive condominium and had a leased luxury sports car.
3. After leaving the force, Kilbride’s net worth declined considerably. He began to borrow
heavily and sell off certain assets, including a rental property. He was also involved with
various unsuccessful business ventures.

4. By March 1998, substantially all of Kilbride’s net worth was represented by assets he
owned jointly with his wife. These assets included the equity in their condominium,
furniture, furs, jewelry and household effects.
5. Between the time of Mary’s death in March and his receiving the life insurance proceeds
in September, Kilbride spent more than $100,000 traveling throughout the United
States, Canada and Europe. Although Kilbride had no known employment income, he
and Ms. Smith rented a villa on the Mediterranean coast. He had approximately
$15,000 in other income during this period. Kilbride financed his life-style primarily by
selling more assets, obtaining further loans and making heavy use of credit cards.
6. In late September 1998, Kilbride received the $275,000 in life insurance proceeds from
Mary’s death.
7. Also in September 1998, Kilbride sold the luxury condominium; he and Ms. Smith
continued to live in the Mediterranean villa until he returned to the United States in
January 1999, when he was arrested.
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In summary, the accounting evidence revealed that Kilbride enjoyed a life-style he
could not afford. He was living well beyond his means—his expenses so greatly
exceeded his income during the months before and after Mary’s death that he
would have been virtually bankrupt if he had not received the insurance money on
Mary’s life.

This evidence was very useful in establishing a motive for murder, and weighed
heavily at Killbride’s murder trial at which he was found guilty.

6.3 Individuals versus the Government

Fraud against the government is a general term for several kinds of schemes perpetrated
against federal, state, and local governments or government agencies. Typically, frauds
against the government committed by individuals involve one of the following: income tax
fraud and benefit-program fraud. (See chapter 7 for a discussion of frauds against the
government committed by corporations.)

6.3.1 Income Tax Fraud
According to some estimates, most taxpayers do one of the following:
1. Fail to disclose all their income
2. Take deductions to which they are not entitled

The most common income tax frauds involve categories of individuals who receive their
compensation in cash. These categories include waiters, restaurant owners, bartenders, and
bellhops.
For the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be successful with a claim for income tax fraud,
intent must be proven—it is perfectly legal for taxpayers to manage their affairs to minimize
their taxes—it is illegal for them to do so in a deceitful manner.

6.3.2 Benefit-Program Fraud
Another major category of fraud against the government generally involves making false
statements of various kinds in order to obtain funds. The United States and other countries
with strong social assistance programs are easy targets for fraudsters. The specific programs
targeted include:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Welfare benefits
Medicare and Medicaid benefits
Unemployment benefits
Disability programs
Student loan programs
Housing programs

Often, rings of fraudsters apply for government benefits, resulting in very high losses to the
government, and ultimately to the taxpayer through increased taxes.
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6.4 Individuals versus Financial Institutions
Fraud committed externally against a financial institution can take many forms and can be
committed by anyone who deals with such organizations, including individuals and
corporations. The most common offenses committed by individuals—and sometimes
corporations—are credit fraud, loan fraud, false mortgage security, real estate fraud, money
transfer fraud, money laundering, and check fraud. These and other frauds against financial
institutions, committed by individuals, are described below.

6.4.1 Financial Institutions and Fraud
Definition of a Financial Institution
For the purposes of this Handbook, a financial institution is any organization, whether
domestic or international, that is engaged in receiving, collecting, transferring, paying,
lending, investing, dealing, exchanging, and servicing money and claims to money. This
also includes safe deposit facilities, custodianships, agencies and trusteeships.

Under the broadest concept, the term financial institution may be applied to institutions,
such as cooperatives, export-import banks, investment bankers and mortgage bankers.

Legal Aspects of Bank Fraud
In most jurisdictions, financial institutions are insured by an agency of the government and
are governed by related criminal statutes. For example, in the United States the broadest of
all federal statutes is Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1344. It covers all assets owned or
controlled by a bank, as well as employees and outsiders. It prohibits any action that would
defraud the financial institution, such as embezzlement, misapplication, false statements and
related fraudulent behavior.

6.4.2 Credit-Card Fraud
Generally, credit-card fraud can be divided into two categories. In some instances, the
fraudster uses credit information from one individual to obtain credit for use by another.
For example, John R. Fraud, with bad credit, obtains the credit information ofJohn Q.
Smith, and applies for a credit card under the name ofJohn Q. Smith, using John R.
Smith’s address. John R. Fraud then makes charges on the account. When John Q. Smith
protests, the credit-card company attempts to locate the real user of the credit card, John R.
Fraud, who has since absconded.

The other common credit-card fraud involves duplicating credit cards and then using them
to purchase high-value merchandise, for instance, jewels, furs, and other items that can
easily be resold before the credit-card company catches up with the fraudster.

6.4.3 Loan Fraud
Borrowers sometimes provide false information to a lending institution in order to obtain
funds to continue business activity, or simply to fraudulently get money that they have no
intention of repaying. Some of the most common schemes include loans to nonexistent
borrowers, false applications with false credit information, bribery of a loan officer,
borrower misapplication of funds, and single family housing loan fraud.
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Loans to Nonexistent Borrowers
In a loan-to-a-nonexistent-borrower fraud, the borrower uses a false identity to obtain a
loan. This scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower, or with the assistance of
an insider, such as a loan officer.
Fraud committed by individuals can be difficult to detect, particularly if the identity
documents of the fraudster match his or her details as provided on the loan application.
Warning signs include:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The borrower is unknown to bank personnel.
No public credit report is available.
The borrower or loan officer requests unusual loan terms.

Loan application information does not check out.

The proposed security has an inflated value.
The proposed inventory (security) has an unrealistic value.
There is no CPA associated with the financial statements.

The loan officer’s bonus is based on volume of loans funded.

• The proposed collateral is located outside the bank’s market area.

• The loan proceeds are distributed prior to the loan’s closing.
False Applications with False Credit Information
False information on the credit application can include overstated assets, nonexistent assets,
understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue and understated expenses. For example,
a borrower with marginal net worth might inflate the asset and income figures on his or her
personal financial statements to convince the loan officer of his or her credit worthiness.
The loan officer and others involved in the bank loan approval process can often detect
these schemes by observing one or more of the following:

• Appraisals-valuations that defy common sense and local knowledge
•
•
•
•

Appraisers who are paid on basis of appraisal amount
Large loans beyond experience and expertise of the loan officer

Borrowers who default on the first payment
Numerous payment extensions, or payments that are placed on nonaccrual status

• No audit trail for verifying application information
• Applicant reports receiving loans from many other banks

Bribery of Loan Officers
Statutes (for example, Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 201) prohibit any officer, director,
employee, agent or attorney of a bank from knowingly soliciting or receiving things of
value in connection with bank transactions. In the usual scheme, a borrower offers an
officer an inducement to grant a loan that would not otherwise be made (for instance,
because the borrower has little or no credit, or because the borrower is not using his or her
real name).
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Senior loan officers can often detect these schemes by observing one or more of the
following:

• The life-style of the originating loan officer is beyond the means provided by normal
compensation.
• The loan officer has unreasonably high productivity.
• The loan officer’s compensation is based on volume productivity.
• Loan agreements contain terms unreasonably favorable to the borrower.
• There is a pattern of disbursements to particular agents, brokers, appraisers, finders, and
so on.
• There are multiple loans to the same borrower with the same agents involved.
• The loan or other bank officer has a financial interest in the customer’s project, or
stockholdings in a bank subsidiary profiting from the business.

Borrower Misapplication of Funds
Borrower misapplication is most common when the borrower has little or no personal risk
in the collateral, for example, real estate. The highest risk real estate loans are those in
which the lender provides all the funding on a nonrecourse basis. The most common ways
borrowers misapply loan funds are as follows:

• Kickbacks or profit interests in construction activities
• Brokerage or real estate fees
• Property management fees
• Related-party vendors
• Closing-statement prorations of rent, taxes, and other items

• Land flips
• Sale of property rights, such as laundry or cable TV
• Misappropriation of operating proceeds or loan proceeds
• Misappropriation of escrow payments

Single Family Housing Loan Fraud
One variation of the misapplication-of-funds fraud is the borrower who purchases single
family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality as rental property or in some
instances for resale. When applying to a financial institution, the fraudster usually
misrepresents his or her ability to finance the property and make payments. Usually loan
officers uncover these frauds by observing one or more of the following:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

There is an unrealistic change in commuting distance.
A high-income borrower has little or no personal property.
New housing expense is 150 percent or more of the previous expense.
Bank deposits are listed in round amounts on application.
The borrower reports overlapping dates of current and prior employment.
The previous employer is listed as out of business.
A high-income borrower does not use a professional tax preparer.
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• The appraisal shows a tenant as the contact person on an owner-occupied house.
• The initial title report shows delinquent taxes.

6.4.4 Real Estate Fraud
Real estate fraud is essentially a specialized form of loan fraud committed either by
individuals or corporations. Financial institutions, especially the savings and loan
associations in the United States, were badly hit in the 1980s due to fraud committed in the
real estate area. These schemes are often perpetrated in concert with the insiders of
financial institutions.

Land Flips
A land flip is the practice of buying and selling a parcel of land very quickly, often in a
single day or month, at a successively higher price to related parties, until a lender—who
believes the transaction is at arm’s length—provides financing on an unrealistically inflated
loan amount. The key components of the scheme in sequential order are as follows:
1. The same piece of property is sold back and forth between a borrower—the fraudster—
and dummy or shell corporations.
2. Each time the land is sold, the price is inflated.

3. To support each sale, the borrower secures an appraisal based on an unrealistic or
favorable set of assumptions, or performed by a friendly, incompetent or dishonest
appraiser.
4. The borrower goes to a financial institution—the victim—and mortgages the property
for its appraised value, keeping the grossly inflated loan proceeds.
5. The fraudster defaults on the loan.

False Appraisals
Fraud perpetrators use false and inflated appraisals to support loans larger than the true
value of the property. Appraisers are either parties to the fraud or paid off, or they are
merely unqualified—that is, easily fooled by bogus transactions like land flips—to perform
the appraisal.

Nominee Loans
Nominee loans are those made in the name of a straw (dummy) borrower or agent—that is,
a borrower having no substance—while the identity of the real borrower is undisclosed to
the lender.

Double Pledging Collateral
This scheme involves fraudulently pledging the same collateral with different lenders,
before the related liens are recorded and registered. This obviously hinders the lender’s
ability to look to the collateral as a source of recovery when the borrower defaults.

Real Estate Fraud Detection
Lenders or other interested parties can often detect real estate fraud by observing one or
more of the following warning signs:
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• A single borrower has received multiple loans.
• The same appraiser has appraised two or more different properties for the same
borrower within a short period of time.

• The same appraiser has made successive appraisals of the same property at high values
in a short period of time.
• The property was bought or sold many times in a short period.
• The borrower is a shell with no real substance or a holding company whose substance
lies hidden in its numerous subsidiaries.
• The buyer is obviously shopping for a loan instead of a long-term banking relationship.
• The seller of the property is another bank.
• The borrower has a prior default history.
• The borrower has a history of loan payoffs by obtaining other, larger loans.
• The loan application contains requests for several loans to different persons on the same
property.
• The borrower requires the loan as a condition before delivering large deposits to the
bank, with the loan being the inducement for establishing a continuing banking
relationship.

6.4.5 Money Transfer Fraud
Wires totaling two to three times a bank’s assets may be processed every business day. It is
rare that wires do not at least equal a bank’s total assets, and they can sometimes be ten
times the assets for banks that have a large correspondent network. The process is highly
automated at most banks.
In the most common money transfer fraud, an outsider or bank employee with access to the
correct identification numbers needed to wire transfer funds, steals the funds. In one case in
Chicago, a bank insider with knowledge of the wire transfer codes and procedures
conspired with his friends to wire nearly $70 million out of the country. The scheme was
detected (early enough to avoid a loss to the bank) when the transfer was made from a
customer’s account, thereby overdrawing the account balance.

Warning signs for this kind of fraud include:
• Clerks rather than more senior personnel perform actual processing.
• Managerial personnel conduct frequent overrides of the established approval authority
controls.
• There is evidence of wires to and from offshore banks in countries known for their bank
secrecy laws.
• There are routine high volume, high dollar transfers.
• There are frequent wires for persons with no account at the bank.
• Access to the wire room is often not properly restricted.
• Employees become very comfortable with the routine of the job and with their
coworkers.
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Variations of these schemes involve misrepresenting the customer’s identity. The fraudster
will use pretext telephone calls to obtain correct account information from the bank. Then
the fraudster obtains the codes from an insider. Thereafter, the fraudster makes a telephone
call to transfer the funds out of the bank.

6.4.6 Money Laundering
Money laundering refers to the process of turning dirty money into clean money. The primary
objective is to conceal the existence, source or use of illicit money and thus the underlying
offence—whether the offence is trade in illegal narcotics, robbery, fraud, illegal political
contributions, tax evasion, prostitution or any other criminal activity. Money launderers
may also want to obstruct investigative efforts, preserve assets from forfeiture, and evade
taxes.

Perpetrators may launder money in the country in which the crime is committed or where
the funds originated; more often, however, they send the money across an international
border. Usually they deposit the money in a bank or other institution in a tax haven and it
comes back clean in the form of salaries, loans, fees or services.

Money Laundering Methods
There are three main methods for laundering money:
1. Through legitimate fronts

2. Through couriers and smurfs
3. Through the cooperation of a bank insider who ignores the reporting guidelines
Each of these methods has certain unique characteristics; however, they also have some
common characteristics:
1. Large cash shipments
2. Large volume of wire transfers to and from offshore banks (However, not all offshore
wire transfers involve money laundering—see below.)

Legitimate Fronts. Many money launderers open a legitimate front business that handles a
great deal of cash—for instance, a casino, restaurant, parking lot, vending machine
company, or pawnshop—and then deposit the ill-gotten gain along with the legitimate
income of the business. Perpetrators then commingle the illegal cash with the legitimate
receipts thereby disguising any illegal sources. They then withdraw the cleaned money or
wire-transfer it to a final destination.
Interested parties, for example a bank or bonding company, can usually detect this kind of
fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:
• Accounts accumulate deposits that are subsequently transferred out.
• Cash deposits from sources are not identified as customers of the business.
• There is a sudden and unexplained increase in the volume of cash deposits.
Money launderers can use gambling casinos. The ill-gotten cash is used to purchase chips.
Later the launderers exchange the chips remaining at the end of a controlled (carefully
limiting losses) gambling session for money and receive the proceeds in the form of a check
from the casino, thereby creating a seemingly legitimate paper trail.
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Smurfing. One variation of the money laundering scheme is to use special couriers, called
smurfs, to make relatively small deposits and withdrawals. For example, cash deposits of
$10,000 or more must be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a special form
called a Currency Transaction Report (CTR). To avoid this reporting requirement, smurfs
make deposits or withdrawals just below this threshold amount.
Banks and other interested parties can usually detect this kind of fraud by observing one or
more of the following warning signs:

• Withdrawals made in numerous transactions just under $10,000.
• Customers who are not account holders exchanging large amounts of small bills for
large denomination bills.
• Inquiries as to policies of the bank regarding reporting currency transactions.

• Large dollar volume of cashier’s checks and money orders sold for cash to customers
who are not account holders.
• Persons shown as unemployed and self-employed on a CTR.
Breaches ofthe Reporting Guidelines. In still another variation, the money launderer conspires
with a bank insider, who agrees to make deposits for the money launderer and forego the
reporting mechanisms. The bank gets free use of the deposited funds, and in some
instances, the bank officer is compromised through a bribe or kickback. Banks can usually
detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:

• An account with many different individuals making deposits, and only a few making
large withdrawals.
• Accounts with accumulated deposits that are subsequently transferred out.

• High dollar limits and large numbers of bank customers exempted from CTR
requirements.
• An incorrect or incomplete CTR.

Money Laundering Mechanics
Although laundering and offshore banking conjure up images of financial wizardry and
international tax lawyers and accountants, most illegal activity involves the simple addition
of some layers to the basics common to ordinary business transactions. In essence,
laundering works like this.

Party A, who has come by the dirty money (or legitimate money that needs to be
laundered) gives it to Party B, who is the laundryman. Party B sends the money offshore
where it is deposited and funds are subsequently disbursed or laundered and then returned
to Party A for use.
During the laundering, Party B, having received the money from Party A, sets about
concealing it. Having the money in currency upon receipt makes the job easier. If the
money is in paper (checks, and so on), Party B may have to first start the laundering process
by converting it to local currency. Party B has, or sets up, one or more local companies, of
which he or she is the owner, manager or employee, depending on the relationship to Party
A.
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Now the offshore part of the process begins. Party B goes to a tax haven lawyer and
establishes an offshore company: loan companies, finance companies, or trusts are
preferable. Party B’s name does not appear anywhere in the legal documents.
The company in the tax haven opens an offshore bank account. Party B travels to the
haven with the currency, and Party B or the lawyer buys a cashier’s check at the bank with
the tax haven company as remitter. The lawyer then draws up the necessary loan
documents to show a loan from the haven company to Party B’s local company. Party B
then returns home with the cashier’s check. Thus, the money is brought back home as a
loan (which being capital, not revenue, is not taxable) and is clean.

Party A on his own, or through Party B, now makes use of the laundered funds by drawing
out salaries, obtaining loans from Party B’s local company, paying dividends, opening a
corporate expense account, using a company car, and so on.
Party B’s local company files appropriate tax returns and makes note of payments, or at
least interest payments. Interest is deducted on the company’s tax return. If the company
loses money, it has a tax offset. Party B does nothing illegal in the local country and, of
course, makes interest payments on the loan payable to the offshore company, allowing
further funds to be moved.

If a law enforcement agency questions the loans, the company will obtain full
documentation from Party B’s attorney in the tax haven. Inquiries beyond documents will
be blocked by the haven’s secrecy requirements.

Offshore Banks and Tax Havens
There are many reasons, some legitimate and some not, why money launderers transfer
money and other valuable securities from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction that has
secret banking privileges. These foreign jurisdictions are commonly referred to as tax
havens because, in addition to bank secrecy laws, they had no income taxes so people or
companies first used them to (legally) minimize or to (illegally) evade taxes.

Tax haven is now a misnomer, since funds may be deposited for reasons other than escaping
tax. Tax havens have grown in popularity in recent times as one of the few means of
placing funds beyond the reach of creditors or other investigators. It did not take long for
criminal organizations and individuals to exploit the sanctuary of the tax haven. With the
development of multinational banking systems and international business and commerce, it
became easy to put together sophisticated laundering schemes to move the proceeds of
crime to foreign banks protected from intrusion by law enforcement officials.
The World’s Tax Havens. Switzerland has a long history as an international tax haven,
imposing little financial regulation and strict secrecy laws. Many other countries have
jumped aboard the bandwagon. The key tax havens include—

• Bermuda and the Caribbean: Antigua, Bahamas, Caymans, Montserrat, Netherlands
Antilles, St. Vincent, and Turks and Caicos.
• Central America: Panama and Costa Rica.
• Channel Islands: Guernsey and Jersey.
• Pacific: Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vanuatu.
• Other locations: Liberia, Bahrain, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Cyprus.
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Offshore Facilities. Typically, the tax haven’s biggest domestic industries are banks, financial
institutions, companies, trusts, agents, accountants and attorneys who collectively constitute
offshore facilities. Facilities that are available in tax havens include—

• Banks. There are two classes of banks. Class A banks conduct local business transactions
in the tax haven. Class B banks exist on paper only, as they conduct no local business
transactions.
• Companies and trusts. Companies can be incorporated in the tax haven; trusts (such as
family, estate, or other kinds) can be set up.
• Offshore agents, accountants and attorneys. These are an essential element of the offshore
facilities in a tax haven.
The Tax Haven’s Rationale. Tax havens encourage offshore facilities for economic, political
and social reasons, all of which benefit their residents. For example, offshore facilities
generate up to 20 percent of the Caymans’ revenues, balance the budget in Montserrat
(through licensing fees) and have a huge impact on local economies, particularly those of
economically emerging countries.

For example, in 1964 the Caymans had one or two multinational banks and virtually no
companies. By 1981 they had thirty multinational banks, 300 Class B banks, and about
13,600 companies, the latter handled by a small number of lawyers, accountants and
agents. The Caymans’ total population in 1981 was about 15,000.

Many havens claim that the United States blames them for problems that it is unable to
solve domestically. Furthermore, offshore competition is so stiff that it is estimated that if
one country were to cease being a tax haven three more would start. (When Switzerland
relaxed its secrecy laws, Bahamian and Caymanian business grew at a rapid rate.) Also,
bank brokers move from island to island as laws tighten or loosen.

A local Bahamian bank executive summed it up when he said
The Bahamas must do things which are not allowed in the United States because
to do things which are allowed in the United States is noncompetitive, since in
every instance the United States does it better than the Bahamas do. The
Bahamas are therefore compelled in banking and trust operations to appeal to
unallowable activities and by inference to appeal to activities disallowed in the
United States.
Secrecy. The vital characteristic of a tax haven is that it allows offshore facilities to conduct
their affairs behind a veil of secrecy. Tax havens offer not only secret, numbered bank
accounts but also corporate laws and secrecy provisions that prevent law enforcement
officials from intruding. In addition, lawyers from tax havens offer a further level of secrecy
because they too are shielded by the haven’s secrecy laws, they maintain attorney-client
privilege, they sometimes do not know who their clients are, or they may be coconspirators,
or any combination thereof.
Tax havens view secrecy as a necessity for keeping offshore business. Business people from
various parts of the world (the Middle East and South America, for example) consider
secrecy to be a normal characteristic of business affairs. Flight capital (money being sent out
of politically unstable countries) has to be transferred secretly. Thus, it is not only criminals
but also politicians and governments to whom secrecy is attractive.
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Civil secrecy exists in common law as the result of a British case, Union v. Tournier (1907).
This case established that a banker had a duty to treat his customer’s affairs as confidential.
Many havens follow this law. Some jurisdictions have passed stringent, criminal laws to
buttress Tournier—for example, the Bahamas and the Caymans. Corporate laws in the
havens also aid secrecy by permitting nominee owners and bearer shares, prohibiting
disclosure of the beneficial owner, not requiring financial statements and audits, and
allowing the purchase of companies off the shelf.
Quite apart from the law, secrecy prevails in some tax havens by virtue of inadequate
records, unskilled administrators and corruption.

Vehicles Used to Transfer Funds to Tax Havens. Individuals or businesses can use several kinds
of institutions to transfer funds to tax havens. These include banks with international
branches or facilities, smaller trust companies and banking institutions, shipping companies,
real estate companies, travel agencies, money changers, insurance companies, finance
companies, brokerage and investment companies, international trading companies, holding
companies, and multinational corporations. The transfers themselves may be legal or
illegal. The transfer can be accomplished by means of letters of credit to a bank in a tax
haven, a bank draft, a wire transfer, or the transport of cash itself.
File Folders. Money launderers can purchase a set of legal papers in tax havens—for
example, legal documents, financial statements, and banking documents dated some years
before they are purchased. These documents make it appear that the company has been in
business for several years. In reality, of course, it never previously existed. These
companies have no substance.
Tax Havens and Law Enforcement. The combination of offshore corporate entities and secret
bank accounts in tax havens permits entities to construct a maze of financial transactions.
The tracing of assets becomes a very complex task. The transferring of questionable funds
from one tax haven jurisdiction to another greatly compounds the complexity.
Enforcement problems are pervasive, affecting not only criminal but also civil actions (such
as divorces, bankruptcies, and so on). Investigating cases takes a tremendous effort, and
conviction is by no means certain. There is no central clearing house to handle offshore
inquiries.

Investigations into Narcotics Trafficking
Narcotics trafficking is currently the primary source of laundered funds. The sophistication
and complexity of laundering schemes are virtually infinite and are limited only by the
creativity and expertise of the criminal entrepreneurs who devise the schemes. Organized
crime uses banks and other financial institutions in the course of laundering as routinely, if
not as frequently, as legitimate businesses use banks for legitimate purposes.
Previously, much of the investigation into narcotics trafficking occurred on the street in
which the drugs were followed to identify the dealers. Although this led to many successful
prosecutions, it seldom exposed the leaders of the organizations. The problem with a street
investigation is that the authorities generally cannot make a buy from, or a sale to, the top
person in the organization without the use of an informant, who is generally unreliable.
Furthermore, because the sentences received by drug traffickers were often so light,
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perpetrators considered the risk worth taking—and the leaders of the organizations
continued to be insulated.

Currently, law enforcement authorities obtain financial documentation during seizures in
order to establish that certain individuals possess goods that far exceed their known sources
of income. This technique has made possible the successful prosecution of the leaders in
drug trafficking schemes. Generally investigators use two methods to prove the flow of
funds obtained from narcotics trafficking:
1. Net worth analyses
2. Sources and uses of funds

6.4.7 Check Fraud
Check fraud is a general term for the attempted negotiation of bad checks at a financial
institution. Typically con artists prey on banks in an attempt to negotiate fraudulent or
fictitious instruments. Common kinds of check fraud include forged, altered, and stolen
checks; new account fraud; and check kiting.

Forged, Altered, and Stolen Checks
Most attempts to defraud banks involve one or more of the following:
1. Checks bearing the forged names of makers, endorsers or payees.

2. Altered checks showing increased amounts.
3. Counterfeit checks.

4. Stolen checks passed by others.
Bank officers and other investigators can detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more
of the following warning signs:

•
•
•
•
•

Obvious written alterations on checks
Illegible maker, endorser or officer signatures
Checks imprinted with a maximum amount, or the term void, or nonnegotiable

Unprofessional printing
Business checks presented for cash instead of deposit

New Account Fraud
Check fraud is much more likely to occur in new accounts than in established accounts.
Bank employees must make special efforts to properly identify the potential new customer,
without offending existing customers. Banks should establish screening criteria that must be
enforced by everyone handling new accounts. These employees must take prompt, decisive
action to manage or close (or both) apparent problem accounts.
Most perpetrators of new account fraud use false identification. Examples include
fraudulent birth certificates, fraudulent passports, duplicate social security numbers,
fraudulent voter registration cards, stolen credit cards, stolen driver’s licenses, stolen
paychecks, front (shell) businesses, fraudulent student-identification cards, and disguised
identities (including post office box mail address, lock box rental, mail forwarding,
telephone answering service, and rented office space).
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New-account criminals are professionals. They use false identification to open new accounts
and steal money before the bank collects the funds. Bank officers can normally detect newaccount fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:

1. The customer resides outside the bank’s normal trade area.

2. The customer rushes to open an account and obtain a loan.
3. The customer’s dress or actions, or both, are inappropriate for his or her stated age,
occupation or income level.

To help prevent this kind of fraud, banks should consider adopting the following
procedures:
1. Implement well-defined procedures for increasing employee awareness of new-account
fraud.

2. Establish specific guidance about acceptable identification and its reporting.
3. Require detailed verification of customer’s information, including—
— Previous checking account history (internal and external investigation).

— Credit reports and credit scoring systems.
— Dun & Bradstreet reports.
— Better Business Bureau reports.
— Special requests for no mail contact.
— Post office box or hotel address.
Check Kiting
Check kiting is a term for building up large apparent balances in one or more bank accounts,
based on uncollected or floated checks drawn against similar accounts in other banks. As
banks decrease the amount of time taken to clear checks, this kind of fraud is becoming less
common. Although many individuals engage to some degree in kiting, a commercial
customer can perpetrate this scheme by using several bank accounts to increase available
cash reserves.

The brokerage firm, E.F. Hutton, committed one of the most significant check-kiting
schemes perpetrated in the United States. They engaged in a $20-million kiting scheme to
decrease the cost of their funds during the late 1980s. The resultant bad publicity eventually
led to the company’s demise.
Check Kiting, Illustrated. In commercial bank accounts established over a period of time to
avoid suspicion, a fraudster starts with little or no money in Bank A and Bank B, and writes
$5,000 in checks on each for deposit in the other:

Apparent Balances
Actual Balances
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Total

Bank A

Bank B

$5,000

$5,000

$10,000

-0-

-0-

-0-
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The process is quickly repeated (for example, the next day) with $8,000 in deposited
checks:

Apparent Balances

Actual Balances

Bank A

Bank B

$13,000

$13,000

$26,000

-0-

-0-

-0-

Total

A $6,000 down payment is made on a Mercedes from a check written from Bank A.

Bank A

Bank B

Apparent Balances

$7,000

$13,000

$20,000

Actual Balances

($6,000)

-0-

($6,000)

Total

The next day additional checks for $4,000 each are written and deposited into each
account:

Bank A

Bank B

Apparent Balances

$11,000

$17,000

$28,000

Actual Balances

($6,000)

-0-

($6,000)

Total

The balances are then paid to a travel agent, and the fraudster takes a long trip:

Apparent Balances
Actual Balances

Bank A

Bank B

-0-

-0-

-0-

($17,000)

($17,000)

($34,000)

Total

Check Kiting Characteristics. Bank personnel usually uncover check-kiting schemes by
observing one or more of the following warning signs:

• Frequent deposits and checks in same amounts.
• Frequent deposits and checks in round amounts.
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• Frequent deposits of checks written on the same paying bank, which is not the deposit
bank.
• Little time lag between deposits and withdrawals.
• Frequent Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) account balance inquiries.
• Many large deposits made on Thursday or Friday to take advantage of the weekend.
• Large periodic balances in individual accounts with no apparent business explanation.

• Low average balance compared to high level of deposits.
• Many checks made payable to other banks.
• Bank willingness to pay against uncollected funds (note that not all payments against
uncollected funds are check kites, but all check kites require payments against
uncollected funds).
• Cash withdrawals with deposit checks drawn on another bank.

• Checks drawn on foreign banks with lax banking laws and regulations.

Slowing the Bank-Clearing Process. Before the days of sophisticated computer systems, a
check-kiting scheme could develop using less paper, fewer financial institutions, and smaller
amounts than are commonly used today. Banks can still be hit with large losses when a
fraudster slows down the bank clearing process. Typical fraudsters’ procedures include—

• Using counter checks without any computer or Magnetic Ink Character Recognition
(MICR) coding.
• Providing insufficient information on checks (for example, using an incomplete name of
a bank and branch, leaving out the account number, giving an illegible signature).
•
•
•
•

Making errors on the face of checks such as date and figures.
Defacing the check (for example, by using staples).

Placing stop payments on certain documents.
Having accounts in institutions other than chartered banks (that is, trust companies and
credit unions).

New Techniques. It is now very difficult to effect a check-kiting scheme employing the same
procedures as in the past. Banks are reluctant to accept counter checks; more significantly,
checks usually take only one day to clear. This is true even for checks issued on out-of-town
or out-of-state banks. The financial institutions claim that, in the near future, checks will
clear instantaneously. To counteract the tightening of bank procedures, the fraudster has
had to increase the number of financial institutions used, the dollar amounts, and frequency
of checks issued.

Check-Kiting Scheme Investigations. The main issues to be addressed when investigating a
check-kiting scheme are as follows:
1. The loss does not necessarily occur at the time of detection. Banks are usually put at
increasing financial risk over a period of time.
2. Accounting evidence must show that—
a. Control was exerted over a number of accounts.

b. A loss did occur.
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c. Economic risk has increased as shown by day-by-day analysis.
d. Every time the perpetrator withdraws money from the system of accounts (in excess
of the deposits put into the system), the bank incurs a loss or risk of loss.
e. The volume of inter-account checks is high.
3. The bank must determine whether it gave implied credit to the accused through daylight
overdraft privileges, which allow an overdraft balance at the end of a business day to be
cleared up before the close of the next business day to cover the previous day’s
overdraft.
4. The timing of the investigation and the availability of legible microfilm documentation
are important.
5. Documentation of the modus operandi needs liberal use of visual aids.
Accounting Assistance. When investigating check-kiting, the CPA should—

• Identify the fraudster-controlled accounts because the financial institutions where they
are maintained risk suffering economic losses.
• Identify and demonstrate the loss. This task is difficult because there is a mistaken
tendency to regard loss as occurring at the termination of the check-kiting scheme. In
fact, however, the risk of loss usually builds up day by day, over a period of several
months. Recognition of the economic loss occurs when the perpetrator abandons the
fraudulent activity for whatever reasons (this is equivalent to the game of musical
chairs—the loss isn’t recognized until the music stops).
• Perform a day-by-day analysis to show both the buildup of the loss and the increase in
economic risk to the financial institutions.
• Recognize that a check-kiting scheme could take place over an extended period of time
without the knowledge of the bank. This is an issue that is frequently raised in court.
This component is an educational aspect for many: lawyers, police, bank officials,
laymen, and even CPAs find check kiting difficult to understand.
• Try to accomplish the difficult task of demonstrating to a court of law that this case was
not merely an unbroken circle of checks and that this shell game, which was apparently
tolerated by the financial institutions, resulted in economic loss to them.

Mr. I.M. Kiter Case Study
Recently, between January and the middle of March, an extremely busy, wellrespected professional, Mr. I.M. Kiter, operated a massive check-kiting scheme that
employed at least eight bank accounts at three separate financial institutions. For
two-and-a-half months he was able to falsely inflate the value of his accounts by
issuing checks to or from his various accounts.
About four weeks before the scheme was uncovered, one of the financial institutions
was sufficiently concerned about the status of Mr. Kiter’s accounts that it would
only accept certified checks for deposit. This had the effect of reducing the clearing
time to zero days or in certain instances to minus one day (the check was certified
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the day before it was deposited). Despite these restrictions, Mr. I.M. Kiter was able
to continue his check-kiting scheme for the following reasons:

1. The other financial institutions did not require deposited checks to be certified.
2. Some overdraft privileges were permitted.
3. Mr. Kiter spoke with the financial institutions daily and explained away his
suspicious conduct.

4. Checks were not return marked not sufficient funds (NSF), as required by bank
policy, because the bank’s normal policies were changed for Mr. Kiter, a good
customer.
5. The bank permitted daily daylight overdraft privileges.
Forensic accountants performed an analysis of the deposit and disbursement activity
in the various bank accounts. With the exception of the closing bank overdraft, the
deposits totaled about $87.5 million, of which more than $85 million represented
money circulated among the eight accounts controlled by Mr. Kiter. The total
amount of actual deposits from noncontrolled accounts only amounted to about
$2.5 million. The ending balance in one of Mr. Kiter’s accounts at Anytown Bank
was a negative $1.7 million. This overdraft balance resulted in a loss that was fully
absorbed by Anytown Bank. Forensic accountants also performed an analysis of an
account maintained by Mr. Kiter at Bigtown Bank for the period March 1 to March
10. This analysis indicated that Bigtown Bank permitted ongoing overdraft
privileges to Mr. Kiter in amounts up to almost $1 million. Closer inspection
revealed the extent of Mr. Kiter’s abuse of the daylight overdraft privileges.

This practice was confirmed by the review of Bigtown Bank’s credit
correspondence, and demonstrated that the departure from Bigtown Bank’s policy
allowed Mr. Kiter to continue the check-kiting scheme in an uninterrupted fashion.
In fact, when the kiting scheme fell apart, it provided Mr. Kiter with a defensible
position for court purposes (that is, his conduct was condoned or blessed by Bigtown
Bank).
The practices of Bigtown Bank also raised the questions as to whether the economic
loss suffered by Anytown Bank was because of the check-kiting scheme, or because
of the conduct of Bigtown Bank. Evidence introduced during the trial did not
establish that the banks were aware of the kiting scheme. However, there was
evidence that Bigtown Bank knew that Mr. Kiter was having some cash flow
difficulties pertaining to closing a number of real estate deals. Handwritten
comments from the Bigtown Bank branch manager to his credit department
indicated that—

The bank closely monitored Mr. Kiter’s account.
The bank allowed certified checks to cover the overdraft daily.
The bank tolerated daily overdraft amounts of approximately $ 1 million.
The bank received substantial revenues via overdraft and service charges (an
example of the bank greed factor).
5. The bank indicated at a meeting held with Mr. Kiter on February 25th that it
would permit the overdraft arrangement to continue for another sixty days.

1.
2.
3.
4.
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6. Mr. Kiter had social connections and was a source of business for the bank.

Although Mr. Kiter was found guilty, the judge’s ruling implied that prior
knowledge of the check-kiting scheme on the part of one of the banks weakened the
prosecution’s case.

6.5 Individuals versus Insurance Companies
Insurance fraud generally consists of a presentation to an insurance company of a
materially false or misleading written statement relating to either an application or claim for
insurance. Fraud occurs not only when there is an actual loss (that is, a claim is made based
on bogus information), but also when there is a risk of loss. This distinction is important for
insurance fraud because insurance policies relate to risks. Accordingly, if an insurance
policy based on a material misstatement is placed, the insurance company is the victim of a
fraud because there was the risk of a claim, even if no claims are made on the policy.

Some insurance policies relate to risks faced by individuals, whereas others relate to risks
faced by corporations. This section deals with both kinds.

6.5.1 Life Insurance Fraud
Life insurance is a policy that pays the insured’s beneficiary a predetermined amount of
money in the event of the insured’s death. Common life insurance frauds include homicide
fraud, staged-death fraud, preexisting health condition fraud, and double-indemnity fraud.

Homicide Fraud
A beneficiary of a life insurance policy may commit homicide to collect benefits. In these
cases, there are actually two victims—the person who has been murdered (see section
6.2.6), and the insurance company, which is required to make a payment on the policy.

Staged Death Fraud
An insured might fake his or her death in order to collect benefits. A variation of this
scheme occurs when a policy is taken out on an insured who is already dead.

Preexisting Health Condition Fraud
An otherwise uninsurable person obtains a life insurance policy through false health
statements on the application describing preexisting health conditions. The normal,
minimal medical examination would not be sufficient to expose the condition. The insured
hopes to die of causes unrelated to the feared condition—that is, a condition that would
otherwise prevent the policy from being issued—and without an autopsy being performed,
so that the insurer will pay the policy benefits.

Double Indemnity
In some cases, a beneficiary of a life insurance policy will report the death as having been
accidental in order to obtain twice the face value of the policy. A variation of this scheme
occurs when a beneficiary attempts to make a suicide appear to have been accidental.
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6.5.2 Casualty Insurance Fraud
Casualty insurance covers the personal injuries and property damage that result from an
accident or other covered occurrence. While accidents can occur anywhere and at any
time, a large number of casualty claims involve injuries sustained in traffic accidents. The
following are the common casualty insurance frauds:
• Staged accidents
•
•
•
•

Mortgage insurance fraud
Legitimate accidents with false claims
Personal injury insurance fraud
Fraudulent claims

Staged Accidents
A staged accident is one in which, for example, an individual will purposely pull out into
the path of an oncoming vehicle or will allow themselves to be rear-ended in order to cause
a collision. A fraudulent claim is then made for nonexistent personal injuries or a falsely
inflated claim is made for real injury. These kinds of insurance fraud usually involve rings of
individuals, including unscrupulous doctors, attorneys and claim adjusters.

Mortgage Insurance Fraud
Mortgage insurance is a policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the
purchaser of the property defaults on those payments because of death or disability. A
typical mortgage insurance fraud is a variation on a staged accident fraud—for example, an
employee who is laid off from work claims that he is disabled, so his mortgage is paid via
his mortgage insurance policy.

Legitimate Accidents with False Claims
In many cases, an individual is involved in a legitimate accident and later exaggerates his or
her personal injuries (usually soft-tissue injuries) to bilk the insurance company.
Personal Injury Insurance Fraud
Personal injury insurance fraud usually involves lying about the circumstances of the cause
of an injury so as to bring it within the insurance coverage. For example, a worker covered
by workers compensation insurance injures his back while working at home but reports it
as a job-related injury to come within the workers compensation insurance coverage.
Fraudulent Claims
A fraudulent claim is one in which, for example, an insured’s auto is brought into a body
shop for repair after a legitimate accident. The body shop inflates the claim, typically to
cover the deductible. The body shop may then pay a cash bribe to the claims adjuster or
intentionally cause additional damage to the car to maximize its profit.
In another example, an insured seeks the cooperation of a scrap yard that has the capability
to crush autos. The insured has his auto crushed and files a theft claim. If the auto is not
recovered within a reasonable span of time, the claim is paid. The insured then pays the
scrap yard for destroying the vehicle without a trace.
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In still another variation, a wrecked vehicle is located and insured. A bogus accident is
concocted and a fraudulent claim is filed. Using the same vehicle, this scheme is often
repeated with different insurance companies.

6.5.3 Health Insurance Fraud
Health insurance is a policy that covers someone’s health in the event that the person is
injured or becomes ill. Common health insurance schemes include mobile labs, bundling
and unbundling claims, and collusion between an insured and a provider.

Mobile Labs
In the usual mobile lab scam, a group of people set up a lab in a storefront located in a bluecollar, low income area, often where English is the second language. They then pass out
fliers in the parking lot of a minimum wage manufacturing firm, offering free physicals to
people who have medical insurance. After filling out a family history, the insured is
subjected to extensive tests for a variety of maladies, and the average physical ends up
costing the insurer three to four thousands dollars. When the insured returns for the results
of the tests, the lab is gone.
Bundling and Unbundling Claims
Bundling and unbundling claims is the practice of physicians or clinics billing separately for
medical services performed at the same time. For example, an insured woman has a
hysterectomy performed and at the same time she also has her appendix removed. The
physician, however, bills the insurance company as if the appendectomy was a completely
separate procedure.

Insured-Provider Collusion
In collusion between an insured and a provider, the provider furnishes the insured with a
bill for services not actually rendered. The insured makes an application for reimbursement
to the insurance company, and the proceeds are divided between the insured and the
provider.

6.5.4 Property Insurance Fraud
Property insurance is a policy that covers an individual or corporation’s property from loss
(whether stolen or destroyed), up to a predetermined amount of money. Common property
insurance schemes include: staged false theft, repossessed household goods, pawned
personal property, and arson.
Staged False Theft
In staged false theft, an insured secretes property he or she owns and reports it stolen, or
alternatively reports property stolen that he or she never owned.

In a recent case involving Michael Jackson CDs, a music distributor had misjudged the
demand for the CD and had excess inventory on hand. A theft was then staged in order to
offload the excess stock, which was then destroyed. When forensic accountants revealed the
lack of demand and the excess inventory, the distributor dropped his claim.
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Repossessed Household Goods
Repossessed household goods fraud occurs when, for example, household items (furniture,
appliances, and so on) are repossessed, and the insured reports the property was stolen.

Pawned Personal Property
When pawning personal property, a fraudster may inflate the value of his or her personal
belongings, insure them, and then pawn them for a lesser amount of cash. The fraudster
then reports them stolen and files a claim. Once the insurance payment is received, the
fraudster then redeems the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance
payment, and pockets the difference. These schemes can be risky to the perpetrator,
however, because in most states pawnshops are required to check customer identification
and keep records of their transactions, in order to facilitate police investigations of reported
thefts.

Arson
Arson is the purposeful destruction of property by fires, sometimes for profit. For example,
an insured may be about to lose his or her house, car, or business due to an inability to
make loan payments. The insured sets fire to the property to collect the insurance proceeds.
Alternatively, an insured may replace an item with something less expensive when he or
she remodels after the fire.
Arson can also be committed by companies, which then file claims under their property
insurance policies as well as their business interruption policies. This is covered in
chapter 7.
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Commercial Crime

7.1

Overview

7.1.1 Definitions
The terms white-collar crime, economic crime, and commercial crime are not legal ones and are
often used interchangeably. This chapter covers the distinctions between these terms.

White-Collar and Economic Crimes
Although scholars differ widely in their definition of white-collar crime, the Dictionary of
CriminalJustice Data Terminology, published by the U.S. Bureau ofJustice Statistics, defines
white-collar crime as: “non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of
deception by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semiprofessional and utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; also non
violent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by anyone having special
technical and professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the
person’s occupation.” This definition includes most if not all of the crimes and behaviors
described in this Handbook.
Economic crime has a similar definition regarding its objective and methodology, that is,
crime committed for economic gain by means of deception; however, economic crime is
broader in its scope than white-collar crime: it could also include violent crimes committed
by people without any particular occupational status—for example, armed robbery.

Commercial Crime
The term commercial crime is frequently used as a substitute for the terms white-collar
crime and economic crime. However, for purposes of this Handbook, a more restrictive
definition is adopted: that is, commercial crime is white-collar crime committed by an
individual or a group of individuals in a company for the benefit of that company and,
indirectly, themselves.
This distinction, that is, between fraud committed against a business or commercial entity,
and commercial crime committed by a business or commercial entity—is a useful one.
Historically, our legal system, institutions, and even the procedures adopted by auditors
have tended to focus more on conventional fraud committed purely for personal gain. In
recent years, however, awareness has been heightened to the possibility of the business or
commercial entity itself being the perpetrator.
Frauds against investors and environmental crime are two examples that have received
increasing, media attention.
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7.1.2 Victims of Commercial Crime
Victims of commercial crime can include—

• Customers—for example, through false advertising and price fixing.

• Competitors—for example, through industrial espionage and intentional copyright
infringement.
• Creditors—for example, through a planned bankruptcy.

• Investors—for example, through false financial statements and other securities fraud.
• The general public—for example, through environmental abuse.

In addition, the practice of organizational bribe giving may victimize any one of the above
groups—for example, the general public when a bribe is given in the awarding of a
government contract.

7.1.3 Extent of Commercial Crime
Two decades ago commercial crime received much less media attention than today, largely
being confined to a short paragraph or two in the business section of the nation’s
newspapers, if it was mentioned at all. Today’s front-page stories are a testimony to the
current widespread public interest in and concern about commercial crime. Scholars
attribute this growing emphasis to, among other things, a greater skepticism about the
behavior of persons in authority. The alleged crimes of Whitewater involving President
Clinton and his associates only deepen the mood of distrust of those in prominent places.

Statistics suggest that there is some reason for distrust. For instance, KPMG Peat Marwick’s
1998 Fraud Survey reported that false financial statements caused losses of $1 million or
more in 42 percent of the reported instances, whereas in the 1994 survey, losses of this
magnitude represented only 24 percent of the total losses.

While it is true that surveys only deal with reported crime, what is clear is that the extent
and value of reported commercial crime is on the increase. Many experts believe that many
frauds go unreported and that the extent of unreported commercial crime is also on the
increase.

7.1.4 Responsibility for Commercial Crime
Some scholars debate whether individuals should be held responsible for crimes committed
on behalf of their organizations. Although some direct benefit accrues to the perpetrator, far
more benefit accrues to the organization.
Regardless of whether the organization is held liable, the frauds are a direct result of some
human action or interaction: if a business is like a dynamite charge, someone must push the
plunger.

Most criminal statutes require that the guilty person have the required criminal intent.
However, an organization can be held liable even if it were unaware of or did not
participate in the fraud. The law recognizes two theories of organizational responsibility:
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1. The identification theory. The organization is held liable when the employees and
organizations can be viewed as one and the same, for example, a small business owner
who has incorporated.

2. The imputation theory. The organization is held responsible for the actions of its
employees through the doctrine of respondeat superiour, a seventeenth century doctrine
that means “let the superior respond.” The legal theory was developed from civil
lawsuits to prevent employers from denying financial responsibility for the acts of their
employees.

7.1.5 Characteristics of Commercial Crime
While commercial crime can take many forms, often it is distinguished by one or more of
these characteristics: tolerance, diffusion of harm, and rationalization.

Tolerance
While awareness of commercial crime has increased in recent years, there still remains a
somewhat greater tolerance for this form of crime as compared to violent crimes such as
armed robbery, or those involving drugs. This greater tolerance may stem not so much
from the nature of the crime itself, but rather from the perception of the perpetrator as
being somehow more civilized. Anybody with strength, decent aim, or access to poison, can
commit murder, but only a limited number of respectable corporate executives or directors
are in a position to violate antitrust legislation.
Diffusion of Harm
Another notable characteristic of most kinds of commercial crime is that there are often
numerous victims who are frequently unaware that they have been harmed. Death from
smog or asbestos poisoning is very likely to be slow and insidious, and its victims will be
hard-pressed to relate their terminal illness to its precise cause, given the complicated
nature of other possible contributing factors. A factory worker with cancer is not likely to be
certain whether it was the toxic chemicals that he handled for fifteen years, the fact that he
smoked too many cigarettes, or bad genes or bad luck that will shorten his life.
In many other cases of commercial crime, the harm tends to be widely diffused and, for
each person, rather insignificant. But these can still be significant crimes. Companies can
earn millions over the course of a year by charging higher prices for products that do not
meet the standards they are alleged to attain. Few people who pay for a package of onehundred thumb tacks will take the time and energy to count the contents of the package to
be certain that they have gotten their money’s worth; it would be an easy and safe venture
to put ninety-two tacks in each package, and some merchandisers find the temptation
irresistible. Similarly, a customer will most likely remain unaware that the gasoline pumps
at a service station are calibrated so that they get fewer gallons than those for which they
are charged. Even if they come to know about these kinds of issues, most customers would
shrug them off as not worth the trouble it would take to do something to remedy the
situation; at most, they might take their business elsewhere.
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Rationalization

Perpetrators of white-collar crime are known for providing elaborate excuses for their
crimes, and the nature of such explanations may be a major distinguishing mark between
them and street offenders. It has been posited that embezzlers typically claim that they are
only borrowing the money; they intended to repay it once they had covered the bills and
other financial demands vexing them. Commercial criminals will similarly rationalize their
behavior; for example, antitrust violators usually maintain that they are seeking to stabilize
an out-of-control price situation when they conspire with others to fix prices, and they are
likely to insist that power-hungry prosecutors and investigators are singling them out.

7.1.6 Investigation and Prosecution of Commercial Crime
The diffuse nature of most commercial crime poses a particular law enforcement dilemma.
Without complaining witnesses, policing has to be proactive instead of reactive; that is, the
enforcement officials themselves have to decide where the offenses are being committed
and how to go about stopping them. Enforcers obviously cannot cope with all the violations
and must decide on rules to guide their efforts. Should they go after the behaviors that
cause the most harm? Should they take on the bigger offenders, or concentrate on the
smallerfry, where their chances of success are much better? They can readily accumulate ten
convictions in a year against ten insignificant companies, whereas it might take three years
to win a victory over one huge corporation. Besides, the resources of the large organization
might allow it to win its case, regardless of the lawless nature of its behavior.

7.1.7 Causes of Commercial Crime
Because businesses are bottom-line driven, it has been posited that they are inherently
prone to committing crime, yet not necessarily criminal. Without necessarily meaning to,
organizations inherently invite commercial crime as a means of obtaining goals. For
example, a department manager’s concern with reaching assigned goals, may lead the
manager to maximize his or her department’s own interests to the detriment of the
organization, or to the detriment of society as a whole.

Organizations can also be criminogenic—prone to producing crime—because they
encourage loyalty. Accordingly, this is because—
The organization tends to recruit and attract similar individuals.
Rewards are given out to those who display characteristics of a team player.
Long-term loyalty is encouraged through company retirement and benefits.
Loyalty is encouraged through social interaction such as company parties and social
functions.
5. Frequent transfers and long working hours encourage isolation from other groups.
6. Specialized job skills may discourage company personnel from seeking employment
elsewhere.

1.
2.
3.
4.

These reasons in turn cause company personnel to sometimes perceive that the
organization might be worth committing crime for.
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Another aspect that makes companies criminogenic is their compensation structures,
particularly for corporate executives who are most likely to be the perpetrators of
commercial crime. Compensation packages for senior personnel usually include a
component based on the results of their company or department, either through stock
options or bonuses. Typically, senior executives have a greater amount of compensation
tied to results than do other employees. Because commercial crime is so diffuse, and the
likelihood of being caught is low, senior executives may perceive that the incentives to
“enhance the success of their organization” through commercial crime will outweigh the
risks.
7.2 Forms of Commercial Crime
Today, the realm of commercial crime can be said to primarily involve offenses against
laws that regulate either one or both of the following: the marketplace or the established
standards of conduct for professional and political life. Some of the most common forms of
commercial crime are described in this section, along with Case Studies and other
examples that illustrate the salient features of such crimes.

The first two cover shams, which Webster’s Dictionary defines as “.. . an imitation or
counterfeit purporting to be genuine [noun]....” and “to act intentionally so as to give a
false impression [verb].”1 Shams are the result of the activities of a confidence trickster or
con artist who has been able to obtain money from the public by various means. Generally,
there are two kinds of shams: corporate shams and investor fraud.
Although these shams are discussed separately in this chapter (due to the size of each
section), in many cases the perpetrator (the corporate con artist) and the victim (individuals)
of the shams have similar characteristics, as does the way in which the sham is operated.
However, they have two major distinctions:

1. In the corporate sham a corporation exists from which the pitch is made. This is in
contrast to an unincorporated individual making a pitch, not on a corporation’s behalf,
but on his or her personal behalf.
2. In investor sham the nature of what is being sold to the victim differs. For example, an
investor sham typically involves making a speculative investment, whereas a corporate
sham typically involves the purchase of something tangible.

The remaining sections of this chapter include the following kinds of fraud as committed by
companies: procurement fraud, industrial espionage, finance fraud, securities fraud,
environmental abuse, economic extortion, health care fraud, and possession of property
obtained by crime.

7. 2.1 Corporate Shams
Corporate shams generally involve something counterfeit or false. In this case the corporate
sales pitch appears to offer something genuine, yet there is no underlying substance. The
perpetrator of the crime is often a con artist acting through a corporate entity. In fact, by
using the corporate veil as a shield from the public, the con artist gains an appearance of

1Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, 1993.
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respectability and substance that he or she would otherwise lack. The con artist’s wares may
consist of one or more of the following:
• Products oriented to individual consumers (as opposed to products that companies
would buy) that are sold by false advertising.
• Franchises or distributorships that the victim purchases in order to run a business.
• Solicitation of money donations towards a charitable or religious cause.
Generally, shams that are carried on through an incorporated business involve pyramid
sales schemes, mail order sales, advertising to be placed in charitable programs or flyers, or
donations to charitable organizations. Newer forms of corporate shams that are becoming
more common are the selling of franchises, and other get-rich-quick schemes, such as the
selling of vending or arcade game machines: the purchasers then set up their own business
using the franchise or the equipment bought.

When a con artist hides behind a corporate veil, some or all of the following characteristics
may apply:

1. The con artist uses expensive letterhead, emblazoned with a worldly name and a classy
address, to impress potential victims.

2. The company has a very informal corporate structure, and a very short life span.
3. The company’s accounting systems are primitive or nonexistent.
4. The company conducts an extensive and appealing advertising campaign.
5. If a product is offered, the product itself may be of questionable value, and there is
seldom, if any, post sale servicing.
6. The customer is expected to pay for the product via cash or readily negotiable checks on
(or before) delivery.
7. Once received, the cash is quickly removed from the company through the payment of
commission expenses, salaries, bonuses or management fees, so that the con artist can
reap the immediate benefits of the scheme.

The key to the corporate sham, as with any sham, is the effectiveness and the speed with
which the sales pitch brings results. The method of delivering the sales pitch may range
from telephone solicitation (via a boiler room operation), to either cold calls, or advertising
in local newspapers, or both.
Possible red flags for a corporate sham include elaborate representations that demonstrate
the quality of the product, proposed earnings that are excessively high for the franchise, or
an apparently hard-sell pitch to raise money for a purported charitable purpose.

Finally, you should be aware of the arguments put forward by defense counsel in corporate
sham cases. Some of the issues defense counsel might raise include:

• Caveat emptor—let the buyer beware.
• Some of the money received was in fact directed to the promoted charitable purpose.
• The investor is at fault: that is, for not working hard enough at a franchise operation to
make it succeed, or for not waiting long enough to receive the goods that would have
eventually been shipped, and so on.
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Merchandise Swindles or False Advertising
Merchandising frauds include all frauds perpetrated against purchasers of merchandise and
services. If you have ever paid for an item and received something less than advertised, you
have been the victim of a merchandising swindle or false advertising.
These frauds generally fall into one of the following four categories:

1. Representations that the purchase is a bargain when in fact it is not—for example,
department stores raise the price of a product significantly one day and then the next
day drop it back to where it had been, maintaining in their advertising that it now is on
sale.

2. Collection of money for one product and substitution of another of lesser quality or
cost—for example, claims have been made that shoes are alligator when in fact they
were made of plastic.
3. Misrepresentations regarding the quality of the product—for example, a company
selling glass demonstrated in television commercials that its car window product was so
perfect that when you looked through it you could hardly believe there was anything
between you and the outside scene; it was later proved that the ads were filmed from
inside a car with the window rolled down.
4. Failure to deliver the product or service—for example, in bait and switch tactics, stores
advertise a specific product at a strikingly low price, but then, when the customer tries to
buy the item, it is no longer available. It is the customer’s presence and attention they
want to attract—once they have him or her listening, they assume that slick sales tactics
can accomplish the rest of the deceit.

Defraud You in Writing Case Study

Between September 1997 and June 1998, Smith and Jones, partners of Defraud You
in Writing Inc. committed fraud by obtaining funds from the public for goods they
did not intend to supply.
Smith and Jones operated the business through telephone solicitation whereby
books were offered for sale, and customers’ names were entered into a drawing for a
trip to the Caribbean via Acme Tours. Door-to-door sales people would follow up
on the calls and try to obtain orders for the books. The orders set forth the terms,
the method of payment, the time and method of delivery, and an announcement for
a drawing on a certain date. The drawing date was inserted in a blank on the order
form, the first draw being December 31, 1997.
From the evidence of Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, during the period between
October 1997 and May 1998, the actual net cash receipts from orders by members
of the public totaled $75,291 (after allowances for returned checks) on 1,867 orders.

Defraud You in Writing’s suppliers were not paid during this period, so the total
number of orders filled was 311. In fact, during the three months with the largest
sales, (December, February and March) no books were ordered from Defraud You’s
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suppliers. Instead, substantial effort was being made to increase the sales force (and
thus the revenue), and new premises were being sought

The judge in this case believed that Defraud You in Writing used the 311 orders to
create a camouflage for the business’ real activity: to obtain funds for orders they
never intended to fulfill.
As for the drawing, no arrangements had been made with Acme Tours to enable
the winner to take the trip.

Franchise and Distributorship Frauds

Both franchise and distributorship frauds are characterized by a get-rich-quick business
opportunity that involves a large up-front purchase of equipment, supplies, and
promotional materials. Many such schemes are part of a pyramid scam.

CookieVend & Run Inc. Case Study
CookieVend & Run Inc. was incorporated in March 1997 to sell cookie vending
machines. CookieVend’s headquarters were located in New York City. Its office
staff generally consisted of the president, general office manager, secretary
treasurer, bookkeeper, and three typists.

Shortly after CookieVend’s incorporation, a series of ads were placed in newspapers
across the country. These ads offered a substantial guaranteed income, which could
be earned for an investment of $3,000 to $9,000. Although the ads differed
somewhat from paper to paper, they all offered a part-time job that could net the
right person an income of $2,000 per month or more.

In addition to the office staff, CookieVend employed a sales staff of approximately
ten people to interview the respondents to the ads. These sales reps traveled
independently of each other and were provided with a corporate brochure and
other material that instructed them on what to promise the new distributors.

Some 180 people purchased these distributorships for an investment of between
$3,000 and $9,000 each, depending on the number of vending machines purchased.
Supplies of cookies and insurance were also purchased. CookieVend’s total sales
from April to December 1997 were approximately $1.2 million.
In the ensuing year, not one distributor was successful in his or her business. The
complaints were generally as follows:

1. The quality of the vending machines was very poor.
2. Three distributors never received their vending machines (twenty-three
machines in all).
3. Cookies were stale when received by the distributor.
4. The price of cookies increased from fourteen cents to twenty cents each soon
after the distributors purchased their machines.
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5. The company did not honor claims of damage to machines in accordance with
the insurance protection policy on the agreement.

6. The company did not honor its three-year repair warranty on vending machines.
7. The company did not attempt to address any reasonable complaints.
Evidence ofFraud. All of CookieVend’s management personnel were found guilty of
fraud and received jail sentences. The evidence that formed the basis for the case
against them was as follows:

1. CookieVend’s revenues and expenses showed that its level of profitability was
directly attributable to the sale of machines. This also showed that the sale of
cookies resulted in losses, thus CookieVend had a motive to sell machines rather
than cookies.
2. CookieVend’s primary disbursements were for commissions, advertising, travel,
and business promotion. These expenditures occurred during a period when the
distributors’ complaints about product quality fell on deaf ears.
3. The profit-loss experience of the distributors was much worse than the profit-loss
statements represented in the newspaper advertisements. One of the highest
performing distributors realized a gross profit, assuming all cookies were sold, of
$375, on an investment of $7,941 over a period of eighteen months.
4. CookieVend never purchased a liability policy although the distributors’
purchase agreements represented that a policy did in fact exist.
5. The distributor agreement set out a nonrescission clause specifically stating, “The
distributor is not relying on any oral or written expressions, promises or
warranties made by anyone to consummate this transaction.”

Charity and Religious Fraud
Jim Bakker, former head of the defunct PTL (Praise the Lord Club) has brought
international attention to religious fraud. The essence of his scheme was to sell “lifetime
partnerships” in a luxury hotel, which his followers could use for life. Prosecutors were able
to show that Bakker’s plan was completely unworkable, because many more partnerships
were sold than could ever be accommodated. Bakker used the money to pay himself and
his lieutenants millions of dollars in salaries and bonuses. He was convicted under federal
mail fraud statutes.
Other kinds of charity and religious groups resort to fraud as a way of obtaining
contributions. In the most common of the schemes, fraudsters operating in boiler rooms call
unsuspecting victims and raise funds for allegedly good causes or for worthwhile
organizations. The funds collected are not used for their intended purpose, or the fraudsters
fail to disclose that they keep the majority of the funds raised for administration costs and
give the sponsoring charity or religion only a small portion of the money collected.
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Rob M. Blind Case Study
Between January 1997 and July 1998, Rob M. Blind and I. Swindle committed
fraud by developing a scheme through the medium of telephone solicitations that
induced the public to contribute funds allegedly for charitable purposes—to benefit
the blind.

The operation, Help the Sightless Associates, carried on by Rob and his associates, was
reasonably simple. They hired three or four blind musicians, who joined other
sighted employees for a tour of several cities. In each city they planned to visit, they
conducted a telephone solicitation campaign: literally by going through the yellow
pages and calling every business listed. The firms solicited were asked to buy an ad
in a program, which was to be distributed at a concert to be held in that city.
If the firm refused to advertise, it would be asked to buy tickets to the concert that it
could use, give away, or allow to be given away on its behalf.
The Help the Sightless Associates was not a charitable organization and never applied
for registration as such. There is no record of them donating anything to the blind
other than paying the musicians who gave the concerts.
As for the dollar amount of the fraud, according to Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, the total
gross receipts for 1997 and part of 1998 were $252,327. These funds were used in the
following manner:

Payments to the blind musicians

-50 percent

Payments unaccounted for

-48 percent

Expenses

Total

-2 percent

100 percent

7.2.2 Investor Frauds
Like corporate shams, investor frauds use techniques designed to produce a quick return or
benefit to the company that is the subject of the con. The techniques generally used are
telephone solicitation, personal cold calls, or spreading the sales pitch by word of mouth
among a particular group of individuals, such as doctors or dentists—who typically have
high incomes or high net worth, or both, but possess limited financial or investment
expertise. The con artist may succeed in persuading a member of the group to introduce
him or her to other members, thus creating confidence in both the scheme and him- or
herself. The investors are actively encouraged to spread the word to their close friends
about this opportunity for an investment. These activities are often perpetrated through a
pyramid or Ponzi scheme—both of which are described below.
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The key to the con is generally a direct pitch to the investors’ greed—that is, promises of
high returns within a short period. The scheme may entail investment in precious metals or
precious or semiprecious gems, and has been known to embrace items, such as antique
coins and commodity futures. Investor frauds have even extended to what is commonly
known as flips of real estate.

Although many of the characteristics of a corporate sham discussed in section 7.2.1 apply
equally to investor frauds, there are two characteristics that are unique to investor frauds:
1. An extensive and appealing get-rich-quick advertising campaign is conducted,
suggesting to the victims that easy money can be made with very little effort.

2. Investors, once the investment is determined to be a con, do not want any publicity that
would expose the foolishness of their investment.

Chain Referral (Pyramid versus Ponzi) Schemes
Chain referral schemes are based on the same idea as the well-known chain letter. This is a
particular kind of sham, which could involve products, or may involve only investments. In
one example of a chain letter, the con artist starts the chain letter by sending a letter to five
or more people requesting (on some pretext—often preying on people’s superstitions) the
recipients to mail money to the con artist. The letter also instructs each recipient to send the
letter to a further five people with the request that money be sent to the names in the first
two tiers of the pyramid. The third tier recipients in turn repeat the process of mailing the
request for money and adding themselves to the bottom of the pyramid. Often there is an
instruction that only four or five tiers should receive the money; the top name dropping out
with the addition of a new name(s) at the bottom. By the time the chain reaches the seventh
or eighth level (if the chain continues that long), the multiplier effect creates enormous
wealth to those higher up in the chain, because they receive money from the geometrically
growing lower tiers.

Of course, things other than money can be the objects of chain letters. Some involve
recipes, Christmas cards, and other harmless items. However, chain letters don’t work
indefinitely. That is because someone in the lower level inevitably fails to mail out his or
her five letters, and the chain is then broken; usually only those in the upper levels profit.

Chain referral schemes, also called pyramids or Ponzi Schemes (after the notorious Charles
Ponzi who successfully employed the scheme in the early twentieth century), are based
largely on the same principal. The difference is that some are legitimate and some are not.
Pyramid sales structures are generally legitimate, and Ponzi schemes are usually
illegitimate.
For example, many products sold exclusively in the home, such as Amway merchandise,
can be legitimate forms of pyramids. Individuals are recruited to sell merchandise. They in
turn recruit their friends and colleagues to sell, and get a cut of their commissions. This
recruitment continues on down, with those in the upper levels receiving a portion of the
commissions from several different layers of sales personnel. However, because of the
turnover in sales personnel, most people fail to achieve a sufficient level in the chain or
pyramid to make the touted commissions. They often get discouraged and quit, further
depressing the chain.
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Illegal pyramids (Ponzi Schemes) exist as well. One common variation is for a fraudster to
place mail order ads promising wealth to individuals for performing work in their homes
for services such as stuffing envelopes. When the victim responds to the ad, they are
informed that the opportunity requires sending in money. In return, he or she receives a
letter suggesting the victim place a similar ad and collect money in the same way, using the
same letter. In other words, the fraudster is telling the victims in effect, “do the same thing
to others that I just did to you.”
Another typical Ponzi scheme involves the diversion of investment funds. This fraud words
as follows: A company will open its doors as an investment firm, promising better than
average returns on its investment. When the company receives money from investors A
through G, the money is diverted to the personal benefit of the principals. When additional
money is received from investors H through L, those funds are used to pay off investors A
through G. When funds are received from investors M through Z, this money is used to pay
off investors H through L, or at least to pay interest, and so on. The money paid out to the
early investors, therefore, is not from returns achieved on investments, but rather a
diversion of new investments. This pyramid continues until the scheme collapses.

Many operators simply set up a mail or telephone operation, collect funds, then close the
operation and move, only to reestablish a similar operation and repeat the scheme. Law
enforcement officials acknowledge a significant problem with chain referral schemes, but
readily admit that they are incapable of adequately controlling the problem.
These schemes, or variations of them, cannot go on indefinitely because they require a
constant stream of money to cover the diverted funds. When the flow of new investments
fall below that level, there is insufficient cash to pay off old investors, and the scheme
collapses. The chain referral schemes are not dependent on a particular product or service,
but rather on the method of diverting funds. Common chain investment schemes include
franchising, sales distributorships, investment and securities of various kinds, and
merchandise.

Finally, it should be noted that many chain referral schemes involve small amounts of
money that are taken from many victims. Because victims typically feel foolish about being
fleeced, they frequently do not file charges. And even when complaints are made, the
police do not give these crimes priority because of staffing and budgetary commitments. As
a result, many chain referral operators stay around a long time.

7.2.3 Finance Fraud
False Mortgage Security
False mortgage security is a term used to refer to security that turns out to be nonexistent or to
have a value far lower than was represented. This is a kind of loan fraud whereby the
perpetrator is usually an individual acting through a sham corporation, and the victim could
be a bank, but is more likely an individual or another corporation.

The usual characteristics of false mortgage security fraud are as follows:
• An investor is persuaded to make a loan or invest funds on the assurance that repayment
of the loan or investment will be fully protected and secured in some way.
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• When the touted investment fails to materialize, the investor discovers that the assets
supposedly securing the investment do not exist, are worth much less than the investor
had been led to believe, or were pledged to numerous other investors rendering them
virtually worthless.
• The investor is often a financially unsophisticated individual who does not review the
transaction papers in detail and may not understand them but is persuaded to invest by
the prospect of a high return (for example, a well above average interest rate).
• The investor usually relies on the promises of the perpetrator or the apparent protection
afforded by the security.

It should be noted that some assets pledged as security (that is, land or stock) may lose
value for legitimate reasons such as fluctuations in their market values. In cases of false
security, however, there is intent to deceive on the part of the person soliciting the funds.

Accounting evidence in most cases can establish and document the funds’ flow in situations
of this nature. It is more likely that evidence establishing the intent to deceive will be
obtained by conducting interviews (viva voce evidence) than through the analysis of the
accounting records. It is often through the interview process that the true nature and intent
of the transactions are revealed. The nature of the documentary evidence required to
establish the economic benefit to the fraud perpetrator, and to trace the flow of funds are
dictated by the nature of the fraud scheme.

Trust Our Paper Inc. Case Study

Trust Our Paper Inc. commenced its syndicated mortgage program in 1995. The
program expanded rapidly, particularly during 1998, to include loans for property
development in Plainville. The company solicited—in appropriate private
offerings—funds from the public for investment in specific mortgages, with certain
representations made about the nature of each loan and the mortgaged property.
Unbeknownst to the investors, the mortgaged property was not as marketable or
valuable as had been represented because it did not have the necessary local
governmental approval for development.

During 1998, the period of its most rapid expansion, Trust Our Paper experienced
an increasingly severe negative cash flow from operations. This condition persisted
until March 1999, when Trust Our Paper went into receivership primarily as a
result of—
1. The apparent inability of the mortgagors (borrowers) to make interest payments.
2. The apparent inability of the mortgagors to pay principal amounts upon
maturity.
In reality, the face amount of the mortgages were much higher than the underlying
value of the property secured by the mortgages.

The problems in this case are best illustrated by a transaction that commenced in
the summer of 1998, when Trust Our Paper purchased land in Plainville at a price
of $400,000. It planned to build a 300-suite apartment complex on the land. Before

15

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

the closing of the transaction, Trust Our Paper had been unsuccessful in obtaining
mortgage financing through normal channels because of an inability to get zoning
approval for its plans. The location of the land and environmental concerns proved
to be insurmountable obstacles.

Trust Our Paper then provided a loan of $1 million to ABC Developments Ltd., the
developer of the property, secured by a first mortgage on the property. Funds were
solicited from the public—in a properly registered offering—for investment in this
mortgage. Trust Our Paper represented to the investors that it had used the
mortgage proceeds for interim construction of a 300-unit residential complex.

However, an examination of the mortgage proceeds revealed a different story. Out
of the proceeds, $400,000 was used to reimburse Trust Our Paper for the cost of the
property. Thus, the purchase was financed entirely by the investors through their
loan to Trust Our Paper. Of the remaining funds, $115,000 was disbursed in
November 1998 to Green Investments Inc., a troubled company with a deficit of
$296,000. The balance of $485,000 was disbursed in a similar manner.
The underlying security given to the Trust Our Paper investors was highly
questionable in light of the following:

1. The mortgage for $1 million was on land purchased for $400,000.

2. The mortgage guarantor advised that the property was unsuitable for financing.
3. The property remained undeveloped.
4. The developers were unable to obtain alternate mortgage financing.

5. The mortgage proceeds were not used as purported.
Thus, the proceeds raised from the public offering were diverted from their
intended use, that is, to develop the property. This diversion diluted the value of
the security and jeopardized the achievement of the appraised potential that was
offered as security.

Advance Fee Fraud
Generally, advance fee schemes involve paying bogus corporations an up-front finder’s fee
in exchange for a promise to receive an advance on a loan. The victims of these kinds of
schemes can be both individuals and corporations. Often if an individual is seeking loan
funds but for whatever reason cannot obtain funding from traditional sources, he or she will
turn in desperation to these fraudsters.

Once the fee is paid, the perpetrator disappears. In some cases, desperate institutions are
offered access to illegal money, and they typically do not report the loss of the advance fee
when the deal falls through. General characteristics of these schemes include one or more
of the following:
• Deals too good to be true often are not true.
• The agent requests documents on bank stationery, or signatures of officers, or both.
• The bank is asked to give nondisclosure agreements to protect the agent or other parties.
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• The agent asks for an irrevocable agreement to pay commissions, expenses, and a fee.
• There are several complex layers of agents, brokers, and other intermediaries.
• The perpetrators often describe the offerings as special one ofa kind offers and state that
the deal will be killed if anyone is contacted to verify the deal.

• The deal often involves foreign agents, banks, and other sources, such as an unnamed
wealthy person or government

Debt Consolidation Schemes
People who find themselves hopelessly in debt frequently turn to debt consolidation
agencies out of desperation. Debt consolidation agencies do not advance loans, but rather
act as an intermediary between the debtor and creditor. Some are legitimate, but many are
not. Bona fide debt consolidation agencies make money by organizing the debtor’s affairs
and collecting a percentage of the money handled on the debtor’s behalf.

In the typical scenario, the debtor contacts the consolidation agency, and provides a
complete list of their creditors and the amount of monthly payments currently owed. The
agency then usually writes letters to the creditors, requesting a debt work-out plan
providing for lower monthly payments spread out over longer periods of time. The
creditors are often motivated to accept the arrangement provided they think that the entire
debt, or the major portion of it, will be repaid or that the debt consolidation plan will
prevent a bankruptcy filing or default by the debtor. The debtor then makes a lump sum
monthly payment to the consolidation agency, which then distributes the money to the
creditors.
Unscrupulous debt consolidation schemes are perpetrated when the agency collects money
from the debtor but does not forward it to the creditor. In some instances, it is months
before the debtor finds out that the money has been misappropriated. The victim debtor
has not only lost money to the unscrupulous agency, but still owes the original debt.

Bankruptcy Fraud
Bankruptcy is designed to give every corporation or individual encumbered by mountains
of debt a fresh start. In a liquidation or Chapter 7 bankruptcy, all assets and liabilities are to
be listed on the bankruptcy petition and a trustee is appointed by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Trustee’s Office in the district where the petition was filed. The role of the trustee is to
liquidate the assets of the estate and distribute the funds to the creditors pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Code.
Generally there are three common kinds of fraud committed by companies or individuals
filing for bankruptcy, they are:

1. Fraudulent conveyances. Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, cash or other assets
are transferred to friends, relatives or business associates. Once the bankruptcy court has
discharged the debtor’s debts, these assets are then transferred back to the debtor. This
kind of transfer is often referred to as parking assets. These prepetition transfers are often
disguised to appear as bona fide business transactions.
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2. Concealing assets or asset stripping. The debtor could: convert assets to his or her own
benefit, simply fail to disclose certain assets in the bankruptcy schedules, or deny the
existence of such assets when meeting with the trustee or at hearings before a
bankruptcy judge.
3. Planned bankruptcy. The debtor’s affairs are structured in a way that gives the appearance
of a failing business, but is actually a lucrative business that needs to avoid the
circumstances of a particular obligation, litigation, or labor dispute. This is often
accomplished through the use of transfer pricing or management fees from related
companies, which may or may not be disclosed to the trustee.
Planned Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy can be attributed primarily to one or a combination of the
following causes:

• Incompetence of management

• Lack of managerial experience
• Neglect
• Severe economic recession or depression (macro or market sector)

• Disaster
• Fraud

Fraud is not the cause of most business failures.
The victims, regardless of the cause of a business failure, are customers and creditors:
customers who have ordered or paid for goods that are undelivered at the time the business
goes belly up, and the various creditors of the business that remain unpaid at that time. On
many occasions the employees are also victimized because they lose their jobs or are
unable to collect unpaid wages or both.

A business experiencing financial difficulties can pursue several remedies either to rectify
the situation or to conclude the operation of the business. The owner may cease business
voluntarily, or an unpaid creditor may precipitate the closing down of the business through
the initiation of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.
Ask the following questions when considering whether a bankruptcy was planned:

1. When did the company realize it would fail? A business failure may appear to be the
result of management incompetence, inexperience and neglect. Notwithstanding the
reasons for the financial difficulties, it is crucial to establish whether management carried
on the business after a point in time when they knew, suspected or should have known
that business failure was imminent. In that case, the fraud occurs when they solicit funds
from the public, including creditors, in spite of knowing or suspecting that the company
might be unable to fulfill the representations and commitments made. The business,
however, may have continued in the honest belief that it would turn around (the rainbow
syndrome).
Establishing the point in time at which management knew, should have known, or
suspected that business failure was imminent requires a detailed review and analysis of
the financial position of the business. Financial statements, accounting records and
banking records have to be scrutinized. The examination would disclose not only the
financial position and any deterioration in it, but also the level of management’s
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knowledge about the situation. Correspondence and other documents from customers
and creditors, expressing concern or demanding delivery or repayment, together with
viva voce evidence may also be useful.
2. Did the company pursue remedies? In determining whether fraud exists, the forensic
accountant must consider whether the remedies available to the business in financial
difficulty, as noted above, were pursued. In addition, the accountant must ask if honest
attempts were made to resolve the difficulties or merely to give the impending business
failure the appearance of legitimacy.
3. Has the business committed an act of bankruptcy? Bankruptcy law defines specific
activities on the part of a debtor as constituting an act of bankruptcy. These activities
include one or more of the following:
• The transfer of assets to a trustee or other third party for the benefit of creditors

• A payment to one creditor in preference over another
• The fraudulent conveyance or transfer of property
• An attempt by the debtor to abscond without paying debts
• A failure to redeem goods seized under an execution order issued against the debtor

• The presentation at a meeting of creditors of a statement of assets and liabilities
indicating insolvency, or a written admission of the debtor’s inability to pay his or
her debts (the filing of a bankruptcy petition), or both
• An attempt to move or hide any of the debtor’s property
• Notice to any creditors that the debtor is suspending payment of his or her debts

• A failure to meet liabilities, generally, as they become due
• Default in a proposal made as part of the bankruptcy proceedings
4. Was the business failure planned? A planned business failure occurs where management
has converted the assets of the business to its own, that is, personal benefit and then tries
to conceal the conversion through formal bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, the
debtor induces vendors to sell goods on credit when the debtor knows that it has neither
the intent nor the capacity to pay the creditors. Characteristics of a planned failure
include one or more of the following:
• The business has developed a reputation for trustworthiness in the business
community. This reputation may have a short history, and may have been
established for the express purpose of inducing companies to sell goods to the
business on credit.

• The business sells tangible and highly marketable products.
• The business seeks to sell, or convert the goods to cash as quickly as possible with
little care about the selling price because they have no intention of paying the
suppliers for the goods.
• The proceeds from operations are moved out of the business so as not to be
identified as an asset of the business at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.
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• The business has little net worth.
• The business has not been a financial success.

• The business departs from its normal business practices with regard to purchasing,
payments to suppliers, sales, and the granting of credit to customers.
The typical changes in business conduct of a planned failure include:

• The volume of inventory ordered from existing suppliers increases significantly. The
suppliers will probably extend credit up to sixty days, largely as a result of their wish
to retain the customer and the established reputation of the company.
• The unsuspecting suppliers will receive little or no payment. They may receive
payment for the initial order but not for subsequent shipments. The scam will
probably be completed within sixty days of the date of purchase of the inventory.
After that time, the suppliers are likely to become suspicious and might take action of
some kind.
• The company will refuse to sell the inventory to its customers on credit; that is, it will
sell on a cash-on-delivery (COD) or other cash-up-front basis only. To get customers
to pay cash, the selling price per unit is commonly at or below the company’s cost
price per unit, as shown on the supplier’s invoice.

• If inventory still remains after the company has approached its usual customers, the
inventory may then be offered to new customers. These sales tend to be non-arm’s
length and may be in cash. Although the sales invoices may indicate the payment
was made in cash, the deposit of the cash into the business’ bank account does not
necessarily follow.
• If, after all these efforts to sell, inventory is still left at the site, it can be physically
removed. The trail will be covered to prevent obvious detection.
A planned bankruptcy is designed, of course, to benefit those in control of the debtor
entity. The fraudster will make every effort to ensure that no trail is left behind to enable
the trustee in bankruptcy to retrieve the proceeds of the fraud and return those proceeds
to the creditors. The techniques employed to block the path of the trustee are limited
only by the perpetrator’s imagination and will vary according to the circumstances.

7.2.4 Arson for Profit
Arson and a planned bankruptcy share some similar characteristics. In both situations,
business problems exist and are acknowledged to exist by management. Arson, like
planned bankruptcy, can become the means of a criminal making the best of a bad
situation. The perpetrator will, of course, seek to commit the crime without leaving a trail of
criminal conduct.

The following are the chief characteristics of cases of arson:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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The fire is of an incendiary nature.
An insurance policy is in force.
There is a financial or other business-related motive.
The financial motive may not be readily apparent.
Exclusive opportunity to commit arson may or may not be evident.
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6. The prosecution’s case will often be based on circumstantial evidence.
7. Efforts may have been made to destroy some or all of the accounting and business
records.
Without a confession or an eyewitness, the evidence in a case of arson is almost always
circumstantial in nature. The prosecutor usually must depend on circumstantial evidence,
which must be sufficient to rebut every reasonable hypothesis other than a willful and
intentional burning. However, evidence supporting the incendiary origin of a fire is often
interwoven with other evidence that tends to connect the accused with the crime. The
connection to the accused is often the presence of a motive and the opportunity of the
accused to perform the act.

Historically, insurance companies have been reluctant to challenge the veracity of loss
claims arising from major fires that have damaged or destroyed commercial, industrial,
recreational or residential establishments. The reasons given for this reluctance include the
following:

• Court proceedings are protracted and expensive, and the ultimate decision is often
favorable to the insured.
• The insurance company (like a bank) is often perceived as the big, bad guy, thus, the
insured sometimes gets the benefit of reasonable doubt because they are perceived as
the little guy.
• The punitive damages awarded to a claimant often far exceed the loss claim if the courts
feel that there has been an unreasonable delay.
• The only evidence is circumstantial.
• The alleged arsonist has been acquitted in a related criminal proceeding.

Accounting Issues and Evidence
The forensic accountant in arson-related matters should differentiate the business position
of the company and its owners from the financial position. Although the financial position
may have a considerable bearing on motive, motive is better understood in the context of
the business itself and the owners, through an overview of all aspects of the operations and
ownership of the business.

Ultimately, the financial analysis is designed to determine the mindset of the company, the
money of the company, and the worker in the company. Accordingly, it is usually appropriate
to obtain as much background information as possible. A starting point may be the
acquisition of a business or the commencement of a new business venture. A review of the
annual financial statements and associated working papers will disclose the company’s
yearly performance and any underlying business problems. Motive not apparent from an
analysis of the company’s financial transactions may become apparent from an
investigation of the social relationships found within a business.
Any review of the status of a business must be objective. It should identify not only matters
that are unfavorable to management and the owners of the company, but also matters that
are favorable. The unfavorable matters may well be obvious, for example, a steady decline
in sales, worsening creditor relations, or a significant withdrawal of funds immediately
before the fire. On the other hand, an owner may have put a substantial amount of his or
her own money into the business shortly before the fire.
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Accounting evidence is likely to be extremely significant in establishing motive. The fire
may have destroyed some or all of the accounting and financial records, as well as
correspondence and file material that could have a bearing on the case. These records will
have to be reconstructed to the extent possible; thus, third-party documentation will have to
be obtained and interpreted.
Issues and Sources ofInformation. A review of several recent judgments shows that the main
characteristics in an arson investigation to consider, investigate, and establish in evidence
are as follows:
1.

Ownership, including business structure, style, and relationships

2. Financial motive, that is the financial position of the owners and business, and existence
of an insurance policy
3. Current events at or around the time of the fire, including the establishment of exclusive
opportunity, and the origin of the fire as incendiary

Information will be sought from people directly and indirectly connected with the business,
possibly including its bankers, lawyer, accountant, customers, suppliers, insurers,
government agencies, and realtors.
The owner should always be given the opportunity to volunteer any personal or business
records that he or she might have.
See below for a list of questions to consider and documents to examine.

Accounting Evidence. Forensic accountants can assist by investigating several issues, in
particular those involving ownership and financial motive. They can analyze information
from several sources and construct a chronology of the financial events leading up to the
fire. They can analyze the financial records of the owner, the business, and third parties,
and demonstrate the company’s position at the time of the fire, comparing it with earlier
periods.
The forensic accountant looks for significant detail when attempting to determine whether a
financial motive exists. If little or nothing is available in the way of accounting books and
records and supporting documentation, the forensic accountant will pursue other third
party sources to secure information for the examination.

Obviously, any financial and accounting records of the business that are available will have
to be examined and analyzed. As previously noted, it is important to provide the owner the
opportunity to volunteer whatever personal or business records he or she has. Beyond this,
the forensic accountant will seek information from others directly or indirectly connected
with the business.
Key questions to consider include the following:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Who maintained the accounting records?
What accounting records would have been available?
What is the ownership structure?
Is the financial position of the owner solid?
Does the business support the owner?
Does the owner support the business?
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7. Have the essential matters been established?

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Is the potential defendant cooperative?

What is the history and pattern of earnings?
Could ownership benefit from selling out to the insurance company?
Did any significant events occur at or around the time of the fire?

Who are the major suppliers and what were the business’ relations with them?

13. Who are the major customers and what were the business’ relations with them?
14. Who are the bankers and what were the business’ relations with them?
15. Who is the external auditor?

16. Who is the outside legal counsel?
17. Is the business for sale and are negotiations currently being conducted?
18. Have there been any recent changes in insurance coverage?
Third-party documents to investigate include:

• Government (usually the Secretary of State of the state of incorporation or of a state in
which the corporation is registered to do business) business registration records
• Recorded documents (for example, for land or other property)
• Work papers and files of accountants, auditors, or both
• Any secured transactions registered under the commercial code of the relevant state
• Tax returns
• Correspondence with customers and suppliers
• Bank credit files

• Credit files from other creditors
• Bank statements, canceled checks, deposit slips, credit memos, and debit memos (paper
or microfiche records)
• Payroll information
• General ledger records
• Real estate listings

7.2.5 Procurement Fraud
All organizations including manufacturers, financial institutions, governments, and retailers,
as well as private individuals are involved in the procurement process to acquire goods or
services. For each and every kind of purchased item, ranging from commodities and
equipment to a professional’s time via a consulting services contract, there is a different
kind of procurement fraud that can be perpetrated by the provider of the goods or services.
The risks and warning signs associated with each kind of procurement fraud vary
depending on what is being purchased, and also by the kind and stage of the procurement
process: Questions to ask when examining procurement fraud include:
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• Is the purchase competitive or noncompetitive?
• What pricing method was used: fixed fee, cost per unit, cost-plus, or a combination
thereof?
• Did the fraud occur at the requirements definition stage, the bidding and selection stage,
or the contract performance and evaluation stage?
Some of the more common kinds of procurement fraud include:
• Bid rigging or price fixing
• False invoices
• Inflated costs
• Product substitution
• Secret commissions and kickbacks

Bid Rigging or Price Fixing
Bid rigging or price fixing, is the process of setting the price or terms of the contract
between the various bidders without the knowledge or consent of the purchaser.

For example, bidders on a highway construction project may secretly meet before bids are
submitted. During their meeting, they decide who will submit the low bid and what the bid
should be. They may also decide who will bid on what jobs. This is known as bid rotation.
Bid rigging is usually characterized by the lack of independent competitive bids, or by prices
that are close together. The entity seeking the bids is victimized by having to pay higher
prices than the amount that would have been charged had there been no collusion.

False Invoices
Invoices submitted by a contractor for goods that have not been delivered, or for services
that have not been performed are false.

Inflated Costs
Contractors often use a pricing method in which they invoice on a cost-plus basis. That is,
the contractor receives payment for the actual cost of the job, plus a certain profit based on
a percentage of the costs. Clearly, the successful bidder has a vested interest in keeping the
costs high: the higher the cost, the higher the profit.

Typically, in order to obtain inflated profits, contractors falsify the cost of the product or
service. This can be done through simple or complex means. Examples of the former
include adding labor charges for nonexistent (ghost) employees or adding charges for
materials not actually used. In the more sophisticated schemes, the costs are inflated
through overhead allocations.

Product Substitution
Procurement contracts sometimes call for very exacting specifications on the materials used
on the job. Contractors frequently believe the contract specifications are too rigid and,
therefore, feel justified in substituting a less costly product or service, and keeping the
difference.
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In one scheme, a contractor bid on a new runway for an airport authority and won the bid.
The contract called for the depth of the concrete covering the runway to be a certain
minimum. After hearing rumors from competitors that the contractor was pouring less
concrete than the minimum, the authority’s auditors checked the work orders and
discovered that the paperwork reflected the concrete depth to hundredths of an inch. The
auditor reasoned that concrete could not be poured so exactly, checked the actual work,
and found the depth to be less than the contract specifications. The auditors concluded that
the contractor was submitting false reports to the airport authority, and was reaping excess
profit because it was supplying less material than that called for in the contract.

Secret Commissions and Kickbacks
Secret commissions and kickbacks are one of the most common forms of procurement
fraud, and also one of the most difficult to detect. It involves the receipt of a secret
payment, usually from one company (the vendor-payer) to a corporate executive (the agent)
of another company (the procurer): the agent then exercises influence on the decision
making of his or her employer in a way that favors the vendor-payer. For example, a
vendor submits false or inflated invoices for payment, which the procurer’s corporate
executive knowingly approves. This process is often described visually by the triangle of
dishonesty shown in figure 7-1.
The key point to note is that secret commissions and kickbacks are a kind of fraud that
generally accompanies other forms of procurement fraud (such as those described in this
section).

Figure 7-1. Triangle of dishonesty
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7.2.6 Organizational Bribe Giving
The two main kinds of bribes that benefit organizations are:

1. Bribing politicians and giving illegal campaign contributions.

2. Implementing commercial bribery as related to procurement fraud. Also included here
are bribes for industrial espionage—that is, paying someone to reveal trade and other
secrets about competitors.
Political Bribery

There are three generally recognized characteristics of political bribe giving:
1. Government benefits are often extremely valuable (or, for penalties and sanctions, very
costly), but the demand for benefits can exceed the supply.

2. The government is the sole purveyor of the benefits and sanctions; you must do business
with the government.
3. The bribe is an attempt to both bypass and guarantee the result of the normal processes,
which are often lengthy, costly, and uncertain in result.
The most common form of political bribe giving is illegal campaign contributions, which
have made headlines during the Clinton Administration.
Paying foreign politicians and governments was (and perhaps still is) common in order to
conduct business in many countries. Since the mid-seventies, when the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act was enacted, paying bribes to foreign officials except in cases of national
security has been unlawful.

Commercial Bribery
Commercial bribery involves making payments in exchange for the award of a contract, for
industrial espionage, or for both.

In the triangle of dishonesty, a payment from a vendor to an employee would encourage
the employee to influence the decision regarding the recipient of a lucrative contract.
Several federal and state laws address the practice of commercial bribery. Both the act of
asking for or the making of a payment constitutes an offense. In some instances commercial
bribery may also be a violation of the restraint-of-trade laws. For example, certain industries—
notably the liquor industry—are specifically prohibited from paying for business. Over the
years, many well-known, major businesses have been guilty of commercial bribery (a listing
of names would not add learning other than the giants of industry are involved from-timeto-time in nefarious activities).
Industrial espionage can involve direct payments to third parties to secure valuable
competitive information. It can also be accomplished indirectly, for example, through the
hiring of a competitor’s employees. In one case, several U.S. military procurement agents
were charged with giving defense contractors information on more than $500 million in
Navy purchases that were going to be the subject of the competitive bidding process.
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7.2.7 Industrial Espionage
Industrial espionage is a term that is broadly applied to activities whose main purpose is to
obtain information or related assets from competitors or potential competitors. The classic
forms of industrial espionage are trade-secret theft and copyright piracy.

Trade Secrets
There are three basic elements to a trade secret: novelty, value, and secrecy. Secrecy,
concerns whether an organization handled its alleged secret in a protective manner. If a
judge deems that an organization failed to protect a secret, that organization will not win
judicial support if it charges an employee with theft of that secret
Patent laws seek a compromise between capitalistic self-interest in a trade secret and social
well-being by granting a seventeen-year monopoly to developers of innovative ideas. The
U.S. Supreme Court, in its only ruling on trade secrets (Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
1974), declared the likelihood “remote indeed” that a company would not patent valuable
information that it had developed. However, the Court overlooked the advantage, wellknown to most companies, that trade secrets can be hoarded far beyond the seventeen-year
patent limitation, a matter well documented by the success and secrecy of the formulas for
Coca-Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken, among others.
Leakage of trade secret information is said to be particularly likely from employees who go
to work for competitors, careless secretaries, gregarious field sales personnel, and high-tech
computer whizzes who often are more loyal to their equipment than to their fellow
employees or employer. Temporary help is regarded as especially vulnerable: these
employees do not have any company loyalty and can be planted for purposes of trade
secret theft. Sharing sensitive information among two or more individuals, neither of whom
knows the full secret, is one way to reduce the possibility of compromising sensitive
information. Another method can be used to protect mailing lists. By including at least one
decoy address in a list, if the list is compromised, whoever uses it will be sending material
to a fictional person at an address that actually is the list-owning company’s mail drop.

A review of court cases on trade-secret theft shows that defendants are typically smaller
corporations that have hired scientists from larger organizations where they had previously
worked for six to ten years. There also appears to be an unusual amount of trade-secret
theft from family-owned businesses. The defendants in these cases claim that because they
were outsiders, they believed their chances of advancement were hopeless, so they stole the
proprietary information to benefit (ingratiate themselves with) their new employers.

Copyright Piracy
Copyright piracy is defined as the infringement of another’s copyright or other business
rights. It is an activity usually undertaken by manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers that do
not have any legal right to manufacture or copy the product, but who want to earn a quick
profit (greed motive) or to ease a financial difficulty (need motive).
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Bigtown Video Case Study

From August 1997 to May 1, 1998, John Smith was the owner, principal
shareholder, director, president, and general manager of Bigtown Video Inc., a
video store with three retail outlets. During this time Jack Brown was also a
shareholder and secretary-treasurer of the company.
Bigtown Video’s business included the sale and rental of prerecorded videocassettes
as well as the sale of blank cassettes. The videotapes sold and rented by Bigtown
Video fell into two categories: legitimate and “counterfeit.” The legitimate tapes
were obtained from sources authorized to manufacture and distribute the tapes in
compliance with all copyright and distribution rights. They were packaged with
stylized printed jackets showing the nature and content of the particular film. The
counterfeit tapes had been duplicated from legitimate tapes, many of which had not
yet been released to the public in videocassette form. The packaging of the
counterfeit tapes was like that of a blank cassette package with the title of the film
handwritten on the side panel. The legitimate tapes were displayed in the front of
the stores. The counterfeit tapes were kept in the back rooms of the stores in a closet
or in a drawer.
When cross-examined at trial, Mr. Brown testified that he and Mr. Smith had jointly
decided to deal in counterfeit videocassettes in late 1997. The decision was made as
a result of customer demands and financial difficulties. Mr. Brown would buy
counterfeit cassettes from various sources and make duplicates of them. These
actions were done with Mr. Smith’s knowledge and consent. Mr. Smith rented the
counterfeit videocassettes at rates of $5 or more and sold them for prices ranging
from $60 to $100 or more. From January 1998 until May 1998, the gross profit
made by the company from each of the three stores was approximately $1,500 per
week, of which about 60 percent was attributed to the distribution of the counterfeit
videotapes.
In Mr. Smith’s cross-examination, he revealed that he was fully aware of the
illegitimate origins of the counterfeit videocassettes supplied to him and that neither
he, his suppliers, nor Bigtown Video had the right to distribute, rent or sell the
cassettes. Mr. Smith knew that by dealing in these counterfeit tapes he was
effectively depriving their owners of copyright and distribution revenues, which
they would otherwise have been likely to earn but for the use of these illegitimate
tapes: he was prejudicing the economic interests of the real owner. Mr. Smith made
no attempt to contact the owners of the copyright or distribution rights in order to
contribute revenues for his counterfeit use, to obtain these rights, and he had no
intention of so doing.
Bob Green, a vice-president at Star-Studded Studios, testified about the effect of
pirated videocassettes on the revenues of his company. He focused on four areas of
impact and said:

1. That the inferior quality of pirated or counterfeit videocassettes tends to provide
the viewer with a poor opinion of the film and the consequent negative publicity
is harmful to the theatrical market.
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2. That people who have seen a counterfeit videocassette are unlikely to buy the
legitimate cassette upon its release.
3. That for extremely high-grossing films, much of the profit arises out of repeated
viewings of the film by the public. The effect of a counterfeit videocassette in
such a situation is to diminish the theatrical value of the film by eliminating the
possessor’s desire to return to the theater.
4. That with respect to distribution in other territories, the markets for legitimate
cassettes have vanished due to the heavy influx of counterfeit videocassettes in
those territories. In cross-examination Mr. Green admitted that he could not
quantify the loss of profit by theatres from counterfeit videocassettes, nor could
he reliably estimate the extent of loss for a given film or a given year.

7.2.8 Securities Fraud
There are four main kinds of securities fraud that fall within the category of commercial
crime:
1. Knowingly providing misleading or false information in financial statements of a traded
business enterprise.

2. Churning: An activity of brokers who buy and sell their clients’ securities for the sole
purpose of generating commissions.
3. Mixing (commingling) of funds.
4. Manipulating the market for a stock by altering the stock’s price through influencing the
factors that affect the market price or. by controlling the pool of shares available for sale
or purchase.

Misleading or False Financial Statements

In large companies, upper level management, whose intent is not necessarily to steal, often
manipulates financial statement information. These managers wish to manipulate data to
enhance profitability and thereby earn higher bonuses, or to impress the brass at
headquarters, or to impress stockholders or lenders, or simply to comply with the goals
imposed by senior management. In small companies, where false financial results can
create a direct benefit for senior management, the intent of management is often sinister.
Intentionally falsifying financial statements can be accomplished by one of the following
methods:

1. Misstatement of financial information by arbitrarily raising profits or lowering costs
using techniques such as plugging sales or ending inventory, incorrectly capitalizing
current expenses, deferring necessary repairs, falsifying sales invoices, and altering cost
invoices.
2. Misrepresentation or omission of significant information.
3. Misapplication of accounting principles.
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In the MiniScribe fraud, the company knowingly inflated inventories to deceive the
auditors as to the value of assets on hand; the primary goal was to maintain and drive the
share price of the company up in the public market.

In more recent instances, particularly in the high tech environment, channel stuffing (that is,
just before year end, shipping inventory to distributors and dealers whether or not ordered,
and booking the shipments as sales) was a popular method used to inflate sales to achieve
projected and expected revenue goals. In many instances, product recorded as sold was
returned shortly after year-end.

Heinz Catch-Up Case Study
Heinz has been a household name representing quality food products for more than
one hundred years. The company had been well managed, profitable and socially
responsible. But in the late 1970s, it received considerable unfavorable publicity for
accounting irregularities. Some of its profit-center managers engaged in reducing its
profits to create a cushion for the next year. The total amount of these pseudo-profit
reductions was quite small ($8.5 million) when compared to overall sales ($2.4
billion). However, annual sales and profits were not what were reported to the IRS,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and company stockholders.

The disclosure of these irregularities occurred as a result of an antitrust suit brought
by Heinz against Campbell Soup. In Campbell’s discovery efforts, it snagged
evidence that Heinz’ advertising agency was billing for services that had not yet
been rendered. When a Heinz executive was questioned about the matter, he
pleaded the Fifth Amendment.
The antitrust suit was settled shortly afterwards, but the disclosure caused Heinz
headquarters’ personnel to launch an investigation into the accounting practices of
several subsidiaries. Being highly decentralized, headquarters’ personnel claimed
they were unaware of the lower-level fudging. Headquarters monitored
performance through budget forecasts of sales and expenses and an incentive
compensation plan that paid off if high-end profit goals were met. Headquarters also
monitored consistent growth in profits. Top management was committed to that
overriding goal and, the company’s earnings did rise consistently: for example,
1978 marked the fifteenth consecutive year of record profits.

Heinz had an explicit policy that prohibited its divisions from having any form of
unrecorded assets or false entries in its books and records. And Heinz didn’t
measure short-term performance alone. The top nineteen executives, including
division general managers, had long-term incentive plans in addition to the oneyear plan.

What existed here initially were income transferals aided and abetted by vendors
who supplied invoices one year for services that were not rendered until the next
year. When that wasn’t enough, false invoices were submitted one year and then
reversed in the following year. But the amounts involved did not have a material
effect on the company’s reported profits.
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Strangely, the problem at Heinz started in 1974 when it appeared that profits in the
Heinz USA division would exceed those allowed by the wage and price controls in
effect at the time. World headquarters sought a way to reduce the division’s profit
Losses in commodity transactions did not reduce profits enough, so the division
booked $2 million in advertising services. Yet, instead of treating the expense as a
prepaid item, the company charged the advertising expenses off immediately.
Despite the lower profits of the division, world headquarters decided that the
division had achieved its goal and paid the relevant bonuses.

By 1977, the following practices had evolved at the Heinz USA division:
1. Employees delayed year-end shipments until the beginning of the next year to
ensure accurate invoicing dates.
2. Employees handled customer complaints about the delays by making the
shipments, but misdating the shipping and invoice documents.

3. Employees did not record credits from vendors until the following year.
4. Income management became a way of life. One employee was given the task of
maintaining private records to ensure the recovery of amounts paid to vendors
on improper invoices.
5. The practice of delayed shipment and prepaid billing to assure that departmental
budgeted amounts were met permeated the division down to the departmental
level.
6. Ten separate vendors joined in supplying improper invoices.
7. Employees used other questionable tactics to manipulate income including
inflated accruals, inventory adjustments, commodity transactions and customer
rebates.
What can be learned from this case? First, exerting pressure for continuous growth
in profits may foster improper accounting practices, particularly if coupled with an
incentive compensation plan that rewards and reinforces continuous growth on the
high side. Second, autonomous units with independent accounting capabilities
might be tempted, under the above circumstances, to manipulate performance data.

Heinz isn’t the only case in which autonomous accounting or pressure for performance led
to manipulations of records. There were similar episodes in the 1980s at McCormick and
Company, J. Walter Thompson, Datapoint Corporation, Saxon Industries, Ronson
Corporation, Pepsico, AM International, U.S. Surgical, and Stauffer Chemical. More
recently, companies like Sunbeam and Cendant have been in the news for the same kind of
earnings manipulation.

Churning
Churning occurs when a broker buys and sells stock for a client to generate fees, rather
than to protect the best interests of the client. Broker discretionary accounts are especially
ripe for churning because they can be used to generate fees for both the brokerage firm and
the broker, without much involvement or control by the actual investor.
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In one case, two sisters gave brokers $500,000 each to be held in discretionary brokerage
accounts. The brokers executed more than 1,400 stock trades, allegedly earning themselves
$400,000 in commissions, while leaving the sisters with $70,000.

Mixing of Funds
Another scheme involves mixing (commingling) client funds with the funds of the
brokerage firm, or broker, or both. In these cases, brokers will use the client’s stock as
collateral for corporate or personal loans, and post the winning trades to themselves, while
posting the losses to their clients. Some brokers also resort to out-and-out embezzlement of
their client’s money and stock.

Manipulating the Stock Market
Stock market manipulation is a crime perpetrated by a promoter who artificially influences
the market price of shares in a company for self-benefit or for the benefit of his or her
holding company at the expense of the investing public. In most cases, the promoter flogs
his or her holdings to the public, the public pays an artificially high price for the stock, and
the resulting increase in price lines the pockets of the promoter.
Promoters of the stock are usually self-styled financiers who start off owning the majority of
the stock. Often other conspirators join the promoter, forming a control group consisting of
financiers, warehousers, or brokerage salespersons, some or all of whom might be acting
under a corporate umbrella.

To increase the stock’s price, the promoter subjects it to a multipronged attack. The
promoter uses such weapons as influencing the demand for the stock and controlling the
supply of the stock, warehousing the stock (parking), paying secret commissions, wash
trading, and issuing fictitious press releases, all of which are intended to stimulate more
trading than would otherwise occur.

The victim is the investing public. In many ways this particular fraud is similar to other
investment scams that rely on telephone solicitations (boiler room operations) and high
commission rates (which are often secret).
Reasons to Study This Kind of Crime. It has been argued that stock market manipulation is a
very specialized kind of crime, restricted to the larger financial centers and, therefore, few
CPAs are likely to come across them. Nevertheless, because of the great increase in stock
market investments, residents anyplace in the country may become victims of stock market
manipulation and may look to their CPA for advice. Further, an increasing number of
CPAs are providing financial planning services, including investment advisory services, to
their clients. These CPAs must be aware of stock manipulation schemes to protect both
their clients and themselves.
In addition, stock market manipulation and the modus operandi may resemble other kinds of
scams in which the price of an investment is influenced by the laws of supply and demand.
Therefore, CPAs should be aware of this kind of crime. They could be called upon to speak
to the public about prevention of white-collar crime in general or investment scams in
particular. Also, they may become an investor in the stock market themselves.

Possible Red Flags. Red flags possibly signaling stock market manipulation, with the possible
exception of churning and commingling of funds, are not as readily apparent as they are in
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some other kinds of economic crime. Most red flags seem to originate from an informant
close to or aware of the control group. In contrast, the regularly required reports investors
receive should be reviewed on receipt to assure that there are not patent red flags, that is,
there is no churning or commingling of funds. Of course, if the fraud involves falsifying
these reports, discovery will probably be delayed until the fraudster is caught, by which
time, the investor could well be wiped out.
The SEC and stock exchanges usually carry out investigations to detect this type of crime
and the investigations are mainly analytical. Unusual price increases or large commissions
earned by salespeople may be investigated, as may press releases or assets reported on
financial statements.

Price as Determined by the Law ofSupply and Demand. The law of supply and demand states,
in essence, that the price of an item will rise when demand for the item exceeds the
available supply of that item, and the price will fall when supply exceeds demand.
Throughout a stock manipulation, the promoter attempts to control both the supply of, and
the demand for, a stock in order to move the price higher. As supply is restricted, the price
increases. As demand is stimulated, the price increases.
A stock market is a composite of the interests of many individuals and corporations offering
to buy and sell shares. Individuals, however, are influenced not only by information
(whether accurate or not), but also by motives such as greed or fear and by perceptions that
may have little to do with facts or reason. Investors are capable of changing their
investment decisions quickly, purchasing recklessly in a down cycle or staying out of the
market entirely in anticipation of disappointing financial information. The common desire
is to make profits and to prefer investments that are perceived as likely to produce profits,
whether or not these perceptions are based in reality.
Thus, investors will often overreact in seeking to take advantage of price changes or in
attempting to correct their errors. A single item of speculative news may dramatically
change the number of people who are willing to purchase, hold or sell a particular
investment, dramatically changing the demand for the shares. It is important to note that
large volumes of shares are often exchanged. Accordingly, time is of the essence in keeping
losses to a minimum and gaining the greatest possible profits. Precisely when a buy or sell
transaction takes place can make a big difference in the value of the purchase or sale.
Market prices are generally influenced by the release of corporate information, such as
news about profits, the announcement of a new product line, or the discovery of a new oil
reserve, as well as by changes in government policy, forecasts, prospectuses, and in general,
matters that occur in the ordinary daily conduct of a business.

In summary, the investing public, through the medium of publicly held stock, whether
traded on an exchange, the NASDQor over the counter, is able to place a value on a share
and to decide to buy or sell accordingly. As more people seek to buy shares, the price of a
share will increase if the number of shares for sale on the market remains the same.
Conversely, the price will fall if an excess supply of shares is available or if the public
demand for the shares drops.

The Manipulation Process. Generally, a manipulation begins with the promoter falsely
increasing demand and restricting or controlling the supply. The combined effect of this
process is an increase in price. After a certain point, called the blow off, the promoter

33

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

attempts to increase supply and dampen demand in order to reduce the price, allowing the
promoter to repurchase at a profit. Throughout, the promoter must act as a control valve in
releasing the stock in order to control the market price, and hence the profits.
Manipulation may be motivated not only by a promoter wanting to make more money, but
also by the desire to make the asset side of an investor’s balance sheet look good or to
improve the performance of an investment portfolio.
A promoter may use any combination of the following tactics to encourage the public to
buy stock at higher and higher prices:

• Using buy or sell pressure by stock brokers who may be receiving secret commissions
• Distributing false press releases and rumors
• Releasing false ownership information
• Promoting fictitious or grossly exaggerated profits, assets or future prospects (or any
combination thereof)
• Warehousing to help restrict the supply of shares
• Using wash trading (that is, trading that results in no change in beneficial ownership) to
stimulate public interest due to high trading volumes

• Controlling the first or last trade of the day in order to set the highest possible price for
the stock
• Dumping into foreign markets

Some or all of the activities generally used in the manipulation process are shown in figure
7-2.
Figure 7-2. Activities frequently used in the cycle of manipulating the stock market
Price Increase:

Price Decrease:

• Obtaining control

• Backdooring

• Setting up a distribution network

• Blowing off

• Warehousing

• Short selling

• Using wash trading

• Issuing bad news releases

• Issuing good news releases

• Repurchasing

A promoter who wanted to manipulate the price of a stock might use any combination of
the activities listed below

7. Obtaining Control: The first step that a promoter usually takes is to gain control over an
existing company’s shares of stock to ensure that the public’s selling off large quantities
of the stock does not undermine his control over the supply of shares. Generally, 70-to90 percent of the voting shares that are issued and outstanding must be acquired to
exert effective control. The promoter can gain the necessary control by using one or a
combination of the following:
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• Buying the shares of an inactive company that is already listed on an exchange
(commonly known as cleaning up the market). The shares of the promoter’s unlisted
company (which do not meet the requirements for listing on an exchange) can then
become listed by merging the corporations and exchanging the unlisted shares for
shares of the listed company.
• Buying a shell company that may have been inactive for a number of years.
• Underwriting an issue of new shares of a somewhat controlled company. This
underwriting usually consists of a new issue of shares in an amount that far exceeds
the original number of outstanding shares. To a promoter, this is the least desirable
method, as it requires a prospectus, financial reporting, and an insider trading
report. In addition, the promoter will have to arrange for his friends to purchase the
new shares and hold them (park them) on his behalf an unequivocally fraudulent
transaction.
2. Setting up a Distribution Network. A distribution network is set up with the promoter at
its head. Immediately underneath the promoter are several distributors in cities that
have stock traders or brokerages. Each of these distributors has access to a brokerage
house’s salespeople who then have access to the active traders. Via this network, the
promoter now has control over what happens in the promoted stock’s market. Secret
commissions are sometimes paid to ensure that the network complies with the
promoter’s demands.

The traders let the salespeople know when trades are pending and keeps them
informed as to the price movement of the promoted stock so that the promoter can
take compensating action. The salesperson’s job is to give the public a sales pitch as to
why they should buy the stock and, once in, why they should stay in. In addition, the
salesperson’s activity will affect the daily trading volume. What members of the public
do not know in this situation is that the shares they are purchasing are those of the
promoters.

3. Warehousing: Warehousing places shares into the hands of people who are friendly to
the promoter. This is essential in order to maintain control of the shares and continue
to restrict and regulate the supply of shares available. This is often accomplished by
having friends buy new offerings of the stock and continuing to hold these shares until
the promoter instructs them to sell.
4. Wash Trading. To promote the public’s interest and increase demand for the promoted
stock, the promoter manipulates the volume of stock traded through wash-trading.
Essentially, this procedure consists of a stock purchases and sales with no change in
beneficial ownership. Wash trading can be accomplished through nominee accounts:
accounts at banks or trust companies set up under the names of trustees, friends,
aliases, or false company names. The promoter sells a block of shares and at the same
time a nominee enters a buy order to match the sell transaction. While the stock is kept
out of the public’s hands, this active, ostensibly normal trading is reflected in the
volume numbers the public sees. Hence, the market in the manipulated stock appears
to be an active one in the public’s eyes.
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5. Issuing Good News Releases: One or more timely news releases may be issued to promote
the stock, attracting further public interest. The news releases may include verifiable
information but may also consist of unsubstantiated rumors, such as:

• Anticipation of good results from drilling tests in resource-based companies

• Expectations for a likely acquisition of rights to explore property close to existing
known resources
• Plans for diversification into a glamour industry

Generally the good news may be described as an intangible promise of future results.
There is nothing of immediate value today. These good news releases are designed to
stimulate the public interest and encourage them to buy shares, even at a high price.
6. Backdooring: Backdooring occurs when friends operating as a warehouse, which the
promoter has previously set up, start selling their shares while the price is still
increasing—contrary to their agreement with the promoter—before getting the word
from the promoter to sell. The friends are backdooring the promoter, effectively
double crossing the promoter. In order to sustain public demand, the promoter has to
buy the backdoor shares at the market price if the existing public demand is not
sufficient to support these sales.
7. Blowing Off. After the promoter has successfully stimulated demand, members of the
public buy significant numbers of shares and then wait for the price to continue its
anticipated rise. The promoter has already picked a tentative price at which he wants
to dispose of his holdings. He starts selling his shares, as well as those of his nominees
and friends. In these circumstances, the sale of unusually large amounts of stock is
referred to as a blow off. The public, expecting a continued price rise, buy the
promoter’s shares over a relatively short period of time.

The price at which the promoter actually begins to blow off his holdings depends
primarily on how much public demand the distribution network has created and how
long the demand is sustained. By blowing off, the promoter has withdrawn all active
support of the stock price. He ceases wash trading, the reported trading volume
decreases, and the price begins to fall quickly as supply far exceeds demand.
8. Short Selling. Short selling is the act of selling stock that one does not yet own and is a
legitimate market activity. The seller is gambling that the price will decrease and that
he or she will be able to buy back the shares at a price lower than the current-selling
price. In this situation, the promoter can safely sell short, because he or she knows that
the price will go down. Thus, the promoter realizes a profit both as the price of the
stock goes up and again as the price goes down.
9. Issuing Bad News Releases: At this point, the promoter often issues a news release about
the company’s misfortunes. The exact reverse of the good news release, the promoter
intends the bad news release to drive down the price of the stock rapidly.
10. Repurchasing. The stock price has now reached rock bottom, and the public is willing to
sell at any price. The promoter often buys back control of the company when the
shares reach this low price and changes the name of the company in order to start the
process again. The same company, under a new name, will go through the cycle again
in a period of one to two years.
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Secret Commissions. Secret commissions were previously mentioned in the distribution
network discussion. Generally, secret commissions or bribes are given to people in the
securities industry to induce them to push or promote the shares in the promoter’s
company and to advise the promoter of orders to purchase shares before the orders are
entered. Secret commissions may also be paid to the wash traders in order to keep their
support. Generally, secret commissions are paid in one or more of the following ways:
• By a check drawn on either a personal or a corporate bank account and payable to the
recipient, to cash, or to a third party. If the check is paid to a third party, it will be
endorsed by the named third party and cashed, with the cash being passed on to the
true recipient of the secret commission.
• By a free delivery to the recipient of stock in signed-off or street certificate form, which
can then be sold by the recipient on the market.
• By the issuance to the recipient of call options on the stock at a fixed price below the
current market price.
• By selling a block of stock to a salesperson or another recipient at a fixed price and
allowing that buyer to sell that block back at a higher price.
The Significance ofAccounting Evidence. Accounting evidence is generally very significant in
the prosecution of stock market manipulation cases because—

• The accountant can perform an analysis to determine whether change in beneficial
ownership occurred (a wash trading analysis).
• Accounting evidence may be instrumental in identifying payments or receipts of secret
commissions, if any.
• Accounting evidence can be used to establish the percentage of the public’s participation
in buying and selling shares when compared to the total transactions in the stock by the
control group.
• Accounting evidence may assist in establishing that the perpetrators have benefited from
the sale of the stock.
However, accounting evidence may not be as significant as viva voce evidence in initially
identifying the control group, establishing the secret commission structure, and identifying
who was paying and receiving these commissions.

Possible Preventive Measures. Perhaps the most significant stock manipulation preventive
measure is to make the investing public aware that a salesperson’s pitch will be persuasive,
will play on the investor’s greed, and will convey a sense of urgency. The following are
questions that an investor should ask a salesperson to answer on the record concerning the
specific representations being made about the investment. The answers given should help
in identifying poor or fraudulent investments.

1. How risky is this stock?
2. What direct costs are paid out of the investors’ funds, such as for commissions, or
advertising, or both?
3. Can I get written documents (the prospectus at a minimum), and can you mail them to
me?
4. What is the specific destination (that is, bank account, brokerage account) of my funds?
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5. How can I sell the stock if I choose to do so, and how long will it take to dispose of the
investment?

6. What are the names of the principal owners and officers of the salesperson’s firm, and
what are the names of the owners and officers of the company in which the investment
is being made?

Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. Case Study
In early 1998, Jack Smith started to promote a company called Acme Mines Co., a
shell company listed on the Westville Stock Exchange. Smith had effective control
of the outstanding shares. In order to promote public interest and buying, Smith
made announcements—through investor bulletins and statutory statements to
regulatory bodies—to the effect that Acme was about to diversify into the movie
production business and other ventures. The announcement touted:

• An investment of $175,000 in the production of a movie, which would return 25
percent of the profits to Acme
• A purchase yielding 58 percent control of a movie theater business called
Everytown Theaters Ltd.
• An acquisition of distribution rights to Krazy Kandy, a confection that would be
sold from automatic vending machines across the country
On February 4, 1998, Smith changed the name of the company from Acme Mines Co.
to Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. (GPY-Movies) to reflect its new objectives.

Smith’s next step was to stimulate trading activity in GPY-Movies’ stock on the
Westville Stock Exchange. To accomplish this, offices were maintained in Bigtown
and Westville and were operated by Mike Jones, a securities desk-trader, and the
controller, Dave Brown. Their objectives appear to have been to maintain the
market with effective control, match orders to create activity (wash trading), and
systematically sell off the stock for profit.
Smith would tell Jones when to buy or sell. Jones would follow through via a series
of controlled nominee accounts. Brown’s job was to keep track of all the accounts,
meet corporate requirements, and generally manage the money and the office in
Bigtown. The nominee accounts were all in corporate names and could be traded
by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones or Mr. Brown.

The office in Bigtown was in the name of Anyco Investment Corp. The accounts at
brokerage firms in both Westville and Bigtown were in the following names:
1.
2.
3.
4.
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At this time Smith was either an officer or director of each company and effectively
controlled them. Stock positions in GPY-Movies were established through
numerous Bigtown and Westville brokerage firms.

The eventual objective was to sell off or distribute the stock for a profit without
causing an obvious decrease in the market price. To achieve this goal, Smith hired
Robert Green who started to work out of the Bigtown Office around April 2, 1998.
Smith instructed Green to sell stock through the accounts of Anyco and Metro
Trading and to limit the price to $1.26 until an underwriting was effected, which
was to occur on April 18, 1998.
Green’s procedure was to prearrange all the buy orders so that they could be
matched with any one of Smith’s selling accounts. Whenever Green learned of a
buy order, he would notify Jones of its size, price and the name of the brokerage
firm. This meant that Green had to be in contact with sales reps or their distributors
who would notify him of forthcoming buy orders. In order to secure their
cooperation, Smith specifically authorized Green to pay sales reps a 15 percent
commission over and above the amount sales reps would normally receive. In
addition, Green, with the assistance of Smith and Brown, arranged for Wally
Chang, a brokerage house manager, to use his sales force to distribute 300,000
shares of GPY-Movies throughout the United States for a 12½ percent commission.

On occasion, Smith arranged to provide cash to Green in order to make payments
to sales reps. Brown made the checks payable to cash and drew them on one of the
companies’ accounts. Green made his own arrangements as to where and when to
pay the sales reps.
Smith convinced two sales reps, Black and White, to set up an account in their firm.
Whenever Black and White were able to persuade one of their clients to buy GPYMovies shares, the offset would come out of Smith’s account in the name of Metro
Trading. In this way, Smith was able to sell off his position and pay Black and
White with shares that they in turn sold through nominee accounts. Paul Wilson, an
analyst, provided Smith with inside information on who was bidding or offering, as
he was indebted to Smith for a substantial loan.

Thus, Smith and Jones, in an effort to generate personal gain, created a misleading
appearance of active public trading in shares of GPY-Movies, both by wash trading
and by the use of secret commissions. The result was a loss to the investing public.

7. 2.9 Environmental Abuse
Generally there are two main kinds of environmental abuse that a company can commit:
1. Pollution
2. Misuse of natural resources
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Pollution
While a certain level of pollution is tolerated by today’s society, media attention has
recently focused on companies that have gone too far. Society is, as a whole, becoming less
tolerant of all forms of pollution, and this is reflected all the way down to the consumer—
for instance, aerosol spray cans and cigarette smoking in restaurants are no longer tolerated
in many jurisdictions. Laws have been passed to limit the levels of pollution, but not all
companies comply with the laws, usually because of the added costs incurred.
Amount ofPollution. The amount of pollution and how it is determined depend on the
nature and source of the pollution. For example, a perpetrator may have dumped garbage
at an authorized site but in quantities greater than the dumping license permits. Or, a
perpetrator may have dumped garbage at an unauthorized site. Or, a perpetrator may have
polluted the environment in some other way, for example, dumping toxic substances into a
river, or exceeding the specificed limits of emission of certain substances into the
atmosphere.
Regardless of the nature and source of the pollution, the alleged offender’s accounting and
administrative records are likely to yield pertinent information about the physical quantities
of substances that are themselves pollutants or that result in pollution. Financial records can
also provide useful evidence as to the alleged offender’s knowledge and intent. For
example, an accounts receivable listing would reveal the names of the company’s
customers, but additional documents would be needed to assess the extent of the polluting
activities. These documents might include invoices, bills of lading, weigh tickets, contracts,
production reports, and so on.

Depending on the nature of the abuse, the financial records may help to put a dollar value
on the cost of the damage done. For example, if you can establish that a company dumped
in excess of the 5,000-ton-garbage limit permitted by its license, the courts can calculate the
cost of the excess from the company’s accounting records. This cost provides the judiciary
with a yardstick against which to determine damages.

Dumping Unlimited Case Study

Dumping Unlimited was a carting company that had a license to dump waste
material at a landfill site near Anytown. The company’s license permitted dumping
a maximum of 150 tons of material per day at the landfill.
Dumping Unlimited maintained a fleet of garbage trucks, which dumped the
company’s waste at the landfill site, and they also accepted waste material from
other haulers on a daily basis.

Based on an analysis of weigh tickets, it was clear that the company was dumping
quantities in excess of the permitted amount. To determine the value of these
quantities, the excess tonnage was priced at the highest and the lowest price charged
by the company, giving a range of values attributable to this offence.
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Financial Capacity. Companies that are fined for noncompliance with antipollution laws
often claim that they cannot afford either the costs of compliance at the time when the
pollution was generated or the costs associated with cleaning up the after effects of the
pollution.
Both of these issues are best examined by a CPA and involve examining financial
statements and budgets.
There are relationships between various components in the financial statements, which help
to identify historical issues relating to both profitability and viability. A review of the
financial statements for a number of accounting periods will be helpful in determining
trends that would enable a CPA to compare the company’s financial results with the costs
required to comply with antipollution laws.
In order to assess whether a company can afford the costs of cleanup (particularly when
that company claims it cannot), a CPA would need a crystal ball. In the absence of a crystal
ball, the CPA should examine the company’s budgets.

Management predicts the future by way of the budgeting process. Most enterprises that take
the time to prepare budgets use them as tools for making financial and operating decisions.
The range of budgets include operating budgets, capital budgets and cash flow budgets. A
comprehensive operating and cash flow budget enables management to plan future
operations and to decide how the company will pay for them. Access to past budgets,
together with the corresponding historical results, allows the forensic accountant to interpret
the proficiency of the company’s budgeting process and to determine whether a company
can or cannot afford the cleanup costs.

Mine Cleanup Case Study

In the 1990s the federal government filed suit against Mine Cleanup, a uranium
mining company, for failure to clean up a former site. The mining company
claimed it would be put out of business if it was required to pay the $30 million
required to clean up the site. Mine Cleanup management was attempting to set
aside the clean-up order.

A thorough review of the company’s financial statements, operating budgets, long
term forecasts, and cash flow budgets revealed that the company was unable to pay
the costs in the short term, but that it was possible for the company to comply with
the cleanup order over an extended period. A negotiated agreement was reached
between the federal government and the company wherein the government
essentially provided the long-term financing for the cleanup so that the cleanup
operations could commence immediately.

Natural Resource Abuse
Laws with respect to natural resource abuse (over-fishing, hunting, logging, mining, and so
on, as well as neglecting the endangered-species legislation) vary from jurisdiction to
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jurisdiction and generally apply to both noncommercial and commercial harvesting of
animals, marine life, and endangered species. Accounting evidence has little relevance to
noncommercial activities; thus the focus in this section is primarily on commercial activities
involving the following three areas:

1. Fur trapping and fur dealers
2. Commercial fishing

3. Endangered species

Note that companies that are involved in these commercial activities need to be aware that
conservation officers appear to have a much broader right of access to business premises
than that available to law enforcement officers. Generally, the legislation allows the officers
to search any aircraft, vehicle, vessel, camp, or office, without the requirement of a search
warrant, if they believe that any fish or game has been killed or taken in contravention of
the applicable state laws.
Fur Trapping and Fur Dealers. Fur trappers must be licensed to practice their trade in each
state in which they operate. They are assigned maximum quotas for different kinds of wild
life. They are generally required to have each pelt examined and registered, at which time a
stamp is affixed to the inside of the pelt. The trapper is not required to submit written
reports to the state; the next level in the distribution system does that.
The fur dealer obtains a license to purchase, receive, sell, or otherwise dispose of fur pelts.
With a few limited exceptions (domestic animals, road kill, and so on) the fur dealer must
ensure that the pelts being purchased have been examined and suitably stamped. Monthly
reports are generally required from the fur dealer specifying:

1. The pelts purchased or received, including the name of the trapper or hunter from
whom the fur dealer purchased or received the furs; the date on which such pelts were
obtained; and the number and the kinds of animals, for example, beaver, mink, lynx,
and otter.
2. The pelts sold or disposed of, including who the pelts were sold to by name, address,
and license number; the date on which the pelts were sold, tanned or disposed of; and
the number and kinds of animals.

The most common form of abuse is the handling of unauthorized pelts, which are
purchased from a trapper or hunter, that are typically excluded from both of the monthly
fur dealers’ reports—that is, they are excluded from the report of pelts purchased, and from
the report of pelts sold. These pelts typically bear no authorized stamp. The transactions
often involve some financial consideration to the purchaser, for example, lower prices or
secret commissions, which could be ascertained upon a review of the fur dealer’s books and
records. The unauthorized pelts are typically disposed of by being included in bundles of
authorized fur pelts submitted to a fur auction outlet, or by being directly supplied to a
tanning operation owned by the fur dealer.

Commercial Fishing. Commercial fishermen are generally licensed to work in designated
regions within the United States and its waters, and are assigned maximum quotas by fish
species and poundage. These fishermen are generally required to submit a monthly report
that accumulates information on the port where the fish were landed, the weight of the
catch by species, and the average price of fish sold.
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Unlike the far dealer, the commercial fisherman is not required to submit a report stating to
whom the fish were sold.

The most common form of abuse involves the fisherman exceeding his quotas and failing to
report the excesses in his monthly reporting. A review of the cash receipts, disbursements,
and sales journals of the commercial fisherman should detect the abuse even though many
purchases and sales are cash transactions that take place off the company’s books. Because
the reporting required is done by weight rather than by supplier or number of fish, it is
necessary to reconcile the weight of fish caught to the weight of fish purchased by
customers after allowing for wastage.
Endangered Species. In most jurisdictions, endangered species of fauna and flora are
protected by laws that prohibit the killing, injuring, interfering with, taking, or attempting to
do any of the above to any of the identified species of fauna or flora or their natural
habitats.
Currently one of the major abuses is the exporting of certain endangered species of wild
birds, particularly falcons, to other countries at an exorbitant profit to the perpetrators.

7.2.10 Economic Extortion
Economic extortion is a crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained through
intimidation or persistent demands.
Some of the forms of crime described in this section of the Handbook could involve an
element of economic extortion. For instance, bribes could be required in order to obtain a
lucrative contract; an owner of a company could be squeezed out by one or more of its
creditors for reasons other than insolvency; an employee could be forced to divulge an
employer’s trade secrets; or a company could be forced to pay a contractor to keep quiet
about its environmental pollution problem. The common element in each of these
situations is that the likely outcome of noncompliance with the extortionist’s demands is
perceived to be worse than the actual outcome of compliance.

Often, an extortionist’s methods involve threats of physical violence, public disclosure of
something that the victim would rather keep private, or financial ruin.

A Piece of the Action (Sport Megaplace) Case Study
In early 1994, Sport Megaplace was established as a state-approved organization to
control the sale of lottery tickets in Megaplace and to apply the net proceeds from
these sales to the development of amateur sports within Megaplace.

At that time the sale of lottery tickets included the sale of Tinylotto tickets, which was
under the control of Mr. Johnson, and the sale of Biglotto tickets, which was under
the control of Mr. Williams. These men were responsible for dividing Megaplace
into wholesale distributorships so that both kinds of tickets could be sold regularly
through wholesalers to retailers and then to the public.
However, Johnson and Williams only allowed others to obtain wholesale
distributorships if they secretly agreed to pay 50 percent of the future profits to a
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holding company under the control of Johnson and Williams. The silent-ownership
payments were structured as payments for management, consulting services and for
office space.
The new distributors were led to believe that this arrangement was legitimate by the
existence of a wholesale distributor agreement with Johnson and Williams’
company, a reporting letter from a lawyer’s office, a declaration of trust agreement,
a power of attorney agreement, working papers from an accountant, banking
resolutions and signature cards.

7.2.11 Customs Duty Fraud
Although customs laws vary from nation to nation, there are common threads and patterns
of fraud that are inherent in transborder transactions. The following material describes
typical customs fraud scenarios in Anyland.
The Customs Act applies to goods imported into Anyland. The Act categorizes imported
goods by tariff schedules and prescribes rates of duty applicable to each item depending on
its nature, the country of origin, and international treaty arrangements.

The duty payable to Anyland’s Customs Service is a percentage (the duty rate) of the
imported item’s Value for Duty. Prior to January 1, 1998, the Customs Act based its
determination of the Value for Duty amount on the fair market value of the goods at the
time of export in the exporting country. In practice, this fair market value was usually the
amount indicated on the commercial invoice. Customs officers did, however, have the
option of disregarding the commercial invoice amount and determining a fair market value
to be used for Value for Duty purposes using other information sources.
This fair market value determination for applying duty rates to imported goods did not
comply with international trade agreements to which Anyland was a party. Thus, effective
January 1, 1998, a revised procedure for determining the Value for Duty amount was
introduced. The new basis, called the Transaction Value Method, specified the Value for
Duty amount to be the price paid or payable to the exporter where the exporter and
importer are dealing at arm’s length. For imports between related parties, the onus is on the
importer to prove that there was no influence on the commercial invoice price. In these
situations, Value for Duty is determined on the following sequential bases:
1. Transaction value of identical goods
2. Transaction value of similar goods
3. Deductive value based on a gross profit reduction of the importer’s selling price

4. Computed value
The abuse generally arises when the importer causes the Value for Duty of the imported
product to be falsely understated, thereby reducing the amount of customs duty paid.
Importers abusing the customs regulations may vary in size of operation, ranging from
small sole proprietors to large national distributors. The benefits from understating Value
for Duty amounts can be enormous. In one case, the fine paid totaled $25,000,000, arising
from a conviction of evading customs duties over a fifteen-year period. There was also a
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civil court claim for $105.2 million against the same company for unpaid duties on goods
imported over a period of years. Even on a small scale, with duty rates ranging up to 30
percent or more, understating the Value for Duty amount may provide the importer with a
10-to-15 percent cost saving and a trade advantage over its competitors.
Because the Value for Duty amount generally is supported by both a commercial invoice
and customs invoice prepared by the exporter, the duty and sales calculations rely on the
integrity of the exporter’s documentation. Many customs investigations have determined
that the documents prepared by exporters understate the actual value at which the goods
were sold.

Current customs practices continue to be conducive to fraud. Importers of legally
importable goods are aware of the enormous volume of imports, the emphasis placed on
illegal drug shipments, the shortage of customs officers, and the officers’ inability to fully
inspect all entries that provide a perceived window of opportunity to perpetrate fraud.

Investigation Issues
Red Flags. Customs investigations have uncovered various schemes to falsely reduce
collectible duties. The presence of one or more of the following red flags may assist in
identifying a customs under valuation.

1, Apparent excess insurance: Insurance coverage for the in-transit goods substantially exceeds the
declared Value for Duty of the same goods.
2. Competitor’s complaints: Competitor’s complaints to customs or any other agency
governing fair trade that it cannot match the importer’s wholesale or retail prices.
3. Poor quality documents: The integrity of the exporter’s documents may be suspect if any
invoice is: printed on tissue paper, hand typed, not preprinted, or not prenumbered.

4. Letters ofcredit or bank drafts: Payments for the imported goods exceed the declared
Value for Duty amount.
5. Presence ofblank invoices: If Anyland customs invoices or export declarations, or the
exporter’s supplier invoices are known to exist at the importer’s place of business and
are found to be blank except for the exporter’s authorization signature, the importer
may be preparing such forms for presentation to Anyland’s customs.
6. Related exporter. The importer and exporter are related parties and, therefore, do not deal
at arm’s length; there could be price collusion.
7. A andB Commercial Invoices:. Total costs for the imported goods may be apportioned
between two separate invoices (often having consecutive invoice numbers, or having the
same invoice number with A and B suffixes), only one of which is submitted to customs
for purpose of Value for Duty determination.
8. Unreasonably high values allocated to nondutiable export costs: The dutiable cost of product is
artificially understated and the nondutiable cost of freight, for example, is overstated on
the commercial and Anyland customs invoices.
Significance of the Accounting Evidence. After performing an overview, the forensic accountant
can provide details for each entry and a summary schedule for all entries. This schedule
quantifies the apparent Value for Duty shortage and calculates the apparent duty shortages,
thereby determining the amount withheld.
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In preparing this quantification, the forensic accountant assumes that documentation other
than that used in the customs declaration in fact provides the true Value for Duty. The
forensic accountant may need to obtain expert-witness evidence to substantiate this basis for
valuation—perhaps a specialist from the Customs Service or from a lawyer.
In addition, in reviewing the importer’s accounting books and records, the forensic
accountant may be able to provide further support for the alleged undervaluation and may
be helpful in refuting possible defense claims.
Testimony: Viva Voce Evidence. The forensic accountant may seek evidence from various
other sources. Employees of the importer may be interviewed to provide evidence as to the
inner workings of the importer and to settle issues of ownership or control of the importing
company. A customs’ broker may provide testimony that, if presented with the documents
on which the forensic accountant’s calculations were based, a higher Value for Duty would
have been declared.

7.2.12 Health Care Fraud
There are a wide variety of health care frauds that have recently been the subject of media
attention. Many such cases are outside the scope of this section—that is, they relate to fraud
committed by individuals rather than by corporations. Health care fraud committed by
corporations typically involves one of the following:

1. Violations of occupational health and safety laws (OSHA).

2. Marketing of drugs that have not been adequately tested or for which the test results
have been falsified.

7.2.13 Possession of Property Obtained by Crime
This offence refers to either the actual possession of property obtained by a crime, or to the
possession of proceeds from the disposal of property obtained by a crime.

When a business is suspected to be in possession of stolen inventory, an examination of the
financial records should be able to establish whether this inventory had been legitimately
purchased.
A reconciliation of the inventory purchased and sold needs to be performed and compared
to the inventory on hand at both the beginning and end of the period in question: the end
date is usually set shortly after the date that the stolen inventory was allegedly obtained.
The purchases and sales should be ascertained from the company’s purchases and sales
records, and also from updated accounts payable and accounts receivable listings. If there is
a positive variance, it could result from an accounting discrepancy, which would need to be
examined further, or it could result from the possession of property obtained by crime.
If the purchases, on the accounting records, appear to be legitimate, then the integrity of the
supplier invoices must be assessed. Often, stolen inventory can be made to appear
legitimate through overstatements on supplier invoices.
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Don’t Fence Me In Case Study
Acme Industries was acting as a fence for stolen car parts. These parts were stolen
by third parties and were sold by Acme to authorized car dealerships at prices
considerably lower than normal wholesale prices. When Acme’s premises were
searched on December 8, 1998, parts valued at approximately $667,900 were
seized.
Forensic accountants were retained to determine, by means of the available books
of account and supporting documents, whether these parts were purchased legally
or otherwise. Here are the steps followed to make the requested determination.

1. The accountant began by performing a period examination. The disbursement
journal disclosed that a payment had been made to a firm of CPAs for services
rendered to Acme. An interview with this firm revealed the existence of a draft
set of financial statements for Acme, dated February 28, 1998. These financial
statements, which were never issued in final form, disclosed inventory valued at
$16,500, with a note stating, “no physical inventory taken; inventory estimated
for accounts.” The draft financial statements established the opening date of the
time period. The closing date was determined by the date of search and seizure,
December 8, 1998. The period March 1, 1998, to December 8, 1998, was,
therefore, the period examined.
2. The accountant then updated the financial records of Acme to the date of search
and seizure. This step disclosed purchases from various suppliers totaling
$886,167. A similar updating of the sales of Acme resulted in a sales figure of
$1,007,815.
3. To calculate the book value of inventory, the accountant created a schedule,
identified as Apparent Inventory of Acme as of December 8, 1998. It set out the total
value of the goods available for sale of $902,667 (opening inventory of $16,500
plus the purchases made, during the period, of $886,167).
The schedule set out the updated sales figure and a gross profit margin (sales
minus cost of sales divided by sales) ranging from 10-to-30 percent. By deducting
the gross profit margin, an apparent cost of goods sold was calculated, ranging
from a high of $907,000 at the 10 percent level to a low of $705,470 at the 30
percent level. A comparison of the apparent cost of goods sold to the value of
goods available for sale showed that there should have been no inventory as of
December 8, 1998 at a 10 percent gross margin. At a 30 percent gross margin,
the value of inventory at December 8 would have been $197,197.
4. To perform a valuation of the parts seized, the accountant compared the goods
seized to the inventory on hand calculated at the 10 percent gross margin level,
indicating an excess quantity of physical parts on hand of approximately
$672,200. When a gross profit margin of 30 percent was applied, the excess on
hand was approximately $470,000. Based on the above procedures, Acme had
in its possession an excess quantity of parts ranging in value from $470,000 to
$672,200.

Interviews with three suppliers indicated that the invoices used in the calculation of
purchases between March 1 and December 8, 1998 had been inflated or padded so
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that the invoiced value of goods purchased by Acme was greater than the actual
value of the goods received. The padded portion of the payments Acme made to its
suppliers were paid to the wife of Acme’s owner in cash.

Padding the supplier’s invoices made the stolen goods on hand harder to detect or
easier to explain away, or both. The inflated purchase prices also allowed cash to be
removed from Acme, tax free, under the guise of an expense. The payments to
suppliers were converted into cash with the excess (padded) portion of the invoiced
price being returned to the owner’s wife as cash.
This disclosure made it necessary to revise the calculated value of inventory as of
December 8, 1998, to reflect the alleged nonpurchases in Acme’s dealings with the
three suppliers who were padding their invoices. These alleged nonpurchases
totaled some $263,000, thereby increasing the value of the excess quantity of parts
in the possession of Acme to a figure between $735,000 and $935,000. These
findings not only placed the onus on the owner of Acme to explain the source of the
excess quantity of parts seized but also disclosed the existence of a fraudulent
scheme involving the three suppliers.

7.2.14 Coupon Redemption Fraud
Coupon redemption fraud involves the fraudulent collection and conversion of coupons
designed to promote various kinds of merchandise. For example, a newspaper coupon for a
box of cereal may require the purchaser to present it at a supermarket to receive twenty-five
cents off the purchase price of the cereal. Normally, the manufacturer reimburses the
supermarket for the discount it paid plus a token fee, perhaps several cents, to cover the
cost of processing the coupon and returning it to the manufacturer.

Unscrupulous grocery and supermarket owners will collect coupons, in some cases from an
intermediary, and redeem them as though merchandise has been purchased from them,
when in fact, it has not been. Although the individual amounts can be small, the volume in
most consumables can make it profitable for stores to engage in these schemes.
7.3 Prevention of Commercial Crime

Four forces can operate to reduce commercial crime:
1. Increased awareness—that is, decreasing the likelihood that a victim will be “taken.”
2. Formal deterrence—that is, the fear of formal, officially imposed sanctions (conviction
and punishment by the government).
3. Informal deterrence—that is, the fear of informally imposed sanctions, such as the loss of
respectability or a career.
4. Ethics—that is, the internalization of values that discourage violations of legal codes.
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7.3.1 Increased Awareness
Increased awareness is achieved through education and by experience. However,
experience can be a costly way to increase awareness. With increased awareness, the
investor, customer, competitor, and general public are more likely to closely scrutinize a
situation and ask questions that would raise alarm bells and prevent them from suffering a
loss. For instance:
• Investors should be wary of schemes pitching high rates of return in a short time.

• Investors also should be wary of schemes with foreign intrigue.
• Investors should thoroughly examine franchise opportunities before any funds are
invested. Brochures and marketing pitches should be viewed with skepticism,
particularly in the case of new or unconventional franchisers. Detailed financial
information, including costs and profit margins of the franchiser for any goods and
services they are contracting to provide, should be reviewed to determine the motives of
the franchiser.
• Investors should ask stock promoters a series of questions about the stock the promoter
is pushing to determine the extent to which that promoter is tied to the stock.

7.3.2 Formal Deterrence
A crime control strategy has little chance of success unless offenders are punished.
However, formal levels of current enforcement are, by all measures, extremely low. One
novel approach is enforced self-regulation. Under this idea, the government would compel
each company to write unique rules for itself or its employees. A governmental agency
would monitor compliance. Two examples of successes in the noncriminal area are the
Federal Aviation Administration, which monitors self-regulation for the U.S. airline
industry, and the Federal Trade Commission, which monitors rules that the U.S.
advertising industry has largely set for itself.

However, there are problems with self-regulation, and the industries that attempt to
regulate themselves have spotty records at best. In one study of the 320,000 physicians in
the United States, an average of only seventy-two medical licenses per year were revoked.

It may be that increased enforcement can only come at the expense of a complete and total
revision of the criminal justice system. Many commercial criminals have little fear of
detection because of the constant barrage of information that demonstrates the police and
courts simply cannot keep up with the pace of criminal offenses. Until potential offenders
have the perception that they will be caught and punished, we should not expect a reversal
of this crime trend.
However, many researchers believe there are better deterrents to commercial crime than
incarceration of the individuals who are directly involved. They argue that the most
effective deterrents are:

• Monetary penalties
• Adverse publicity
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The following remedial steps could be adopted to deal with commercial crime:

1. Strengthen consent agreements and decrees (under which companies do not admit that
what they were doing was wrong, but agree to stop doing it) to provide substantial
remedies for violations of the agreement and to include systematic follow-ups.
2. Increase fine ceilings, assessing fines according to the nature of the violation and in
proportion to the company’s annual sales.

3. Enact stiff criminal penalties for violations of health and safety or environmental
regulations that recklessly endanger the public or employees.
4. Introduce stronger statutes to prohibit companies that previously had violated federal
laws from receiving federal contracts.
5. Promote mandatory publicity for corporate civil and criminal violations.
6. Increase more extensive use of imprisonment with longer sentences. Replace
community service with incarceration, except for unusual circumstances.
7. Prevent convicted corporate offenders from being indemnified by their companies.
8. Prohibit for three years management officials convicted of criminally violating
corporate responsibilities from assuming similar management positions in their
company or others.
9. Make directors liable, but not criminally, for being derelict in their duty to prevent
illegal corporate actions.
10. Enact a new commercial bribery statute to help prosecute corporate executives who
receive kickbacks from their customers or suppliers.

7.3.3 Informal Deterrence
Most commercial criminals, compared to more traditional offenders, perceive the informal
sanctions of the loss of career and prestige to be a greater deterrent. They are, therefore,
theoretically more deterred from misbehaving by those consequences than by
incarceration.
For example, a bank president, who was told he was about to be indicted, spent most of his
time asking whether the charges were going to be made public. When told that indeed the
charges would be public, the banker, promptly committed suicide.

Informal sanctions often exist without formal sanctions. The imposition of formal sanctions,
however, will usually lead to additional informal sanctions.

7.3.4 Ethics
Behaviorists generally conclude that one of the single most important factors influencing
group behavior is the attitude of management, who—in many reported instances—have
been claimed by employees to have exerted pressure on them to engage in unethical
behavior.

One prime example is the famous Equity Funding Case, which occurred in the early 1970s.
It was uncovered when a disgruntled former employee went to the authorities. For nearly
ten years, the Equity Funding Corporation falsified more than 56,000 life insurance policies
and overstated their assets by $120 million. It was estimated that fifty to 75 employees, who
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managed to keep the scheme a secret for several years, were involved. The trustee
appointed to sort out the massive fraud, Robert Loeffler, said, “Of almost equal importance
was the surprising ability of the originators of the fraud to recruit new participants over the
years.”

Teaching people that certain behaviors are illegal and therefore inappropriate is
uncomplicated and extremely effective in reducing crime. Moral education that discourages
illegal behavior, from the top to the bottom of an organization, must be continuous. Simply
put, people must be informed as to what behavior is acceptable and what is not so that they
can alter their actions appropriately.
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CHAPTER 8:
Computer Crime and Computer Criminals

8.1

Overview
The advent of the computer has made certain kinds of crimes more efficient, harder to
detect, and very difficult to prosecute. Add to this the fact that, in a global corporation,
computers are likely to be operated all over the world; even where a company operates in
only one country, access to the Internet connects the company to the world.
A computer-related crime is simply one in which a computer is used either to commit a
crime, or as the target of a crime. Crimes committed using computers may include:
embezzlement, larceny (theft of property and proprietary information), fraud, forgery and
counterfeiting. Crimes committed targeting computers may include sabotage, vandalism,
electronic burglary, wiretapping, and the gaining of illegal access, either by impersonating
an authorized user or by exceeding one’s authority.

Some people incorrectly assume that in order to commit a computer crime, which carries
with it the risk of a substantial prison sentence, a person must be a computer scientist,
information technology specialist or programming genius. However, anyone with access, or
who can gain access, to a computer managing assets or confidential information is in a
position to commit the crime.
Until a few years ago, computer crime was something most people considered to be in the
realm of science fiction, or one that involved cyber-wizards in lab coats doing
incomprehensible things to giant computers. Today, nothing could be further from the
truth. Surveys show losses from computer crimes in the billions of dollars. The high
valuation that the investment community places on companies providing computer security
solutions is testimony to the importance that computer security plays in the modem
organization.

8.1.1 Security
Assuring security for a computer system is no different than having appropriate security for
manual accounting files. Because of the disparity in technology, each system requires its
own particular tools and methods to implement security, but the objective is the same: to
achieve a reasonable and cost-effective control environment in which an unauthorized act is
likely to be detected.
Of course, that technology has changed radically over the last decade, as companies have
moved from large central systems to interconnected local and wide area networks (LANs
and WANs), and since the Internet has made email and communications a part of almost
everyone’s lives. Security measures from years past that were accomplished by locking up
the room containing the mainframe don’t work today. One central machine has been
3
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replaced by hundreds of PCs (each probably exceeding the power of that old mainframe in
many ways) connected into internal networks, and likely interconnected to the outside
world as well. Terms such as firewalls (programs designed to prevent invasion of a system
by an outsider), which had no real applicability to the world of computers as little as five
years ago, are now essential requirements for any reasonably managed corporate or
government computer operation.

8.1.2 Evolution of Computer Crime
In looking at computer crimes, it’s important to remember that computers are just machines
that carry out instructions programmed into them. When a crime involves a computer, it
isn’t the computer suddenly deciding to become a criminal, but the person manipulating
the program or using the computer to perpetrate an act that has been defined in law as
being criminal. Computers are an instrument of the crime, in the same sense that a phone
or fax machine can facilitate the commission of an insider trading offense. And while
certain kinds of crime would not be possible without a computer-for example, planting a
computer virus, others are new versions of old crimes that are facilitated by modem
computer technology. As technology advances, those with a criminal mindset will,
inevitably, continue to look for new ways to exploit the computer for their own ends.

For example, consider the theft of a new computer chip design. Printed out, the details of
the design might require a dozen thick notebooks and a large roll of detailed circuit
diagrams. That same information in computer form would easily fit on a small tape cassette,
smaller than the common audiocassettes used for music. Or, in minutes, the information
could be transmitted via the Internet, either as a file or as an attachment to one or more
email messages.
Most experts agree that computer crime is a growing problem, and that the tools to prevent
it are evolving, but so are new ways of committing those crimes. Feeling confident that your
systems are 100 percent secure is never a good idea, but given the speed of computer
evolution, today, it is downright dangerous!
This chapter should provide you with an understanding of computer crime, how it has
evolved, and the ways that computer criminals are likely to attack organizations like yours.

8.2 Computer-Related Crimes
In today’s organizations, virtually every asset, from money to proprietary and confidential
information, is likely to be recorded on some computer’s hard drive, on a computer tape or
on a disk. Every day trillions of dollars are transferred between bank accounts relying on
computerized records. Millions of individuals essentially never see the inside of a bank.
Their pay is deposited directly into their accounts, and when they need cash, they head for
the nearest automatic teller machine (ATM). Yet money may not be the most valuable
commodity on the computer.

8.2.1 Intellectual Property
Intellectual property, which can range from business plans to trade secrets, can have
immense value. There are unique differences between stealing information and stealing
almost anything else. If $100 is stolen from you, the thief has deprived you of your money.
4
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Similarly, if your car is stolen, the thief has it and you don’t. With information, however,
particularly information stored on a computer, a thief can steal the information and you can
still have it. If the thief is a really good crook, your information can be stolen without you
ever knowing that an incident has taken place. So computers can be used to facilitate the
theft of money (for example, by manipulating banking or accounting records), the theft of
goods (by manipulating inventory, shipping records or receivables records) or information
(usually by copying it). This category includes computer-based implementations of
traditional crimes (theft, insider trading, and so on) and of newly defined crimes such as
economic espionage in which company secrets are stolen for the benefit of another
organization, or computer intrusion, which criminalizes the unauthorized access into
another organization’s computers.

8.2.2 Computer Hardware
Another class of computer crime attempts to target the computers themselves. If a
perpetrator can put a computer virus into your computer, the virus can cause a huge
disruption of your business when it is triggered to destroy data (particularly if you haven’t
been backing up that data regularly). In some cases, criminals may take more direct action
to damage your computer. These attack profiles are sometimes referred to as denial ofservice
attacks, because they are designed to deprive the rightful users of the use of their systems’
resources.

8.2.3 Computer Crimes and the Law
Whether a target of an attack is the computer itself or the information residing in the
computer, the attempt may well be a crime. But what if it isn’t?
To be a crime, there has to be a law that declares a particular course of action to be a
criminal act. Until the passage of specific computer crime laws over the past twenty years,
prosecutors had to find ways to apply traditional laws, such as, wire fraud or mail fraud, to
high-tech crimes. And it is important to remember that laws only apply within the state or
country in which they are promulgated. Because the Internet can be accessed from
anywhere in the world, perpetrators can carry out crimes from anywhere, including from
countries that have weak computer crime laws, or from which extradition is unlikely. Some
laws specifically require the victims to show that they had safeguarded the information
stolen or provided notification that the information was not in the public domain.

Unfortunately, in our society, there are too few law enforcement and prosecution personnel
who are specialists in computer crime investigation. There are very specific procedures that
must be followed in handling and analyzing computer files and equipment if the evidence
of the offense is to be admissible in a court of law. Failure to do so may cause a prosecution
to fail. Corporations should be aware that attempts of their in-house technical or
investigative personnel to examine computers involved in an offense, however well
intentioned may result in evidence being rendered inadmissible. Once a crime occurs, a
court is going to apply the rules of evidence to determine whether any actions taken could
have modified the evidence or otherwise damaged its credibility.
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8.3

A Brief History of Computer Crime
No one knows who the first computer criminal was. However, computer-related crimes
certainly have been around since the early 1970s. Throughout the rest of that decade,
computer crimes tended to focus on the manipulation of computer records to obtain
money. In the 1980s, we began to see cases in which the target of the crime was the
information on the computer. Insider trading was facilitated by the relative anonymity with
which information could be accessed in many systems.

In one of the largest early cases, an insurance company took advantage of its accounting
firm’s computer naivete to perpetrate a huge fraud. The insurer created thousands of bogus
policies, which it could identify through special policy numbers. When the auditors, as part
of random checks, wanted to see some of these nonexistent policies, they were told the
policies would be available the next day. That evening, the perpetrators busily created the
appropriate documentation to prove the validity of the policies. Millions of dollars were
funneled out of the company through this scheme. This case marked the period when
auditors learned that it was vital to include computer systems in their audit plans.

In another noteworthy case, the chief teller of a bank located in Brooklyn, NY, devised a
plan to manipulate dormant accounts using the bank’s new computer system. He
discovered that he could move money in and out of those inactive accounts simply by using
his supervisor’s key. He withdrew several hundred thousand dollars. Even though the
manipulations all showed up on accounting reports, there were so many thousands of
irregularities as a result of the complex new systems that the internal auditors were not able
to keep up with the volume, and ignored what they considered low-priority items, like
dormant account transactions. Unfortunately for the perpetrator, he was a dedicated (but
spectacularly unsuccessful) horse-player. When the Attorney General of New York State
conducted a raid on his bookmaker, the volume of his gambling was discovered, and the
source of his funds uncovered. He was convicted of theft and imprisoned.
In another case, in California, a young man discovered that the phone company had
installed a system that permitted their employees to order equipment to be delivered to job
sites using a push-button phone. He obtained the requisite code numbers from manuals
recovered from the phone company’s trash. Using the codes, he ordered the computer to
arrange the delivery of equipment to downtown manholes. He then collected the valuable
materials with his own truck, and eventually sold the valuable equipment to foreign phone
companies. His scheme was discovered when he refused to give his truck driver a raise, and
the driver turned him in. It was shown that he had stolen about $1.1 million in equipment.
He was tried, convicted, and after a short 90-day stay in jail, promptly established a
business as a consultant to attorneys who defended computer criminals. His ads proudly
proclaimed that he had “actual courtroom experience.”

Today, computer crime has progressed from crimes committed by individuals against
individuals and companies to a topic of great concern to governments: information warfare
has emerged as a real threat to national infrastructures.
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8.4

Computer Crime Today
Computer crime is in the news. Whether it is the arrest of the creator of a damaging
computer virus or a person using computers to sell child pornography, the media has
realized that our society has become worried about technology failures. This media
attention has had an unintended effect that can be a problem.

If you were to believe the media, hackers are the number one cause of computer crime
problems. In fact, however, the major problem is computer-facilitated crime committed by
employees and others who have been granted access to a system. Because the common
perception of threats is one of the key inputs people use for deciding how to spend their
security dollars, this misperception may lead to an inappropriate distribution of resources,
so that risk does not match security measures. Today many companies are realizing that this
may well be the case.
The problem of preventing computer crime is no different than that of preventing any other
crime against a business. After all, crimes were committed against business long before
computers. Accountants worked to discourage these crimes by requiring separation of
duties between people handling cash or other assets and those making the entries in the
books of the company concerning the assets. By dividing access to assets and the records of
those assets, the theory was that two or more people would have to conspire to carry out a
fraud, thus increasing the likelihood of detection.

Along with separation of duties, accountants have traditionally depended on the paper trail
of records that document transactions. This paper trail required that all transactions be
entered into journals that would be backed up by source documents, such as invoices,
purchase orders, receiving reports, canceled checks, sales receipts and vendor invoices.
Of course, in spite of the best efforts of the accountants, fraud did occur. Accounting
systems are neither foolproof nor fraud proof. Determined criminals could still find ways to
circumvent or override controls.
Computers haven’t really changed anything. A crook is still a crook. Fraud, theft and
embezzlement are still possible in the age of computers. Indeed, some argue that crime has
become more likely, as traditional paper trails are replaced by computerized trails, which
are not as easily verified by traditional methods. The speed of processing took precedence
over effective control, according to some writers. CPAs should determine how and what to
do to validate the information stored in computer systems. And that has become more
difficult as computer architectures have evolved from central mainframe computers to
networks of hundreds or even thousands of PCs and file servers distributed throughout the
company.

As stated earlier, surveys, including those conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Computer Security Institute, and the American Society for Industrial Security, show
that computer crime is responsible for billions of dollars of loss each year. Many of these
surveys indicate that the average loss in a computer crime is higher than in noncomputer
based crimes. It is often more difficult to prosecute a computer crime than a traditional
crime. Evidence on a computer is very difficult to connect to an individual because
computer data can be manipulated; therefore, providing proof not only that the crime
occurred but also how it was accomplished can be a complex process. Part of the problem

7

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

is that there are a limited number of police and prosecutors who are trained in the
investigation and prosecution of computer crime.

In fact, new opportunities for theft, fraud and embezzlement have been created by
computer technology. Accounting records, once kept under lock and key in the accounting
department, are now stored on computers that can be accessed remotely. Not only are the
systems available to authorized users (employees who have a job-related requirement to
access and use the accounting system) but also by data entry clerks, computer operators,
systems analysts and programmers. If the computer’s access control security system is not
set correctly, unauthorized employees or even outsiders could gain access to the system.
With the proper skills and a criminal inclination, systems can be manipulated, and
programs changed to eliminate records of the fraud.

8.4.1 Classification of Computer Fraud
Generally, there is no accepted chart-of-accounts for computer fraud. If there were, it would
constantly be changing. But certain computer-fraud activities that could affect a business’
chart-of-accounts should be recognized: manipulating computer inputs, manipulating
programs and tampering with outputs.

Manipulating Computer Inputs
One of the most frequent bases of computer crime involves the falsification of computer
inputs. Those inputs may involve putting false transactions into the system, modifying
actual transactions, or in some schemes, not putting information into the system.
From an accounting standpoint, the main reasons for manipulating inputs are to overstate
or understate revenues, assets, expenses and liabilities. The objective of the perpetrator
determines the manipulation necessary. Sometimes the objective is to provide false data to
managers, stockholders, creditors or government agencies. Sometimes the manipulation is
part of an embezzlement, for example, entering false invoices into an accounts payable
system. There can be little question that the manipulation of data is the most common form
of computer-related fraud.
Input fraud should be among the easiest to detect and prevent with effective supervision
and controls. These include:

• Separation of duties
• Audit trails
• Control totals and access controls (both those that limit access to data entry screens and
those that place limits on values that can be entered)
Manipulating Programs
Another major class of computer crime involves altering the instructions that computers use
to manipulate input files and databases. These can range from schemes in which programs
are designed to process fraudulent entries without making audit trail entries, to those
featuring deliberate miscalculations (for example, to shortchange depositors of a bank of
fractions of a cent of interest, which can be accumulated and stolen).
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Tampering with Outputs
Yet another category of computer fraud involves tampering with the results of computer
activity: reports and files. This category includes theft of confidential or proprietary
information (customer lists, research and design [R&D] results, company business plans,
employee information, secret formulas, and so on). According to the previously mentioned
surveys these intellectual property thefts are apparently escalating as competition increases
globally. Computers have undoubtedly facilitated the thefts, because they have provided
the capability for fast copying of huge databases, and at the same time provided, through
data communications, the capability for moving the copied data globally at tremendous
speeds. Intellectual property theft by computer is a unique crime: someone can steal your
data, but it’s still where it originally was, and there may be no record of the crime.

8.4.2 The Most Common Computer Crimes
With all of the hype concerning hackers, you would think they represent the major threat of
computer crime, but nothing could be further from the truth. Regardless of the evolution of
computer technology, the manipulation of inputs and outputs is still the most common form
of computer-related crime.

Computers are frequently manipulated to get to assets, the most popular of which are either
cash or information that can be converted to cash, or both. In terms of cash, input is
frequently manipulated through submission of falsified documents, such as invoices from
vendors, suppliers or contractors; claims for government benefits; refund or credit claims;
or fraud involving payroll or expenses. The phony claims can involve anyone from clerks
to senior executives, although employees in either the claims approval or accounting
functions are most often involved. From an accounting viewpoint, the false claim is a fake
debit to an expense so that a corresponding credit can be posted to the cash account to
cover the issuance of a check or funds transfer.

Executive Computer Crimes
In the higher levels of an organization, the nature of fraud changes. Rather than simply
grabbing cash, fraud may be designed to overstate profits by fabricating data such as sales
(which are simply overstated or which are booked before the transaction is really
completed), or by understating expenses (either by simple reduction of the numbers or in
improper deferral to a later accounting period). There is a nearly infinite range of variations
on these themes, based on the ingenuity of the perpetrators. For example, profits may be
overstated by increasing ending inventory of manufactured goods or merchandise held for
sale. That results in understatement of the cost of goods sold and raises the net profits.
Manipulation of operating results is probably more highly motivated today than ever
before. With increasing market volatility as well as an insistence on continuous growth and
on beating analyst expectations every quarter, managers may turn to manipulation to
borrow time in order to turn around what they may believe to be temporary problems.
With so much of their personal wealth tied up in company stock, there is a tremendous
motivation to keep the numbers where the market perceives they should be. Or it may be
done to make the company a more attractive merger or acquisition target, with the
assumption that in the course of the merger the falsification would be overlooked or
attributed to some undefined error. Or it may be done for personal greed; in some
companies, the executive compensation plan is directly tied to reported results.
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8.5

Computer Criminal Profiles
Who commits computer crime? It would be useful to have a profile of the offender so that
we could perhaps predict who will commit the crimes.

8.5.1 Predictions
In the 1980s, criminologists, who focused their attention on white-collar crime, argued that
the perpetrators tended to be trusted employees with unresolvable personal problems,
usually financial in nature. These included indebtedness as a result of illness in the family,
or problems with alcohol, narcotics, gambling, expensive tastes, or sexual pursuits
(according to the police, the three Bs: booze, babes and bets).

At about the same time, various studies provided a profile of the computer criminal. In this
profile the culprit—
1. Is male, white, and between 19 and 30 years of age.
2. Has no prior criminal record.
3. Identifies with technology more than with the employer’s business.
4. Is bright, creative, energetic, willing to accept challenges, and highly motivated.
5. Is employed in the field of either information processing or accounting.

6. Feels a desperate need for money because of personal problems.
7. Feels exploited by his or her employer and wants to get even. The culprit feels that
promotions, salary increases, bonuses, stock options, and so on, are not fairly
distributed. Others have gotten more than they deserve through various forms of
favoritism.
8. Does not intend to hurt people, just the employer, who is perceived of as cold,
indifferent, uncaring and exploitive.
9. Does not have a self-image as a criminal.
10. Believes that actions against the establishment are justified for political or social reasons.
11. Perceives beating the system as a challenge worthy of his or her efforts.

In addition, there are four frequently cited characteristics that are symptoms of trouble:

1. High living: Not too long ago, eyebrows were raised at the programmer who showed up
in the company parking lot in a new Mercedes convertible. However, in the turn of the
century marketplace, programmers who have been through one or two initial public
offerings (IPOs) can easily afford any car they want. Nonetheless, a discrepancy between
life-style and income must be regarded as suspicious.
2. Ultradedication to the job: The bookkeeper or computer programmer who never takes a
vacation is either very dedicated (increasingly less likely in today’s business
environment) or afraid that some scheme would come to light if he or she were not
around to control things.
3. Aging: As some people age, they grow increasingly resentful of perceived wrongs; for
example, the awarding of increased salaries and stock to younger employees. Therefore,
they may feel justified in making a big score if they think they can get away with it.
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4. Chronic Lateness: The common wisdom held that people who were constantly late with
their work were late because they were trying to fabricate or cover up something they
were doing.

In today’s environment, how valid are these assumptions? We do know that most
perpetrators who are caught committing computer crimes are male. They also tend to be
young. But there are not a lot of reliable indicators in the above lists that provide any kind
of predictive ability. Does this mean that the perpetration of computer manipulations is
unpredictable?
Certainly, there is no simple test that will detect whether a person, who has never
committed a crime in the past, will or will not commit one in the future, given the proper
circumstances and motivations. However, a review of cases over the past few years reveals
one interesting phenomenon: those who committed these offenses often had problems with
former employers who were glad to be rid of them. Companies that do not perform
background checks that include contacting former employers and checking for falsification
on employment applications are the fraudster’s friend. The perpetrators can ignore their
pasts and start anew at a company that appears to have weak security. Certainly, former
employers can lie about an employee or refuse to give any reference beyond confirmation
of employment, but a good background check should pick up at least some potential
problem employees.

Three other things to say about perpetrators are important. First, an offender does not have
to be a computer genius to pull off a major fraud. Anyone who can gain access to a system,
either because he or she is authorized to use it, or because the security controls are weak,
can potentially manipulate that system for personal advantage. Even if they cannot directly
access the computer, if they can fake the data, they can manipulate it.
Second, it is easy to limit consideration of risk to employees. Many companies today,
particularly in high-tech industries, make considerable use of temporary employees and
independent contractors. All too often, because they are not carried on the books as
employees, they are not subject to the same background checks and security measures. It
should be clear that computers don’t care if they are manipulated by employees or
independent contractors. If a person has access, they should be subject to the same controls
as regular employees.
Finally, there are offenders you will never meet, who will never meet you, but who may
cause you great difficulties. These are the virus writers and virus distributors who develop
and spread them simply because they can.

8. 5.2 Reasons for Committing Computer Crimes
Criminologists, in looking at why crimes are committed, often use a four-element model,
sometimes called Motivation, Opportunity, Means, and Methods, (MOMM).
Motivation represents the reason why one is willing to commit a crime. Motivation can be
related to both personal (or internal) conditions and external conditions. Personal
motivation factors include:
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• Economic Motivators: Economically motivated perpetrators act to fulfill the need or desire
for financial gain, for money or for other assets (or information) that can be turned into
money.
• Egocentric Motivators: Egocentric perpetrators have a need to show off their talents in
committing what may be perceived by others as a complex crime. Money or other assets
are sometimes part of the crime, but frequently they are not the underlying motivation.
Certainly, assets symbolize a measure of the success of the venture, which is important
in demonstrating the prowess and ingenuity of the criminal. Many hackers fall into this
category. But for many others, their downfall is the need to brag about their exploits and
thus gain favor in the eyes of their peer group.
• Ideological Motivators: Ideologically motivated perpetrators feel compelled to seek
revenge against someone or something they perceive as oppressing or exploiting either
them personally or other individuals possibly unknown to them. Terrorist bombings of
computer centers is an extreme example of this mindset. Sabotage against systems by
disgruntled employees or exemployees is a frequently encountered motivator.
• Psychotic Motivators: Psychotic perpetrators (that is, people suffering from mental disease)
may view the company through a delusional state of mind that does one or more of the
following: distorts reality, validates feelings of grandeur or of persecution, or exaggerates
hatred or fear of the organization or of particular people in the organization (often direct
superiors) to the extent that they may commit extreme actions against their perceived
enemies to relieve their anxieties. One way of acting out these feelings is exemplified by
the person who shows up at the office with a gun and kills those he or she believes are
“out to get them.” Another way this kind of troubled individual may lash out at these
imaginary adversaries is to attack the computer systems that may be perceived as
facilitating the work of supposed enemies. The subject of workplace violence is an
important one, but is outside the scope of this Handbook.
Environmental Motivators
Environmental motivators are those conditions in the environment of the company (or
sometimes of society in general) that are claimed as motivators. But no external motivator
forces anyone to commit a crime. It would be fair to say that environmental motivators may
aggravate personal motives. These include the work environment, reward systems, levels of
interpersonal trust, corporate ethics, stress and weaknesses in internal controls, or security
systems that may make a person believe that they can get away with a crime.

It was indicated earlier that there are no guaranteed ways of spotting a computer criminal
any more than any other kind of criminal, and that people commit offenses for many
different reasons. Does this mean that there’s nothing we can do to prevent computer
crime? Nothing could be further from the truth. We may not know specifically who will
commit a crime, but we know that given the right circumstances, someone is likely to try. In
the next section, we will look at the things a business can do to reduce the chance that it
will be victimized by a computer criminal.
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8.6 Controls for Preventing and Detecting Computer Crime

It would be nice to assume that everyone associated with a business is honest. Certainly, it
would eliminate the need for controls to prevent crime. Of course, that assumption is not
viable. People will commit crimes for many reasons, some of which are rational, others of
which may make no sense to the observer. The larger the organization, the more likely it is
that someone is out to commit a crime. Managers who subscribe to this belief are not
necessarily paranoid. In fact, most managers can name their disgruntled employees.
There are those who will steal under the best of employment circumstances. Others would
not steal even if they were unfavored employees of Ebenezer Scrooge (before the events in A
Christmas Carol, of course.)

8.6.1 Internal Control and Security Systems
Internal control and security systems are designed on the basis of past experience both in
the company in which they are installed and in other companies. The challenge here is to
build in enough controls to discourage and catch criminal behavior without breaking the
bank in costs or going overboard on security. Companies that have been victimized often
react by increasing controls to the point at which the controls can become oppressive and
actually interfere with company operations. While rational companies set up rules to define
acceptable and unacceptable behavior, too many constraints make people feel oppressed,
distrusted, and under constant surveillance.

Our society is based on freedoms and rights. We highly value our freedoms of speech,
religion and assembly, but these freedoms are not absolute. We can speak our minds, but
we cannot freely slander or libel another individual. We cannot, as one famous jurist put it,
feel free to yell “FIRE” in a crowded theatre. We cannot trade on inside information (unless
we like prison food) or release secret company information (unless we like having the
opportunity to spend time as a defendant in both the criminal and civil courts.)
Well-designed controls should provide similar checks and balances. We need to consider
the risks, threats, and other vulnerabilities in today’s marketplace and technological
environment, while simultaneously taking into account our responsibilities to employees,
the value of their contributions, and their need for satisfaction in the workplace, including
the provision of a work environment that encourages outstanding performance,
profitability, and efficiency.
A competent systems analyst or information security specialist can design layer upon layer
of controls. But controls in excess of those required by the nature of the risks are not costeffective and can place undue burdens both on those who must work under them and those
who must monitor and control them. So a company’s requirement for an effective internalcontrol environment does not represent a justification for a siege mentality or the
construction of an impregnable fortress. Done effectively, the development of internal
controls is a matter of proper balance and equilibrium, not of the implementation of
paranoia.
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Looking at the potential for theft and fraud and the actions available to prevent crime,
brings forth several conclusions:

• Most prevention efforts concentrate or focus on building more accounting and access
controls or physical security controls.
• It is vital to recognize that there are limits to technological and procedural controls.
Given the speed with which computer and data communications technology evolves and
the complexity of modern systems, it is difficult for improvements in protection and
detection mechanisms to keep pace.
• It is also important for companies to recognize that improvements in the working
environment, including a positive ethical climate and strong interpersonal trust, help to
discourage criminal thinking and behavior and, as a result, are a part of the control
environment. Some factors in the business environment are likely to encourage
computer crime. Other factors discourage crime. Clearly, we want to minimize the
criminal behavioral motivators, and maximize the noncriminal behavioral motivators.

8.6.2 Factors That Encourage Computer Crime
The factors that enhance the probability that a company will be the target of theft, fraud,
embezzlement and corruption, including computer crime, can be either motivational
(related to the corporate reward system and company policies) or personal (relating to the
personal character of a particular employee).

The following are motivational factors that encourage computer crime:
• Inadequate rewards including pay, fringe benefits, stock and stock options, bonuses,
incentives, perquisites, job security, meaningful work and promotional opportunities.

• Inadequate management controls, including failure to communicate expected standards
of job-related performance or on-the-job behavior, and ambiguity in relationship to
work roles, relationships, responsibilities, and areas of accountability.
• Inadequate reinforcement and performance feedback mechanisms, including lack of
recognition for good work, loyalty, longevity and effort; lack of meaningful recognition
for outstanding performance; delayed or nonexistent feedback on performance
inadequacies or unacceptable on-the-job behavior.
• Failure to offer counseling when performance or behavior falls below acceptable levels.
• Acceptance of mediocre performance as the standard.
• Inadequate support and lack of resources to meet standards, such as not providing
authority to hire sufficient personnel to meet requirements for quality, quantity, and
timeliness of work produced.
• Inadequate operational reviews, audits, inspections, and follow-throughs to assure
compliance with company policies, priorities, procedures, and government regulations.

• Condonation of inappropriate ethical norms or inappropriate behavior.
• Failure to control hostility generated by promotion or destructive competitiveness
among departments, offices, or personnel.
• Failure to control bias or unfairness in selection, promotion, compensation and
appraisal.
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The following are personal or personnel-based encouragements of computer crime:
• Inadequate standards of recruitment and selection.
• Inadequate orientation and training on security matters and on sanctions for violating
security rules.

• Unresolved personal financial problems.

• Unresolved problems relating to personal status.
• Failure to screen and background check personnel before appointing to sensitive
positions. This includes verification of prior employment, verification of educational
qualifications, verification of financial stability, and examination of character.
• Inadequate control of the level of job-related stress and anxiety.

8.6.3 Factors That Discourage Computer Crime
Computer crime can be discouraged through measures that are designed not only to
prevent crime but also to detect attempts to engage in computer crimes. The recommended
prevention measures are—

1. Internal accounting controls. These are the traditional measures that discourage crime,
and they are as important in an automated environment as in a manual-processing
environment. These include:
• Separation and rotation of duties. Remember that as personnel change jobs, it is vital
to update the list of computer applications that they can access, so that their access at
any given time matches their current job requirements.
• Periodic internal audits, surprise inspections and computer security reviews.
• Absolute insistence that control policies and procedures be documented in writing.
• Establishment of dual signature authorities, dollar authorization limits, expiration
dates for signature authorizations, and check amount limits. These authorities also
should be examined on both a routine and surprise basis.
• Offline controls and limits, including batch controls and hash totals.

2. Computer Access Controls. These controls may include:
• Authentication and identification controls, including keys or smartcards, passwords,
biometrics, callback systems, one-time passwords, time and day constrained access,
and periodic code and password changes.
• Compartmentalization, also known as need to know.
• Use of encryption to protect data while stored or in transit.
3. Use of firewalls and similar safeguards to prevent unauthorized access through the
Internet.
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The measures to detect attempts to commit computer crime include:

1. Logging and follow-up of exceptions. The system should be designed to log unusual
activities, and procedures should be in place to follow up on reported exceptions, such
as—

• Transactions that are out of sequence, out of priority or otherwise out-of-standard.
• Aborted runs and entries, including repeated attempts to unsuccessfully enter the
system.
• Attempts to access applications or functions beyond a person’s authorization.
2. Logging and following up on variances that indicate a problem may have occurred or is
occurring.

3. Awareness of employee attitudes and satisfaction levels.
4. Sensitivity to reports that particular individuals are having problems, living beyond their
means, or talking about getting even for perceived slights.
5. Use of newly developed intrusion detection systems that use artificial intelligence
capabilities to detect unusual transactions flowing through a system. These are evolving
and have the prospect of being an order-of-magnitude improvement in crime detection
technology.

8.6.4 Security Countermeasures to Computer Crime
The focus of chapter 4 of this Handbook is computer security in general. The focus of this
section is the specific measures that are often used to prevent computer crimes by those
either inside or outside an organization. While some measures are applicable to almost all
situations, it is vital that each organization consider those controls that are appropriate to its
particular circumstances.

Security Holes
One of the unpleasant realities in today’s systems environment is that the systems we use,
including operating systems, firewalls and security packages, and application systems, are
not perfect when they are released by the manufacturers to their customers. On a continual
basis, security problems are discovered. Information about ways to exploit security holes is
quickly reported worldwide by independent bulletin board systems, government-funded
sites (such as the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie-Mellon
University), and the manufacturers. Sometimes the problem and the ways to exploit it are
reported before a repair patch can be developed. It has become, therefore, absolutely vital
that every organization monitor these information sources to be certain that all relevant
holes in security are understood and closed as soon as possible.

If the hole is not closed, and experience indicates that this is often the case, a company can
continue to operate with known holes in its security. It is also vital that the internal auditors
understand the importance of monitoring and closing software holes, and that this is
included in the review plan.
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Computer Access Control
Controls that allow only authorized people access to sensitive systems include—
• Passwords. Use passwords that are long enough to be difficult to guess. Passwords
should not comprise simple words, names of relatives, and so on, and should be
changed regularly.

• Compartmentalization. Restrict users to the specific files and programs that they have a
job-related need to access.
• Use ofbiometrics. Use fingerprints, iris recognition, hand geometry and other new
technologies for added measures of control.
• Use of one-time passwords. Use hardware or software that generates a new password for
each access.
• Automatic log off. Use this measure to prevent unauthorized access to the system when
authorized users fail to log off.
• Time-day controls. Restrict personnel access to those times when they are supposed to
be on duty. An extension of this concept for companies using automated time-clock
systems is to deny access and report a violation if access is attempted when an
employee is not shown in the time clock system as being present.

• Dial back systems. Use these systems when access is through a dial-up system. On
accepting a user ID and password, the system hangs up and dials a preestablished
number at which the approved user is standing by. This is very helpful when a
person works at a predictable location, for example, the home office of a
telecommuting employee.
• Random personal information checks. Implement this means of identifying unauthorized
log-in attempts. The system randomly transmits a question that only the authorized
individual could answer and denies access unless the right answer is received. If
several dozen personal questions are on file, this technique can be very useful.
• Internet authentication. Use this control for telecommuting employees. With
telecommuting on the rise, many companies are taking advantage of low-cost, highbandwidth Internet connections, such as Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Lines, which
offer download speeds of up to 1.5MB per second and uploads of 400KB per second
for nominal monthly charges, which includes continuous access, twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week. This technology, which identifies a specific Internet user and
sends information across the Internet securely, is rapidly evolving.

8.6.5 Solutions
When investigating computer crimes, investigators and forensic accountants often discover
what could have been done to prevent the crimes. The following are some of the most
frequently found items. The organizations failed to:
• Have written policies and security rules for the use of computers and systems.
• Have temporary employees and independent contractors follow the same security
rules as regular employees.
• Adjust access as people changed responsibilities internally.
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• Keep up with and close security holes in applications, firewalls, and operating
systems.
• Maintain virus protection on a fully updated basis.

Some of the suggestions to improve computer security include implementing:
• More effective policies for security over proprietary information.
• Better interaction between the human relations, systems and security functions.
• Better internal accounting controls.
• Better supervision of those with sensitive access to systems.
• Better education of computer users regarding security.
• Better computer audit software.
• Better software security.

• Better physical security in the workplace.
8.7

Selected Computer Crimes

8.7.1 Brief Case Synopses
It is useful to look at actual cases of computer crime to see the challenges businesses face if
targeted by an offender. In each of these brief case studies, consider how your
organization’s existing security system would have faired, how your own organization
would have reacted, and how likely it is that your current system of internal controls would
have identified the problem and traced it back to the guilty parties.

ER Fraud Case Study

A computer operator at a hospital was charged with embezzling $40,000 by
submitting false invoices that were processed through the hospital’s computer
system. At the same time, the hospital’s assistant data processing manager accepted
a $41,000 bribe from a consultant who stole an additional $150,000 by submitting
false invoices for computer services. Both the operator and the assistant manager
had prior convictions for computer-related crimes. Because computer personnel
were not directly involved in patient care, hospital policy did not require a
background check. An inexpensive reference check with previous employers could
have possibly prevented the crime because the offenders would probably not have
been hired when it was revealed that they had falsified their employment
applications.
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Even Experts Have Bad Days Case Study

A partner at a major international consulting firm received an anonymous call
suggesting that one of the firm’s senior information systems managers was
defrauding the firm through a scheme involving false invoicing for supplies like
laser toner cartridges and backup tape cartridges. A confidential internal
investigation was carried out and no problems were revealed. Every invoice could
be shown to tie directly to the actual material that had been delivered. The report
seemed to be false, but a member of the firm’s management committee decided that
someone independent of the company should take a second look. Investigators
were hired and they discovered that the material had been delivered, but they could
find no record of the firm that supplied the materials. A simple background check
on the vendor showed that it was just a shell formed by the senior information
systems manager. He had developed a scheme in which he would place orders with
the shell company (actually, with himself) and then order the same material from a
reputable supplier who sent it to his home overnight. He would open the boxes,
remove the original vendor’s invoices, insert his own invoices (which were exactly
15 percent higher than what he had paid) and then he reshipped them. This simple
scam resulted in a loss to the company of more than $300,000.
As shown in this case, vendor fraud can occur even in situations when all of the
materials were actually received. No employees had questioned why so many
orders were being placed with a company no one had ever heard of when major
vendors could provide the same material in less time and at a lower cost.

The Invoice Looked Good Case Study

The scam was brilliant. The accounting manager had found a way to get his
employing company to pay for his gambling losses in Las Vegas. Every time he
needed to send a payment, he simply created an invoice for services at some distant
office. The invoices were always from different companies, but on all of them he put
a stamp on which he wrote their vendor number in the company’s system. Of
course, the vendor number was one the accounting manager had assigned to the
holding company that owned the casino. Of course the casino was always glad to
see him on his quarterly visits: it didn’t care whether the check was made out to it or
to its parent company. Because the computer system wouldn’t reject the invoice as
long as the vendor number was valid, the computer generated the check in the
weekly check run; it was signed by another machine, and mailed out with thousands
of other checks.
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The scheme worked for years, until the outside auditors decided to conduct an
internal control review, and determined that there was no match between vendor
names on invoices and vendor numbers. In checking a vendor list, one of the
auditors recognized the name of the casino’s parent company, and wondered why
this unlikely organization would be a vendor. The manager told the auditor that the
company held meetings at the casinos owned by the company. Unfortunately for
the manager, the auditors checked his story, and the scheme was revealed.

Breaking the Bank Case Study

A European bank sustained losses estimated at $65 million over a two year period
when the head of the foreign currency transfer department and her assistant, who
had broken the bank’s computer transfer codes, were able to move money into
outside accounts. The fraud was discovered through an audit, and the two
perpetrators were arrested. Afterwards, everyone questioned how it was possible for
such a large amount of money to be stolen with no one noticing and raising the
alarm. Further investigation showed that the bank was involved in complex money
laundering and tax evasion activities. Apparently the two managers believed that
with all of the manipulation going on, no one would notice their independent
scheme, and they were almost correct.

A New Form of Fraud Case Study

An employee of an insurance company in Florida had the dubious honor of being
one of the first people convicted under that state’s computer crime law. The
employee was a benefits clerk with the company, and used her expertise in the
company’s systems and procedures to steal more than $200,000 in two years. She
filled in the forms that benefits examiners used to approve claims and entered them
into her computer terminal. She used a variety of names and policy numbers-all
real-and created the paperwork to back up the claims. Her mistake was always
using, as the mailing addresses for the checks, one of three addresses: her own, her
father’s, or her boyfriend’s. The security department of the company discovered the
fraud by looking for unusual patterns of payment addresses.
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Welfare? It Was for our Own Welfare! Case Study

It may be impossible to discover exactly how much they stole, but a State
Department of Social Services learned that one of their supervisors worked in
collusion with a clerk to steal $300,000. This was a simple matter of input
falsification. The clerk and supervisor submitted dozens of false claims for benefits
and collected the payments. The fraud was discovered when a data input clerk
noticed that the authorization data on one of the forms she was entering was
incomplete. She called the eligibility worker, whose signature had been forged by
the supervisor, to check on the incomplete form. When that person denied
authorizing the claim or signing the form, an investigation was performed and the
fraud was discovered.

When Time Stood Still Case Study

Wouldn’t it be great to get the results of horse races before they ran? Imagine
always betting on long shots when you know the winner. Just a dream? Not for the
computer operator at a government-run betting agency in Australia. He figured a
way to reverse time. Just before certain races, he reset the system clock to read three
minutes earlier than it actually was. As soon as the race was run, he called his
girlfriend, who was an off-track telephone betting clerk. She immediately entered
bets on the winner. Because the computer believed that the race had not yet started,
the bets were accepted. Then, the operator would reset the clock. Unfortunately, we
can’t report that the scheme was uncovered by brilliant work by internal auditors,
external auditors, corporate security personnel, or even brilliant police work. The
operator’s girlfriend turned him in when she discovered he was seeing another
woman.

8.7.2 Case Study: A Closer Look
There are thousands of cases of serious computer crimes on the books. Some were
presented in the previous section. To provide a closer look at the way these cases are
investigated, one full-length case study is included. This case involves deliberate actions by
an insider who disrupted the email capabilities of an organization.

The Case of the Suicidal Computers Case Study

It happened, as do so many unpleasant things, in the dark of night. A dozen
computers—each dedicated as an email router for a major financial services firm—
apparently made a mutual decision, precisely at 5:00 A.M. one morning, to commit
suicide. At that time, each of the computers suddenly and without warning,
proceeded to completely reformat each of their hard disk drives. From that moment
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on, email within the huge global organization stopped. Any message that went
outside of the local office was not going to be delivered.
Within an hour, the problem was noticed. Within two, it was apparent that the
problem was not small and was not going to be easy to fix. Because many of the
important daily operating communications of the company went through email, it
was clear that a back-up plan would be needed to replace the damaged
communications links. While one group of managers developed a plan to keep the
organization functioning, the Chief Information Officer passed the word to the
company’s communications manager to fix the problem. The data communications
manager immediately contacted the manufacturer. Because the organization was a
large and valued customer, the manufacturer put two systems engineers on the next
available flight.
At the same time, the Director of Corporate Security recognized that, while it was
possibly an accident—perhaps a programming bug—that caused this crisis, it was
probably a deliberate act of sabotage. If it were, he knew he would need proof to
determine who had caused it. The Director of Corporate Security also understood
that proof requires evidence that could be admitted in a court of law. Unfortunately,
the director had previous experience in computer fraud cases in which evidence that
might have existed was destroyed in the attempt to fix software problems.
Therefore, two calls were made: The first was to the CEO of the company, who
gave him authority to investigate the incident and, if it were shown to be deliberate,
to identify and punish the perpetrator. The second call was to a private
investigations firm that specialized in high-technology incidents.

The investigators understood that they could not interfere with the repair efforts;
nevertheless, they immediately went to the data center. They briefed the repair
team, and made a simple request: Please don’t destroy or change anything that
might be the cause of the incident without checking with us first, and keep detailed
notes of your findings.
Over the two days it took to identify the problem and complete repairs, the
investigators collected evidence, both in the form of software, and in written
statements from the software engineers.

During the investigation, it was discovered that one email server had not
reformatted itself. Because of a hardware problem, it had been shut down when the
incident occurred. When the engineers discovered this, they examined the unit.
One of the company’s technicians noticed that the program that controls the
processing of daily backups indicated it had been modified a few weeks earlier.

The technician who was responsible for backup knew that she had not changed the
program in months. Yet the program had been changed. It still performed its
normal backup, but there was a new routine that checked the date every time the
program ran. On a specific date, the program had just two lines of code to be
executed, and those two lines instructed the computer to immediately reformat its
hard drives without warning, and without any report being generated. The
investigators took possession of the server, since it was now apparent that the act
was deliberate.
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Over a forty-eight-hour period, the problem was solved, and all systems were
checked for the existence of the deadly software. Before the engineers from the
computer manufacturer left, the investigators assigned them one additional task.
Using the notes they made during the previous forty-eight hours, each of the
engineers wrote a memo documenting his or her findings in the context of what was
now a potential criminal investigation. These statements were quickly reviewed, and
then signed and sworn to before a notary. This action converted a memo into a
sworn affidavit, which could have great value in any future court action.
With the email system back in operation, the data center management worked with
the investigative team to determine who could have inserted the killer code into the
dozen servers. Because of security measures built into the system, very few people
had the authority to make those changes. In fact, the investigators were told, only
four employees had that authority, and all were exemplary employees, so far
beyond suspicion that no one could conceive of any of them having done this. Yet it
had to be one of them. Who else could it be?

That was the question put to the head of the email management group, where the
four suspects worked. She was convinced that none of the four employees were
responsible; however, she had another candidate under consideration. He had
resigned some weeks earlier, but, as a member of the group, he would have had the
authority. Why had he left? Because he felt that he was misunderstood and
insufficiency appreciated. He believed he knew far more than the others in the
group, including the group head, about email technology. He had publicly gone to
senior data center management to request a promotion to group head. When his
managers decided that they would keep the present manager, this disgruntled
employee had given notice, telling others that the company did not deserve him.
An examination of the former employee’s computer revealed evidence of the
destructive code that had caused the shutdown. There were several versions of the
code found, including the key line that delayed the destruction until several weeks
after he left the company. On the evidence presented by the investigators, the case
was referred to law enforcement. The police accepted the case and reviewed the
evidence. The case was brought to the county prosecutor, who determined the
actions to modify the computer’s program were a violation of the state’s computer
crime laws and that he would prosecute.

8.8

Conclusion
One of the peculiar things about the field of computer crime is that one can say almost
anything and go unchallenged. The only thing people seem to agree on is that most
computer crime is probably never reported, either because it is never discovered or
because the company is embarrassed and chooses to handle it administratively. Often the
company will forego prosecution if the offender resigns and agrees to never discuss the
incident. This is why people who commit computer crimes can, in effect, get away with it
and go on to another company with their reputations apparently intact.
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In this chapter, we’ve tried to show that it does not require tremendous computer skills to
commit a computer crime. Any employee, temp, or independent contractor with authorized
access, as well as anyone with unauthorized access, can do it Since most computer crimes
involve input or output manipulations, the individuals most able to commit these crimes are
not developers but employees in departments that use the systems. This is not to say that
systems people don’t commit computer crimes; they do but they are not typically likely to
do so.

We have also tried to show that the commonly held belief that most computer crime is
committed by outside hackers, who gain access to systems through almost mysterious
abilities, is also a myth. Most of the incidents involve actions by insiders. Again, some
occurrences do involve those outside of the organization, and defensive systems, such as
firewalls, are absolutely necessary.
A third myth is that computer-related thefts, including fraud and embezzlement, are not
detected by audit, but by accident. If that were true, and it is not, it would imply that the
criminals are somehow more intelligent or more skillful, or perhaps more cunning than the
noncriminals, and this is not the case. Good internal security, accounting and audit systems
are very effective and do catch the bad guys. It is when these controls are not in place or
when they are not implemented with sufficient resources, that the criminals get the upper
hand.
As computer security becomes an increasingly important aspect of technology, it is likely
that better mechanisms to prevent and detect computer crimes will evolve. But to gain the
needed protection, it will be necessary for companies to adopt the technology and to
implement it properly. Again, those who fail to assign sufficient resources to prevent the
problem are destined for problems.
Finally, remember that once a security weakness is identified in a system, whether by
hackers or security experts and the knowledge of the hole becomes public, it is important
that it be closed quickly. There is nothing more discouraging than having to tell a victim
that it was hit by a perpetrator who used a well-known hole to enter its system, and that all
along there had been an easy-to-install, free patch out there, but that it was never installed.
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CHAPTER 9:
Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud

9.1

Overview

9.1.1 Purpose and Scope
The primary focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention, not fraud investigation. Likewise,
this Handbook is intended primarily for the CPA, whether in public practice or in industry,
who is responsible for fraud prevention, rather than the full-time fraud investigator.
However, professional fraud investigators will also find this Handbook useful in many ways,
and occasionally there may be some crossover between the two functions; nevertheless, the
distinction between the two is an important one. Prevention cannot come without an
understanding of how fraud is perpetrated and the means by which it is concealed. To
reach this understanding, it is necessary to have a firm foundation in fraud investigation
techniques.
The experienced fraud investigators achieve their status through professional training and,
most important, extensive experience in the investigation of fraud. It is well beyond the
scope of this Handbook—indeed, it would be a virtually unachievable goal for any text—to
synthesize the knowledge and expertise gained by an experienced forensic and
investigative CPA over many years. There is simply no substitute for experience.
Nevertheless, virtually all CPAs should be concerned with fraud prevention, investigation
and reporting, whether internally to an employing company, to a client, or to a court.
Occasionally and despite the best fraud prevention efforts, a known or suspected fraud
situation may surface. It is important in such circumstances that the CPA—

1. Be capable of acting competently: that is, perform the acts that should be performed and
avoid or not perform those acts that should not be performed.
2. Understand the role of the forensic accountant and others who may be called in as part
of the fraud investigation.

This chapter should serve to introduce the CPA to fraud investigation and reporting. It is
not intended as a substitute for professional expertise in fraud investigation. Until the
requisite experience is gained, in all cases involving fraud or suspected fraud, the
inexperienced CPA should seek the assistance of a lawyer knowledgeable about fraud and a
CPA experienced in forensic accounting.
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9.1.2 Forensics and Forensic Accounting
The term forensic can be defined as, “belonging to, used in, or suitable to courts of law.”
This term describes the standards that are applicable to the discipline in question—that is, a
forensic medical examiner would conduct autopsies to a standard required for court
purposes, and a forensic accountant would conduct financial analyses to a standard
required for court purposes. Thus, a forensic accountant may also be involved in civil
litigation cases, which do not necessarily involve fraud.
But what is that standard? Generally, the forensic standard involves considering all the
relevant evidence that could affect the professional’s opinion and yet withstand rigorous
cross-examination from counsel who is keen to undermine or disprove the professional’s
opinion so that the professional can properly assist the court reach its decision. It also
involves a strong understanding of the legal system.

It follows then, that forensic accounting is a discipline involving accounting to a standard
required by the court—the criminal and civil courts, as well as arbitration, mediation, and
other forms of business dispute resolution that require expert evidence to a similar
standard. It involves the application of financial skills and an investigative mentality to
unresolved issues, conducted within the context of the rules of evidence. As a discipline, it
encompasses financial acumen and a strong knowledge and understanding of business
reality and the workings of the legal system. In the context of a fraud case, extensive fraud
investigation expertise is essential. Its development has been primarily achieved through
on-the-job training, as well as experience with investigating officers (in fraud cases), legal
counsel and in the courts.
Accounting practitioners who concentrate their professional practice on matters requiring
them to testify in court as to the findings from an investigation of accounting and financial
evidence are termed forensic accountants. The ultimate test for the forensic accountant is
acceptance by the courts of law—both criminal and civil—of him or her as an expert
witness providing testimony in the area of accounting and financial matters.

While the American Institute of CPAs and the state Boards of Accountancy currently do
not prescribe any standard specifically related to forensic accounting, it is clear that the
standards for this practice are determined in the first instance by the courts of law. At the
same time, a CPA is required to meet the general standards of professional practice as
stipulated by the governing State Board of Accountancy and American Institute of CPAs.

9.2 The Five-Step Investigative Approach
Typically, there are five major steps in the forensic accounting and fraud investigation
process:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Planning.
Gathering evidence.
Analyzing and testing.
Reporting and testifying.
Case Resolution.

For a more detailed checklist, see the table at the end of this chapter.
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9. 2.1 Planning
As with almost all endeavors, planning is critical. A well-planned investigation maximizes
the chances of success; poor planning can lead to disaster. In the early stages of a forensic
accounting or investigative engagement, it’s especially important to (1) establish the
scenario, (2) identify areas of concern and uncertainty, and (3) define the nature and scope
of the investigation.

Establishing the Scenario
The amount of information available during the earliest phase of an engagement will vary
from case to case. Establishing what is known is of special importance. This is true because
it has a direct impact on the nature and scope of the investigation.

A known or suspected fraud almost always comes to light through one of the following
three broad scenarios:
1. Accounting irregularities. One of the most common irregularities is a discrepancy between
the book value of an asset and its value as determined through physical counts or
confirmations. For example, a physical inventory count may reveal a major shortage
compared to the perpetual inventory records, or accounts receivable confirmations may
reveal much lower values than the accounts receivable subledger. Other common
examples include bank reconciliations that do not balance, and complaints from
customers that their statements are incorrect. Any irregularity that comes to light during
an internal or external examination would also fall into this category. The common
theme in all of these examples is that the company’s records—its information system—
have raised a red flag that signals the possibility of fraud.
2. Immediate physical evidence. Physical evidence may be readily apparent or uncovered
upon inspection. Obvious examples include the aftermath of sabotage or arson. Human
or electronic surveillance techniques might also yield immediate evidence (for example,
with respect to employee theft or the diversion of inventory).
3. After-the-fact incriminating information. Incriminating information is a grab-bag category
that comes in various incarnations: outright confessions brought on by guilt, anonymous
tips, memos in brown envelopes, whistle-blowing employees, irate spouses looking to
get back at their fraud-perpetrating husband or wife, honest citizens just trying to do the
right thing, and so on.
In any fraud investigation the first step is to establish which of these three scenarios exists,
and the nature and scope of the related evidence.

Identifying Areas of Concern and Uncertainty
The next step in the planning phase is a blending of the Boy Scout motto: be prepared and
Murphy’s Law: whatever can go wrong, will Immediate areas of concern depend on the
scenario identified in the previous step. Dealing with sabotage requires the immediate
beefing up of security at other likely targets to prevent further damage. Dealing with a
specific employee who is suspected of fraud—such as an accounts receivable clerk who
might be perpetrating a lapping scheme, or a shipping department employee
misappropriating inventory—you would want to secure all possible evidence and remove
the suspect employee from the scene. Removing the employee from the scene need not be
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done in a direct, accusatory way. For example, if the fraud red flag is not common
knowledge among the work force, the employee could be sent on a week’s training course.
Beyond the immediate concerns of asset protection and evidence preservation, it’s
important, to the extent possible, to identify the uncertainties in the investigation—any
pieces of the puzzle that are missing, so to speak. What are the major strengths and
weaknesses of the existing evidence and supporting material? What additional evidence is
likely to be available? What additional research, investigation and analysis are likely to be
required to obtain any needed additional evidence and make it useful? Without at least a
rough idea of where you’re going, you most likely will not arrive at any valid conclusions.

Perhaps most important, you should think of any constraints, obstacles and pitfalls you are
likely to encounter along the way. Obviously, forensic accountants and investigators need
to be concerned about legal constraints in conducting their investigation. For example, as a
general rule, only law enforcement authorities in possession of a valid search warrant can
legally search a residence or a vehicle. (There are several exceptions, but for practical
purposes none of them would apply to a fraud investigation.)
Less clear may be situations such as searching employee lockers. Judicial authorities have
established that if employees have been put on notice all along that their lockers are subject
to inspection, they probably can be searched. If this notice is lacking, legal counsel should
be consulted, which should be the rule followed in all cases. Other concerns of investigators
include lawsuits for false accusations or wrongful dismissal, and constraints imposed by
collective bargaining agreements. The point is that a fraud investigation can be a legal
minefield that must be navigated very carefully and deliberately, not haphazardly. To keep
from hitting a mine, the safest course to set is early consultation with appropriate legal
counsel and an experienced forensic CPA.

In addition to legal constraints, factors such as the company’s reputation and relationship
with its employees must be considered. For example, you would not want to alienate all
your employees through hasty implementation of draconian investigative or security
measures, just because of one bad apple.

Defining the Nature and Scope of the Investigation
The last step in the planning phase is to define the nature and scope of the investigation.
This should be a fairly simple and straightforward process if the first two steps—establishing
the scenario and identifying areas of concern and uncertainty—were properly thought out.
The nature and scope of the investigation are defined by several interrelated attributes
including—

• The nature of the main objective—for example, prevention of further incidents,
dismissal of the perpetrator, proving the case for criminal prosecution, establishing a loss
claim, and so on—and the ranking of the objectives when there is more than one.
• If a criminal prosecution is envisaged, the point at which to involve the police.
• The level of secrecy or cover required in conducting the investigation.
For example, if the scenario involves an anonymous but seemingly credible tip implicating
a purchasing employee in a kickback scheme, the objective may be to prove the case for
criminal prosecution. The nature of the investigation will be fairly secret, because the
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parties involved are unlikely to confess and you would not want to alert them to the
investigation. Because kickback (that is, secret commission) cases can be difficult to
establish, the scope of the investigation could become extensive, including background
investigations of both the bribe giver and bribe taker, surveillance, and possibly even
setting up a sting operation.

9.2.2 Evidence Gathering
Once the planning phase is complete, the general objectives of the investigation must be
translated into specifics, for example, identifying the documents and other information to
analyze, conducting interviews, and obtaining third-party information required for
corroboration.

Throughout the process, two important questions to keep in mind are what logical
alternative interpretations exist for the evidence, and what eventual use will be made of the
evidence. In particular, the forensic accountant must be able to understand the difference
between relevant and irrelevant information, and must be willing to apply the standards of
evidence required by the court.

Information Gathering Techniques
The forensic and investigative accountant is not a police officer. He or she does not have
the resources of a police officer and, even when working to assist the police, must work
within his or her own expertise, and within the rules governing professional conduct.
Among the most important investigative tools are those that enable the forensic accountant
to gather and analyze information available in the public domain in conjunction with other
information gathered during the investigation.

For example, in investigating an individual, it may be possible to gather background
information concerning certain aspects of an individual’s financial circumstances (for
example, mortgages and other secured debts, old court judgments, and so on), educational
and employment references, professional qualifications, and other details such as whether
he or she has taken his or her annual vacation. Also worth exploring is corporate
information such as jurisdiction of incorporation, authorized share capital, and the identity
of all officers and directors since incorporation can often be obtained from the appropriate
state office, usually the Secretary of State of the jurisdiction where the incorporation took
place. In some jurisdictions, shareholder identities can be obtained. In many instances,
private offshore corporations have less information available than publicly traded North
American companies.

Public domain information may also provide critical clues or evidence. For example,
comparison of a company’s statistics and trends to others in its industry, that is,
benchmarking, may identify unexplained variances that alert the forensic accountant to
possible questionable activities or that warrant further investigation. At the very least, the
background data will provide context for the detailed findings from the examination of
nonpublic data.
There are many sources of public information about organizations, industries, and
institutions. Very often a university reference library or a government resource center can
provide access to documents, reference textbooks, computerized databases, and other
sources of information that can assist in understanding and analyzing a case.
7

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
Documentary Evidence
At the beginning of any case involving documentary evidence, there are two key questions.
What documents should be obtained? And where will they come from? These questions are
usually resolved after discussions with available witnesses and an initial assessment of the
findings to date. Depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary to involve the
authorities to obtain a search warrant or begin legal proceedings so that a court could order
the seizing of documents.

The main goal is to gather all documents that might be useful, bearing in mind that
irrelevant documents can always be returned to their proper place. It is necessary to decide,
in consultation with legal counsel, whether to be selective (that is, review all documents but
take only those deemed necessary), or whether to remove or secure all of the documents
from the premises by taking the filing cabinets, and so on. It is difficult to lay down hard
and fast rules, but clearly the primary purpose is to obtain all documents that might be
relevant without resorting to a fishing expedition.
The minimum requirements for financial documentation, for the period under
investigation, are likely to be the following:
• Books and records, management reports, and statistical analyses pertaining either to the
management of the company or to an individual.
• Documentation pertaining to the movement of assets into and out of a company.

• Relevant correspondence.
• Personal documentation, such as bank-account records.
Documents, including seized documents, should be properly identified and catalogued.
Documents must be handled carefully. They should not be written upon, altered, stapled or
unstapled during the course of the investigation. The investigating accountants, in
particular, should bear this in mind.

Documents should be examined in detail and categorized as follows:
1. Documents required for evidence.
2. Documents required for rebuttal of the defense arguments.
3. Documents required for other reasons.

4. Documents that can be returned.
Once the documents have been sorted into these groups, photocopies can be made to
provide working copies for the investigating accountant to use when preparing schedules,
and in general for the working paper files.

Documents will subsequently be selected, from among those photocopied, for use in the
presentation of evidence in a court of law. They should be compiled and assembled into a
document brief.

Admissibility of Accounting Evidence
It is important during the evidence gathering stage to consider the two forms of
documentary accounting evidence that may be presented in a court of law:
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1. Primary, that is, the original, individual accounting documents obtained from the parties
concerned or other sources.
2. Secondary, that is, summaries and schedules based on the original documents, which are
produced by an accountant after examining the primary evidence.

The issue of whether secondary accounting evidence should be admissible has been argued
in the courts for many years. Two opinions that allowed secondary accounting evidence,
are described below.

In the first case, the court ruled, and was upheld on appeal, that a summary of documentary
evidence was admissible. The court said, however, that the summary was in itself not
evidence of the underlying facts; rather, it was strictly an aid to understanding primary
evidence that had already been established. The judge made the following observations
about the use of secondary evidence:
1. No more reliance could be placed on the survey than was placed on the primary
evidence it was intended to summarize.
2. The summary did not prove the veracity and content of the primary evidence.
3. Any summary of primary evidence must show every weakness previously determined as
existing within the primary evidence.
In the second case, the court ruled that an exhibit prepared by an accountant, based on the
documentation before the court, be introduced into evidence because it helped to simplify
and trace the many transactions previously discussed in the court. The defense was
concerned that the exhibit expressed the independent opinions of the accountant who
prepared the material and, therefore, was not objective. However, the judge ruled that any
opinions reflected in the exhibit were opinions that were readily ascertainable from the
documents themselves—the primary evidence.

Interview Techniques
One of the more important tools for the forensic accountant is the interview process—this is
a complex subject area on which several books have been written, and which takes years of
experience for forensic accountants to master.

For the purposes of this Handbook, rather than attempt to explain the entire process, this
section provides highlights of a few of the skills involved:
• The interview process should yield evidence that is as clear, unambiguous and concise
as possible.
• Each interview, in order to be effective, should be carefully planned regarding the issues
to be examined. All supporting documentation relating to the issues in question should
be readily available to the interviewer in the event that the documentation is needed for
reference purposes during the interview.
• The forensic accountant should consider the timing of the interview in relation to the
extent of evidence gathered to date. Usually, it is best to gather as much documentary
and other evidence as possible before either confronting the suspect or suspects directly
or alerting those suspects by interviewing a parade of witnesses in a highly visible
manner.
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• The forensic accountant should consider all the physical aspects relating to the venue of
the interview—including the size, temperature and lighting of the room; the size and
positioning of the furniture within the room; and the seats to be occupied by those
attending the interview.
• The forensic accountant should be skilled at asking both open-ended and closed
questions, and should be able to distinguish when these kinds of questions would be
most effective.

• The forensic accountant must be able to differentiate between an inarticulate
explanation by a nervous individual and the evasive explanation offered by an
individual who does not want to have his or her actions or motives identified and
examined more closely.

• The forensic accountant must be able to control and direct the interview process to draw
out further evidence, often from hostile or adversarial interviewees. Effectively, the
forensic accountant applies his or her own knowledge of the human element to assist in
this process.
• The forensic accountant must be expert at taking good notes.

Private Investigators
It may also be necessary to engage private investigators to conduct surveillance of
suspected perpetrators, for example, to observe their activity and record their presence at
various locations and times, including meetings with certain individuals.
Forensic accountants who regularly work with private investigators as part of their team
should be consulted for a recommendation regarding how to use investigators effectively,
and whom to use.

Search and Seizure Mechanisms
In criminal matters, law enforcement agencies often obtain a search warrant to obtain
documentary evidence. The forensic accountant may assist them in specifying on the search
warrant those accounting, banking and other records that are to be seized as evidence of
fraudulent activity. Depending on the jurisdiction, the forensic accountant may also be
named on the warrant to attend its execution at the premises to be searched, in order to
help identify those documents that are to be seized as evidence.
In civil matters, depending on the jurisdiction, different search and seizure mechanisms
may also be available. The forensic accountant could provide assistance in obtaining
evidence through the use of a seizure order, granted pursuant to a court application. Under
the court’s supervision, an order would permit counsel to recover documentary evidence
from the other party. This evidence could otherwise have been destroyed or concealed.

Similarly if there is a concern that the assets of an individual under investigation may be
dissipated, an injunction may be obtained from a court. This injunction would prohibit the
individual under investigation from conducting his or her affairs in a manner that would
financially prejudice the other party in a case prior to the court rendering its decision.
The rules governing civil suits in most jurisdictions allow discovery proceedings, which
include answering either orally or in writing questions under oath and the production of
documents, or some equivalent process. During discovery, the forensic accountant can
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assist counsel in requesting documents to be produced by the other party and in
determining questions to be put to the witnesses for the other party.

The Role of Computers
Over the years, the role of computers in investigations has increased exponentially; for
example, the use of the Internet as a research tool and the development of faster, more
efficient software to assist in the investigative process.

Investigative software now includes many packages that are designed to assist the forensic
accountant, investigator or lawyer with his or her work. For instance, scanners can be used
to scan in huge volumes of paper evidence that can then be searched via keywords or
phrases and organized using a database for quick reference later in the case. Queries can be
generated in a matter of minutes, which search through databases of millions of
transactions, to identify the proverbial needles in the haystack. Similarly, specialized
software is now readily available for procurement fraud investigation and to recover file
fragments from personal computers.

The work product of the forensic accountant is also generated by computers and generally
includes a written report accompanied by various supporting information—for example,
document briefs, chronologies of events, accounting schedules (either summaries or
analytical schedules), graphs and charts.

9.2.3 Analyzing and Testing
During the analysis stage, the financial issues being investigated are evaluated in detail.
Appropriate conclusions are drawn, either in terms of a finding of fact (for example,
whether a particular transaction or event took place) or the resulting quantification of the
alleged fraud. If the investigation has been properly planned and appropriate evidence is
available and has been gathered, this step should go fairly smoothly.

The ultimate test of the evidence may come when the perpetrator is confronted with it. A
trained interviewer in possession of all the facts can often elicit an immediate confession
from an unprepared suspect. In many cases, the suspect is relieved that the matter is finally
over because he or she no longer has to endure the stress of covering up the fraud.
Of course, there are many cases that are not resolved as quickly, proceeding instead to
lengthy civil or criminal court challenges. The planning, evidence gathering, and analyzing
and testing phases of the investigation must yield a product that, in the end, can withstand
the court challenges.

9.2.4 Reporting and Testifying
The forensic accountant must be able to present his or her findings in a way that is
understandable, and must do so in an appropriate format. The American Institute of CPA
Practice Aids should be referred to when preparing the final report. In general, however, the
appropriate format might be one of the following:

• A reporting letter, for example, a communication to counsel outlining the scope of the
review and findings.
• An affidavit or deposition, that is, a sworn statement of findings with supporting
documentation.
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• A formal communication to the court, such as a report that sets out the forensic
accountant’s opinions and underlying findings, and that provides details as to how those
findings are substantiated.

Often the findings must be communicated through oral testimony in court. Once again, that
is why every phase of the investigation up to this point must be conducted with the legal
evidence standards in mind. Forensic accountants must be prepared for examination under
oath about all their activities. This examination can come at any time and in any form, for
example, as an affidavit, a deposition, or oral testimony at the actual trial. They must be
able to qualify as an expert witness based on their education, experience and knowledge.
Finally, they must be prepared to respond to cross-examination and to the submission of
different financial evidence and alternatives by the other side.
Keep in mind that conventional accounting evidence is only one part of a much larger pool
of evidentiary material, which includes one or more of the following:

• Testimony of witnesses.
• Police witness interview notes.

• Statements of claim.
• Statements of defense and counterclaim.
• Examinations or production of documents relating to a civil matter or search warrants.
Additionally, the forensic accountant may carry out research to identify any precedents that
may assist in reporting and presenting evidence.

Preparing and Presenting Accounting Evidence
Certain guidelines should be considered when preparing and presenting accounting
evidence. Although set out primarily from the point of view of the investigator or legal
counsel, forensic accountants (especially those who act as expert witnesses) should also be
aware of these guidelines, which include:
1. Make yourself fully aware of the evidence, or lack of it, from an accounting standpoint:
a. Be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the case based on the available
documents.
b. Be aware of any investigation that may be needed to complete the accounting
picture.
2. Thoroughly familiarize yourself with the final accounting picture as set out in the
accountant’s report, schedules, and document brief.
3. Decide what accounting evidence to call, if any.
4. Prepare evidence for the court:
a. Request that the accountant prepare the appropriate report, schedules, and document
brief.
b. Request that the accountant prepare appropriate visual or other aids.
c. Make available, as required by the rules of procedure, to the other side accounting
material including the report, schedules, and document brief.
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d. Accomplish the following at the meeting with the other side.

• Explain the accounting material.
• Ensure that there is an opportunity for explanation and production of documents
by the other side.
• Consider the admissibility of accounting material without formal proof.

5. Conduct a final pretrial witness interview of the accountant:

a. Ensure that all documentation is introduced as exhibits.
b. Confirm that the accounting schedules are properly cross-referenced to the document
brief.
c. Review the format of the examination of expert witnesses, including:
• Areas to be covered.
• Sequence of examination.
• Exact nature of opinion evidence, if any.
• Use of visual aids.
6. Make final preparations for tendering the accountant’s evidence in court:
a. Place exhibits in proper numerical order.
b. Index the accountant’s document brief with exhibit numbers.

c. Confirm the logistics of using visual aids.
d. Confirm the availability and legibility of copies of accounting schedules and visual
aids.
Qualifying as an Expert Witness
The simulated testimony reproduced below shows how a CPA’s qualifications as an expert
witness can be established.

Examination—of Mr. I.M. Sleuth, CPA by Jim Jones, Esq. (Prosecutor)

Q. Mr. Sleuth, where do you reside, sir?
A. I live in Bigtown, Megaplace.
Q. And what is your occupation?

A. I am a CPA and a Certified Fraud Examiner.
Q. And do you practice on your own or with someone else?

A. I practice in partnership with other CPAs under the firm name of Sleuth &
Company.
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Q. And how long have you been operating the accounting partnership?
A. Close to twenty-two years now.

Q. And prior to that were you associated with any other firm?
A. Yes, prior to that I worked for a period of six years with a national firm
following my graduation from school.

Q. And in what year did you qualify as a CPA?
A. In 1972.

Q. And since that date have you had occasion to testify in court with respect to
accounting matters?
A. I have.
Q. And approximately how many occasions would that have occurred on?

A. An estimate of some fifty occasions.
Mr. Jones:

Your Honor, I offer Mr. Sleuth as an expert witness on the basis of his
qualifications that I have elicited.

Mr. Green (Defense Counsel): No objection, Your Honor.

His Honor: Thank you.

Q. Mr. Sleuth, I understand that you have prepared a number of documents
relating to various transactions dealing with Acme Manufacturing?
A. Yes, I have.

Q. Mr. Sleuth, I show you a document, a rather large document, marked Exhibit A.
I would ask you to look at that document and tell me if you recognize it?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. And did you prepare that document yourself?
A. Yes, I did, with the assistance of staff under my direct supervision.

Q. And I wonder if you would hold it in such a way that the jury will be able to see
the structure of that document itself. It appears to consist of a number of
columns, vertical columns, am I correct?
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A. That’s correct.
Q. And the document is headed what?

A. It’s headed, Analysis ofSales for the Period August 1, 1998 to October 5, 1998.

Observing the Accountant Witness: A Positive Approach
The following list presents the ideal a CPA should, under the direction of legal counsel,
strive for when giving oral testimony.

• The answers given should be responsive to the questions and as brief as possible,
without losing sense.
• The statement of qualifications as an expert witness should be well outlined, factual, and
not overly laudatory.
• There should be no show of bias when describing the scope and purpose of the services.
• The accountant should indicate the source of all documentation and acknowledge that
all documents used to support his or her findings are currently before the court.
• The accountant should be prepared to consider new evidence provided it is relevant to
the case.
• The accountant should be specific about the time period covered and the dollar amount
of his or her findings.
• The accountant should be able to articulate the basis for his or her opinion in an
organized and logical fashion that is easy for the judge (and if it is a jury case, a lay jury),
to follow.
• The accountant should make good use of visual aids.
• The accountant should speak slowly and deliberately, leaving sufficient time for the
judge (and jury) to absorb his or her evidence.
• The accountant should periodically check that the judge (and jury) is following his or her
evidence.
• The accountant should direct his or her answers to the judge (and jury) rather than to the
lawyer conducting the examination or cross-examination.
• The accountant should make a clear presentation.
• The accountant should be certain that the terms of the engagement are well organized
and clearly set forth.
• The accountant should see to it that the accounting schedules are well referenced,
including the visual aids, and can easily be tied to the supporting documents.
• The accountant should be calm and collected.
• The accountant should demonstrate knowledge of the documents and the case, and an
understanding of the testimony of the other witnesses preceding him or her; that is, there
should be a positive demonstration and total commitment and understanding of the
matter before the court.
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The Accountant Witness—A Negative Approach: What Not to Do
The following list presents the negatives an accountant can exhibit when giving testimony:
• Confusion.
• Lack of preparation.
• Self-described expert (that is, self importance: impressed with himself or herself and his
or her credentials).
• The accountant demonstrates bias in the presentation and explanation of the scope and
purpose of his or her services.

• Failure to present findings or conclusions.
• Lack ready notes in his or her file.
• Findings convey no definite time period.
• Findings convey no definite dollar amount.
• Poor visual image.
• Poor posture.

• Incomplete supporting documents.
• Argumentative and belligerent.

• Openly nervous.
• Off-hand answers to questions.

9.2.5 Case Resolution
Fraud is a crisis for an organization and its employees. Good crisis management demands
that the investigative process not end with the reporting of findings or the giving of
testimony. Briefly, this means the victim organization should—

1. Seek or enforce restitution from the perpetrator (for example, seize any assets pursuant
to a court order).
2. Learn and adjust from the experience—in particular, ensure that controls are
implemented to prevent a recurrence.
3. Keep channels of communication open between the crisis survivors—that is, the
organization and its employees—to ensure the crisis does not damage their relationship
or impair the organization’s ability to function effectively and efficiently.

4. Implement regular, diligent monitoring and follow-up on the above points.
9.3 Forensic Accountants

Forensic accountants must possess a range of skills in order to carry out their investigations
in a professional manner. These skills include not only thorough accounting knowledge but
also knowledge of business and an awareness of the legal process. With these skills, the
forensic accountant can investigate, analyze, document, report on, and testify as to the
financial aspects of an investigation into a fraud or other so-called white-collar crimes.
In many instances, the forensic accountant may be requested to quantify the amount of a
fraud loss in a criminal matter or the financial damages in a civil matter. While a criminal

16

Chapter Nine: Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud

matter must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a civil matter must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. Both require a demonstration of similar techniques and
skills from the forensic accountant.

9.3.1 Professional Skills and Attributes
The seven major categories of a forensic accountant’s professional skills and attributes are:

1. Accounting and audit knowledge, including good business knowledge.
2. Fraud knowledge.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Law and rules of evidence knowledge.
Investigative mentality and critical skepticism.

Psychology and motivation awareness.
Communication skills.
Computers and information technology comprehension.

A closer inspection of each category follows.

Accounting and Audit Knowledge
Professional training in accounting and auditing provides not only accounting and audit
knowledge but also a practical understanding of business operations, business finance,
corporate structure, industry practices, and standards of conduct.

The majority of those who identify themselves as forensic accountants are CPAs. These
individuals have sought and found careers for themselves in an area that allows them to use
their skills as CPAs, together with other personal attributes that are necessary in
investigating business fraud and commercial crimes.

Audit skills are an important foundation for a forensic accountant. Due to the sensitivity of
the work involved, forensic accountants must be able to focus on the need for a 100 percent
substantive examination of all documentation related to a particular matter.
The accountant with good audit skills must have the ability to prepare and use complete
and accurate documentation; thus the accountant must know how to catalog the available
information. He or she must also be able to determine the other existing information
sources, which initially may not be available but which can, with research and diligence, be
uncovered, obtained, and utilized. With his or her accounting and audit skills, the
accountant can inquire about, locate and identify investigation-related documents—whether
they are present initially or obtained during the course of the investigation.
For most CPAs, audit experience includes both audit and nonaudit engagements covering a
wide cross-section of business enterprises and their operations, from small sole
proprietorships to large multinational corporations, both public and private. This familiarity
with business enterprise is an important element in the forensic accountant’s investigation
of business frauds and similar matters.

Fraud Knowledge
In addition to professional training in accounting and auditing, the most important aspect of
the forensic accountant skills mix is exposure to and knowledge of many different kinds of
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fraudulent transactions. This will allow the forensic accountant to identify red flags and to
piece together patterns and theories that may otherwise elude an accountant who has not
had the same degree of exposure to fraud.

Forensic accountants do not merely compute, they analyze. The analytical process is not an
easy one, as each case is unique and therefore calls upon the forensic accountant’s
experience, formal training, and other important attributes. Specifically, he or she must be
able to identify accounting problem areas, prioritize these problem areas or issues as
required, and refine or change the focus of the investigation as new information is obtained
and assessed. Often, an original theory may be only the beginning of an investigation, or it
may be refined to a specific issue warranting further review. In providing assistance to the
courts, this ability to properly focus the investigation is important.
The importance of experience cannot be overemphasized. The forensic accountant must
also be able to look beyond the form of the documentation, to understand its substance and
foundations, and to assess whether it is consistent with other business realities. The forensic
accountant must understand the nature of the documents that he or she is reviewing and
question their business reality. More than anything, a forensic accountant is distinguished
by having “been there before.” Knowledge of many different kinds of fraud, based on first
hand investigative experience, means a more effective plan of investigation, knowing when,
how, and who to interview as well as the format for communicating findings in reports to
clients and if necessary to the court.
Law and Rules of Evidence Knowledge
It is important for the forensic accountant to be knowledgeable about both criminal and
civil laws, since these laws have a direct impact on matters involving the forensic
accountant. Specifically, a forensic accountant must be able to understand both criminal
and other statutes that may have been contravened, in order to identify possible issues.
There is also a need to understand the rules of evidence to ensure that all findings are
admissible in court, if necessary. Specifically, investigative accountants must have an
understanding of the rules of evidence—for both civil and criminal matters—which consist
of:
•
•
•
•
•

What evidence is.
How it is obtained.
How it is preserved.
How it is presented before the courts.
How the forensic accountant’s own work can become part of the evidence brought
before the courts or before some other tribunal responsible for determining what has
occurred.

To provide accounting assistance in a matter involving fraud, the forensic accountant must
possess a general understanding of the issues by which the courts can judge an act to be
fraudulent. He or she must be knowledgeable as to the court’s tests for fraud—for example,
the presence of dishonest intent as seen in the perpetrator’s actions, or more particularly,
the mens rea or criminal intent of the perpetrator at the time the act occurred. He or she
must review and analyze accounting, banking, financial and other business records, and
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identify both specific acts and patterns of conduct that are suggestive of dishonest intent to
deprive a victim of an asset.

Investigative Mentality and Critical Skepticism
The forensic accountant must possess an investigative outlook, tenacity, and the ability to
identify indicators of fraud. Collectively, these attributes could be termed as the
investigative mentality. This mentality encourages the forensic accountant to seek substance
over form—to identify and analyze data and to conduct interviews to determine what has
actually occurred in a business transaction, rather than what simply appears to have
happened.

The investigative mentality is sometimes manifested by the smell test—the ability to assess
relevant transactions or events to determine their reasonableness and to the extent possible,
their veracity. In other words, in light of all the known facts, does a particular action appear
reasonable and logical? Is the action or pattern of behavior plausible in the circumstances,
or is there an odor that begs for further investigation?
The investigative mentality can also be thought of as professional, critical skepticism. It is
not a shotgun approach; rather, it is a specific and precise set of judgmental procedures
suitable for the circumstances that allows the forensic accountant to identify and assess all
relevant facts and develop hypotheses. These hypotheses can then be researched further
and tested more extensively as the investigation proceeds. The forensic accountant never
discounts any aspect of an investigation on face value: Only after examining all available
evidence and weighing its totality will he or she determine an item to be irrelevant to the
issues at hand.

Another analogy—that of the watchdog-bloodhound—further illustrates the forensic
accountant’s investigative mentality attribute. A CPA is more akin to a watchdog—he or
she looks for material misstatements in financial statements caused by error or fraud, but
will respond affirmatively if warning signs of fraud appear through audit procedures. The
forensic accountant, however, is more of a bloodhound—actively seeking out the presence
of evidence, all of which when viewed together may indicate the occurrence of a fraudulent
act.
While the investigative mentality requires a disciplined approach and a methodology, it
also requires creativity in being able to identify and seek out further sources of evidence
and to analyze this new information. Attention to detail is critical as the success or failure of
the case may depend on the identification of evidence that, on initial review, may appear
insignificant or irrelevant. The issues of materiality or sampling relevant in an audit
assignment do not restrict a forensic investigation. Those restrictions may cause fraudulent
acts to be overlooked, and they are inadequate in establishing evidence.

Psychology and Motivation Awareness
Another attribute of the forensic accountant is an understanding of the human element.
Documents do not commit fraud; computers do not commit fraud; rather, people commit
fraud. In assessing information, documentation and accounting records, one of the
seasonings that the forensic accountant can apply to the mix is his or her understanding of
individuals, including what motivates an individual to commit fraud and the attributes of an
individual who commits fraud. This understanding, together with the ability of the forensic
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accountant to examine information not just from an accounting viewpoint, but also within
the context of the overall picture or business reality, is important
In general, it can be said that individuals react to satisfy needs. The forensic accountant
must recognize the presence of such needs during his or her investigation, whether it is the
need of an employee for greater income to maintain an extravagant lifestyle or the need of
a sales manager to maintain sales volumes in a declining market so as to ensure his or her
continued employment. Such needs often provide the motivation for acts that an employee
may label differently but which are, in essence, fraud.
In a situation where an individual has both the need and the opportunity, a fraudulent act
may be the result.

Communication Skills

Forensic accountants, as expert witnesses to the court in findings of fact, must be able to
clearly and effectively communicate information. This means that they must be able to
communicate without bias in written form, including the use of accounting schedules,
charts, and exhibits. They must also be able to communicate to others the nature and extent
of the work undertaken and the findings that have evolved from that work so that it can be
understood both in a court of law and in other forums.

When the forensic accountant testifies as an expert witness in court, he or she must be able
to explain the procedures, analyses, and findings of the investigation in such a way that the
basis for his or her expert testimony—both facts and, if necessary, opinion—is understood
by the judge and, if there is one, the jury. The forensic accountant’s knowledge of the
available evidence and possible alternate explanations of the events must be as complete as
possible, to ensure that the findings are not compromised on cross-examination.
Understanding Computers and Information Technology

Today’s computers have replaced yesterday’s ledgers, and in fraud investigation it is
important to be as up-to-date as the alleged perpetrators of fraud. Thus, the skills of a
forensic accountant should include the ability to understand the opportunities computers
provide to potential perpetrators of fraud as well as the ability to use computers in analysis
and documentation of an alleged fraud.
Because succinct presentation to the judge and jury is so critical, knowledge of computer
graphics is also helpful. The forensic accountant’s findings often include quantitative
analyses that are conducive to presentation in the form of graphs and charts that depict and
summarize the information. Typical graphs and charts include summaries of the source and
use of funds, as well as flow charts showing the movement of assets at various times.

9.3.2 Ethics
Independence and Objectivity
Independence and objectivity are integral concepts in the ethical training of CPAs. While
the need for these attributes is well established in the audit area, they are extremely
important in investigative work. The forensic and investigative accountant is not an
advocate; rather, he or she provides the skills and input of an independent expert. Even a
bias with respect to a single, small matter—whether actual or perceived—may call into
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question in the eyes of the court other unbiased evidence presented by the forensic
accountant. He or she must therefore report objectively at all times.
Respect for Access to Information and Privacy Laws
One factor that must not be overlooked in the role of investigator is that the information
that is gathered must be collected in an ethical and legal manner. One cannot misrepresent
one’s self when gathering information, nor can the process of collecting information be
abused.
Most important, the rights of an individual whose activities are being reviewed must not be
abused.

9.3.3 Kinds of Services Offered
Proactive versus Reactive Services
Forensic accounting services can be proactive or reactive. Proactive services include
training on fraud awareness and fraud prevention measures, presented elsewhere in this
Handbook. Reactive services are investigative and analytical in nature and are rendered
after the event. Much of the information in this chapter addresses reactive services.
Civil versus Criminal Services
Another way to identify the kinds of services that a forensic accountant renders is to
consider the forum in which a dispute is finally resolved. For example:

• A criminal forum must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• A civil case has a less onerous burden of proof than a criminal case. The trier of the facts
must reach his or her conclusion based on the preponderance of the evidence.
• A nonjudicial tribunal, for instance, an alternative dispute resolution proceeding
(arbitration) can differ from a court of law by being either stricter or more lenient.
• Finally, if the circumstances are such that no reference is made to an outside tribunal,
but rather two parties are to resolve a matter on their own, then the level of proof
required is only what the other side will accept.

Other Categorizations
Services of a forensic accountant can also be categorized in other ways, for example by the
type of procedures performed. These procedures can include—
• Performing an initial review of documentation to determine whether further research or
investigation is required or necessary.
• Providing an affidavit or deposition outlining the results of a review of documentation.
• Providing a report identifying the scope of the work performed and findings.
• Assisting counsel in obtaining a search warrant (that is, in a criminal case).
• Providing expert testimony in court.

The nature of the industry in which a forensic accountant is performing an investigation can
be another method of classification. For example:
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• Service industries could include transportation, banking, securities brokerage, retail, real
estate, construction, professional services (such as services of CPAs and lawyers),
mortgage brokerage, and telecommunications.
• Manufacturing industries could include construction, farming, food processing, all forms
of manufacturing, mining, petroleum, and publishing.

The above classifications could then be further refined, and others added. For example,
government and nonprofit sectors are other areas where forensic accountants are called
upon to provide their services.

9.4 Checklist: Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud
CPAs can use the following checklist when dealing with a known or suspected fraud in their
organizations or in those of their clients. No answers may require investigation and follow-up,
the results of which should be documented. Use the
column to cross-reference the
checklist to the appropriate work papers.

The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If fraud is of vital
concern to an organization or if serious fraud is suspected, seek the advice of legal counsel and
a CPA experienced in fraud investigation.
Table 9.1 Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud Checklist
Dealing With a Known or Suspected
Fraud Checklist

1. Planning

a. Has the main scenario of the fraud been established, including
the sources of information pointing to fraud (that is,
accounting irregularities, physical evidence, or incriminating
information)?

b. Have immediate areas of concern been identified, such as the
need to protect assets from further damage (for example, by
boosting security) and to preserve key evidence for further
investigation (e.g., by removing the key suspect from the
scene, through a leave of absence or other appropriate
means)?
c. Have legal and other constraints been identified, (that is, the
provisions of any collective bargaining agreement) and has
legal counsel been consulted?
d. Has a preliminary assessment been made to determine:

• The quality of the information currently available
• Additional information that is needed

• How to obtain the information
e. Have the nature and scope of the investigation been defined,
including:
___________________
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected
Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• The main objective(s)
• Whether (and when) to pursue criminal charges

• The level of secrecy required

• Administrative matters (for example, engagement letters; or
if external forensic accountants are used, budgets)
2. Evidence Gathering

a. Has a detailed list been prepared of the evidence that is to be
obtained or seized?
b. Have all sources of evidence been considered (for example,
books and records, documents, correspondence, public
domain information, background financial information and
personnel history, etc.)?

c. When evidence is obtained, is it assessed for:

• Relevance
• Alternative interpretations (for example, simple error)
• Eventual use and admissibility (for example, as court
evidence)

d. Are proper evidence-handling procedures in effect, (for
example, taking photocopies; not writing on, altering, stapling
or unstapling originals)?

e. Especially for larger investigations, has evidence been
categorized in a way that will facilitate its future retrieval and
use?
f. Has the nature, timing and scope of any interviews (especially
of suspects) been carefully considered?

g. Are interviews conducted by or with trained and experienced
interviewers, with appropriate safeguards to prevent bogus
harassment or other charges (for example, safeguards could
include leaving the door ajar during interviews and having
assistants interrupt at predetermined times)?
h. When appropriate, has the use of reputable private
investigators been considered?

i. For any evidence to be seized, does the search warrant or
court order have the proper scope so that all of the required
evidence falls within its reach?
(continued)
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected
Fraud Checklist

j. Especially for larger investigations, have computer databases
and other appropriate tools been used to store and cross
reference evidentiary materials?
k. Has security over all evidence been established, including, if
appropriate, off-site storage of copies (electronic, paper, or
both) for key evidence and documents?

3. Analyzing and Testing
a. Has all evidence been systematically analyzed?

b. Were appropriate conclusions drawn?
c. Has the evidence been thoroughly checked and tested and
reviewed with legal counsel to ensure it is up to court
standards?

4. Reporting and Testifying
a. Has a forensic accountant prepared a well-organized,
unambiguous report, summarizing the findings of the
investigation?
b. Has the report undergone a quality-control review?
c. Has adequate preparation been done for testifying in court,
including a full run-through?
d. Is the person giving the testimony experienced, and if
necessary, has he or she previously qualified as an expert?

e. For expert witnesses, have fairness and impartiality, and the
appearance of such, been present throughout the process (for
example availability to both sides)?
5. Case Resolution

a. Has a plan and process been put into effect to seek and
enforce restitution from perpetrators?

b. Have controls and procedures been put into place to prevent a
recurrence?
c. Have channels of communication been kept open and other
appropriate steps taken to maintain good employee relations
and mitigate any other adverse effects of the crisis?
d. Has a program been established to monitor the results of the
above on an ongoing basis? __________________________
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Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

1

Construction
1.1 Introduction
The construction sector includes entities conducting the following kinds of operations:
• Residential and commercial building construction
• Construction of roads, bridges and similar public works
• Residential and commercial renovations
• Installation of plumbing, electrical and similar infrastructure

This sector is highly cyclical, and competition for work can be fierce. The competitive
pressure affecting construction firms, their employees, and sub-contractors can result in an
increased risk of fraud.

1.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:

• Contract bidding fraud (bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions and so on):
Competitive pressures can lead to collusion among bidders on a contract, thus exposing
the company to criminal prosecution. Alternatively, managers and employees who feel
they have little stake in the company may accept kickbacks or secret commissions from
either the company’s customers or its suppliers in exchange for under-the-table financial
consideration or preferential treatment.
• Materials substitution: Subcontractors may substitute materials of lower quality than
called for in the contract specifications, in order to (1) make a profit on contracts they
have underbid on, or (2) increase their profits. The company itself may also engage in
this practice, exposing itself to criminal prosecution or civil liability.
• Tax evasion (underground economy): Especially in residential construction and
renovations, companies may solicit or accept “cash-without-a-receipt” business, in order
to avoid sales taxes as well as reduce their income taxes.
• Employee misbehavior (theft, sabotage, and the like.): Depending on the nature of the
employee-employer relationship and the construction contract, some employees may
feel little loyalty to the projects they work on and have no inclination to complete work
on time. Line employees may steal materials or intentionally create time and cost
overruns to extend their own employment. As material and labor costs soar during the
construction phase, support personnel (for example, accounting or purchasing) may
concoct inventory or accounts payable schemes to defraud their employer or customers.

1.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the construction sector are described below.
• Corporate policies, particularly in the areas of employee relations and enforcement, are
key to establishing an environment that minimizes the risk of fraud. If both management
and lower-level employees feel they have a stake in the company and they also believe
that (1) they are being fairly treated, for example with respect to compensation, and (2)
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any employee will be severely dealt with for any breach of the law or the company’s
policies, then they are less likely to engage in fraud, commercial crime or destructive
acts.
• Physical access restrictions, for example with respect to construction materials and
supplies at the company’s premises and at work sites, will deter theft or sabotage.
• Supervisory performance and independent checks will help ensure that the company’s
work is up to contract standards and minimize the potential for materials substitution or
other quality problems.
• Adequate insurance is especially important in this sector.

1.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the construction sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Construction Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management—Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
construction sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])

• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, audit [especially
confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution (related controls include good
corporate policies and supervision)

• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, tax evasion, and violating
occupational health and safety laws (related controls
include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision] and strong internal, audit
functions)
• Other key risk management issues for this sector: insurance
(continued)
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Construction Sector Checklist (continued)
Construction Sector Checklist
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the construction
sector, and related controls, as set out on the attached grids,
been adequately addressed:

• Lapping frauds, such as accounts receivable lapping (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies, especially strict
enforcement)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Construction Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

Bid-rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

X

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like
Supplier fraud (for example, inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud

Commercial Crime:
X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X
X

False advertising

X

Insider trading
X

Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety laws

X

Violation of privacy

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Construction Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Construction Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Corporate Policies:

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)
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2 Financial Services

2.1 Introduction
The financial services sector includes entities such as:

• Banks, trust companies, and credit unions
• Insurance companies and insurance brokers
• Stock and other investment brokers

• Mutual and pension funds
The extremely high liquid asset values in this sector make it a prime target for fraud, from
both inside and outside. Indeed, Willie Sutton, the infamous bank robber, probably
summed it up best when he was asked why he robbed banks. He responded: “Because
that’s where the money is, stupid!”

2.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Employee frauds, typically involving cash or accounts receivable. These range from
outright theft or skimming of cash to the setting up of phony customer accounts. For
example, some of the largest bank frauds have involved loan managers who set up
phony borrowers and diverted the loan proceeds to their own benefit.

• Frauds by customers: Banks are vulnerable to schemes such as check kiting, credit card
fraud, or phony loan security. Insurance companies are particularly vulnerable to fake
or inflated loss claims by their policy holders.
• Con artists see this sector as having deep pockets and frequently target it with a wide
variety of schemes, both direct and indirect. A direct example is a scheme-in which a
manager is approached with an elaborate, seemingly irresistible quick-profit
opportunity. The catch is that he or she must put up a large amount of cash for a short
period. An indirect example is the bank inspector fraud in which a bank’s elderly customer
is persuaded by the con artist to help in the investigation of a teller. The catch is that the
customer must withdraw a large amount of his or her savings.
• Computer-related fraud, since this sector tends to be heavily automated.
• Commercial crime involving breach of trust (for example, a stock broker or money
manager absconding with a client’s funds, or churning a customer’s account with a series
of unauthorized transactions in order to increase commissions), money laundering, or
invasion of privacy.

2.3 Key Preventive Controls
Because of the large asset values at stake, there are many key fraud prevention controls in
the financial services sector including:
• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong physical access controls.
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• Testing and screening of employees prior to hiring. At a minimum this should include
checking all references, including education and work history. Some organizations in
this sector go even farther, especially for more sensitive positions. This could include
more extensive background checks, psychological testing, and even drug testing.
• Mandatory annual vacations. Ongoing schemes are common in this sector. These
schemes often fall apart or are easily detected when the perpetrator is removed from the
scene for even a few weeks.
• Prohibition of management override of basic controls. There have been many instances
of branch managers in this sector who were able to circumvent or override basic
controls, enabling them to perpetrate extremely large frauds sometimes running in the
millions of dollars.
• Good computer security including access restrictions, disaster recovery contingencies,
and control over software and program development.
• Supervisory controls including a well-defined review and approval process, test-checking
and monitoring of employee performance, and thorough follow-up of any exceptions or
customer complaints.
• A strong internal audit function, and periodic external audits.

2.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the financial services sector follows, along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.
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Financial Services Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the financial
services sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

• Customer and other outsider frauds, such as false loan
applications, con schemes, and the like (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, good corporate policies, and strong internal
audit function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust, money laundering, and violation of privacy (related
controls include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision] and strong internal audit
functions and periodic external audits

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Financial Services Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (sabotage, espionage, and the like)

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (theft of funds, misuse of information,and the like)

X
X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

False advertising

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

X

Violating occupational health and safety laws
Violation of privacy
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Financial Services Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Financial Services Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like
Mandatory annual vacations

X
X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

Prohibition of management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Internal-Audit Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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3 Government

3.1 Introduction
The government sector includes:
• Federal, state, and municipal governments.
• Government agencies and government-owned corporations.
• Organizations that receive most of their funding from government sources. For example,
depending on the jurisdiction, this could include public elementary and secondary school
systems; institutions of higher education (for example state university systems and local
community colleges); municipal and state hospitals; and local ambulance services and
volunteer fire departments.

Because of its tremendous size and the large budgets involved, this sector is especially
prone to supplier and accounts payable frauds.

3.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Theft or diversion of government-owned inventory, for example office supplies.
• Accounts payable schemes by managers or employees, involving phony suppliers,
inflated invoices, and so on.
• Overstated expense accounts.
• Acceptance of bribes (kickbacks, secret commissions) in exchange for contract approvals
or inflated price approvals.
• Frauds by suppliers (overbilling, double-billing, product substitution, and so on).
• Computer-related fraud.
• Money laundering, for example, through government-run lotteries or pari-mutual
betting facilities; bribe giving, for example through government-owned corporations or
agencies seeking foreign sales.
• Violation of privacy, because of the extensive records on individuals kept by this sector.
Tax evasion is obviously also a major problem in this sector, with the perpetrator in this
case being the taxpayer.

3.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the government sector include:

• Strong enforcement, that is, ensuring that employees are severely dealt with for any
breach of either the law or the government’s policies.
• Good employee relations. This is especially important because of the large number of
employees in this sector and the very high percentage who are unionized. Poor handling
of this area can lead to a very antagonistic employer-employee relationship, which can
not only lower productivity but also increase the risk of fraud, sabotage, and other illegal
acts by some employees.
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• Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, including appropriate segregation of
duties. For example, the responsibility for each step in the accounts payable cycle (such
as contracts, requisition, purchase order, receiving, accounts payable, check preparation)
should ideally be segregated to minimize the otherwise high potential for fraud in this
cycle.

• Good computer security including access restrictions, disaster recovery contingencies,
and control over software and program development. This is important not only to
ensure smooth operations, but also to avoid breaches of confidentiality, or the misuse of
information, or both.
• Supervisory controls including a well-defined review and approval process.
• A strong internal audit function.

3.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the government sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Government Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
government sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees, and expense report fraud
(related controls include job descriptions and segregation of
duties, audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good management policies [especially
strict enforcement])

• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good management
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good management policies and
supervision)
• Commercial crime by or against the government, including
money laundering (for example, for government-run
lotteries and pari-mutual betting operations), tax evasion,
and violation of privacy (related controls include good
management policies [especially strict enforcement and
supervision], and strong internal audit functions [especially
internal audit])
(continued)
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Government Sector Checklist (continued)
Government Sector Checklist

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the government
sector, and related controls, as set out on the attached grids,
been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good management policies [especially
strict enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees or others (related
controls include physical access restrictions, and good
management policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Government Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by managers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:
X

Theft, false instruments or claims, and the like
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X
X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like.

Use of Computers in Fraud

X

Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (theft of funds, misuse of information, and the like)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

Money laundering (for example, lotteries and pari-mutual betting
operations)

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion (that is, where the taxpayer is the perpetrator)

X
X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy

X

Government Policies:
X

Mission statement and code of ethics

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Government Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Government Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts payable
variance)

X

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

X

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

Supervisory review and approval
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)
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4 High Technology

4.1 Introduction
The high technology sector includes activities such as:
• Computer hardware and software development
• Biotechnology
• Defense and aerospace
• Other leading-edge scientific or industrial research and development
The common denominator in this sector is high research and development expenditures.
The sector is not necessarily defined by the business entity alone. For example, the auto
industry would be considered manufacturing in the conventional sense, but certain areas
might be considered high-tech (for example, development of better vehicles powered by
electricity, related battery technology, and so on).
In terms of its vulnerability to fraud, this sector also shares some similarities with the media
and communications sector (section 6).

4.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Theft or diversion of inventory, for example small items, such as computer chips, with a
high per-unit dollar value.
• Frauds by officers or directors such as fraudulent financial reporting, stock touting, and
manipulation of share prices, insider trading, and other antitrust violations, or
organizational bribe giving as part of the contract bidding process.
• Sabotage and espionage, both from inside and outside the organization.
• Con artists who may approach this sector with schemes requiring the payment of
advances or upfront seed money, but then disappear or never deliver on their end of the
contract.

• Copyright and patent infringement, which can be a problem for many parts of this
sector.

4.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the high technology sector include:
• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach. Management example is also
important.
• Strong enforcement, for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt
with for any transgressions, such as antitrust violations (by both the company and society
generally), and prosecuting copyright and patent infringers to the fullest extent of the
law.
• Employee testing and screening.

21

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
• Good computer controls, including physical and computer access controls to protect the
company’s assets and trade secrets, disaster recovery contingencies and control over
software and program development.
• Keen supervisor awareness of fraud and the possibility of fraud. While important in all
industries, the high technology industry may be particularly vulnerable to supervisor
complacency in this area because (1) there tends to be a very high focus on the product
or technology, possibly to the exclusion of other management concerns, and (2)
employees tend to be highly educated and skilled, possibly strengthening the erroneous
bias that such employees are incapable of fraud.

4.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the high technology sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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High Technology Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the high
technology sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion of computer
chips (related controls include physical access restrictions
and surveillance, periodic and surprise counts, job
descriptions and segregation of duties, supervision, and
good corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like, (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal
audit function)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies particularly at the hiring stage)

• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Commercial crime by or against the organization, including
patent infringement, antitrust violations, and organizational
bribe giving (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement and supervision],
strong internal audit functions, and periodic outside audits)

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the high technology
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
(continued)
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High Technology Sector Checklist (continued)
High Technology Sector Checklist

• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, strong internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

24

Yes

No

NA

Ref

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

Fraud Vulnerability Grid
High Technology Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Interned Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (for example, front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers, or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (theft or diversion of computer chips)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (for example, inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud

X

Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading and antitrust violations

X

Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving

X
X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

Violation of privacy

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—High Technology Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
High Technology Sector

High

Avg

Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud
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X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft.)

X

Low
or NA
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5 Manufacturing

5 . 1 Introduction
The manufacturing sector contains numerous varieties of businesses. A few of the major
segments include:

• Auto and auto parts manufacturing

• Clothing and textile industries
• Production of other consumer goods (ranging from durable goods, such as televisions,
washing machines, and furniture to everyday items such as soap and garbage bags)
• Food processing and packaging

This sector is fairly average in its overall susceptibility to fraud.

5.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:

• Employee frauds, typically involving inventory, accounts payable, or payroll. These
frauds are sometimes carried out in collusion with outsiders.
• Supplier frauds such as overbilling or materials substitution.
• Some forms of commercial crime, such as environmental crime, or violation of
occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws, or both.

5.3 Key Preventive Controls
The manufacturing sector is fairly average across the board in terms of the importance of
specific controls.

The best defense against the potential for inventory, accounts payable, and payroll frauds is
a good segregation of duties and regular accounting reconciliations. Included in the latter
should be periodic inventory counts for comparison with the perpetual records. Consistent
unexplained shortages in raw materials, for example, may indicate the presence of fraud.

5.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the manufacturing sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Manufacturing Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
manufacturing sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, periodic external
audits [especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime and violating occupational health and
safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement],
supervision, and strong internal audit functions)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the manufacturing
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions, [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
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Manufacturing Sector Checklist (continued)
Manufacturing Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
etc. (related controls include good corporate policies
[especially strong enforcement, and strong internal audit
functions])

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Manufacturing Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

X

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

X

False advertising
Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X
X

Organizational bribe giving
X

Tax evasion

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
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Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Manufacturing Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Manufacturing Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

X

Mandatory annual vacations

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable, and inventory)

X

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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6 Media and Communications

6.1 Introduction
The media and communications sector includes:
• Book publishing
• Print and broadcast media
• Music and motion picture industries
• Telephone, cable, and satellite industries

Although certain parts of this sector are in decline (for example, newspaper and fiction
book publishing), for the most part the sector has been characterized by very high growth,
especially over the last two decades. As is the case with the high technology sector, the
growth and the glamorous nature of some parts of the media and communications sector
contribute to the risk of fraud.

6.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Frauds by officers or directors, such as fraudulent financial reporting, manipulation of
share prices, insider trading, and antitrust violations.

• Frauds by customers. Some parts of this sector—for example, telephone and cable
companies-are vulnerable to equipment theft by customers.
• Con artists, who may approach this sector with schemes requiring the payment of
advances or up front seed money, but then disappear or never deliver on their end of the
contract.
• Copyright and patent infringement, which can be a problem for some parts of this
sector-for example, unauthorized decoder boxes in the cable industry.
• Violation of privacy. The nature of the sector can sometimes make this a problem,
although violations have to be weighed against other rights, such as freedom of the
press.

6.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the media and communications sector
include:
• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong enforcement—for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt
with for any antitrust violations (by both the company and society generally), and
prosecuting copyright and patent infringers to the fullest extent of the law.
• Physical access controls, such as credit screening of customers before allowing them to
walk off with leased company equipment.
• Good computer security, to protect against fraud and avoid breaches of confidentiality,
or the misuse of information, or both.
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• A strong internal audit function and periodic external audits. This should include
periodic direct confirmation of customer statement information.

6.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the media and communications sector follows
along with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in
that sector.

34

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

Media and Communications Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the media and
communications sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:

• Management fraud, such as making false financial
statements, inflating income, manipulating share prices,
insider trading, and the like (controls include good
corporate policies such as strong enforcement, and internal
audit functions)
• Customer and outsider frauds, such as theft of equipment,
copyright and patent infringement, con schemes, (related
controls include good corporate policies, supervision, and
enforcement)

• Commercial crime by the organization, including violation
of privacy (related controls include good corporate policies
[especially strict enforcement and supervision])
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the media and
communications sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
division of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
(continued)

35

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Media and Communications Sector Checklist (continued)
Media and Communications Sector Checklist

• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Media and Communications Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X
X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like
Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X
X

Employee sabotage or espionage
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading and antitrust violations

X
X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

Violation of privacy

X

Corporate Policies:

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Media and Communications Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Media and Communications Sector

High

Avg

Employee relations (fair compensation, counseling, and the like)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (locks, alarms, security), and the like

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X
X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (physical access, passwords, and the like)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (antivirus, full documentation, and the like)

X

Programmer controls (supervision, antisabotage, and the like)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)
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X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (fidelity, fire, liability, theft, and the like)

X

Low
or NA
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7 Nonprofit
7.1 Introduction
The nonprofit sector, for purposes of this section, consists primarily of charitable and
benevolent organizations. It excludes operations set out under the government sector
heading in section 3.
Except for cash theft and skimming, this sector is generally less prone to fraud from either
within or outside the organization. However, there are a number of commercial crime risks.

7.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:

• Employee or volunteer frauds, typically involving the theft or skimming of cash.
• Commercial crime involving such things as breach of trust (that is, cash theft or
skimming at the organizational level), con schemes in which funds received are not used
for the advertised purposes, and tax evasion by phony charities. Since this sector collects
large volumes of information in the form of mailing lists and other data about
contributors, there is also the potential for abuse of this information, invasion of privacy,
and so on.

7.3 Key Preventive Controls
Three key fraud prevention controls in the nonprofit sector are:

1. Strong enforcement, that is ensuring that employees are severely dealt with for any
breach of the law. This is important to send a deterrent message as well as to maintain
public faith and support in the organization.
2. Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, especially with respect to segregation and
duplication of duties. For example, the opening of mail should be carefully controlled
because it may contain cash. An appropriate system might be for two people to open
mail, one of whom records cash receipts in a log for later balancing against deposit slips,
charitable receipts issued, and so on.
3. Follow-up of contributor complaints (for example, no receipt received).

7.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the nonprofit sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.

39

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Nonprofit Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the nonprofit
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust, false advertising, tax evasion, and violation of privacy
(related controls include good corporate policies [especially
strict enforcement and supervision], and strong internal
audit functions)

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the nonprofit sector,
and related controls, as also set out on the attached grids, been
adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal and external
audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Nonprofit Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (lapping, phony customers or credits, and the like)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X
X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

X

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and so on

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X
X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

False advertising (perpetration of con schemes)

X
X

Insider trading
Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion (illegitimate charities)

X
X

Violating occupational health and (OSHA) safety laws

Violation of privacy

X

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Nonprofit Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Nonprofit Sector

High

Avg

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
X

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

X

Mandatory annual vacations

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, contributor complaints)

42

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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8 Professional Services

8.1 Introduction
The professional services sector includes:
• Accountants

• Architects and engineers

• Doctors, dentists, and other medical professionals
• Lawyers

The distinguishing characteristics of this sector are: (1) the form of the businesspartnership, professional corporation, limited liability company or-sole practitioner; and (2)
the professional-client relationship, as well as an element of public trust.
Because the management of the business is also generally in the hands of the ownership,
there is more at stake here in terms of fraud losses. Every dollar lost to fraud is a dollar out
of the professional’s pocket, and not merely a management embarrassment.

8.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Frauds involving accounts receivable, for example, accounts receivable lapping
schemes. Also, in partnership situations, some partners may commit fraud by
undertaking work directly, or billing clients directly, or both, rather than for the benefit
of the partnership as required in the partnership agreement.

• Inflated expense reports.
• Breach of trust such as theft of client funds.

8.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the professional services sector include:

• A strong code of ethics.
• Good basic controls such as (1) job descriptions, such as appropriate segregation of
duties, (2) mandatory annual vacations, (3) regular accounting reconciliations, and (4) no
management override of basic controls.
• Good computer controls especially in the area of access restrictions and disaster
recovery contingencies. This is important not only to ensure smooth operations, but also
to avoid breaches of confidentiality, or the misuse of information, or both.
• An awareness of the possibility of fraud, something that is absent among many
nonaccounting professionals. Doctors and lawyers, for example, are often unaware of
the issue because they are too preoccupied with the practice of their own profession.
Adequate insurance is also important, but more from a liability standpoint than in the areas
of theft or fidelity.
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8.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the professional services sector follows along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.
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Professional Services Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
professional services sector, and related controls, as also set
out on the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts receivable lapping (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, mandatory annual
vacations, regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of
exceptions [for example, relating to patient or client
complaints or confirmation discrepancies], and good
management policies [especially strict enforcement])

• Inflated expense report fraud (related controls include
internal audit and supervision)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust and money laundering (related controls include good
management policies [especially strict enforcement and
supervision], and strong internal audit function and periodic
external audits
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the professional
services sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good management policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good management policies and
supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)

45

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Professional Services Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, personal billings)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and so on

X

Manipulation of financial statements by the owning professionals

X

Manipulation of valuation of ownership interest by the owning
professionals

X
X

Employee sabotage or espionage

External Frauds:
Client or patient theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X
X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)
False advertising

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X
X

Violation of privacy
Professional Policies:
X

Mission statement and code of ethics
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Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

_____________ ............
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Professional Services Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Professional Services Sector

High

Avg

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Senior professionals acting as a good role models

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X
X

Patient or client account statements, or confirmations, or both

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Professionals’ awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Senior professional’s follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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9 RealEstate

9.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section, the real estate sector includes principals or agents conducting
the following kinds of operations:

• Buying and selling of commercial and residential real estate (land and buildings)
• Leasing or rental of commercial and residential real estate (land and buildings)

9.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Three key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
1. Employee frauds involving cash, accounts receivable, or the acceptance of secret
commissions.
2. Con schemes involving inflated real estate values, for example flipping a property
several times in nonarm’s-length transactions-each time increasing the price-in order to
ultimately induce an arm’s-length third-party to pay a fraudulently inflated price. A
variation of this is when the fraudulently inflated price is used to obtain an inflated
mortgage or loan on the property.
3. False advertising or representation concerning the property being sold, leased, or rented.

9.3 Key Preventive Controls
This sector is quite average in terms of the importance of specific controls.

Some of the best defenses against fraud in this sector include:
• Strong enforcement, (for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt
with for any violations of law or the company’s policies).
• Adequate segregation of duties (for example, between cash handling and record
keeping).
• Good supervisory and audit-investigative controls (for example independent checks to
ensure that purported real estate values make sense).

9.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the real estate sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Real Estate Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the real estate
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

• Outsider frauds, such as con schemes (related controls
include good corporate policies and supervision)
• False advertising and representation, (related controls
include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision], and strong internal audit
functions and periodic external audits
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the real estate
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, and the like (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strong enforcement], and
strong internal audit functions)
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Real Estate Sector Checklist (continued)
Real Estate Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust, environmental crime, money laundering, tax evasion,
and violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
(related controls include good corporate policies [especially
strict enforcement and supervision], and strong internal
audit functions
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Real Estate Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising or representation

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy
Corporate Policies:

X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Real Estate Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Real Estate Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X
X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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10 Recreation

10.1 Introduction
The recreation sector includes operations such as:
• Amusement parks

• Movie theaters
• Professional sports clubs
• Golf, tennis, and similar sport or recreation clubs

10.2 Key Vulnerabilities
With one major exception, this sector actually has a relatively low vulnerability to fraud.
Unfortunately, the exception involves a very important asset: cash. However, controls over
cash tend to be well developed in most of these businesses, so that in practice the main risk
is outright theft of cash rather than fraud.

Because of the seasonal and part-time nature of much of the employment in this sector, the
opportunity for payroll-related fraud may also be slightly higher.

10.3 Key Preventive Controls
The key fraud prevention control in this sector is good cash control. This includes good
physical controls (for example, cash register-ticket dispensing systems with accompanying
counters, all of which provide an audit trail), segregation of duties for cash handling and
record-keeping, and accounting reconciliations.
Other important controls are: (1) a termination-prosecution policy for the commission of
fraud or theft, and (2) a good internal audit function.

10.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the recreation sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Recreation Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the recreation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft and cash
skimming (related controls include admission counters,
physical controls and surveillance, supervision, and good
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Payroll fraud [for example, ghost employees], (related
controls include strong internal audit and supervision)

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the recreation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable fraud, such as phony suppliers (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
internal audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)

• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering,
tax evasion, violating occupational health and safety
(OSHA) laws, and violation of privacy (related controls
include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision], and strong internal audit
function and periodic external audits
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Recreation Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X
X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X
X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving
X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Recreation Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Recreation Sector

High

Avg

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X
X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls
Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)
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X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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11

Natural Resources

11.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section the natural resource sector primarily includes entities
conducting mining, and oil and gas operations.

11.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector are:
• Inventory, accounts payable, payroll, and expense report frauds. Because of the largeproject nature of the resource sector, companies can be particularly vulnerable to these
types of frauds.
• Frauds-by senior managers, officers, or directors-such as bid rigging, kickbacks, or
secret commissions; fraudulent financial reporting, stock touting and manipulation of
share prices; insider trading and antitrust violations; or organizational bribe giving as
part of the contract bidding process. Just as in the high technology sector, many stockrelated frauds involve mining companies.
• Supplier frauds involving inflated prices, product substitution, or substandard materials.
• Commercial crime in the areas of environmental crime and the violation of occupational
health and safety (OSHA) laws.

11.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the more important controls in the resource sector include:

• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong physical controls, particularly with respect to the company’s precious inventory.
• Supervisor awareness of fraud and the possibility of fraud.
• A strong internal audit function, and periodic external audits.

11.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the natural resources sector follows, along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.
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Natural Resources Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the natural
resources sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal
audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies particularly at the hiring stage)
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)

• Environmental crime, and violating occupational health
and safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement and
supervision], and strong internal audit functions)
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Natural Resources Sector Checklist (continued)
Natural Resources Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the natural
resources sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and accounts receivable lapping frauds (related
controls include job descriptions, division of duties, annual
vacations, regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of
exceptions, [for example, relating to customer complaints
or confirmation discrepancies], and good corporate policies
[especially strict enforcement])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
division of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Natural Resources Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud

Commercial Crime:
X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

X

False advertising
Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy
Corporate Policies:

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Natural Resources Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Natural Resources Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (especially inventory)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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12 Retail

12.1 Introduction
The retail sector is one of the largest and its diversity precludes a comprehensive list of its
elements. Any operation that caters to the consumer, from department stores to specialty
retail stores (clothing, hardware, and so on), fits this category.
Outright theft rather than fraud is the key threat to the retail sector. Just as the insurance
sector is very conscious of the cost of fraud to its industry, the retail sector is very conscious
of the cost of theft. Both industries regularly research and publish estimates of the extent of
fraud and theft in their industries, which is substantial.

12.2 Key Vulnerabilities
As noted, the key vulnerability in this sector stems not so much from fraud as it does from
theft by the industry’s employees and its customers, perhaps in equal measure although
shoplifting by customers receives by far the greatest amount of publicity.
Major fraud risks can involve cash, accounts receivable, and inventory, because all of these
are important to the industry. Outright theft of cash and especially inventory-by both
customers and employees—receives the largest amount of attention, and it is undeniably the
biggest in terms of losses. However, the fraud risks in other areas should not be ignored.

The heavily computerized nature of the industry, even among smaller retailers, means that
the opportunity to use computers in fraud is also increased.
On the commercial crime side, false advertising is a major problem in the industry, even
among some large retailers who have been charged and convicted of it. Tax evasion can
also be a problem, but mainly among smaller retailers who make cash-only deals to avoid
sales and excise taxes.

12.3 Key Preventive Controls
Among retailers of any significant size—for Mom and Pop stores, see section 13, Small
Business-virtually all the basic and computer controls are critical. Obviously, good physical
security—especially control over cash and inventory—are the most important. These controls
range from good point of sale and cash register systems that provide a proper audit trail, to
security surveillance systems that dissuade thieves.
Other important controls are: (1) a termination-prosecution policy for the commission of
fraud or theft, (2) supervisory follow-up on all customer complaints, and (3) a good internal
audit function.

12.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the retail sector follows, along with related
grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.

65

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Retail Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the retail
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies especially strict
enforcement)
• Inventory fraud, such as customer or employee theft or
diversion (related controls include physical access
restrictions and surveillance, periodic and surprise counts,
job descriptions and segregation of duties, supervision, and
good corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)

• False advertising and tax evasion (related controls include
good corporate policies, strict enforcement, and internal
audit functions)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the retail sector, and
related controls, as also set out on the attached grids, been
adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
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Retail Sector Checklist (continued)
Retail Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, and the like (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strong enforcement], and
strong internal audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Retail Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions (to buyers)

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

Use of Computers in Fraud

X
X

Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

False advertising

X
X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X
X

Organizational bribe giving

Tax evasion

X

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—retail sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Retail Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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13

Small Business

13.1 Introduction
The small business sector cuts across a large number of the other sectors. While there is no
arbitrary dividing line, it is typically thought of as an owner-operated business with
relatively few employees.
As with the professional services sector, the management of the small business is also the
ownership. In that sense, there is more at stake here in terms of fraud losses. Once again,
every dollar lost to fraud is a dollar out of the small-business person’s own pocket, and not
merely a management embarrassment.

13.2 Key Vulnerabilities
By far the most important vulnerability to fraud in this sector is employee fraud involving
cash (for example, skimming) or accounts receivable (for example, lapping schemes).
Inventory-related frauds can also be a problem.

13.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the small business sector include:
• Enforcement (for example dismissal and prosecution for the commission of fraud by an
employee).
• Fair treatment of employees. In closely-held businesses, it is important that employees
not become alienated from the owner-manager, because that will only help establish a
motive for fraud.
• Good physical controls over cash and inventory.
• Regular accounting reconciliations.
• Good supervisory control is perhaps the most important preventive control. This
includes an awareness of the possibility of fraud, something that is absent among many
small-business owners who become preoccupied with other areas of the business.

• Adequate insurance.

13.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the small business sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Small Business Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the small
business sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good policies especially strict
enforcement)

• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good policies
[especially strict enforcement])
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the small business
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable fraud, such as phony suppliers, inflated
invoices, and the like (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, and especially
supervision)

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good policies [particularly at the hiring stage])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, and supervision)
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Small Business Sector Checklist (continued)
Small Business Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Commercial crime by the business, including breach of
trust, environmental crime, false advertising, money
laundering, tax evasion, and violating occupational health
and safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good
policies [especially strict enforcement and supervision])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Small Business Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by principals

X

Manipulation of business valuations by principals

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X
X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X
X

Insider trading
Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Mission statement and code of ethics
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Small Business Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Small Business Sector

Fair performance appraisal and review system

High

Avg

Low
or NA

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Principals acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No principal’s override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Principal’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Principal’s follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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14 Transportation

14.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section, the transportation sector includes:
• Trucking industry

• Railway and airline companies (both passenger and freight)

• Other passenger transportation systems (buses, subways, ferries, etc.)

14.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The most important vulnerability to fraud in this sector is in the billing and accounts
receivable area. Accounts receivable lapping schemes, for example, are a major risk
especially among smaller carriers. Cash frauds may also exist where payment by customers
is in cash.
Because of the competitiveness of the industry and the fact that much of it is contract-based,
there is also a higher risk of frauds involving bid rigging, kickbacks, and secret
commissions.

14.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the transportation sector include:
• Strong enforcement, including dismissal and prosecution of employees for fraud.

• Job descriptions with good segregation of duties.
• Reconciliations, especially bank and accounts receivable.
• Customer statements with supervisory follow-up on any related customer complaints or
exceptions.
• A good internal audit function and periodic external audits.

14.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the transportation sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Transportation Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
transportation sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies] and good corporate policies especially strict
enforcement)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the transportation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement and strong internal
audit functions])

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, and
the like (related controls include access restrictions, and
good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
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Transportation Sector Checklist (continued)
Transportation Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
segregation of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering,
tax evasion, and violating occupational health and safety
laws (related controls include good corporate policies, strict
enforcement, supervision, and strong internal audit
functions)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Transportation Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X
X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Transportation Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Transportation Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations
Accounting reconcihations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X
X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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15

Wholesale
15.1 Introduction
The wholesale sector basically consists of distributors and importers of just about any form
of merchandise. Typically, the sector is the bridge between the manufacturing and retail
sectors.

15.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Employee schemes involving any one or more of the following-accounts receivable,
inventory, or accounts payable-are probably the most common threats, as well as frauds by
suppliers, such as overbilling and product substitution.

15.3 Key Preventive Controls
Key controls include:

• Enforcement, including dismissal and prosecution for fraud.
• Strong physical access controls over assets, especially inventory.
• Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, including appropriate segregation of
duties.
• Mandatory annual vacations. Ongoing schemes are common in this sector. These
schemes often fall apart and are easily detected when the perpetrator is removed from
the scene for even a few weeks.
• Regular (that is, monthly) accounting reconciliations, including bank, accounts
receivable and accounts payable.
• Good computer security, especially access restrictions.
• Supervisory follow-up on exceptions and customer complaints.
• A strong internal audit function and periodic external audits.

15.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the wholesale sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Wholesale Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the wholesale
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, especially accounts
receivable lapping (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions
[for example, relating to customer complaints or
confirmation discrepancies], and good corporate policies
[especially strict enforcement])

• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable frauds, especially phony suppliers and
inflated invoices (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, internal audit [especially
confirmations], and supervision)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the transportation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal
audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, and
the like (related controls include access restrictions, and
good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring stage])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
segregation of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
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Wholesale Sector Checklist (continued)
Wholesale Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering,
tax evasion, and violating occupational health and safety
(OSHA) laws (related controls include good corporate
policies, strict enforcement, supervision, and strong internal
audit functions)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Wholesale Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid-rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X
X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X
X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud

Commercial Crime:
X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X
X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Wholesale Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Wholesale Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

X

Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

........

X
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Appendix B—
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82,
Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit

February 1997

Statement
on Auditing
Standards

82

Issued by the Auditing Standards Board

Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit
(Supersedes Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53, AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316; and amends AU sec. 110,
“Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor” and
AU sec. 230, “Due Care in the Performance of Work” of Statement
on Auditing Standards No. I, AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,
and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312.)
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Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit
*
(Supersedes Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53, AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316; and amends AU sec. 110, “Responsibilities and
Functions of the Independent Auditor” and AU sec. 230, “Due Care in the
Performance of Work” of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47,
AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312.)

Introduction
1. AU Section 110 of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1,
Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, as amended by this
Statement [appendix A] (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec.
110, “Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor”),
states that “The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial state
ments are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or
fraud.”*1 This Statement provides guidance to auditors in fulfilling that
responsibility, as it relates to fraud, in an audit of financial statements
conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
Specifically, this Statement—
• Describes fraud and its characteristics (see paragraphs 3 through 10).
• Requires the auditor to specifically assess the risk of material mis
statement due to fraud and provides categories of fraud risk factors
to be considered in the auditors assessment (see paragraphs 11
through 25).

◦All references to AU section 110 of SAS No. 1, AU section 230 of SAS No. 1, or to SAS
No. 47 “as amended by this Statement” reflect the amendments that appear in appen
dixes A, B, and C, respectively, in this Statement.
1 The auditors consideration of illegal acts and responsibility for detecting misstate
ments resulting from illegal acts is defined in SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts By Clients
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317). For those illegal acts that are
defined in that Statement as having a direct and material effect on the determination
of financial statement amounts, the auditors responsibility to detect misstatements
resulting from such illegal acts is the same as that for errors (see SAS No. 47, Audit
Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, as amended by this Statement [appen
dix C] [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312]) or fraud.
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•

Provides guidance on how the auditor responds to the results of the
assessment (see paragraphs 26 through 32).
Provides guidance on the evaluation of audit test results as they
relate to the risk of material misstatement due to fraud (see para
graphs 33 through 36).
Describes related documentation requirements (see paragraph 37).
Provides guidance regarding the auditors communication about
fraud to management, the audit committee, and others (see para
graphs 38 through 40).

•

•
•

2. While this Statement focuses on the auditors consideration of
fraud in an audit of financial statements, management is responsible for
the prevention and detection of fraud.2 That responsibility is described
in paragraph 3 of SAS No. 1, AU section 110, “Responsibilities and
Functions of the Independent Auditor,” as amended, which states,
“Management is responsible for adopting sound accounting policies and
for estabfishing and maintaining internal control that will, among other
things, record, process, summarize, and report transactions consistent
with management's assertions embodied in the financial statements.”

Description and Characteristics of Fraud
3. Although fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditors interest
specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement
of financial statements. The primary factor that distinguishes fraud from
error is whether the underlying action that results in the misstatement
in financial statements is intentional or unintentional.3 Two types of mis
statements are relevant to the auditors consideration of fraud in a
2 In its October 1987 report, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting, also known as the Treadway Commission, noted that “The responsibility for
reliable financial reporting resides first and foremost at the corporate level. Top man
agement—starting with the chief executive officer—sets the tone and establishes the
financial reporting environment. Therefore, reducing the risk of fraudulent financial
reporting must start with the reporting company.”
3 Intent is often difficult to determine, particularly in matters involving accounting
estimates and the application of accounting principles. For example, unreasonable
accounting estimates may be unintentional or may be the result of an intentional
attempt to misstate the financial statements. Although the auditor has no responsibil
ity to determine intent, the auditors responsibility to plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of mate
rial misstatement is relevant in either case.
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financial statement audit—misstatements arising from fraudulent finan
cial reporting and misstatements arising from misappropriation of
assets.4 These two types of misstatements are described in the following
paragraphs.

4. Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are
intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in
financial statements to deceive financial statement users. Fraudulent
financial reporting may involve acts such as the following:
• Manipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting records or
supporting documents from which financial statements are prepared
• Misrepresentation in, or intentional omission from, the financial
statements of events, transactions, or other significant information
• Intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating to
amounts, classification, manner of presentation, or disclosure
5. Misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets (sometimes
referred to as defalcation) involve the theft of an entity’s assets where
the effect of the theft causes the financial statements not to be pre
sented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.5
Misappropriation can be accomplished in various ways, including
embezzling receipts, stealing assets, or causing an entity to pay for goods
or services not received. Misappropriation of assets may be accompa
nied by false or misleading records or documents and may involve one
or more individuals among management, employees, or third parties.

6. Fraud frequently involves the following: (a) a pressure or an incen
tive to commit fraud and (b) a perceived opportunity to do so. Although
specific pressures and opportunities for fraudulent financial reporting
may differ from those for misappropriation of assets, these two condi
tions usually are present for both types of fraud. For example,
fraudulent financial reporting may be committed because management
is under pressure to achieve an unrealistic earnings target.

4 Unauthorized transactions also are relevant to the auditor when they could cause a
misstatement in financial statements. When such transactions are intentional and
result in material misstatement of the financial statements, they would fall into one of
the two types of fraud discussed in this Statement. Also see the guidance in SAS
No. 54.
5 Reference to generally accepted accounting principles includes, where applicable, a
comprehensive basis of accounting other than generally accepted accounting princi
ples as defined in SAS No. 62, Special Reports (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,
AU sec. 623), paragraph 4.
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Misappropriation of assets may be committed because the individuals
involved are living beyond their means. A perceived opportunity may
exist in either situation because an individual believes he or she could
circumvent internal control.
7. Fraud may be concealed through falsified documentation, includ
ing forgery. For example, management that engages in fraudulent
financial reporting might attempt to conceal misstatements by creating
fictitious invoices, while employees or management who misappropriate
cash might try to conceal their thefts by forging signatures or creating
invalid electronic approvals on disbursement authorizations. An audit
conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
rarely involves authentication of documentation, nor are auditors
trained as or expected to be experts in such authentication.

8. Fraud also may be concealed through collusion among manage
ment, employees, or third parties. For example, through collusion, false
evidence that control activities have been performed effectively may be
presented to the auditor. As another example, the auditor may receive a
false confirmation from a third party who is in collusion with manage
ment. Collusion may cause the auditor to believe that evidence is
persuasive when it is, in fact, false.
9. Although fraud usually is concealed, the presence of risk factors or
other conditions may alert the auditor to a possibility that fraud may
exist. For example, a document may be missing, a general ledger may be
out of balance, or an analytical relationship may not make sense.
However, these conditions may be the result of circumstances other
than fraud. Documents may have been legitimately lost; the general
ledger may be out of balance because of an unintentional accounting
error; and unexpected analytical relationships may be the result of
unrecognized changes in underlying economic factors. Even reports of
alleged fraud may not always be reliable, because an employee or out
sider may be mistaken or may be motivated to make a false allegation.

10. An auditor cannot obtain absolute assurance that material mis
statements in the financial statements will be detected. Because of (a)
the concealment aspects of fraudulent activity, including the fact that
fraud often involves collusion or falsified documentation, and (b) the
need to apply professional judgment in the identification and evaluation
of fraud risk factors and other conditions, even a properly planned and
performed audit may not detect a material misstatement resulting from
fraud. Accordingly, because of the above characteristics of fraud and the
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nature of audit evidence as discussed in AU section 230 of SAS No. 1,
as amended by this Statement [appendix B] (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the
Performance of Work”), the auditor is able to obtain only reasonable
assurance that material misstatements in the financial statements,
including misstatements resulting from fraud, are detected.

Assessment of the Risk of Material Misstatement
Due to Fraud
11. SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 311), provides guidance as to the level of
knowledge of the entity’s business that will enable the auditor to plan
and perform an audit of financial statements in accordance with gener
ally accepted auditing standards. SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and
Materiality in Conducting an Audit, as amended by this Statement
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312), provides that deter
mination of the scope of the auditing procedures is directly related to
the consideration of audit risk and indicates that the risk of material mis
statement of the financial statements due to fraud is part of audit risk.
12. The auditor should specifically assess the risk of material mis
statement of the financial statements due to fraud and should consider
that assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed. In
making this assessment, the auditor should consider fraud risk factors
that relate to both (a) misstatements arising from fraudulent financial
reporting and (b) misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets
in each of the related categories presented in paragraphs 16 and 18.6
While such risk factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud,

6 The auditor should assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud regardless of
whether the auditor otherwise plans to assess inherent or control risk at the maximum
(see paragraphs 29 and 30 of SAS No. 47, as amended by this Statement). An auditor
may meet this requirement using different categories of risk factors as long as the
assessment embodies the substance of each of the risk categories described in para
graphs 16 and 18. Also, since these risk categories encompass both inherent and
control risk attributes, the specific assessment of the risk of material misstatement due
to fraud may be performed in conjunction with the assessment of audit risk required
by SAS No. 47, paragraphs 13 through 33, as amended by this Statement, and SAS
(continued)
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they often have been observed in circumstances where frauds have
occurred.

13. As part of the risk assessment, the auditor also should inquire of
management (a) to obtain managements understanding regarding the
risk of fraud in the entity and (b) to determine whether they have knowl
edge of fraud that has been perpetrated on or within the entity.
Information from these inquiries could identify fraud risk factors that
may affect the auditors assessment and related response. Some exam
ples of matters that might be discussed as part of the inquiry are (a)
whether there are particular subsidiary locations, business segments,
types of transactions, account balances, or financial statement categories
where fraud risk factors exist or may be more likely to exist and (b) how
management may be addressing such risks.
14. Although the fraud risk factors described in paragraphs 17 and 19
below cover a broad range of situations typically faced by auditors, they
are only examples. Moreover, not all of these examples are relevant in
all circumstances, and some may be of greater or lesser significance in
entities of different size, with different ownership characteristics, in dif
ferent industries, or because of other differing characteristics or
circumstances. Accordingly, the auditor should use professional judg
ment when assessing the significance and relevance of fraud risk factors
and determining the appropriate audit response.
15. For example, in a small entity domination of management by a sin
gle individual generally does not, in and of itself, indicate a failure by
management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude regard
ing internal control and the financial reporting process. As another
example, there may be little motivation for fraudulent financial reporting
by management of a privately held business when the financial statements
audited are used only in connection with seasonal bank borrowings, debt
covenants are not especially burdensome, and the entity has a long history
of financial success consistent with the industry in which it operates.
Conversely, management of a small entity with unusually rapid growth or
profitability may be motivated to avoid an interruption in its growth
trends, especially compared with others in its industry.
No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), paragraphs 27
through 38. Furthermore, the assessment of audit risk may identify the presence of
additional fraud risk factors that the auditor should consider.
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Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent
Financial Reporting

16. Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from fraudulent
financial reporting may be grouped in the following three categories:
a. Managements characteristics and influence over the control envi
ronment. These pertain to managements abilities, pressures, style,
and attitude relating to internal control and the financial reporting
process.
b. Industry conditions. These involve the economic and regulatory
environment in which the entity operates.
c. Operating characteristics and financial stability. These pertain to
the nature and complexity of the entity and its transactions, the
entity’s financial condition, and its profitability.
17. The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstate
ments arising from fraudulent financial reporting for each of the three
categories described above:
a. Risk factors relating to managements characteristics and influence
over the control environment. Examples include —
• A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent financial
reporting. Specific indicators might include —
— A significant portion of management's compensation repre
sented by bonuses, stock options, or other incentives, the
value of which is contingent upon the entity achieving unduly
aggressive targets for operating results, financial position, or
cash flow.
— An excessive interest by management in maintaining or
increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings trend through
the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices.
— A practice by management of committing to analysts, credi
tors, and other third parties to achieve what appear to be
unduly aggressive or clearly unrealistic forecasts.
— An interest by management in pursuing inappropriate means
to minimize reported earnings for tax-motivated reasons.
• A failure by management to display and communicate an appro
priate attitude regarding internal control and the financial
reporting process. Specific indicators might include —
— An ineffective means of communicating and supporting the
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entity’s values or ethics, or communication of inappropriate
values or ethics.
— Domination of management by a single person or small
group without compensating controls such as effective over
sight by the board of directors or audit committee.
— Inadequate monitoring of significant controls.
— Management failing to correct known reportable conditions
on a timely basis.
— Management setting unduly aggressive financial targets and
expectations for operating personnel.
— Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory
authorities.
— Management continuing to employ an ineffective account
ing, information technology, or internal auditing staff.
• Nonfinancial managements excessive participation in, or preoc
cupation with, the selection of accounting principles or the
determination of significant estimates.
• High turnover of senior management, counsel, or board mem
bers.
• Strained relationship between management and the current or
predecessor auditor. Specific indicators might include —
— Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor
on accounting, auditing, or reporting matters.
— Unreasonable demands on the auditor including unreason
able time constraints regarding the completion of the audit
or the issuance of the auditors reports.
— Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappro
priately limit his or her access to people or information or his
or her ability to communicate effectively with the board of
directors or the audit committee.
— Domineering management behavior in dealing with the
auditor, especially involving attempts to influence the scope
of the auditor's work.
• Known history of securities law violations or claims against the
entity or its senior management alleging fraud or violations of
securities laws.
b. Risk factors relating to industry conditions. Examples include —
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• New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements that could
impair the financial stability or profitability of the entity.
• High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied
by declining margins.
• Declining industry with increasing business failures and signifi
cant declines in customer demand.
• Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnerability to
rapidly changing technology or rapid product obsolescence.
c. Risk factors relating to operating characteristics andfinancial stabil
ity. Examples include —
• Inability to generate cash flows from operations while reporting
earnings and earnings growth.
• Significant pressure to obtain additional capital necessary to stay
competitive considering the financial position of the entity—
including need for funds to finance major research and develop
ment or capital expenditures.
• Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant
estimates that involve unusually subjective judgments or uncer
tainties, or that are subject to potential significant change in the
near term in a manner that may have a financially disruptive effect
on the entity — such as ultimate collectibility of receivables, tim
ing of revenue recognition, realizability of financial instruments
based on the highly subjective valuation of collateral or difficultto-assess repayment sources, or significant deferral of costs.
• Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course
of business or with related entities not audited or audited by
another firm.
• Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially
those close to year end, that pose difficult “substance over form”
questions.
• Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in
tax-haven jurisdictions for which there appears to be no clear
business justification.
• Overly complex organizational structure involving numerous or
unusual legal entities, managerial lines of authority, or contrac
tual arrangements without apparent business purpose.
• Difficulty in determining the organization or individual(s) that
control(s) the entity.
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• Unusually rapid growth or profitability, especially compared with
that of other companies in the same industry.
• Especially high vulnerability to changes in interest rates.
• Unusually high dependence on debt or marginal ability to meet
debt repayment requirements; debt covenants that are difficult
to maintain.
• Unrealistically aggressive sales or profitability incentive pro
grams.
• Threat of imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure, or hostile
takeover.
• Adverse consequences on significant pending transactions, such
as a business combination or contract award, if poor financial
results are reported.
• Poor or deteriorating financial position when management has
personally guaranteed significant debts of the entity.

Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From
Misappropriation of Assets
18. Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappro
priation of assets may be grouped in the two categories below. The
extent of the auditor's consideration of the risk factors in category b is
influenced by the degree to which risk factors in category a are present.
a. Susceptibility of assets to misappropriation. These pertain to the
nature of an entity’s assets and the degree to which they are subject
to theft.
b. Controls. These involve the lack of controls designed to prevent or
detect misappropriations of assets.

19. The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstate
ments arising from misappropriation of assets for each of the two
categories described above:
a. Risk factors relating to susceptibility of assets to misappropriation
• Large amounts of cash on hand or processed
• Inventory characteristics, such as small size, high value, or high
demand
• Easily convertible assets, such as bearer bonds, diamonds, or
computer chips
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Fixed asset characteristics, such as small size, marketability, or
lack of ownership identification
b. Risk factors relating to controls
• Lack of appropriate management oversight (for example, inade
quate supervision or monitoring of remote locations)
• Lack ofjob applicant screening procedures relating to employees
with access to assets susceptible to misappropriation
• Inadequate recordkeeping with respect to assets susceptible to
misappropriation
• Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or independent checks
• Lack of appropriate system of authorization and approval of
transactions (for example, in purchasing)
• Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or
fixed assets
• Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for transactions
(for example, credits for merchandise returns)
• Lack of mandatory vacations for employees performing key
control functions
•

20. The auditor is not required to plan the audit to discover informa
tion that is indicative of financial stress of employees or adverse
relationships between the entity and its employees. Nevertheless, the
auditor may become aware of such information. Some examples of such
information include (a) anticipated future employee layoffs that are
known to the workforce, (b) employees with access to assets susceptible
to misappropriation who are known to be dissatisfied, (c) known unusual
changes in behavior or lifestyle of employees with access to assets sus
ceptible to misappropriation, and (d) known personal financial pressures
affecting employees with access to assets susceptible to misappropria
tion. If the auditor becomes aware of the existence of such information,
he or she should consider it in assessing the risk of material misstate
ment arising from misappropriation of assets.
Consideration of Risk Factors in Assessing the Risk of Material
Misstatement Due to Fraud

21. Fraud risk factors cannot easily be ranked in order of importance
or combined into effective predictive models. The significance of risk
factors varies widely. Some of these factors will be present in entities
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where the specific conditions do not present a risk of material misstate
ment. Accordingly, the auditor should exercise professional judgment
when considering risk factors individually or in combination and
whether there are specific controls that mitigate the risk. For example,
an entity may not screen newly hired employees having access to assets
susceptible to theft. This factor, by itself, might not significantly affect
the assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
However, if it were coupled with a lack of appropriate management
oversight and a lack of physical safeguards over such assets as readily
marketable inventory or fixed assets, the combined effect of these
related factors might be significant to that assessment.

22. The size, complexity, and ownership characteristics of the entity
have a significant influence on the consideration of relevant risk factors.
For example, in the case of a large entity, the auditor ordinarily would
consider factors that generally constrain improper conduct by senior
management, such as the effectiveness of the board of directors, the
audit committee or others with equivalent authority and responsibility,
and the internal audit function. The auditor also would consider what
steps had been taken to enforce a formal code of conduct and the effec
tiveness of the budgeting or reporting system. Furthermore, risk factors
evaluated at a country-specific or business segment operating level may
provide different insights than the evaluation at an entity-wide level.7 In
the case of a small entity, some or all of these considerations might be
inapplicable or less important. For example, a smaller entity might not
have a written code of conduct but, instead, develop a culture that
emphasizes the importance of integrity and ethical behavior through
oral communication and by management example.
23. SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of
Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), requires the auditor to obtain a suffi
cient understanding of the entity’s internal control over financial
reporting to plan the audit. It also notes that such knowledge should be
used to identify types of potential misstatements, consider factors that
affect the risk of material misstatement, and design substantive tests.
The understanding often will affect the auditor's consideration of the
significance of fraud risk factors. In addition, when considering the
7 SAS No. 47, paragraph 18, as amended by this Statement, provides guidance on the
auditors consideration of the extent to which auditing procedures should be per
formed at selected locations or components.
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significance of fraud risk factors, the auditor may wish to assess whether
there are specific controls that mitigate the risk or whether specific con
trol deficiencies may exacerbate the risk.8

24. If the entity has established a program that includes steps to pre
vent, deter, and detect fraud, the auditor may consider its effectiveness.
The auditor also should inquire of those persons overseeing such pro
grams as to whether the program has identified any fraud risk factors.
25. The assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud
is a cumulative process that includes a consideration of risk factors indi
vidually and in combination. In addition, fraud risk factors may be
identified while performing procedures relating to acceptance or con
tinuance of clients and engagements,9 during engagement planning or
while obtaining an understanding of an entity’s internal control, or while
conducting fieldwork.10 Also, other conditions may be identified during
fieldwork that change or support a judgment regarding the assess
ment— such as the following:
• Discrepancies in the accounting records, including —
— Transactions not recorded in a complete or timely manner or
improperly recorded as to amount, accounting period, classifi
cation, or entity policy.
— Unsupported or unauthorized balances or transactions.
— Last-minute adjustments by the entity that significantly affect
financial results.
• Conflicting or missing evidential matter, including —
— Missing documents.
— Unavailability of other than photocopied documents when
documents in original form are expected to exist.
— Significant unexplained items on reconciliations.
8 SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, paragraph 47, states that assessing control risk
at below the maximum level involves identifying specific controls that are likely to
prevent or detect material misstatements in those assertions, and performing tests of
controls to evaluate their effectiveness.
9 See Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 2, System of Quality Control for a
CPA Firm’s Accounting and Auditing Practice (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 2,
QC sec. 20), paragraphs 14 through 16.
10 The auditor also ordinarily obtains written representations from management con
cerning irregularities involving management and employees that could have a material
effect on the financial statements (see SAS No. 19, Client Representations [AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 333]).
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— Inconsistent, vague, or implausible responses from management
or employees arising from inquiries or analytical procedures.
— Unusual discrepancies between the entity’s records and confir
mation replies.
— Missing inventory or physical assets of significant magnitude.
Problematic or unusual relationships between the auditor and client,
including —
— Denied access to records, facilities, certain employees, cus
tomers, vendors, or others from whom audit evidence might
be sought.11
— Undue time pressures imposed by management to resolve com
plex or contentious issues.
— Unusual delays by the entity in providing requested information.
— Tips or complaints to the auditor about fraud.

The Auditors Response to the Results
of the Assessment
26. A risk of material misstatement due to fraud is always present to
some degree. The auditors response to the foregoing assessment is
influenced by the nature and significance of the risk factors identified as
being present. In some cases, even though fraud risk factors have been
identified as being present, the auditors judgment may be that audit
procedures otherwise planned are sufficient to respond to the risk fac
tors. In other circumstances, the auditor may conclude that the
conditions indicate a need to modify procedures.12 In these circum
stances, the auditor should consider whether the assessment of the risk
of material misstatement due to fraud calls for an overall response, one
11 Denial of access to information may constitute a limitation on the scope of the audit
that may require the auditor to consider qualifying or disclaiming an opinion on the
financial statements (see SAS No. 58, as amended, Reports on Audited Financial
Statements [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 508], paragraphs 22
through 32).
12 SAS No. 47, as amended by this Statement, requires the auditor to limit audit risk to
a low level that is, in the auditor’s professional judgment, appropriate for expressing an
opinion on the financial statements.
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that is specific to a particular account balance, class of transactions or
assertion, or both. The auditor also may conclude that it is not practica
ble to modify the procedures that are planned for the audit of the
financial statements sufficiently to address the risk. In that case with
drawal from the engagement with communication to the appropriate
parties may be an appropriate course of action (see paragraph 36).

Overall Considerations

27. Judgments about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud
may affect the audit in the following ways:
• Professional skepticism. Due professional care requires the auditor
to exercise professional skepticism — that is, an attitude that
includes a questioning mind and critical assessment of audit evi
dence (see SAS No. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in
the Performance of Work,” paragraphs 7 through 9, as amended by
this Statement). Some examples demonstrating the application of
professional skepticism in response to the auditor's assessment of the
risk of material misstatement due to fraud include (a) increased sen
sitivity in the selection of the nature and extent of documentation to
be examined in support of material transactions, and (b) increased
recognition of the need to corroborate management explanations or
representations concerning material matters — such as further
analytical procedures, examination of documentation, or discussion
with others within or outside the entity.
• Assignment of personnel. The knowledge, skill, and ability of per
sonnel assigned significant engagement responsibilities should be
commensurate with the auditors assessment of the level of risk of
the engagement (see SAS No. 1 [AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 210, “Training and Proficiency of the Independent
Auditor,” paragraph 3]). In addition, the extent of supervision should
recognize the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and the
qualifications of persons performing the work (see SAS No. 22, para
graph 11).
• Accounting principles and policies. The auditor may decide to con
sider further management's selection and application of significant
accounting policies, particularly those related to revenue recogni
tion, asset valuation, or capitalizing versus expensing. In this respect,
the auditor may have a greater concern about whether the account-
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ing principles selected and policies adopted are being applied in an
inappropriate manner to create a material misstatement of the finan
cial statements.
Controls. When a risk of material misstatement due to fraud relates
to risk factors that have control implications, the auditor's ability to
assess control risk below the maximum may be reduced. However,
this does not eliminate the need for the auditor to obtain an under
standing of the components of the entity’s internal control sufficient
to plan the audit (see SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78). In
fact, such an understanding may be of particular importance in fur
ther understanding and considering any controls (or lack thereof)
the entity has in place to address the identified fraud risk factors.
However, this consideration also would need to include an added
sensitivity to managements ability to override such controls.

28. The nature, timing, and extent of procedures may need to be
modified in the following ways:
• The nature of audit procedures performed may need to be changed
to obtain evidence that is more reliable or to obtain additional cor
roborative information. For example, more evidential matter maybe
needed from independent sources outside the entity. Also, physical
observation or inspection of certain assets may become more impor
tant. (See SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, as amended [AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 326], paragraphs 19 through
22.)
• The timing of substantive tests may need to be altered to be closer
to or at year end. For example, if there are unusual incentives for
management to engage in fraudulent financial reporting, the auditor
might conclude that substantive testing should be performed near or
at year end because it would not otherwise be possible to control the
incremental audit risk associated with that risk factor. (See SAS No.
45, Omnibus Statement on Auditing Standards—1983 [AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 313, “Substantive Tests Prior
to the Balance-Sheet Date”], paragraph 6.)
• The extent of the procedures applied should reflect the assessment
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. For example,
increased sample sizes or more extensive analytical procedures may
be appropriate. (See SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling [AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 350], paragraph 23, and SAS
No. 56, Analytical Procedures [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.
1, AU sec. 329].)
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Considerations at the Account Balance, Class of
Transactions, and Assertion Level

29. Specific responses to the auditor's assessment of the risk of mate
rial misstatement due to fraud will vary depending upon the types or
combinations of fraud risk factors or conditions identified and the
account balances, classes of transactions, and assertions they may affect.
If these factors or conditions indicate a particular risk applicable to spe
cific account balances or types of transactions, audit procedures
addressing these specific areas should be considered that will, in the
auditor's judgment, limit audit risk to an appropriate level in light of the
risk factors or conditions identified. The following are specific examples
of responses:
• Visit locations or perform certain tests on a surprise or unannounced
basis — for example, observing inventory at locations where auditor
attendance has not been previously announced or counting cash at a
particular date on a surprise basis.
• Request that inventories be counted at a date closer to year end.
• Alter the audit approach in the current year — for example, con
tacting major customers and suppliers orally in addition to written
confirmation, sending confirmation requests to a specific party
within an organization, or seeking more and different information.
• Perform a detailed review of the entity’s quarter-end or year-end
adjusting entries and investigate any that appear unusual as to
nature or amount.
• For significant and unusual transactions, particularly those occurring
at or near year end, investigate (a) the possibility of related parties
and (b) the sources of financial resources supporting the trans
actions.13
• Perform substantive analytical procedures at a detailed level. For
example, compare sales and cost of sales by location and line of
business to auditor-developed expectations.14
• Conduct interviews of personnel involved in areas in which a con13 SAS No. 45, Omnibus Statement on Auditing Standards—1983 (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 334, “Related Parties”), provides guidance with respect to
the identification of related-party relationships and transactions, including transac
tions that may be outside the ordinary course of business (see paragraph 6 of SAS No.
45).
14 SAS No. 56, Analytical Procedures (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec.
329) provides guidance on performing analytical procedures used as substantive tests.
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cern about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is present,
to obtain their insights about the risk and whether or how controls
address the risk.
When other independent auditors are auditing the financial state
ments of one or more subsidiaries, divisions, or branches, consider
discussing with them the extent of work necessary to be performed
to ensure that the risk of material misstatement due to fraud result
ing from transactions and activities among these components is
adequately addressed.
If the work of a specialist becomes particularly significant with
respect to its potential impact on the financial statements, perform
additional procedures with respect to some or all of the specialist's
assumptions, methods, or findings to determine that the findings are
not unreasonable or engage another specialist for that purpose. (See
SAS No. 73, Using the Work of a Specialist [AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 336], paragraph 12.)

Specific Responses — Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent
Financial Reporting
30. Some examples of responses to the auditors assessment of the
risk of material misstatements arising from fraudulent financial report
ing are —
• Revenue recognition. If there is a risk of material misstatement
due to fraud that may involve or result in improper revenue recog
nition, it may be appropriate to confirm with customers certain
relevant contract terms and the absence of side agreements — inas
much as the appropriate accounting is often influenced by such
terms or agreements.15 For example, acceptance criteria, delivery
15 SAS No. 67, The Confirmation Process (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 330), provides guidance about the confirmation process in audits performed in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Among other considerations,
that guidance discusses the types of respondents from whom confirmations may be
requested, and what the auditor should consider if information about the respondent’s
competence, knowledge, motivation, ability, or willingness to respond, or about the
respondents objectivity and freedom from bias with respect to the audited entity
comes to his or her attention (AU sec. 330.27). It also provides that the auditor main
tain control over the confirmation requests and responses in order to minimize the
possibility that the results will be biased because of interception and alteration of
the confirmation requests or responses (AU sec. 330.28). Further, when confirmation
responses are other than in written communications mailed to the auditor, additional
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and payment terms and the absence of future or continuing vendor
obligations, the right to return the product, guaranteed resale
amounts, and cancellation or refund provisions often are relevant in
such circumstances.
• Inventory quantities. If a risk of material misstatement due to
fraud exists in inventory quantities, reviewing the entity’s inventory
records may help to identify locations, areas, or items for specific
attention during or after the physical inventory count. Such a review
may lead to a decision to observe inventory counts at certain loca
tions on an unannounced basis (see paragraph 29). In addition,
where the auditor has a concern about the risk of material misstate
ment due to fraud in the inventory area, it may be particularly
important that the entity counts are conducted at all locations sub
ject to count on the same date. Furthermore, it also may be
appropriate for the auditor to apply additional procedures during
the observation of the count — for example, examining more rigor
ously the contents of boxed items, the manner in which the goods
are stacked (for example, hollow squares) or labeled, and the quality
(that is, purity, grade, or concentration) of liquid substances such as
perfumes or specialty chemicals. Finally, additional testing of count
sheets, tags or other records, or the retention of copies may be war
ranted to minimize the risk of subsequent alteration or
inappropriate compilation.

Specific Responses — Misstatements Arising From
Misappropriations of Assets
31. The auditor may have identified a risk of material misstatement
due to fraud relating to misappropriation of assets. For example, the
auditor may conclude that such a risk of asset misappropriation at a par
ticular operating location is significant. This may be the case when a
specific type of asset is particularly susceptible to such a risk of misap
propriation — for example, a large amount of easily accessible cash, or
inventory items such as jewelry, that can be easily moved and sold.
Control risk may be evaluated differently in each of these situations.
Thus, differing circumstances necessarily would dictate different
responses.
evidence, such as verifying the source and contents of a facsimile response in a
telephone call to the purported sender, may be required to support their validity (AU
sec. 330.29).
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32. Usually the audit response to a risk of material misstatement due
to fraud relating to misappropriation of assets will be directed toward
certain account balances and classes of transactions. Although some of
the audit responses noted in paragraphs 29 and 30 may apply in such cir
cumstances, the scope of the work should be linked to the specific
information about the misappropriation risk that has been identified.
For example, where a particular asset is highly susceptible to misappro
priation that is potentially material to the financial statements, obtaining
an understanding of the control activities related to the prevention and
detection of such misappropriation and testing the operating effective
ness of such controls may be warranted. In certain circumstances,
physical inspection of such assets (for example, counting cash or securi
ties) at or near year end may be appropriate. In addition, the use of
substantive analytical procedures, including the development by the
auditor of an expected dollar amount, at a high level of precision, to be
compared with a recorded amount, may be effective in certain circum
stances.

Evaluation of Audit Test Results
33. As indicated in paragraph 25, the assessment of the risk of mate
rial misstatement due to fraud is a cumulative process and one that
should be ongoing throughout the audit. At the completion of the audit,
the auditor should consider whether the accumulated results of audit
procedures and other observations (for example, conditions noted in
paragraph 25) affect the assessment of the risk of material misstatement
due to fraud he or she made when planning the audit. This accumula
tion is primarily a qualitative matter based on the auditors judgment.
Such an accumulation may provide further insight into the risk of mate
rial misstatement due to fraud and whether there is a need for
additional or different audit procedures to be performed.
34. When audit test results identify misstatements in the financial
statements, the auditor should consider whether such misstatements
may be indicative of fraud.16 If the auditor has determined that mis
statements are or may be the result of fraud, but the effect of the
misstatements is not material to the financial statements, the auditor
nevertheless should evaluate the implications, especially those dealing
16 See note 3.
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with the organizational position of the person(s) involved. For example,
fraud involving misappropriations of cash from a small petty cash fund
normally would be of little significance to the auditor in assessing the
risk of material misstatement due to fraud because both the manner of
operating the fund and its size would tend to establish a limit on the
amount of potential loss and the custodianship of such funds is normally
entrusted to a relatively low-level employee.17 Conversely, when the
matter involves higher level management, even though the amount
itself is not material to the financial statements, it may be indicative of a
more pervasive problem. In such circumstances, the auditor should
reevaluate the assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to
fraud and its resulting impact on (a) the nature, timing, and extent of the
tests of balances or transactions, (b) the assessment of the effectiveness
of controls if control risk was assessed below the maximum, and (c) the
assignment of personnel that may be appropriate in the circumstances.
35. If the auditor has determined that the misstatement is, or may be,
the result of fraud, and either has determined that the effect could be
material to the financial statements or has been unable to evaluate
whether the effect ismaterial, the auditor should —
a. Consider the implications for other aspects of the audit (see previ
ous paragraph).
b. Discuss the matter and the approach to further investigation with an
appropriate level of management that is at least one level above
those involved and with senior management.
c. Attempt to obtain additional evidential matter to determine whether
material fraud has occurred or is likely to have occurred, and, if so,
its effect on the financial statements and the auditors report
thereon.18
d. If appropriate, suggest that the client consult with legal counsel.

36. The auditors consideration of the risk of material misstatement
due to fraud and the results of audit tests may indicate such a significant
risk of fraud that the auditor should consider withdrawing from the
engagement and communicating the reasons for withdrawal to the audit
committee or others with equivalent authority and responsibility (here-

17 However, see paragraph 38 for a discussion of the auditor's communication responsi
bilities.
18 See SAS No. 58 for guidance on auditors’ reports issued in connection with audits of
financial statements.
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after referred to as the audit committee).19,20 Whether the auditor con
cludes that withdrawal from the engagement is appropriate may depend
on the diligence and cooperation of senior management or the board of
directors in investigating the circumstances and taking appropriate
action. Because of the variety of circumstances that may arise, it is not
possible to describe definitively when withdrawal is appropriate. The
auditor may wish to consult with his or her legal counsel when consid
ering withdrawal from an engagement.

Documentation of the Auditor's Risk Assessment
and Response
37. In planning the audit, the auditor should document in the work
ing papers evidence of the performance of the assessment of the risk of
material misstatement due to fraud (see paragraphs 12 through 14).
Where risk factors are identified as being present, the documentation
should include (a) those risk factors identified and (b) the auditors
response (see paragraphs 26 through 32) to those risk factors, individu
ally or in combination. In addition, if during the performance of the
audit fraud risk factors or other conditions are identified that cause the
auditor to believe that an additional response is required (paragraph 33),
such risk factors or other conditions, and any further response that the
auditor concluded was appropriate, also should be documented.

19 Examples of “others with equivalent authority and responsibility" may include the
board of directors, the board of trustees, or the owner in owner-managed entities, as
appropriate.
20 If the auditor, subsequent to the date of the report on the audited financial statements,
becomes aware that facts existed at that date which might have affected the report had
the auditor then been aware of such facts, the auditor should refer to section 561 of
SAS No. 1 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 561, “Subsequent
Discovery of Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditors Report”), for guidance.
Furthermore, paragraph 10 of SAS No. 7, Communications Between Predecessor and
Successor Auditors (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 315), provides
guidance regarding communication to the predecessor auditor.
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Communications About Fraud to Management,
the Audit Committee,21 and Others21
22
38. Whenever the auditor has determined that there is evidence that
fraud may exist, that matter should be brought to the attention of an
appropriate level of management. This is generally appropriate even if
the matter might be considered inconsequential, such as a minor defal
cation by an employee at a low level in the entity’s organization. Fraud
involving senior management and fraud (whether caused by senior man
agement or other employees) that causes a material misstatement of the
financial statements should be reported directly to the audit committee.
In addition, the auditor should reach an understanding with the audit
committee regarding the expected nature and extent of communications
about misappropriations perpetrated by lower-level employees.

39. When the auditor, as a result of the assessment of the risk of
material misstatement due to fraud, has identified risk factors that have
continuing control implications (whether or not transactions or adjust
ments that could be the result of fraud have been detected), the auditor
should consider whether these risk factors represent reportable condi
tions relating to the entity’s internal control that should be
communicated to senior management and the audit committee.23 (See
SAS No. 60, Communication of Internal Control Related Matters Noted
in an Audit [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 325].) The
auditor also may wish to communicate other risk factors identified when
actions can be reasonably taken by the entity to address the risk.
40. The disclosure of possible fraud to parties other than the client’s
senior management and its audit committee ordinarily is not part of the
auditor’s responsibility and ordinarily would be precluded by the audi
tor’s ethical or legal obligations of confidentiality unless the matter is
reflected in the auditor’s report. The auditor should recognize, however,

21 See note 19.
22 The requirements to communicate noted in paragraphs 38 through 40 extend to any
intentional misstatement of financial statements (see paragraph 3). However, the com
munication may utilize terms other than fraud — for example, irregularity, intentional
misstatement, misappropriation, defalcation — if there is possible confusion with a
legal definition of fraud or other reason to prefer alternative terms.
23 Alternatively, the auditor may decide to communicate solely with the audit committee.
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that in the following circumstances a duty to disclose outside the entity
may exist:
a. To comply with certain legal and regulatory requirements24
b. To a successor auditor when the successor makes inquiries in
accordance with SAS No. 7, Communications Between Predecessor
and Successor Auditors (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 315)25
c. In response to a subpoena
d. To a funding agency or other specified agency in accordance with
requirements for the audits of entities that receive governmental
financial assistance
Because,potential conflicts with the auditors ethical and legal obliga
tions for confidentiality may be complex, the auditor may wish to consult
with legal counsel before discussing matters covered by paragraphs 38
through 40 with parties outside the client.

Effective Date
41. This Statement is effective for audits of financial statements for
periods ending on or after December 15,1997. Early application of the
provisions of this Statement is permissible.

24 These requirements include reports in connection with the termination of the engage
ment, such as when the entity reports an auditor change under the appropriate
securities law on Form 8-K and the fraud or related risk factors constitute a
“reportable event” or is the source of a “disagreement,” as these terms are defined in
Item 304 of Regulation S-K. These requirements also include reports that may be
required, under certain circumstances, pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (codified in section 10A(b)l of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934) relating to an illegal act that has a material effect on the financial statements.
25 In accordance with SAS No. 7, communication between predecessor and successor
auditors requires the specific permission of the client.
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Appendix A
Amendment to "Responsibilities and Functions
of the Independent Auditor"
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. I, AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 110.)

1. This amendment adds a new paragraph 2 (and renumbers the existing
paragraphs 2 through 9) to include a statement of the auditor's responsibility, in
an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards,
for the detection of material misstatement in the financial statements due to
fraud. The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) believes that the revised descrip
tion of that presently existing responsibility is more understandable because its
structure parallels the description of the auditor’s responsibility contained in
the auditors standard report. The ASB also believes that inclusion of this state
ment in the general standards should heighten the auditor’s awareness of the
extent of the current responsibility in an audit for the detection of material mis
statement due to fraud. New language is shown in boldface italics. The
amendment is effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on
or after December 15, 1997. Early application of the provisions of this
Statement is permissible.
2. The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud.1 Because of the
nature of audit evidence and the characteristics offraud, the auditor is able
to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material misstate
ments are detected.2 The auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that misstatements, whether caused
by errors or fraud, that are not material to the financial statements are
detected.

1 See SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, as amended
by SAS No. 82 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec, 312), and SAS No.
82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). The auditor’s consideration of illegal acts and
responsibility for detecting misstatements resulting from illegal acts is defined in
SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts By Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,AU sec.
317). For those illegal acts that are defined in that Statement as having a direct
and material effect on the determination offinancial statement amounts, the audi
tor's responsibility to detect misstatements resulting from such illegal acts is the
same as that for error or fraud.
2 See SAS No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, as amended
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the
Performance of Work,” paragraphs 10 through 13).
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Appendix B
Amendment to "Due Care in the Performance of Work"
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230.)

1. This amendment includes an expanded discussion of due professional
care and reasonable assurance reflected in the change of the section title from
“Due Care in the Performance of Work” to “Due Professional Care in the
Performance of Work.” The objective of these revisions is to heighten the audi
tor’s awareness of the need for professional skepticism throughout the conduct
of the audit as well as to articulate clearly the concept of reasonable assurance.
New language is shown in boldface italics; deleted language is shown by strike
through. The amendment is effective for audits of financial statements for
periods ending on or after December 15, 1997. Early application of the provi
sions of this Statement is permissible.
1.

The third general standard is:
Due professional care is to be exercised in the planning and performance of the
audit and the preparation of the report.1

2.
This standard requires the independent auditor to plan and perform his or her
work with due professional care. Due professional care imposes a responsibility
upon each person professional within an independent auditors organization to
observe the standards of field work and reporting. Exorcise of duo care requires crit
ical review at every level of supervision of the work done and the judgment exercised
bythose assisting in the audit.
3.
A paragraph appearing in Cooley on Torts, a legal treatise, often cited-by^ttorneys in discussing due care merits quotation here describes the obligationfor due

care as follows:
Every man who offers his services to another and is employed assumes the duty
to exercise in the employment such skill as he possesses with reasonable care and
diligence. In all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers
his services, he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the
degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his
pretentions are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon every man who
employs him in reliance on his public profession. But no man, whether skilled or
unskilled, undertakes that the task he assumes shall be performed successfully,
and without fault or error; he undertakes for good faith and integrity, but not for
infallibility, and he is liable to his employer for negligence, bad faith, or dishon
esty, but not for losses consequent upon pure errors of judgment.2

4.
The matter of due professional care concerns what the independent auditor
does and how well he or she does it. The quotation from Cooley on Torts

1 This amendment revises the third general standard of the ten generally accepted
auditing standards.
2 D. Haggard, Cooley on Torts, 472 (4th ed., 1932).
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provides a source from which an auditor’s responsibility for conducting an
audit with due professional care can be derived. The remainder of the
Statement discusses the auditor’s responsibility in the context of an audit.
5. An auditor should possess “the degree of skill commonly possessed” by
other auditors and should exercise it with “reasonable care and diligence”
(that is, with due professional care).

6. Auditors should be assigned to tasks and supervised commensurate with
their level of knowledge, skill, and ability so that they can evaluate the audit
evidence they are examining. The auditor with final responsibility for the
engagement should know, at a minimum, the relevant professional account
ing and auditing standards and should be knowledgeable about the client.3
The auditor with final responsibility is responsible for the assignment of
tasks to, and supervision of, assistants.4

Professional Skepticism
7. Due professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional skep
ticism. Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning
mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence. The auditor uses the knowl
edge, skill, and ability called for by the profession of public accounting to
diligently perform, in good faith and with integrity, the gathering and objec
tive evaluation of evidence.
8. Gathering and objectively evaluating audit evidence requires the auditor
to consider the competency and sufficiency of the evidence. Since evidence is
gathered and evaluated throughout the audit, professional skepticism should
be exercised throughout the audit process.
9. The auditor neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes
unquestioned honesty. In exercising professional skepticism, the auditor
should not be satisfied with less than persuasive evidence because of a belief
that management is honest.

Reasonable Assurance
10. The exercise of due professional care allows the auditor to obtain rea
sonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material
misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. Absolute assurance is not
attainable because of the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of
fraud. Therefore, an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards may not detect a material misstatement.

11. The independent auditor’s objective is to obtain sufficient competent evi
dential matter to provide him or her with a reasonable basis for forming an
opinion. The nature of most evidence derives, in part, from the concept of
selective testing of the data being audited, which involves judgment regard
ing both the areas to be tested and the nature, timing, and extent of the tests
to be performed. In addition, judgment is required in interpreting the results
3 See SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,
AU sec. 311), paragraph 7.
4 See SAS No. 22, paragraph 11.

33

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

32

Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82

of audit testing and evaluating audit evidence. Even with good faith and
integrity, mistakes and errors in judgment can be made. Furthermore,
accounting presentations contain accounting estimates, the measurement of
which is inherently uncertain and depends on the outcome offuture events.
The auditor exercises professionaljudgment in evaluating the reasonableness
of accounting estimates based on information that could reasonably be
expected to be available prior to the completion offield work.5 As a result of
these factors, in the great majority of cases, the auditor has to rely on evi
dence that is persuasive rather than convincing.6

12. Because of the characteristics offraud, particularly those involving con
cealment and falsified documentation (including forgery), a properly
planned and performed audit may not detect a material misstatement. For
example, an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards rarely involves authentication of documentation, nor are auditors
trained as or expected to be experts in such authentication. Also, auditing
procedures may be ineffective for detecting an intentional misstatement that
is concealed through collusion among client personnel and third parties or
among management or employees of the client.
13. Since the auditor’s opinion on the financial statements is based on the
concept of obtaining reasonable assurance, the auditor is not an insurer and
his or her report does not constitute a guarantee. Therefore, the subsequent
discovery that a material misstatement, whether from error or fraud, exists
in the financial statements does not, in and of itself, evidence (a) failure to
obtain reasonable assurance, (b) inadequate planning, performance, orjudg
ment, (c) the absence ofdue professional care, or (d) a failure to comply with
generally accepted auditing standards.

5 See SAS No. 57, Auditing Accounting Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 342), paragraph 22.
• See SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, as amended (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 326).
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Appendix C
Amendment to Audit Risk and Materiality
in Conducting an Audit
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312.)

1. This amendment revises SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Con
ducting an Audit, to provide a foundation within the audit risk model for the
consideration of fraud and to incorporate guidance on errors that was formerly
included in SAS No. 53, The Auditors Responsibility to Detect and Report
Errors and Irregularities (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316),
which is superseded by this SAS. The revisions also (a) elaborate on factors an
auditor should consider for an entity with multiple locations or components and
(b) include changes to conform to the definition and description of internal
control contained in SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a
Financial Statement Audit: An Amendment to SAS No. 55 (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319). New language is shown in boldface italics;
deleted language is shown by strike-through. The amendment is effective for
audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December 15,
1997. Early application of the provisions of this Statement is permissible.
1 . This Statement provides guidance on the auditors consideration of audit risk and
materiality when planning and performing an audit of financial statements in accor
dance with generally accepted auditing standards. Audit risk and materiality affect
the application of generally accepted auditing standards, especially the standards of
field work and reporting, and are reflected in the auditor's standard report. Audit risk
and materiality, among other matters, need to be considered together in determin
ing the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures and in evaluating the
results of those procedures.

2 . The existence of audit risk is recognized by the statement in the auditor' standard
report that the auditor-obtained “reasonable assurance” about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement.1 in the description of the responsi

bilities and junctions of the independent auditor that states, “Because of the
nature of audit evidence and the characteristics offraud, the auditor is able
to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material misstate
ments are detected.”1 Audit risk2 is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail
1For purposesof this section,-misstatements includes both errors and irregularities as
defined in SAS No. 53, The Auditors Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and
Irregularities, paragraphs 2 3.

1 See SAS No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, as amended
by SAS No. 82 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 110, “Respons
ibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor”) and SAS No. 1 (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the Per
formance of Work”), for a further discussion of reasonable assurance.
2 In addition to audit risk, the auditor is also exposed to loss or injury to his or her profes
sional practice from litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with

(continued)
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to appropriately modify his or her opinion on financial statements that are materi
ally misstated.*3

3. The concept of materiality recognizes that some matters, either individually or in
the aggregate, are important for fair presentation of financial statements in confor
mity with generally accepted accounting principles,4 while other matters are not
important. The phrase in the auditor’s standard report “present fairly, in all mate
rial respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles” indicates
the auditors belief that the financial statements taken as a whole are not materially
misstated.
4. Financial statements are materially misstated when they contain misstatements
whose effect, individually or in the aggregate, is important enough to cause them not
to be presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles. Misstatements result from misapplications of generally
accepted accounting principles, departures from fact, or omissions of necessary
information. Misstatements can result from errors or fraud.5

5. In planning the audit, the auditor is concerned with matters that could be
material to thefinancial statements. The auditor has no responsibility to plan
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that misstatements,
whether caused by errors or fraud, that are not material to the financial
statements are detected.

financial statements that he has audited and reported on. This exposure is present even
though the auditor has performed -his-the audit in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards and has reported appropriately on those financial statements. Even if an
auditor assesses this exposure as low, he the auditor should not perform less extensive pro
cedures than would otherwise be appropriate under generally accepted auditing standards.
3 This definition of audit risk does not include the risk that the auditor might erroneously
conclude that the financial statements are materially misstated. In such a situation, he the
auditor would ordinarily reconsider or extend his auditing procedures and request that
the client perform specific tasks to reevaluate the appropriateness of the financial state
ments. These steps would ordinarily lead the auditor to the correct conclusion. This
definition also excludes the risk of an inappropriate reporting decision unrelated to the
detection and evaluation of misstatements in the financial statements, such as an inappro
priate decision regarding the form of the auditor's report because of an uncertainty or a
limitation on the scope of the audit.
4 The concepts of audit risk and materiality also are also applicable to financial statements
presented in conformity with a comprehensive basis of accounting other than gener
ally accepted accounting principles; references in this Statement to financial statements
presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles also include those
presentations.

5 The auditor’s consideration of illegal acts and responsibility for detecting
misstatements resulting from illegal acts is defined in SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts
By Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317). For those illegal
acts that are defined in that Statement as having a direct and material effect on
the determination offinancial statement amounts, the auditor's responsibility to
detect misstatements resulting from such illegal acts is the same as that for errors
or fraud.
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6. The term errors refers to unintentional misstatements or omissions of
amounts or disclosures in financial statements. Errors may involve—
• Mistakes in gathering or processing datafrom which financial statements
are prepared.
• Unreasonable accounting estimates arising from oversight or misinter
pretation offacts.
• Mistakes in the application of accounting principles relating to amount,
classification, manner of presentation, or disclosure.6

7. Although fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditor’s interest specifically
relates to fraudulent acts that cause a misstatement offinancial statements.
Two types of misstatements are relevant to the auditor’s consideration in a
financial statement audit — misstatements arising from fraudulent financial
reporting and misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets. These
two types of misstatements are further described in SAS No. 82,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). The primary factor that distinguishes fraud
from error is whether the underlying action that results in the misstatement
in financial statements is intentional or unintentional.
8. When considering the auditor’s responsibility to obtain reasonable assur
ance that the financial statements are free from material misstatement, there
is no important distinction between errors and fraud. There is a distinction,
however, in the auditor’s response to detected misstatements. Generally, an
isolated, immaterial error in processing accounting data or applying
accounting principles is not significant to the audit. In contrast, when fraud
is detected, the auditor should consider the implications for the integrity of
management or employees and the possible effect on other aspects of the
audit.
5. 9. When reaching a conclusion concluding as to whether the effect of misstate
ments, individually or in the aggregate, is material, an auditor ordinarily should
consider their nature and amount in relation to the nature and amount of items in
the financial statements under audit. For example, an amount that is material to the
financial statements of one entity may not be material to the financial statements of
another entity of a different size or nature. Also, what is material to the financial
statements of a particular entity might change from one period to another.
6. 10. The auditor’s consideration of materiality is a matter of professional judgment
and is influenced by his or her perception of the needs of a reasonable person who
will rely on the financial statements. The perceived needs of a reasonable person are
recognized in the discussion of materiality in Financial Accounting Standards Board
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of
Accounting Information, which defines materiality as “the magnitude of an omission
or misstatement of accounting information that, in the light of surrounding circum
stances, makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the
information would have been changed or influenced by the omission or misstate
ment.” That discussion recognizes that materiality judgments are made in light of

6 Errors do not include the effect of accounting processes employed for convenience,
such as maintaining accounting records on the cash basis or the tax basis and peri
odically adjusting those records to prepare financial statements in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles.
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surrounding circumstances and necessarily involve both quantitative and qualitative
considerations.

7. 11. As a result of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations in
materiality judgments, misstatements of relatively small amounts that come to the
auditors attention could have a material effect on the financial statements. For exam
ple, an illegal payment of an otherwise immaterial amount could be material if there
is a reasonable possibility that it could lead to a material contingent liability or a
material loss of revenue. 6 6 7

Planning the Audit
8. 12. The auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a) planning the
audit and designing auditing procedures and (b) evaluating whether the financial
statements taken as a whole are presented fairly, in all material respects, in confor
mity with generally accepted accounting principles. The auditor should consider
audit risk and materiality in the first circumstance to obtain sufficient competent evi
dential matter on which to properly evaluate the financial statements in the second
circumstance.
Considerations at the Financial Statements Level6

9. 13. The auditor should plan the audit so that audit risk will be limited to a low
level that is, in his or her professional judgment, appropriate for issuing expressing
an opinion on the financial statements. Audit risk may be assessed in quantitative or
nonquantitative terms.

10. 14. SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 311), requires the auditor, in planning the audit, to take into consid
eration, among other matters, his or her preliminary judgment about materiality
levels for audit purposes.78 That judgment may or may not be quantified.
11. 15. According to SAS No. 22, the nature, timing, and extent of planning and thus
of the considerations of audit risk and materiality vary with the size and complexity
of the entity, the auditors experience with the entity, and his or her knowledge of
the entity’s business. Certain entity-related factors also affect the nature, timing, and
extent of auditing procedures with respect to specific account balances and classes of
transactions and related assertions. (See paragraphs 17 24 through 26 33.)

16. An assessment of the risk of material misstatement (whether caused by
error or fraud) should be made during planning. The auditor’s understand
ing of internal control may heighten or mitigate the auditor’s concern about
the risk of material misstatement.9 In considering audit risk, the auditor
67 The auditor's responsibility for illegal acts is discussed-in- See SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by

Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.

1, AU sec. 317).

• See SAS No. 53,- The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregu
larities, paragraphs 10 12, for afurther discussion of the consideration of-audit risk at the
financial statement-level.
7 8 This Statement amends SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision, paragraph 3e, by substi
tuting the words "Preliminary judgment about materiality levels” in place of the words
“Preliminary estimates of materiality levels.”

9 See SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in
a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,AU sec. 319).
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should specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial
statements due to fraud.10 The auditor should consider the effect of these
assessments on the overall audit strategy and the expected conduct and scope
of the audit.

17. Whenever the auditor has concluded that there is significant risk of
material misstatement of the financial statements, the auditor should con
sider this conclusion in determining the nature, timing, or extent of
procedures; assigning staff; or requiring appropriate levels of supervision.
The knowledge, skill, and ability of personnel assigned significant engage
ment responsibilities should be commensurate with the auditor's assessment
of the level of risk for the engagement. Ordinarily, higher risk requires more
experienced personnel or more extensive supervision by the auditor with
final responsibilityfor the engagement during both the planning and the con
duct of the engagement. Higher risk may cause the auditor to expand the
extent of procedures applied, apply procedures closer to or as of year end,
particularly in critical audit areas, or modify the nature of procedures to
obtain more persuasive evidence.
18. In an audit of an entity with operations in multiple locations or compo
nents, the auditor should consider the extent to which auditing procedures
should be performed at selected locations or components. The factors an
auditor should consider regarding the selection of a particular location or
component include (a) the nature and amount of assets and transactions exe
cuted at the location or component, (b) the degree of centralization of
records or information processing, (c) the effectiveness of the control envi
ronment, particularly with respect to management’s direct control over the
exercise of authority delegated to others and its ability to effectively super
vise activities at the location or component, (d) the frequency, timing, and
scope of monitoring activities by the entity or others at the location or com
ponent, and (e) judgments about materiality of the location or component.

19. In planning the audit, the auditor should use his or her judgment as to the
appropriately low level of audit risk and his or her preliminary judgment about
materiality levels in a manner that can be expected to provide him, within the inher
ent limitations of the auditing process, with sufficient evidential matter to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement. Materiality levels include an overall level for each statement; however,
because the statements are interrelated, and for reasons of efficiency, the auditor
ordinarily considers materiality for planning purposes in terms of the smallest aggre
gate level of misstatements that could be considered material to any one of the
financial statements. For example, if he the auditor believes that misstatements
aggregating approximately $100,000 would have a material effect on income but that
such misstatements would have to aggregate approximately $200,000 to materially
affect financial position, it would not be appropriate for him or her to design audit
ing procedures that would be expected to detect misstatements only if they
aggregate approximately $200,000.
13. 20. The auditor plans the audit to obtain reasonable assurance of detecting mis
statements that he or she believes could be large enough, individually or in the
aggregate, to be quantitatively material to the financial statements. Although the
auditor should be alert for misstatements that could be qualitatively material, it ordi10 See SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.
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narily is not practical to design procedures to detect them. SAS No. 31, Evidential
Matter, as amended (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 326), states
that “an auditor typically works within economic limits; the auditors opinion, to be
economically useful, must be formed within a reasonable length of time and at
reasonable cost.”

44? 21. In some situations, the auditor considers materiality for planning purposes
before the financial statements to be audited are prepared. In other situations, his
planning takes place after the financial statements under audit have been prepared,
but he the auditor may be aware that they require significant modification. In both
types of situations, the auditors preliminary judgment about materiality might be
based on the entity’s annualized interim financial statements or financial statements
of one or more prior annual periods, as long as he gives recognition is given to the
effects of major changes in the entity’s circumstances (for example, a significant
merger) and relevant changes in the economy as a whole or the industry in which the
entity operates.

15. 22. Assuming, theoretically, that the auditor’s judgment about materiality at the
planning stage was based on the same information available to him at the evaluation
stage, materiality for planning and evaluation purposes would be the same. However;
it ordinarily is not feasible for the auditor, when planning an audit, to anticipate all
of the circumstances that may ultimately influence his judgments about materiality
in evaluating the audit findings at the completion of the audit. Thus, his the audi
tor’s preliminary judgment about materiality ordinarily will differ from his the
judgment about materiality used in evaluating the audit findings. If significantly
lower materiality levels become appropriate in evaluating his audit findings, the audi
tor should reevaluate the sufficiency of the auditing procedures he or she has
performed.

16. 23. In planning auditing procedures, the auditor should also consider the
nature, cause (if known), and amount of misstatements that he or she is aware of
from the audit of the prior period’s financial statements.
Considerations at the Individual Account-Balance or

Class-of-Transactions Level

17. 24. The auditor recognizes that there is an inverse relationship between audit
risk and materiality considerations. For example, the risk that a particular account
balance or class of transactions and related assertions could be misstated by an
extremely large amount might be very low, but the risk that it could be misstated by
an extremely small amount might be very high. Holding other planning considera
tions equal, either a decrease in the level of audit risk that the auditor judges to be
appropriate in an account balance or a class of transactions or a decrease in the
amount of misstatements in the balance or class that he the auditor believes could
be material would require the auditor to do one or more of the following: (a) select
a more effective auditing procedure, (b) perform auditing procedures closer to year
end the balance sheet date, or (c) increase the extent of a particular auditing proce
dure.

18. 25. In determining the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures to be
applied to a specific account balance or class of transactions, the auditor should
design procedures to obtain reasonable assurance of detecting misstatements that he
or she believes, based on his the preliminary judgment about materiality, could be
material, when aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes, to the
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financial statements taken as a whole. Auditors use various methods to design pro
cedures to detect such misstatements. In some cases, auditors explicitly estimate, for
planning purposes, the maximum amount of misstatements in the balance or class
that, when combined with misstatements in other balances or classes, could exist
without causing the financial statements to be materially misstated. In other cases,
auditors relate their preliminary judgment about materiality to a specific account bal
ance or class of transactions without explicitly estimating such misstatements.
19.26. The auditor needs to consider audit risk at the individual account-balance or
class-of-transactions level because such consideration directly assists him in deter
mining the scope of auditing procedures for the balance or class and related
assertions. The auditor should seek to restrict audit risk at the individual balance or
class level in such a way that will enable him or her, at the completion of his the
examination, to express an opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole at an
appropriately low level of audit risk. Auditors use various approaches to accomplish
that objective.

20. 27. At the account-balance or class-of-transactions level, audit risk consists of
(a) the risk (consisting of inherent risk and control risk) that the balance or class and
related assertions contain misstatements (whether caused by error orfraud) that
could be material to the financial statements when aggregated with misstatements in
other balances or classes and (b) the risk (detection risk) that the auditor will not
detect such misstatements. The discussion that follows describes audit risk in terms
of three component risks. 11 The way the auditor considers these component risks
and combines them involves professional judgment and depends on his the audit
approach.
a. Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an assertion to a material misstatement,
assuming that there are no related internal controls structure policies or proce
dures. The risk of such misstatement is greater for some assertions and related
balances or classes than for others. For example, complex calculations are more
likely to be misstated than simple calculations. Cash is more susceptible to theft
than an inventory of coal. Accounts consisting of amounts derived from account
ing estimates pose greater risks than do accounts consisting of relatively routine,
factual data. External factors also influence inherent risk. For example, techno
logical developments might make a particular product obsolete, thereby causing
inventory to be more susceptible to overstatement. In addition to those factors
that are peculiar to a specific assertion for an account balance or a class of trans
actions, factors that relate to several or all of the balances or classes may
influence the inherent risk related to an assertion for a specific balance or class.
These latter factors include, for example, a lack of sufficient working capital to
continue operations or a declining industry characterized by a large number of
business fadlures. (See SAS No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and
Report Errors and Irregularities, paragraph 10.)
b. Control risk is the risk that a material misstatement that could occur in an asser
tion will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis by the entity’s internal

11The formula in the appendix (paragraph 48) to SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 350), describes audit risk in terms of four compo
nent risks. Detection risk is presented in terms of two components: the risk that analytical
procedures and other relevant substantive tests would fail to detect misstatements equal
to tolerable misstatement, and the allowable risk of incorrect acceptance for the sub
stantive test of details.
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control structure policies or procedures. That risk is a function of the effective
ness of the design and operation of internal control structure policies or
procedures in achieving the entity’s broad internal control structure objectives
relevant to an audit preparation of the entity’s financial statements. Some con
trol risk will always exist because of the inherent limitations of any internal
control structure.
c. Detection risk is the risk that the auditor will not detect a material misstatement
that exists in an assertion. Detection risk is a function of the effectiveness of an
auditing procedure and of its application by the auditor. It arises partly from
uncertainties that exist when the auditor does not examine 100 percent of an
account balance or a class of transactions and partly because of other uncertain
ties that exist even if he or she were to examine 100 percent of the balance or
class. Such other uncertainties arise because an auditor might select an inappro
priate auditing procedure, misapply an appropriate procedure, or misinterpret
the audit results. These other uncertainties can be reduced to a negligible level
through adequate planning and supervision and conduct of a firm’s audit prac
tice in accordance with appropriate quality control standards.
21. 28. Inherent risk and control risk differ from detection risk in that they exist
independently of the audit of financial statements, whereas detection risk relates to
the auditor’s procedures and can be changed at his or her discretion. Detection risk
should bear an inverse relationship to inherent and control risk. The less the inher
ent and control risk the auditor believes exists, the greater the detection risk he that
can be accepted. Conversely, the greater the inherent and control risk the auditor
believes exists, the less the detection risk he that can be accepted. These compo
nents of audit risk may be assessed in quantitative terms such as percentages or in
nonquantitative terms that range, for example, from a minimum to a maximum.

22. 29. When the auditor assesses inherent risk for an assertion related to an
account balance or a class of transactions, he or she evaluates numerous factors that
involve professional judgment. In doing so, he the auditor considers not only fac
tors peculiar to the related assertion, but also, other factors pervasive to the financial
statements taken as a whole that may also influence inherent risk related to the asser
tion. If an auditor concludes that the effort required to assess inherent risk for an
assertion would exceed the potential reduction in the extent of his auditing proce
dures derived from such an assessment, he the auditor should assess inherent risk
as being at the maximum when designing auditing procedures.

23. 30. The auditor also uses professional judgment in assessing control risk for an
assertion related to the account balance or class of transactions. The auditor’s assess
ment of control risk is based on the sufficiency of evidential matter obtained to
support the effectiveness of internal control structure policies or procedures in pre
venting or detecting misstatements in financial statement assertions. If the auditor
believes controls structure policies or procedures are unlikely to pertain to an asser
tion or are unlikely to be effective, or if he believes that evaluating their effectiveness
would be inefficient, he or she would assess control risk for that assertion at the max
imum.

24. 31. The auditor might make separate or combined assessments of inherent risk
and control risk. If he the auditor considers inherent risk or control risk, separately
or in combination, to be less than the maximum, he or she should have an appro
priate basis for his these assessments. This basis may be obtained, for example,
through the use of questionnaires, checklists, instructions, or similar generalized
materials and, in the case of control risk, his the understanding of the internal con-
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trol structure and his the performance of suitable tests of controls. However, pro
fessional judgment is required in interpreting, adapting, or expanding such
generalized material as appropriate in the circumstances.

32. The detection risk that the auditor can accept in the design of auditing pro
cedures is based on the level to which he or she seeks to restrict audit risk related to
the account balance or class of transactions and on his the assessment of inherent
and control risks. As the auditor’s assessment of inherent risk and control risk
decreases, the detection risk that he can be accepted increases. It is not appropriate,
however, for an auditor to rely completely on his assessments of inherent risk and
control risk to the exclusion of performing substantive tests of account balances and
classes of transactions where misstatements could exist that might be material when
aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes.

26. 33. An audit of financial statements is a cumulative process; as the auditor per
forms planned auditing procedures, the evidence he obtains obtained may cause
him or her to modify the nature, timing, and extent of other planned procedures. As
a result of performing auditing procedures or from other sources during the
audit, Iinformation may come to the auditors attention as-result of performing
auditing procedures or from other sources during the audit that differs significantly
from the information on which his the audit plan was based. For example, the extent
of misstatements he detects detected may alter his the judgment about the levels of
inherent and control risks, and other information he obtains obtained about the
financial statements may alter his the preliminary judgment about materiality. In
such cases, he the auditor may need to reevaluate the auditing procedures he or
she plans to apply, based on his the revised consideration of audit risk and material
ity for all or certain of the account balances or classes of transactions and related
assertions.

Evaluating Audit Findings
27. 34. In evaluating whether the financial statements are presented fairly, in all
material respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, the
auditor should aggregate misstatements that the entity has not corrected in a way
that enables him or her to consider whether, in relation to individual amounts,
subtotals, or totals in the financial statements, they materially misstate the financial
statements taken as a whole. Qualitative considerations also influence an the auditor
in reaching a conclusion as to whether misstatements are material.

28. 35. The aggregation of misstatements should include the auditors best estimate
of the total misstatements in the account balances or classes of transactions that he

or she has examined (hereafter referred to as likely misstatement
**
l2), not just the
amount of misstatements he specifically identifiesd (hereafter referred to as known
misstatement).10 13 When the auditor tests an account balance or a class of transSee SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report—Errors and
Irregularities, 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, para
graphs 22-25, 33—35, for a further discussion of the auditors consideration of

differences between the accounting records and the underlying facts and circumstances.
paragraphs provides specific guidance on the auditor's considera
tion of an audit adjustment that is, or may be, an irregularity the result offraud.

This section Those

10 13 If the auditor were to examine all of the items in a balance or class, the likely misstate
ment applicable to recorded transactions in the balance or class would be the amount of
known misstatements specifically identified.
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actions and related assertions by an analytical procedure, he or she ordinarily would
not specifically identify misstatements but would only obtain an indication of
whether misstatement might exist in the balance or class and possibly its approximate
magnitude. If the analytical procedure indicates that a misstatement might exist,
but not its approximate amount, the auditor ordinarily would have to employ other
procedures to enable him or her to estimate the likely misstatement in the balance
or class. When an auditor uses audit sampling to test an assertion for an account
balance or a class of transactions, he or she projects the amount of known misstate
ments he identified in his the sample to the items in the balance or class from which
his the sample was selected. That projected misstatement, along with the results of
other substantive tests, contributes to the auditors assessment of likely misstatement
in the balance or class.

29. 36. The risk of material misstatement of the financial statements is generally
greater when account balances and classes of transactions include accounting esti
mates rather than essentially factual data because of the inherent subjectivity in
estimating future events. Estimates, such as those for inventory obsolescence, uncol
lectible receivables, and warranty obligations, are subject not only to the
unpredictability of future events but also to misstatements that may arise from using
inadequate or inappropriate data or misapplying appropriate data. Since no one
accounting estimate can be considered accurate with certainty, the auditor recog
nizes that a difference between an estimated amount best supported by the audit
evidence and the estimated amount included in the financial statements may be rea
sonable, and such difference would not be considered to be a likely misstatement.
However, if the auditor believes the estimated amount included in the financial
statements is unreasonable, he or she should treat the difference between that esti
mate and the closest reasonable estimate as a likely misstatement and aggregate it
with other likely misstatements. The auditor should also consider whether the dif
ference between estimates best supported by the audit evidence and the estimates
included in the financial statements, which are individually reasonable, indicates a
possible bias on the part of the entity’s management. For example, if each account
ing estimate included in the financial statements was individually reasonable, but the
effect of the difference between each estimate and the estimate best supported by
the audit evidence was to increase income, the auditor should reconsider the esti
mates taken as a whole.

30. 37. In prior periods, likely misstatements may not have been corrected by the
entity because they did not cause the financial statements for those periods to be
materially misstated. Those misstatements might also affect the current period’s
financial statements.11 14 If the auditor believes that there is an unacceptably high risk
that the current period’s financial statements may be materially misstated when those
prior-period likely misstatements that affect the current period’s financial statements
are considered along with likely misstatements arising in the current period, he the
auditor should include in aggregate likely misstatement the effect on the current
period’s financial statements of those prior-period likely misstatements.
31. 38. If the auditor concludes, based on his the accumulation of sufficient evi
dential matter, that the aggregation of likely misstatements causes the financial

11 14The measurement of the effect, if any, on the current periods financial statements of
misstatements uncorrected in prior periods involves accounting considerations and is
therefore not addressed in this Statement.
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statements to be materially misstated, he the auditor should request management
to eliminate the material misstatement. If the material misstatement is not elimi
nated, he the auditor should issue a qualified or an adverse opinion on the financial
statements. Material misstatements may be eliminated by, for example, application
of appropriate accounting principles, other adjustments in amounts, or the addi
tion of appropriate disclosure of inadequately disclosed matters. Even though the
aggregate effect of likely misstatements on the financial statements may be immate
rial, the auditor should recognize that an accumulation of immaterial misstatements
in the balance sheet could contribute to material misstatements of future finan
cial statements.
88? 39. If the auditor concludes that the aggregation of likely misstatements does
not cause the financial statements to be materially misstated, he or she should rec
ognize that they could still be materially misstated duo to because of further
misstatement remaining undetected. As aggregate likely misstatement increases, the
risk that the financial statements may be materially misstated also increases. The
Aauditors generally reduces this risk of material misstatement in planning the audit
by restricting the extent of detection risk they are he or she is willing to accept for
an assertion related to an account balance or a class of transactions. The Aauditors
also can also reduce this risk of material misstatement by modifying the nature, tim
ing, and extent of planned auditing procedures on a continuous basis in performing
the audit. (See paragraph 26 33.) Nevertheless, if the auditor believes that such risk
is unacceptably high, he or she should perform additional auditing procedures or
satisfy himself or herself that the entity has adjusted the financial statements to
reduce the risk of material misstatement to an acceptable level.

40. In aggregating known and likely misstatements that the entity has not
corrected, pursuant to paragraphs 34 and 35, the auditor may designate an
amount below which misstatements need not be accumulated. This amount
should be set so that any such misstatements, either individually or when
aggregated with other such misstatements, would not be material to the
financial statements, after the possibility offurther undetected misstatements
is considered.

Effective Date
33. 41. This Statement is effective for audits of financial statements for periods
beginning after June 30,1984. The amendments are effective for audits offinan
cial statements for periods ending on or after December 15,1997.
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This Statement entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
was adopted by the assenting votes of the fifteen members of the board, of
whom three, Messrs. McElroy, Rockman, and Vice, assented with qualification.

Messrs. McElroy, Rockman, and Vice qualify their assent for paragraphs 17 and
19, which list risk factors. They believe that it can be inferred from the
Statement that the selection of appropriate risk factors is mandated by
the Standard. Also, in paragraph 17, several of the risk factors are supported
by specific indicators. These indicators, when taken with the risk factors, create
a list of examples far too numerous for the body of a Statement.

They are concerned that, despite the fact that paragraph 14 of the Statement
states that “the auditor should use professional judgment when assessing
the . . . relevance of fraud risk factors,” in practice, auditors may mistakenly
believe that they need to consider all of the fraud risk factors in the Statement
on every audit.
In practice, the auditor should apply judgment, based on “entities of different
size, with different ownership characteristics, in different industries, or because
of other differing characteristics or circumstances,” as stated in paragraph 14 of
the Statement. Further, as business practices and processes change, including
the effects of technology, auditors will need to consider risk factors appropriate
to changed circumstances.

Messrs. McElroy, Rockman, and Vice believe that the profession and the pub
lic would be better served by publishing fewer risk factors within the Statement
and by providing example risk factors in nonauthoritative documents that can
be better tailored to the circumstances, and that can change over time as new
knowledge becomes available.

Auditing Standards Board (1996)
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Note: Statements on Auditing Standards are issued by the Auditing Standards Board,
the senior technical body of the Institute designated to issue pronouncements on audit
ing matters. Rule 202 of the Institutes Code of Professional Conduct requires
compliance with these standards.
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Glossary

Absconding with retainers and down payments: A fraud wherein the fraudster obtains
money from the victim in advance in connection with the promise to provide goods or
services in the future, but then disappears with the proceeds. Simply put: “Get the money
and run.”

See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain and property improvement schemes.
Abuse of Trust: The misuse of one’s position or of privileged information (or both) gained
by virtue of that position in order to acquire for oneself (or for another in whom one has an
interest) money, property, or some privilege to which one is not entitled. In addition, abuse
of trust often involves a violation of fiduciary duty. The victims of these abuses are those
who rely on, to their detriment (that is, who have placed their trust in), the individual or
group that misuses its trusted position.
The abuse of trust can occur in many areas but is a situation that arises most frequently in
the following four white-collar crime areas:

1. Banking: for example, abuse of trust can involve self-dealing in connection with loans or
credit to oneself, one’s friends or business associates.

2. Securities: for example, insider information may be used for personal benefit at the
expense of clients, stockholders and others.
3. Commercial bribery: for example, the procurement and competitive bidding processes
may be manipulated.
4. Embezzlement: for example, trustees may misuse property or funds in their custody.

See also: Bankingfraud, commercial bribery, embezzlement andfiduciary frauds, Insider training,
Procurement fraud, and Securities fraud.

Acquisition and payment cycle: The business cycle that deals with a business procurement
of and payment for all goods and services except for payroll and capital acquisitions.
See also: Capital Acquisition and Repayment Cycle, Payroll and Personnel Cycle, and Procurement
Fraud.

Advance fee fraud: A scheme in which assurances of some future benefit are made, with full
compensation to the promisor or perpetrator, who has no intention of performing, but rather is
interested in obtaining the partial payment requested as an advance service fee or other
advance good faith deposit (often falsely described as a returnable deposit). Typical victims of
advance fee schemes are businesspeople who cannot obtain customary banking or credit
sources. They pay deposits or fees to others on the promise that the perpetrator will arrange loans
or credit for them.
See also: Commercial crime and Financefraud
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Allegation: In litigation, a formal assertion, claim, declaration, or statement of a party to an
action, made in a pleading, setting out what the party expects to prove. In a nonlitigious
situation, a concern, which is backed by evidence, that a party has committed fraud.
See also: Allege and Suspicion.

Allege: In litigation, the act of making an allegation; to state, recite, assert, or charge. In
nonlitigious situations, a statement wherein the person making the statement has some
evidence to suggest that a party has committed fraud.
See also: Allegation and Suspicion.

Altered credit card receipts: A problem in the retail industry and in the restaurant business
wherein the salesclerk or waiter increases the amount written on a credit card receipt.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.

Altering input data: Changing the amounts, dates, or other information contained in data to
be input into a computer system to record a company’s transactions.
See also: Computer crime and Sales and collection cycle.

Altering internal copies of invoices: The altering of a company’s copy of the sales
invoice to report an amount lower than that actually billed to the customer. When payment
is received, the employee diverts the excess amount.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Antitrust offenses: Offenses consisting of one or more of the following: combinations in
restraint of trade, price fixing, predatory pricing, or other schemes to unlawfully drive
competitors out of business; agreements among competitors to share business according to
some agreed formula (such as, bid-rigging conspiracies and discriminatory pricing agreements);
or domination of a business area by one or a few enterprises. Victims of antitrust offenses are
businesses and purchasers of goods or services who pay higher prices than they would
otherwise pay if the offenses were not committed.
See also: Price fixing, Procurement fraud, and Restraint oftrade.

Arson: The intentional burning of the house or property of another.
See also: Arson for profit.

Arson for profit: The intentional burning of a house or property, whether his or her own or
another’s, to collect the insurance proceeds associated with the resulting loss.
See also: Commercial crime, Insurance fraud, and Property insurance fraud

Auto repair fraud: A form of consumer fraud involving maintenance services to automobiles
such as overcharging for labor or parts or use of shoddy or substandard parts, or failure to
perform promised services, charging for services not performed or parts not used, and
performing unnecessary services.
See also: Consumerfraud and Repair fraud
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Backdooring: An occurrence in which friends of a promoter in a stock market manipulation
scheme start selling their shares while the price is still increasing, contrary to their agreement
with the promoter, and before the promoter gives them the word to sell.
See also: Setting up a distribution network, Stock market manipulation, and Warehousing.

Bait and Switch: A form of consumer fraud involving misleading advertising. For example, in
a bait and switch scheme, a store advertises a bargain, which is no more than an inducement
(that is, the bait) to lure customers to the store where they are presented with similar but higher
priced items (that is, the switch). Thus the advertisement does not constitute a bona fide offer for
sale of the merchandise in question. This may be because (1) the advertised item is not
available on the premises or is available in unreasonably short supply, or (2) acts are
undertaken to prevent the customer from purchasing the advertised item in favor of higher
priced merchandise (that is, by downgrading or knocking the advertised goods). Similar
techniques may be found in the financial services industry.
See also: Consumerfraud and False and misleading advertising.
Banking fraud: Violations by insiders or by customers of banks, savings and loan associations,
or credit unions. Insider violations generally involve embezzlements or self-dealing—for
example, insiders lend money to themselves or to businesses in which they have an interest,
take bribes, or provide special favors, such as, to make loans or to refrain from collecting loans.
Violations by outsiders would include submitting false financial statements to induce a bank to
make a loan, the use of fraudulent collateral, check kiting, and similar offenses.

Victims of banking fraud are depositors and shareholders, bank stockholders, creditors, the
federal government as the insurer of deposits, and surety companies who bond bank
employees and officials.
See also: Abuse of trust, Check kiting, Collateralfrauds, and Commercial bribery.

Bankruptcy fraud: Fraud involving financial insolvency in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding. Victims of bankruptcy frauds are usually creditors and suppliers of the failed or
failing business, although managers of the business who operate fraudulently can also victimize
silent partners and stockholders. There are two major kinds of bankruptcy fraud:
1. The scam or planned bankruptcy, in which the assets, credit, and viability of a business
are purposely and systematically milked to obtain cash that is hidden by scam operators.

2. Fraudulent concealments or diversions of assets in anticipation of filing for bankruptcy,
which prevents the assets from being sold for the benefit of creditors (that is, squirreling
away assets when bankruptcy appears imminent).
Planned thefts and fencing activities may be associated with either kind of bankruptcy fraud as
a means by which assets can be diverted and converted to cash.

See also: Financefraud.
Bid rigging: A process whereby several contractors conspire, without the knowledge or
consent of the purchaser, to set the price or terms of a contract in a manner that would
ultimately raise the cost for the purchaser.

See also: Commercial crime and Procurement fraud.
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Biometrics: A method that is sometimes used to ensure that only authorized people are
permitted access to computer systems and includes the checking of fingerprints, iris
recognition, hand geometry, and other evolving technologies.

See also: Computer access control
Blowing off: A stage in a stock market manipulation that involves the sale of unusually large
amounts of stocks.
See also: Stock market manipulation.

Boiler room: A mechanism used to promote fraudulent sales of securities, charitable
donations, lotteries, and so on through the use of telephone solicitors, operating locally or by
use of long distance lines, who call lists of victims and solicit them to buy a particular product
or service. The telephone salespeople work on high commissions using pre-planned sales
pitches. Their services, particularly in charitable solicitations, are sometimes sold to otherwise
legitimate enterprises, which rarely see much of the collections. The technique depends
primarily upon glib misrepresentations.

See also: Charity and religiousfrauds and Securities fraud
Borrower misapplication of funds: A kind of loan fraud whereby the borrower, who has
little or no personal risk in the collateral, misapplies loan funds.

See also: Loan or lendingfraud
Breaches of the reporting guidelines: Defiance of the U.S. government requirements for
banks to report details of large cash deposits to assist in the prevention of money laundering.
For example, a bank insider who conspires with a money launderer, and agrees to make
deposits for the money launderer without reporting the required details, is breaching the reporting
guidelines.

See also: Money laundering.

Bribe: Any money, goods, right in action, property, thing of value, or any preferment,
advantage, privilege, or emolument, or any promise or undertaking to give such items, with the
corrupt intent to induce or influence action.
See also: Bribery.

Bribery: The offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of something of value for the purpose of
influencing the action of anyone in the discharge of his or her duties.

See also: Bribe.
Bribery of a loan officer: An inducement offered to a loan officer by a borrower to grant a
loan that would not otherwise be made (usually because the borrower’s credit is insufficient).
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain and Loan and lendingfraud.
Bundling and unbundling claims: The practice of physicians or clinics billing separately for
medical services performed at the same time.

See also: Health insurancefraud
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Business opportunity fraud: One of the most prevalent and varied forms of fraud in which
victims are offered the opportunity to make a living, or to supplement their income, by going
into business for themselves (full or part-time), or by purchasing franchises or equipment to
manufacture some item, sell merchandise, or perform some service.

Victims are generally individuals with a small pool of money they have saved and who are
enticed by the prospect of the promised independence or income, or both.
Such schemes range from total shams to opportunities whose promised returns are highly
illusory. The operators of these schemes have essentially one goal, which is to acquire the
money of the subscriber or investor victims. Work-at-home merchandising schemes (for
example, selling knitting machines, raising mink, and so on) or the sale of distributorships (for
example, in cosmetics, special rug cleaning processes, and so on) are common examples of the
kinds of opportunities pitched in this form of fraud. The opportunity presented by the fraud
operator often includes the promise of guaranteed markets for the goods or services to be
produced. Often the schemes induce the victim to enlist other victims, creating a pyramid
scheme.
See also: Franchisingfrauds, Pyramid schemes, and Self-improvement schemes.

Capital acquisition and repayment cycle: The cycle of a business whereby capital items are
purchased and paid for (as compared to operating goods and services that are acquired through
the purchasing and payments cycle). The capital acquisition and repayment cycle is sometimes
referred to as the financing cycle.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle and Procurementfraud.

Casualty insurance fraud: Claims for staged accidents and false claims for legitimate
accidents submitted under a casualty insurance policy, which covers personal injuries and
property damage that one may sustain as the result of an accident.
See also: Insurance fraud, Legitimate accidents with false claims, Personal injury insurance fraud, and
Staged accidents.

Chain referral schemes: Schemes in which the victims are induced to part with money or
property on the representation that they will make money through inducing others to buy into
the same deal. First-tier victims usually believe that those they involve in the scheme (secondtier victims) will make money—but since second-tier victims can only make money by
involving third-tier victims, and so on, the scheme must eventually collapse. Generally, only
the fraud operators who manage the scheme make money on it; few first or second-tier victims
(especially if they are honest) have a sufficient number of participating friends and
acquaintances to come out whole.

One common form of chain-referral scheme is the chain-letter; more sophisticated is the
pyramid scheme (q.v.), in which, for example, the victim is sold a franchise to sell both
merchandise and other franchises, with the promise of profits on merchandise sold, and
commissions, or overrides on merchandise sold by any second or later-tier victims who buy a
franchise. The profits appear, therefore, to be in selling franchises rather than in selling
merchandise. These schemes ultimately collapse under their own weight.
See also: Consumerfraud, Merchandisingfrauds, and Pyramid scheme.
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Charity and religious frauds: Frauds arising out of the fund-raising activities of charitable
groups, or religious groups, or both. Almost anyone can be the victim of these frauds often
without knowing it, but even if the victim may later suspect the fraud, his or her individual loss
may be so small that there is little desire to pursue the matter. Three kinds of fraud situations
are generally observed in this area: the bogus charity or religious group, misrepresentation of
association with a charity or religious group, and misrepresentation of the benefits or uses of
contributions.
See also: Boiler room and Corporate shams.

Check forgery: The copying of a check, or some or all of its components (most often the
signature) onto a fraudulent check, in order to induce a financial institution to believe that it is a
bona fide check.

See also: Checkfraud.
Check fraud: A general term for the attempted negotiation of bad checks at a financial
institution. Fraud in this category includes: a new account customer attempting to make a false
deposit; forged, altered or stolen checks; and check kiting.
See also: Check kiting and New account fraud

Check kiting: Any of a variety of frauds against banks that, in order to succeed, depend on the
time the banking system takes to clear checks. The most common form of check kiting involves
at least two bad checks that are intentionally used to temporarily obtain credit. This is done by
writing one check against a bank account in which funds are insufficient to cover it, then,
before the check clears the bank, depositing funds in the form of another bad check, which will
temporarily cover the shortfall. In this manner, balances are built up in each account by
deposits from the other. Checks are circulated between accounts, with no money taken out of
any account, until at least one of the banks develops confidence in the depositor. To prevent
detection, the depositor then takes money out of that bank, using a time frame based on the
circulation of checks between the two or more banks, and the several days it takes to clear
checks (especially between different cities).
Banks are victims of check kites. When first discovered, check kites appear far more costly than
when all transactions are analyzed, since hundreds of thousands of dollars in checks may be
circulated to steal only a few thousand dollars. In some instances, however, massive amounts
have been stolen. In many instances businesses employ check kites when they cannot get loans
from banks to tide themselves over a temporary negative business situation, and intend to (and
often do) put the money back into the accounts before the check kite is discovered. In these
instances the bank has been fraudulently induced to unwittingly grant what amounts to an
interest-free loan.

See also: Bankingfraud and Checkfraud

Churning: A process in which a broker buys and sells stock for a client in order to generate
fees, rather than to meet the client’s investment objectives.

See also: Commercial crime and Securitiesfraud
Collateral frauds: Deceptions involving the holding, taking or offering of defective collateral
pursuant to a financial transaction. In many instances, collateral fraud will be related to bank
loan transactions. Beyond this, however, these frauds may be encountered in connection with
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any transaction in which defective security is provided, for example, nonexistent accounts
receivable sold or pledged to factors (as security for private loans). In some cases, collateral
used as security may not belong to the person offering it It could be stolen (for example, stolen
securities), borrowed, or already subject to an undisclosed lien or other encumbrance.
Alternatively, there may be some gross misrepresentation as to the collateral’s value.
See also: Bankingfraud.
Collusion or collusive fraud: A private agreement in which several parties plan to commit
fraud against another party or organization. The group of fraudsters could be as few as two
people, and could include parties who are internal, or external to an organization, or both. For
example, collusion occurs if an internal fraudster helps an external fraudster commit a crime in
return for a secret commission, kickback, or bribe.

See also: Externalfraud and Internalfraud.

Commercial bribery: A form of insider fraud or abuse of trust in which an employee or
officer of a business, charitable organization or government entity is given a bribe, or some
other valuable consideration, to induce the employee or official to make a purchase, or grant a
contract or provide some special privilege (such as a zoning variance, license, and so on).
See also: Abuse oftrust and Procurementfraud.

Commercial crime: A white-collar crime committed by an individual or group of individuals
in a company for the benefit of that company and, indirectly, themselves.
See also: Economic crime, Externalfraud, Procurementfraud, Shams, and White-collar crime.

Compartmentalization: A restriction that limits computer users access to the specific files and
programs for which they have a job-related requirement.

See also: Computer access control
Computer access control: A series of controls used to help ensure that only authorized
people are permitted to access computer systems. Controls include: passwords,
compartmentalization, use of biometrics, one-time passwords, automatic log off, time-day
controls, dial-back systems, random personal information, requests and Internet authentication.
See also: Biometrics, Compartmentalization, Computer crime, Dial-back systems, Internet authentication,
Random personal information, and Time-day controls.

Computer crime: A crime in which a computer is used, either to commit a crime, or as the
target of a crime. Crimes committed using a computer may include: embezzlement, larceny,
fraud, forgery and counterfeiting. Crimes committed targeting computers may include:
sabotage, vandalism, electronic burglary, wire tapping, and gaining illegal access. The most
common forms of computer crime involve the manipulation of inputs and outputs.
See also: Computer access control

Computer fraud: Deceptions arising out of the increasing use of the computer to maintain
business and government records, such as those relating to inventories, accounts payable and
receivable, and customer and payroll records. Most computer frauds are really old frauds that
are committed in a computer environment. True computer frauds do exist—such as those
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involving unauthorized changes to a computer’s programming—but these are relatively less
common and are most often committed by technical computer people.

See also: Computer crime.

Computer intrusion: Unauthorized access into another’s computers.
See also: Computer access control and Computer crime.

Consumer fraud: A deception in the marketplace involving seller misrepresentations to
buyers. Victims are consumers of all kinds, individual and institutional, public and private.
Common forms of consumer fraud include:
• Selling of useless goods or services, represented as beneficial, for example, miracle face
creams
• Misrepresentation of product performance, benefits or safety
• False and misleading advertising
• Failure to service items after sale, including reneging on warranties
• Repair fraud

• Hidden charges with respect to financing, necessary follow-up services, and so on
• Weights and measures violations
See also: Auto repairfraud, Bait and switch, Chain referral schemes, False and misleading advertising,
Merchandisingfrauds, Repairfraud, and Weights and measures violations.

Copyright piracy: The infringement of another’s copyright or other business rights for profit
or to ease a financial difficulty when the infringer does not have any legal right to manufacture
or copy the product.
See also: Commercial crime.

Corporate shams: A scheme that deals with something that is counterfeit or false. The
fraudster often acts through a corporate entity, hiding from the public behind the corporate veil—
thereby gaining an appearance of respectability and substance that would otherwise be lacking.
See also: Commercial crime and Shams.

Coupon redemption fraud: The fraudulent collection and conversion of coupons designed
to promote various kinds of merchandise. Unscrupulous grocery and supermarket owners will
collect coupons, in some cases from an intermediary, and redeem them as though merchandise
has been purchased from them when in fact it has not. Although the individual amounts can be
small, the volume in most consumables can make it profitable for stores to engage in these
schemes.

See also: Commercial crime.
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Credit card frauds: Frauds arising out of the application for, extension, and use of credit
cards. Victims are the issuers of the credit cards. Common credit card abuses include:

• Use of stolen credit cards.
• False statements in the application for a credit card, including application under a false
name.
• Purchase, using a legitimate credit card with no intention to pay.
• Manufacture of fake credit cards and their use.
See also: Bankingfraud.

Credit rating schemes: Frauds arising out of the application for, extension and use of credit.
Victims are generally the providers of credit. Common credit-related schemes include: the sale
of good credit ratings to high risk applicants, false statements in credit applications, and the
creation of false credit accounts for the purpose of theft
The modus operandi of these schemes varies widely. Recently, employees of credit rating
organizations have altered credit ratings for payment, sometimes using computer techniques.
False financial statements are another common method. On a smaller scale is a fraud that
operates like shoplifting—opening a charge account with false information in order to purchase
and immediately take away goods.

See also: Loan or lendingfrauds.

Customs duty fraud: A fraud that generally arises when an importer falsely understates
the value of goods to be imported, thereby reducing the amount of customs duty paid to
that government.
See also: Commercial crime and Tax and revenue violations.

Debt consolidation or adjustment swindles: Swindles perpetrated against people who are
heavily in debt, and against their creditors, by purporting to provide a service that will
systematically organize the marshaling of the debtor’s assets and income to repay all creditors
over a period of time, with creditors refraining from pressing for immediate payment of all
sums due. There are legitimate private agencies that provide these services, and they have
similar workout procedures available after filing for bankruptcy.
The modus operandi of this fraud is often to use heavy television and newspaper advertising to
lure debtors into signing up. Sometimes the perpetrators talk creditors into waiting for their
money; in other instances they falsely tell the debtors they have been able to call the creditors
off. They then take the debtors’ assets, and a portion of their weekly or monthly earnings,
paying themselves first, and (usually only after they have their entire fee) dole out the remainder
to creditors. Frequently creditors receive little or nothing, and the debtors are left minus their
fees and still in debt.

See also: Financefraud.

Dial-back systems: A computer security system in which access to a computer is through a
dial-up system. On accepting a user ID and password, the system hangs up and dials a
predetermined number—this only works when the person dialing in works at a set location.
See also: Computer access control
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Differential association: A theory established by Edwin H. Sutherland that explains why
crime is committed. There are ten principles to his theory, which, in summary, asserts that a
person becomes a criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of the law
over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law.
Diploma mills: Outlets that grant diplomas to all people who apply for them, in exchange for
a hefty fee. Because the diploma mill is not accredited, the diplomas it grants are, therefore,
essentially worthless.

See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain, and Self-improvement schemes.
Direct manipulation of accounts: A procedure in which computer programs may be altered
to obtain direct access to allow a perpetrator to manipulate files without authorization.
See also: Computer crime.

Directory advertising schemes: Frauds arising from the selling of printed mass advertising
services. These schemes are of two basic kinds:
1. Impersonation schemes, in which con artists send bills to business enterprises that look
like those customarily received; for example, from the phone company for yellow page
advertising, with directions to make checks payable to entities that resemble legitimate
payees of the bills.
2. Schemes in which it is promised that advertising will appear in a publication distributed
to potential customers but in which, in truth and in fact, distribution will be limited to
the advertisers themselves, if the directory is printed at all.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain.

Diversion of payments from written-off accounts: The action taken by an employee who
takes advantage of the opportunity to divert payments from a customer whose account that
employee has written off. Because most companies do not monitor the activity on these
accounts, this activity is rarely detected. For example, an employee will work with a customer
to collect an overdue receivable. Before the customer pays, the employee writes off the
account—removing it from the books—pocketing the receipts.
See also: Internal fraud and Sales and collection cycle.

Double indemnity fraud: A scheme in which a beneficiary of a life insurance policy reports
an actual natural death as having been accidental in order to obtain twice the face value of the
policy.
See also: Insurancefraud and Life insurance fraud.

Double pledging collateral: Fraudulently pledging the same collateral to different lenders,
before the related liens are recorded and registered.

See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain, Landfraud, and Real estate fraud
Economic crime: A crime that is similar to white-collar crime but broader in its scope to
include violent crimes committed by people without any particular occupational status.
See also: White-collar crime.
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Economic espionage: An act in which business secrets are stolen for the benefit of another
organization.
Economic extortion: A crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained through
intimidation or persistent demands.
See also: Commercial crime.

Embezzlement and fiduciary frauds: The conversion to one’s own use or benefit of the
money or property of another, over which one has custody, to which one is entrusted, or over
which one exerts a fiduciary’s control. Victims include institutions, businesses in general,
pension funds, and beneficiaries of estates being managed by fiduciaries.
See also: Abuse oftrust, Bankingfraud, Insider trading, and Loan or lendingfrauds.

Employment agency frauds: Fraudulent solicitations of money or fees in order to find
employment for, to guarantee the employment of, or to improve the employability of another.
Victims are generally individuals seeking jobs or hoping to improve their skills to obtain better
paying employment opportunities. Variations of employment-related frauds include:
1. Phony job agencies, that is, an agency that solicits advance fees to find employment for
the victim, when, in fact, the service is neither performed nor intended to be provided.
2. Job training frauds, that is, money is received from victims to train them for specific
employment and (1) the training is not supplied, (2) guaranteed job opportunities on
completion of training are not supplied, or (3) the training is misrepresented as being
certified or recognized by employers when it is not and does not qualify the victim for the
anticipated employment.

See also: Shams.
Energy Crisis Frauds: Frauds arising out of the sale of goods or services related to energy or
fuel use, saving, and production. Victims are generally individual consumers interested in
stretching their dollars spent on energy sources, or energy saving methods, or both. Energy
schemes include the following:
• Merchandise schemes: sale of worthless or bogus items that do not deliver the specific
benefits promised or the degree of benefit promised, for example, carburetor gadgets to
save gasoline or phony solar heating systems. Often these frauds occur because of the
novelty of the items involved combined with the naivete of the victims.

• Weights and measures violations: short weighing or measuring of fuels to customers, for
example, manipulation of gas pump measuring devices, or misrepresentation of fuel by
changing octane ratings on fuel pumps.
• Distributor’s discriminatory allocation of fuel: distribution to subdistributors and
retailers, in consideration of commercial bribes to distributors’ executives or special
payments to companies with the power to make distribution in the form of under-thetable payments or required purchases of other items—useful or not needed—in violation
of antitrust or other laws.
See also: Antitrust offenses, Commercial bribery, Merchandising schemes, and Weights and measure
violations.
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Entering false transactions: Entering invoices for fake vendors into the accounts payable
system, or recording false credit memos to accounts receivable.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle and Sales and collection cycle.
Entering phony file maintenance transactions: Performing file maintenance transactions
such as changing a customer’s address or adding a new employee to the payroll. Phony file
maintenance transactions can lay the groundwork for any number of frauds, for example, the
use of ghost employees to embezzle funds.
See also: Computer crime, Payroll and personnel cycle, and Sales and collection cycle.
Environmental abuse: Business behavior that can harm the environment. Considered
crimes, the two major practices are pollution and misuse of natural resources. Businesses
commit these crimes to avoid the costs associated with compliance.
See also: Commercial crime, Natural resource abuse, and Pollution.

Ethics: Principles or standards of human conduct.
Evidence: Material that generally takes one of three forms—oral evidence, written evidence,
or physical evidence—and is presented as proof in a trial or other hearing to convince the trier
of fact (that is, judge, jury, mediator, arbitrator, and so on) about the facts and allegations.

Expert witness: A person who has special knowledge or training not possessed by ordinary
people; or one skilled in a particular profession or trade through experience, education, or
training. Expert witnesses can provide opinions in court, whereas lay witnesses can only
provide evidence regarding their physical experiences—what they saw, smelled, heard, tasted
or touched.

See also: Forensic accountant.

External fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by arms-length parties who are
external to the organization (that is, either individuals or corporations).
See also: Commercial crime, Externalfraudfor personal gain, and Internal fraud.

External fraud for personal gain: Fraud committed against an organization by arms-length
parties who are external to the organization, that is motivated by personal gain to the individual
committing the fraud.
See also: Commercial crime and Externalfraud.
Failure to enter file maintenance instructions: Failure to input information into the
computer system because of an intention to deceive. For example, deliberately not updating
computer files when an employee has left the firm and thus not removing that employee from
the payroll records. An individual committing the failure might do so with the intention of
creating a ghost employee.
See also: Payroll and personnel cycle.
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False and misleading advertising: Use of untrue or deceptive promotional techniques
resulting in consumer fraud. Victims are consumers who, to their detriment, rely on the false or
misleading advertising or promotion. Noteworthy practices include:

• Advertising as a sale item one that is actually at the regular or higher price.
• Misrepresenting the size, weight, volume, or utility of an item.
• Stating false claims about an attribute that a good or service does not in fact possess.

• Misstating the true costs of a good or service through the use of confusing payment
provisions or otherwise.
See also: Bait and switch and Consumerfraud.

False applications with false credit: False information on a credit application including
overstated assets, nonexistent assets, understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue, and
understated expenses. Such credit applications are then used to obtain credit or loans, thereby
placing the lender at a higher risk than they realize.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain and Loan or lendingfraud.
False appraisals: False and inflated appraisals used to support loans for an amount larger than
the true value of the property.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain, Landfraud, and Real estatefraud.

False or fraudulent claims: Fraudulently written claims for payment for goods or services not
provided as claimed, to public or private entities. False claims may involve activities such as:

• Presentation of a bogus claim or claimant, for example, the ghost payroll situation.
• Misrepresentation of the qualifications of an otherwise ineligible claim or claimant, for
example, welfare fraud.
• Misrepresentation of the extent of payment or benefits to which a claimant is entitled,
for example, overtime-pay frauds.
• Claims for insurance benefits to which the recipient is not entitled, for example, staged
accidents.
• Claims for reimbursement for goods and services allegedly provided to nonexistent
recipients, for example, Medicaid-Medicare fraud by service providers.
The false claim will carry all the trappings of a legitimate claim and is most successfully
undertaken by individuals with a thorough knowledge of the system being defrauded. False
claims will sometimes involve the cooperation of executives or officials of the private or
governmental entity to which such claims are submitted.
See also: Commercial bribery, Frauds against government benefit programs, Ghost employees, Insurance
fraud, Medicaid-Medicarefraud, and Welfare frauds.

False expense reports: Expense reports prepared and submitted for reimbursement to an
employee that contain any combination of overstated, fictitious, or duplicated items.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle and False orfraudulent claims.
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False financial statements: False information that is generally created by upper-level
managers whose intent is not necessarily to steal, but to manipulate data to enhance
profitability and thereby earn higher bonuses, to impress the brass at headquarters, to impress
stockholders or lenders, or simply to comply with the goals imposed by senior management.
The methods of creating false financial statements include overstating revenue, overstating
assets, understating expenses, understating liabilities, and misrepresenting information in the
notes to the financial statements.
See also: Commercial crime, False statements, and Securities fraud.

False invoices: Invoices submitted by a contractor for goods that have not been delivered, or
for services that have not been performed.

See also: Commercial crime and Procurement fraud.

False mortgage security: A term used to refer to security offered for mortgage financing
purposes that is nonexistent or has a value far lower than represented.
See also: Commercial crime and Finance fraud.

False overhead charges: Fraudulently inflating costs, through the addition of bogus labor
charges or overbilling of materials, to increase profits in a cost-plus contract allowing the
contractor to keep the difference between actual and inflated costs.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain and Property improvement schemes.

False sales invoices: Altered company copies of sales invoices showing lower sales amounts
than the original bills sent to the clients. The difference between the real sale amounts and the
adjusted lower amounts are then misappropriated.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.

False statements: The concealment or misrepresentation of facts material to the decision
making process of an entity. False statements are often the means by which a fraudulent
scheme to obtain money or benefit is effected either because (among other things):
• The false statement constitutes the underlying documentation for a false claim.
• The false statement impedes discovery of the fraudulent scheme, that is, covers up the
fraud. These statements often provide the opportunity for conditioning the victim to
unquestioningly accept and approve a false claim.
See also: False or fraudulent claims, Frauds against government programs, and Ghost employees.

False supplier invoices: Suppliers’ invoices prepared and submitted for payment to the
company when no goods have been delivered; no services rendered; or that bear either an
inflated quantity, or value, or both.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle and Procurementfraud.
Finance fraud: One of several kinds of finance fraud, including:

• False mortgage security in which the mortgages are much higher than the underlying
value of the property secured by such mortgages.
• Advance fee fraud in which the victim pays a bogus corporation an up-front finder’s fee
in exchange for a promise to receive an advance on a loan.

14

Glossary
• Debt consolidation schemes in which fraudulent debt consolidation agencies make
money by organizing the debtors’ affairs and collecting and retaining most, if not all, of
the money handled on the debtor’s behalf.
• Bankruptcy fraud in which there are fraudulent conveyances, concealing assets, asset
stripping, or planned bankruptcy.

The victims of financial fraud are generally financial institutions and other organizations
that are involved in providing financing.

See also: Advance fee fraud, Bankruptcy fraud, Commercial crime, and False mortgage security.
Financial institution: Any organization engaged in receiving, collecting, transferring, paying,
lending, investing, dealing, exchanging, and servicing money and claims to money, both
domestically and internationally.

See also: Offshore banks and tax havens.
Financial statement auditing: A methodology that is used by auditors and is intended to
evaluate the level of accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of the recording of business
transactions through the use of sampling and confirmation techniques.
Forensic: Material that is “belonging to, used in, or suitable to courts of law.” This term
describes the standards that are applicable to the discipline in question—that is, a forensic
medical examiner conducts autopsies to a standard required for court purposes; and a forensic
accountant conducts financial analyses to a standard required for court purposes.
See also: Forensic accountant and Forensic standard.

Forensic accountant: An accounting practitioner who concentrates his or her professional
practice on matters necessary for testifying in court as to the findings from the investigation of
accounting and financial evidence.
See also: Forensic, Forensic accounting and Forensic standard.

Forensic accounting: A discipline involving accounting to a standard required by the
courts—criminal and civil—as well as arbitration, mediation, and other forms of business
dispute resolution that require expert evidence to a similar standard.

See also: Forensic, Forensic accountant, and Forensic standard.

Forensic standard: The criteria used in which a professional considers all the relevant
evidence that could affect his or her opinion to properly assist a court and withstand
rigorous cross-examination from counsel. The standard involves a strong understanding of
the legal system.
See also: Forensic and Forensic accountant.
Franchising frauds: Frauds arising out of business opportunity situations in which individuals
invest time, talents, and money to obtain a business enterprise, relying on others (that is, the
franchiser) to supply at prearranged rates specified goods and services such as necessary
business structures, the goods to be sold or materials from which goods can be made,
advertising, and an exclusive territorial market or market area for the franchisee’s output.
Victims generally invest their major assets in what are fraudulent franchise opportunities.
Frauds in franchises generally arise because one or more of the following occurs:
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1. The franchiser has no intention of honoring on any of its obligations; that is, the franchise
is a complete ruse to acquire the victim-franchisee’s initial investment monies.

2. The franchiser fails to provide promised goods or services essential to the success of the
franchise.
3. The franchiser makes success for franchisee either difficult or impossible by allowing too
many franchises in a given locale or market area.

4. The franchiser has misrepresented the market or demand for goods or services central to
the franchise, or has misrepresented the level of skills needed to realize franchise
profitability.
Item (1) in the list above is outright fraud, while Items (2)-(4) are variations that range from
fraud to shady dealing to failure to fulfill contractual obligations.
See also: Business opportunity schemes and Chain referral schemes.

Fraud: The criminal deception intended to financially benefit the deceiver. The deception
must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.
See also: Commercial crime, Externalfraud, Externalfraudfor personal gain, and Internalfraud.
Fraud auditing: A methodology that is used by fraud auditors to find transactions that differ
from the normal series of transactions generally processed (usually because they are inaccurate
or incomplete), and that represent the accounting entries associated with a fraud. To find such
transactions, the fraud auditor requires a mindset that relies on creativity as much as it does on
reasoning. It also requires the fraud auditor to think, but not act, like a thief.

See also: Financial statement auditing.
Frauds against government benefit programs: Unlawful applications for and receipt of
money, property, or benefit from public programs designed to confer money, property, or
benefit under specific guidelines. Victims are federal, state, and local governments, their
taxpayers, and qualified, intended beneficiaries of such programs. Typical kinds of frauds
suffered by government programs include:
• Misrepresentations of applicants’ qualifications concerning program eligibility; for
example, welfare received by ineligible persons.
• False billing or vouchering in which public programs make good on false claims for
services not rendered or for nonexistent beneficiaries; for example, physician’s claims
under Medicaid-Medicare programs for patients not treated, or for specific treatments
not provided.
• Inflated billing, vouchering or claiming, by which public programs are charged more
than allowable costs; for example, housing fraud in which the cost of construction is
inflated so that the builder or owner receives more than the total cost of land and
buildings, and avoids making the investment required by law and administrative
guidelines.
• Embezzlement, by which employees or officials of public programs convert funds,
property, or benefits to their own use (often via their custodial or fiduciary relationship
to the program), for example, licensed dispensers of food stamps converting them to
their own use.
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• Misuse of properly obtained funds, in which money, property, or benefit conferred
under very specific guidelines concerning end use are received and utilized for
unauthorized ends; for example, receipt of federal loan funds (such as student
educational loans) with failure to use such for specified purposes.
See also: Embezzlement and fiduciary funds, False or fraudulent claims, False statements, MedicaidMedicare fraud, and Welfare frauds.

Fraudulent disbursement: The theft (embezzlement) of a company’s cash caused by an
employee who uses company checks either to withdraw cash directly for his or her own benefit
or pay personal expenses.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.

Front-end fraud: The improper direction given to a company’s customers to take their
business elsewhere, thereby depriving the company of profits it could otherwise have earned.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.

Funeral frauds: A class of guilt-inducement frauds that rely on the emotional stress of victims
who have lost, or are about to lose, loved ones through death. Victims are the relatives or
friends of deceased or terminally ill people. Funeral-related frauds often are consumer and
merchandising schemes and generally involve one or more of the following:
1. The perpetrator relies on the guilt or anxiety of bereaved relatives. Victims are
persuaded to contract for unnecessary or unduly elaborate funeral services or
merchandise.
2. The perpetrator bills for funeral expenses that include charges for services not
performed (here the fraud artist relies on victim anxiety or guilt to preclude the memory
of whether a particular service was performed or not, or to preclude the victim’s
challenge of the bill for payment, or both.)

3. The perpetrator states that services or goods in connection with burial are legally
required, when in fact they are not.
4. The perpetrator arranges contracts for future provision of goods or services in
connection with funeral and burial arrangements when in reality he or she has neither
the intention nor the capacity to provide them; for example, the sale of nonexistent
cemetery plots.
See also: Consumerfraud, Guilt-inducementfrauds, and Merchandisingfrauds.
Generic-risk factors: Risk factors, which in the context of fraud and the environmental factors
that promote the occurrence of fraud, are largely within the control of the organization or entity
that is protecting itself, and largely outside the control of potential perpetrators.
See also: Individual riskfactors.

Ghost employees: A payroll fraud in which the embezzler enters the names of fictitious
employees into the payroll system and receives the resulting payroll checks. Fictitious
employees are commonly referred to as ghosts. In one variation of this scheme, the fraud artist
keeps the names of individuals whose employment has terminated for several pay periods after
they leave their job. The embezzler then receives the paychecks for the former employee. In
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another variation of the ghost payroll, the fraud artist develops an overtime-pay scheme in
which false claims are made for overtime work performed by bona fide employees.

See also: False or fraudulent claims and Payroll and personnel cycle.

Guilt inducement frauds: Frauds perpetrated via the tactic of inducing guilt or anxiety in the
victim concerning his or her relationship or obligations to another person who is significant to
the victim (that is, a child, parent, or spouse). Victims are individuals who, susceptible to the
guilt or anxiety induced by the fraud operator, are persuaded to part with money or property in
the belief that the questioned transaction will atone for any shortcomings or fulfill obligations they
have toward another.
Because guilt inducement is a major tactic used to secure voluntary victim action, it cuts
across many fraud areas. Some examples of the dynamics of these frauds are noted below:

• Encyclopedia salespeople induce victims to enter into purchase contracts for books,
having suggested to the victims that imminent scholastic failure of their children can be
expected if the purchase is not made—here a potential merchandising fraud is
consummated by the offender’s capacity to induce parental anxiety in victims.
• Children of deceased parents are persuaded to purchase elaborate and unnecessary
funeral arrangements construed by the fraud operator to constitute a decent burial. The
implication in funeral frauds is that failure to buy the most expensive items, or close
checking of the details of bills, are tantamount to lack of affection or respect for the
deceased.
• Unnecessary and imprudent expenditures for life insurance are made by many wage
earners, to whom it is suggested that failure to subscribe to the policies constitutes a
failure to one’s spouse and family.
• Self-improvement merchandise and facilities are marketed to victims on the basis of
such guilt inducements as “you owe it to your spouse to be as (lovely, manly, successful)
as you can be” or “you can only be a failure if you fail to take advantage of opportunities
to improve your (looks, job, speaking ability).”
See also: Funeralfrauds and Self-improvement schemes.

Health care fraud: There are a wide variety of health care frauds that have recently been
the subject of media attention. Although many health care frauds are committed by
individuals, businesses are also involved. For example, violating occupational health and
safety laws, and marketing drugs that have not been adequately tested or for which the test
results have been falsified.

See also: Commercial crime, Health insurance fraud, Medicaid-Medicare fraud, and Medical frauds.

Health insurance fraud: There are several forms of health insurance fraud; for instance
mobile labs, bundling or unbundling claims, or collusion between an insured and a provider to
claim health insurance for his or her own benefit.
See also: Bundling and unbundling claims, Externalfraudfor personal gain, Health care fraud,
Insurance fraud, and Mobile labs.

Home repair or improvement frauds: Frauds arising from the provision of goods and
services in connection with the repair, maintenance, or general improvement of housing units.
Victims are generally homeowners but may also include public agencies or programs that
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subsidize or underwrite home purchase and ownership. Home repair or improvement frauds
include the following practices:

1. Intentionally shoddy or incompetent workmanship.
2. Sale of over-priced or unfit materials or services for home repair projects.

3. Failure to provide services or goods paid for by the customer.
4. Submission of false claims for materials or work not provided.
5. Misrepresentation of the need for particular materials or services to be performed.

6. Misrepresentation or concealment of the costs of credit, or of the nature of liens securing
the payment obligations.
The victim may be told that the home is in violation of building codes or in a condition
substandard to the rest of the neighborhood, endangering the value of the home, or the safety
of the victim’s family.

See also: Consumerfraud, Merchandisingfrauds, and Repairfraud.

Homicide for profit: A homicide case in which a victim is murdered for a financial gain of
the murderer or the person who hires the murderer. Insurance companies are also victims in
these crimes because of the insurance policy payments that are made to the beneficiaries of the
policies.
See also: Homicide fraud, Insurance fraud, and Life insurance fraud.

Homicide fraud: A fraud in which a beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the policy
owner in order to collect benefits.
See also: Homicide for profit, Insurance fraud, and Life insurance fraud.

Income tax fraud: Generally, a scheme in which a taxpayer willfully attempts to evade a tax
by any means including filing false or fraudulent returns.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain.
Individual risk factors: Risk factors, which in the context of fraud and the environmental
factors that promote the occurrence of fraud, change from person to person, and can even
change for the same individual over time. They are only partially within the control of the
organization or entity that is protecting itself, and this control is more difficult to exercise
because it applies to each individual separately. Whenever turnover occurs, the individual risk
factors change and must be managed.
See also: Generic riskfactors.

Inflated costs: Expenses that have been artificially inflated and invoiced when a contractor is
paid on a cost-plus basis; that is the actual cost of the job, plus a certain profit based on a
percentage of the costs.

See also: Commercialfraud and Procurementfraud.

Input tampering: A computer scheme that can be accomplished by altering, forging, or
fabricating computer input documents. In an entity with inadequate logical access control
(which is common for small businesses), input tampering is quite easy to accomplish.

See also: Computer crime.
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Insider trading: Benefiting oneself, or others in whom one has an interest, by trading on
privileged information or position. Typical situations include those in which a corporate officer
or director trades in the stock of his or her company on the basis of inside information as to
prospective profits or losses; bank officers lending money to themselves or businesses in which
they have an interest; corporate executives or purchasing officials setting up suppliers of goods
and services to contract with their companies, and so on.
See also: Abuse oftrust, Bankingfraud, Commercial bribery, and Securitiesfraud.

Insurance fraud: Fraud perpetrated by or against insurance companies. Victims may be the
clients or stockholders of insurance companies or the insurer itself. Insurance fraud breaks
down into the following categories and subclasses:
1. Frauds perpetrated by insurers against clients or stockholders include:

• Failure, when a claim is made, to provide the coverage promised and paid for.
• Failure to compensate or reimburse properly on claims.
• Manipulation of risk classes and high-risk policy holder categories.
• Embezzlement or abuse of trust in management of premium funds and other assets of
insurance companies.
• Twisting, that is, illegal sales practices in which the insurer persuades customers to
cancel current policies and to purchase new replacement ones.

2. Frauds perpetrated by insureds against insurance providers include:
• Filing of bogus claims for compensation or reimbursement, or of multiple claims for
the same loss from different insurers, and so on.
• Inflating reimbursable costs on claim statements.
• Paying bribes or kickbacks to local agents to retain coverage or to obtain coverage in
an improper risk category.
• Failing to disclose information or false statements made in application for insurance.
See also: Abuse oftrust, Casualty insurance fraud, Double indemnity, False orfraudulent claims,
Homicide fraud, Legitimate accidents with false claims, Life insurance fraud, Mortgage insurancefraud,
Personal injury insurance fraud, Staged accidents, and Staged death fraud.

Intellectual property theft: The theft of assets, which can have immense value, ranging
from business plans to trade secrets. Intellectual property is generally synonymous with
intellectual work, but carries a clear emphasis on the value of the work as an asset in a
financial sense.

Internal fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by its employees, officers, or
directors.
See also: Externalfraud.
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Internet authentication: A rapidly evolving computerized security measure used to
identify a specific Internet user and to send information across the Internet safely. With
more and more people telecommuting, many companies are taking advantage of low-cost,
high-bandwidth Internet connections, and therefore find Internet authentication a valuable
tool.

See also: Computer access control.

Inventory and warehousing cycle: The cycle of a business that handles functions relating to
the purchase and warehousing of merchandise for manufacture, or resale, or both.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.

Investment frauds: Frauds in which victims, induced by the prospect of capital growth and
high rates of return, invest money in imprudent, illusory, or bogus projects or businesses.
Investment frauds generally victimize those with a pool of liquid or convertible assets. Victims
can include retirees or near-retirement-age people, widows and widowers, and high-income
professionals and businesspeople. The hallmarks of many of these frauds are as follows:

• The investment promises a higher-than-average rate of return.
• The investment project is still in development, that is, the project or business is not a
mature entity.
• The buyer purchases the investment from a stranger.
• The investment has a generalized definition of its nature and scope, and lacks detailed
plans for measuring any progress.
• The object or site of the investment is geographically remote or distant from investors.

• The seller fails to fully disclose facts that are material to the investor prior to his or her
commitment of money.
• The seller is not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or
comparable state regulatory agencies.
• The seller promises special advantages, for example, tax benefits.
See also: Landfraud, Ponzi schemes, Pyramid schemes, and Securitiesfraud.

Investor frauds: Frauds in which the perpetrator uses techniques to persuade people who
possess limited financial or investment expertise to invest in the perpetrator’s company to
produce a quick return or benefit to the perpetrator.
See also: Commercial crime.

Kickbacks: A form of off-book fraud that refers to schemes in which the funds used for
illegal payments or transfers are not drawn from the payer’s regular company bank
account, and the payments do not appear on the payer’s books and records. In collusion
with suppliers, a purchasing agent may get paid a kickback for any number of activities
including: allowing the vendor to submit fraudulent billing and approving the payment,
excess purchasing of property or services, or bid rigging.
See also: Commercial crime, Procurement fraud, Off-bookfrauds, and Secret commissions.
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Kickbacks to customers: Schemes that include underbilling for merchandise and splitting the
difference, and writing off receivables owed to the company for a fee.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.

Land fraud: An investment fraud that involves the sale of land, based on extensive
misrepresentations as to value, quality, facilities, or state of development Victims are usually
individuals buying land for retirement, investment, or both simultaneously. Land frauds usually
consist of the sale of land or of interests in land:

1. To which the seller has no present title or claim of right; that is, the seller cannot
properly transfer title or interest to the buyer as represented at the time of the sale.
2. About which a misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact has occurred.
3. At inflated or unjustified prices based on misrepresentations made to the purchaser.
4. On the promise of future performance or development, which the seller neither intends
to provide nor can reasonably expect to occur. Misrepresentations usually involve
presence of utilities, water, roads, recreational facilities, credit terms, and so on.
See also: Investmentfrauds.

Landlord-tenant frauds: Unlawful practices involving the leasing or renting of property.
Common fraud practices by landlords include: keeping two sets of books—that is, tax
violations, schemes to avoid return of security deposits, rental of property to which one has no
title claim or right, deliberate and persistent violations of safety and health regulations, and
failure to provide heat or services, and so on.
Lapping: An internal fraud relating to accounts receivable collections in which a customer’s
payment is embezzled by the perpetrator, and is then recorded as paid sometime after receipt
of a subsequent payment from another customer (thereby “stealing from Peter to pay Paul”) —
that is, the payment from customer A is diverted by the employee. To keep customer A from
complaining, the payment from customer B is applied to customer A’s account. Customer C’s
payment is applied to customer B’s account, and so on.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.

Legitimate accidents with false claims: A scheme in which individuals get involved in
legitimate accidents and later exaggerate their personal injuries in order to collect excessive
amounts from insurance companies.
See also: Casualty insurance fraud and Insurance fraud.
Legitimate front: A form of money laundering that involves opening a legitimate front
business, which handles a great deal of cash, and then depositing the ill-gotten gains to disguise
its illegal source along with the legitimate income of the business.

See also: Money laundering.
Life insurance fraud: Any form of fraud whereby the victim is a life insurance company. For
instance, a policy beneficiary commits homicide or fakes his own death to collect benefits from
the insurer, or a beneficiary reports the policy owner’s death as having been accidental in order
to obtain twice the face value of a double indemnity policy.
See also: Double indemnity, Homicidefraud, Insurance fraud, and Staged death fraud.

22

Glossary

Loan or lending fraud: Unlawful practice arising out of the lending or borrowing of money.
Victims may be financial institutions, the stockholders of financial institutions, or borrowers.
Loan fraud generally involves either the failure to disclose relevant information, which would
bear on the extension or granting of a loan, or the provision of false information, or both.
When perpetrated by borrowers, loan fraud may take the form of:
1. False statements, whereby a loan to which one is not entitled is fraudulently obtained.
2. Improper use of legitimately obtained loans, whereby improper use was intended at the
time the loan application was made.
3. Larceny by false pretenses by which a loan is obtained with no intention of repayment.
When perpetrated by the lending officer, loan fraud may take the form of:

1. Lending to oneself through ghost accounts.

2. Lending to friends or entities in which one has an interest.
3. Commercial bribery.
4. Advance fee schemes, by which borrowers remit money to secure a loan that is not
forthcoming or for which no payment was necessary.
A separate and important dimension of loan fraud involves the misuse or misrepresentation of
items of collateral and collateral accounts.
See also: Abuse oftrust, Banking violations, Collateralfrauds, and False statements.

Loans to nonexistent borrowers: A scheme in which the borrower uses a false identity to
obtain a loan. This scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower or with the
assistance of an insider, such as a loan officer.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain and Loan or lendingfraud.

Manipulating computer inputs: One of the most frequent bases of computer crime through
the use of false inputs—for example, entering false transactions in the system, modifying actual
transactions, or in some schemes, not entering information into the system that should have
been entered.
See also: Computer crime.

Market manipulation fraud: See Insider trading.
Medicaid-Medicare fraud: Fraudulent practices arising in connection with the receipt or
provision of health care services under government-financed Medicare or Medicaid programs.
These frauds are nearly always perpetrated by health care providers (both professionals and
facility operators) against the government financing the programs, or the intended beneficiaries
of the programs, or both. Specific Medicaid-Medicare fraud practices include:

• Ping-ponging: referring patients to other doctors in a clinic in order to claim
reimbursements for the “consultation” rather than for bona fide patient treatment or
observation.
• Upgrading: billing for services not provided.
• Steering: sending patients to a particular pharmacy, medical lab, and so on, for required
prescriptions or services, and receiving improper payments in return.
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• Shorting: delivering less medication—for example, pills—than prescribed while
charging for full amount.
• Procurement abuses: establishing supply-purchase arrangements with firms that pay
kickbacks to health care facilities or providers with firms that are owned by those
controlling the facility itself.

• False claims: submitting claims for payment by the government for patients who do not
exist, or who were never seen or treated.
See also: False orfraudulent claims, Frauds against government benefit programs, Kickbacks, and
Procurement fraud.

Medical frauds: Unlawful activities arising out of the provision and sale of bogus, highly
questionable or dangerous medical services, cures, or medications. Victims are often
individuals who have been given little hope of recovery or improvement by the traditional
medical establishment and desperately seek any promise of ameliorating their conditions. Also
victimized are people who are poorly informed and thus vulnerable to claims made by medical
fraud artists, often in such areas as beauty treatments and cosmetics. Medical frauds generally
include one or more of the following abuses:

1. Quackery: false representation of oneself as a legally trained and licensed health care
professional.
2. Fake cures: sale of bogus or highly questionable cures for specific illnesses or diseases.
3. Misrepresentations of medication: misrepresentations as to the therapeutic value of
medications, or intentional omissions made regarding known side effects of medications,
or both.
4. Misrepresentations of treatment: false statements made about the therapeutic value of a
particular treatment protocol and the degree of its acceptance or bona fide medical
practice; or omissions of material information concerning known side effects of the
treatment that would affect the patient’s choice of treatment program, or both.

See also: Medicaid-Medicare fraud.
Merchandising frauds: An umbrella term for a broad variety of consumer frauds involving
misrepresentations inducing the victims to purchase merchandise, which is either not as
represented or will never be delivered to them. These frauds usually involve one or more of the
following:

1. Representation that the item is sold at a lower than usual price, whereas it is sold at the
usual retail price or higher.
2. Misrepresentation as to the quality or utility of the merchandise.
3. Misrepresentation as to the ultimate price, or credit terms.
4. Misleading information as to warranties, cancellation of transaction, returnability of
merchandise, and validity of money-back guarantees.
5. Solicitation of money with no intention to deliver the merchandise promised.

6. Bait-and-switch frauds.
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Victims customarily buy from door-to-door salespeople or are entrapped when they respond to
newspaper, magazine, telephone, radio, or television advertisements.
See also: Consumerfrauds.

Misappropriation of accounts receivable: The diversion of payments received from
customers. An employee may open a personal bank account with a name similar to that of the
company (Acme Inc. rather than Acme Company). Customer payments can then be taken by
the employee and deposited into the employee’s bank account.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Misappropriation of trust funds: The diversion of client funds held in trust and the use of the
money for purposes other than the intended use of the funds.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain.

Mixing of funds: Commingling client funds with the funds of the brokerage firm, which then
enables the broker to post the winning trades to the brokerage firm, or the losing trades to their
clients, or both.
See also: Commercial crime and Securitiesfraud.

Mobile lab: A scheme in which a group of people set up a lab in a storefront located in a bluecollar, low income area to offer free physicals to people who have medical insurance. The
insured is subjected to extensive, expensive tests that are billed to his or her insurance
company. The mobile labs are gone when the insured returns for the test results.
See also: Health insurancefraud and Insurancefraud.

Modeling school: A scam in which fraudulent schools tell students to get a portfolio of
portraits to send to potential customers, ostensibly to enhance the possibility of the victim
getting modeling assignments. The victim is then charged greatly inflated prices for a
photographer, who is often a participant in the scam, to take the pictures for the portfolio.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain and Self-improvement schemes.

Money laundering: The process of turning “dirty” money into “clean” money to conceal the
existence, source, or use of illicit money, or to obstruct investigative efforts, preserve assets from
forfeiture, and evade taxes.

See also: Breaches ofthe reporting guidelines, Legitimate front, Offshore banks and tax havens, Offshore
facilities, and Smurfing.
Money transfer fraud: Fraud in which funds are stolen by an outsider or bank employee who
has access to the correct identification numbers needed to transfer funds by wire.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain.

Mortgage insurance fraud: A scheme in which a healthy individual, who has a mortgage
insurance policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the purchaser of the
property defaults on those payments because of death or disability, claims that he or she is
disabled in order to have the mortgage paid via this mortgage insurance policy.
See also: Casualty insurancefraud and Insurancefraud.
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Natural resource abuse: Violation of laws protecting natural resources, such as fishing,
hunting, logging, mining, and so on, as well as endangered-species legislation. Laws vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and generally apply to both noncommercial and commercial
harvesting of animals, marine life, and endangered species.

See also: Commercial crime, Environmental abuse, and Pollution.

New account fraud: The use of false identification to open new accounts and steal money
before the bank collects the funds.
See also: Checkfraud.

Nominee loans: Loans made in the name of a straw borrower or agent while the identity of
the real borrower is undisclosed to the lender.
See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain, Loan or lendingfraud, and Real estatefraud.
Nursing home abuses: A variety of frauds perpetrated by individuals who provide
institutional nursing and convalescent care to patients, particularly the aged. Victims of such
frauds are the patients of the facilities, their families, or governmental entities that subsidize the
cost of care provided to eligible patients. Forms of nursing home fraud abuses include:

• Unlawful conversion or attachment of patients’ assets.
• False claims to patient, family or government entity regarding services delivered.
• False statements in license application or renewal.
• Maintenance of fraudulent records as to general or overhead costs of operation of
facilities as a basis for false claims to governmental entities.
• Receipt of kickbacks from facility suppliers.
• Employment of inadequate or unqualified staff in violation of licensing guidelines.
See also: Embezzlement andfiduciary frauds, False orfraudulent claims, Frauds against government
benefit programs, Medicaid-Medicare fraud, and Procurement fraud.

Obtaining control: Gaining control over an existing company’s stock to ensure that other
shareholders do not undermine the promoter’s control over the supply of shares.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Off-book fraud: Fraud that occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit trail is
likely to exist.
See also: On-book fraud.

Offshore banks and tax havens: Banks or financial institutions located in tax havens that
conduct local and international business transactions in which money and other valuable
securities can be held or transferred from one jurisdiction to another, at the direction and
discretion of the assets’ owners, under the protection of secret banking privileges. The owners
of the assets direct the transactions—personally or through an intermediary, such as a trust—
and benefit from little or no taxation in their effort to minimize taxes (legally), to evade taxes
(illegally), or to avoid creditors.
See also: Money laundering and Offshorefacilities.
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Offshore facilities: Facilities available in tax havens, such as banks, financial institutions, trust
companies, agencies, and accountanting and legal firms.

See also: Money laundering and Offshore banks and tax havens.
On-book fraud: Fraud that principally occurs within a business in which an audit trail
(sometimes obscure) exists that could aid in its detection.
See also: Off-bookfraud.

Patent fraud: A form of self-improvement scheme that most closely resembles vanity
publishing frauds. In patent frauds, the con artist solicits individuals through items such as
newspaper advertisements, enticing them to send in patentable ideas or gadgets for evaluation by
experts. The evaluation, of course, usually involves a fee, or at least “further processing” of the
submission may involve a fee, thus an advance fee situation evolves. The fraud operator
generally has neither the intention nor the capacity to develop or process a patentable item.

See also: Advance fee schemes, Self-improvement schemes, and Vanity publishing schemes.
Payment of invoices to a fictitious company: A scheme in which the embezzler establishes
a fake entity (often with a post-office box for an address, and a name similar to that of a
legitimate company) and gets the fake entity entered into company records as a legitimate
vendor. The embezzler then produces invoices for the fake vendor, and then processes them in
the accounts payable system pocketing the payments made to satisfy the fake invoices.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle, Corporate shams, Procurementfraud, and Shams.

Payroll and personnel cycle: A cycle of a business that handles the hiring, firing, and
payment of employees, along with timekeeping, expense accounts and travel reimbursement,
and insurance matters.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.

Pension frauds and abuses: Thefts and fraudulent conversions of pension fund assets either
by trustees, employers, or employees. Frauds perpetuated by trustees involve the violation of
their fiduciary duty in the management of pension fund monies by poor investments tied to
self-dealing or commercial bribery and embezzlement The frauds victimize those who have
contributed to the fund and those intending to benefit from it.
Fraud perpetuated by employees includes the accrual of abnormal overtime or other similar
items to form an inflated base period on which pension payment level is established (very often
in local public sector employment situations). Victims are other employees, whose potential
benefits are reduced by the fraud of their peers or bankruptcy of the fund, as well as the
employer whose contributions to the pension plan could be inflated or lost.

See also: Abuse oftrust, Embezzlement andfiduciary frauds, Commercial bribery, and False or fraudulent
claims.
Personal injury insurance fraud: A scheme in which an individual reports a real but
overstated physical injury or a faked injury to an insurance company to recover unentitled
benefits, such as, from a tort claim or reimbursement of fake medical expenses.

See also: Casualty insurance fraud and Insurance fraud.
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Personal property pawned: A scheme in which a perpetrator inflates the value of his or her
personal belongings, insures them, and then pawns them for a lesser amount of cash. He or she
then reports them stolen and files a claim. When the insurance payment is received, he or she
then recovers the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance payment and
pockets the difference.
See also: Insurancefraud and Property insurance fraud.

Pigeon drop or pocketbook drop: One of a large variety of street con games regularly
perpetrated on gullible victims. In the scheme the victim is persuaded to withdraw a large sum
of cash from a bank account in order to show good faith or financial responsibility regarding
the sharing of a discovered cache of money with two other persons (who are con artists). In the
course of the con, both the discovered money and the victim’s good-faith money disappear, as do
the con artists. Victims may be anyone, because perpetrators of this fraud have a remarkable
ability through words to disarm their victims. Keys to the pigeon drop con are:

1. The con artists do not appear to be associated or know each other in any way.
2. A pocketbook, envelope, and so on is foundry one of the confederates, and it contains a
sizable amount of money, no owner identification, and the suggestion that the money is
illicitly generated—for example, a gambler’s proceeds.
3. An agreement to share the money is made with the victim showing good-faith (that is,
putting up money) to those involved. (Alternately, a deal is made for all to put up money
in a pool to be held by a coconspirator, the one who did not find the money).
4. A switch is made while the victim is distracted, and his or her money is stolen by one of
the confederates.

See also: Shams.

Pollution: One of many abuses in the environmental area that violate specific
environmental- and pollution-control statutes and orders. White-collar crime abuses in this
area consist primarily of the making or submitting of false statements concerning the degree
of compliance with statutes and regulations for pollution control, in order to cover up
violations or lack of compliance with environmental standards. Falsification of test or
sample data designed to measure compliance with standards represent another from of
white-collar violation in this area.
While a certain level of pollution is tolerated by today’s society, media attention has lately
been focussed on companies that have gone too far. Society is, as a whole, becoming less
tolerant of all forms of pollution, and this is reflected all the way down to the consumer-for
instance, aerosol spray cans and cigarette smoking in restaurants are no longer tolerated in
many jurisdictions. Laws have been passed to limit the levels of pollution, but not all
companies comply with the laws, usually because of the cost implications involved.
See also: Commercial crime, Environmental abuse, and False statements.

Ponzi schemes: A general class of frauds (a variation of a pyramid scheme) in which the fraud
operator uses money invested by later victims to pay a high rate of return to the first group of
investors instead of making the promised investments. These schemes must inevitably collapse
because it is mathematically impossible to continue them indefinitely. The length of time they
can continue will depend on the promised rate of return to investors, the amount of money the
fraud operator takes out for himself or herself, and the costs of inducing victims to part with
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their money (for example, sales commissions). Many such frauds have cheated victims of
millions of dollars; some frauds have operated over a period of years.
Ponzi elements exist in many varieties of investment frauds, under different guises and in
different variations; for example, long-term investments and short-term business financing.

See also: Investmentfrauds and Shams.

Possession of property obtained by crime: An offense that refers to either the actual
possession of property obtained by a crime, or to the possession of proceeds from the
disposal of property obtained by a crime. For example, when a business is suspected to be
in possession of stolen inventory (that is, property), an investigator should be able to
establish after examining the financial records whether this inventory has been legitimately
purchased. Similar reconciliations could also be performed to determine whether an
individual is in possession of property obtained by crime.

See also: Fraud.
Posting improper credits to an account: Concealing a fraud involving the sales and
collection cycle. In this scheme an employee posts credit memos or other noncash reductions
(for example, a sales return or write-off) to the customer account from which the funds were
diverted.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.

Price fixing: Illegal combinations by sellers to administer the price of a good or service, to
deprive customers of a competitive marketplace, restrain competition, and maintain an artificial
price structure.

Victims are customers of the combinations who are deprived of freely determined prices for
the goods and services they purchase. Secondary victims may be competitors of the firms
participating in the price-fixing agreement.

Often when one thinks of price fixing, one thinks of a large nationwide conspiracy among
industrial giants. While this is part of the problem, it is equally probable that many
arrangements occur at the local level. For example, in Virginia the practice of a local bar
association that set the price for title searches was held to be unlawful. In other locally
prosecuted cases, druggists have been adjudicated for fixing prices on prescription drugs.
See also: Antitrust offenses and Restraint oftrade.

Procurement fraud: Unlawful manipulation of the public or private contracting process to
obtain an advantage. Victims are competitors not participating in the fraud, the public or
private entity soliciting bids, and customers or constituents of those entities who do not realize
benefits that would be derived from a truly competitive procurement process.

Three common forms of procurement fraud are:
1. Bid rigging—that is, a form of illegal anticompetitive conduct in which bidders in a
competitive procurement collusively set their bids so as to deprive the bid solicitor of a
competitive process. The effect is an administered bidding process in which the winner
and the terms and prices of the goods and services involved in the procurement are set
by the conspirators rather than by the competitive process. Parties to the conspiracy are
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thus able to divide among themselves a set of procurement contracts and to fix prices for
goods and services at the same time.

2. Bid fixing—that is, a form of illegal manipulation of the procurement process whereby
one bidding party is provided with inside information (by the bid solicitor or an agent),
which enables the said bidder to gain an unfair advantage over other bidders.
3. Bribery and kickbacks—that is, a situation in which procurement contracts are awarded
on the basis of the payment of bribes and kickbacks to procurement officials rather than
on the basis of competitive procurement guidelines.

See also: Commercial bribery, False orfraudulent claims, Kickbacks, and Public or official corruption.

Product substitution: A scheme in which contractors substitute a lesser product or service,
which costs much less then the one promised, and keep the cost difference without the
knowledge of the purchaser. The purchaser is charged for the higher product or service.
See also: Commercial crime, Externalfraud, Procurementfraud, and Property improvement schemes.
Property improvement schemes: A fraud that involves perpetrators who obtain business
primarily from door-to-door solicitations, promising repairs to property at bargain rates,
collecting up-front money, then absconding with the proceeds. The victims of these schemes
are usually senior citizens.

See also: External fraudfor personal gain.

Property insurance fraud: An insured reports a false theft, inflates the value of his or her
personal belongings and pawns them, or purposely destroys his or her own property to collect
a benefit from the insurer.
See also: Arson for profit, Insurance fraud, Personalproperty pawned, Repossessed household goods, and
Stagedfalse theft.

Public or official corruption: White-collar crime, which generally falls into the category of an
abuse of trust-type violation involves commercial bribery, collusion with bid-rigging, avoidance
of the competitive process in connection with the purchase of goods and services by
governmental entities, and self-dealing in connection with governmental purchases or grants of
franchises to use public property and real estate.
Most public corruption has its parallel in the private sector. Thus conflict of interest is the
public equivalent of insider trading; there is little distinction between public and commercial
bribery situations particularly when they overlap, such as in the government procurement

See also: Abuse oftrust, Commercial bribery, and Frauds against government benefits programs.
Pyramid scheme: The commercial version of the chain letter scheme, used by fraud operators
in the selling of phony investments (Ponzi Scheme), distributorships, franchises, and business
opportunity plans.
See also: Chain referral schemes, Franchisingfrauds, and Investmentfrauds.

Random personal information: Information, which only an authorized individual would
know, that is used as a means of identifying unauthorized log-in attempts to a computer
system. The computer randomly transmits a question using this information and denies
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access to the user unless it receives the right answer. If several dozen questions are on file, it
can be a very useful technique.
See also: Computer access control.

Real estate fraud: A form of loan fraud involving the purchase of under or over-valued real
estate that is committed either by individuals or corporations.

See also: Externalfraudfor personal gain, False mortgage security, and loan fraud.
Recognizing revenue in the improper period: A method used for preparing false financial
statements through the improper accruals of revenue on future, anticipated sales. Techniques
include altering dates on shipping documents or holding the books open until after shipments
have occurred.

See also: Falsefinancial statements and Recognizing revenue on transactions that do not meet the revenue
recognition criteria.
Recognizing revenue on transactions that do not meet the revenue recognition
criteria: A method of preparing false financial statements by improperly recognizing revenue
on transactions for which the earnings process is incomplete—for instance, when the right of
return exists, or bill-and-hold transactions. The items involved are often concealed through the
use of written side agreements or oral agreements that are not included with the company’s
books of account.
See also: Falsefinancial statements and Recognizing revenue in the improper period.

Recording fictitious sales: A form of covering up a fraud by using the sales and collection
cycle and involves, for example, recording sales to nonexistent customers, or recording phony
sales to legitimate customers.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Referral sales schemes: See Chain referral schemes and Merchandisingfrauds.

Repair fraud: A form of consumer fraud involving repairs or maintenance services performed
on consumer goods. The schemes generally involve:

• Overcharging for services performed.
• Charging for services and parts not used.
• Performing services or repairs not wanted or needed.
• Failing to perform services or repairs promised.

See also: Consumerfraud.

Repossessed household goods: A scheme in which household items are repossessed and the
insured reports to the carrier that the property was stolen in order to fraudulently get the
proceeds.
See also: Insurancefraud and Property insurance fraud.

Repurchasing: A scheme in a stock market manipulation in which the promoter buys back
control of the company when the stock price reaches rock bottom.

See also: Stock market manipulation.
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Restraint of trade: Actions, combinations, or schemes that interfere with unfettered
marketplace transactions. Examples are: price fixing, bribery and kickbacks for commercial
advantage; interference with competitive bidding processes, dictation of price structure to
customers or dealers; and exclusive buying arrangements.
See also: Commercial bribery, Pricefixing, and Procurementfraud.

Sales and collection cycle: The billing of goods or services to customers, the setting up of
accounts receivable for customers who purchase goods or services on credit, and the collection
of funds relating to those receivables.
Secret commissions: The most common form of procurement fraud. It involves the receipt of
a secret payment, usually from a supplier to a purchasing agent for the influence the purchasing
agent wields on his or her employer’s decision-making in a way to favor the payer.
See also: Bribery, Commercial crime, Kickbacks, and Procurementfraud.

Securities fraud: Fraudulent activities involving the sale, transfer, or purchase of securities or
of money interests in the business activities of others. Victims are generally securities investors
who are not aware of the full facts regarding transactions into which they enter. Abuses cover a
broad range, and can include, for example, situations where:
• Businesses or promoters seek to raise capital unlawfully or without proper registration
and oversight.
• Securities of no value are sold, or are misrepresented to be worth more than their actual
value.
• Purchasers are not advised of all facts regarding securities, or of the failure to file
appropriate disclosures with federal and state regulatory agencies, or both.
• Insiders use special knowledge to trade in securities to the disadvantage of the general
public, which lacks the knowledge.
• Broker-dealers and investment advisers act for their own benefit rather than for the
benefit of their clients.
• False information is provided to security holders and the investing public in financial
statements published or filed with securities regulatory agencies, or in the media as a
result of payments to financial writers or publications.
• Manipulation of the price of securities by purchases and sales occurs in stock exchange
or over-the-counter markets.
Securities violations potentially exist whenever investors rely on others to manage and conduct
the business in which an investment is made. It is not necessary that there be any formal
certificates such as stocks and bonds. Any form of investment agreement is potentially a
security.
See also: Advance fee schemes, Boiler rooms, False statements, Insider trading, and Investmentfrauds.

Self-improvement schemes: Frauds that appeal to the victims’ desires to improve themselves
personally or financially, by the acquisition of social, employment skills, or physical skills or
attributes.

Schemes in this category tend to run on a continuum from improving purely personal or social
skills and attributes to those tied to an individual’s employment opportunities. On the personal
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end of the scale are the dance studio or charm school schemes; on the employment end of the
scale are fraudulent job training schemes and advance fee employment agencies.
Somewhere in the middle are modeling agencies that purport to improve both the person and
his or her employment prospects. Also included here are courses on improving one’s image or
ability to communicate with others. Some business opportunity schemes, which hold out the
prospect of financial improvement plus “being a respected community businessperson,” also
fall into this category by appealing to the victim’s desire to improve his or her finances and
lifestyle.
See also: Business opportunityfraud, Employment agency frauds, and Vanity publishing schemes.
Setting up a distribution network: A term used in stock market manipulation. The network
is set up with the promoter as its head with several distributors associated with the promoter all
located in cities that have facilities for trading the stock in question. Each distributor has access
to a brokerage house’s sales force, who in turn have access to the floor traders who will be
executing the trades. Via this network, the promoter has control over trading in the subject
stock.

See also: Stock market manipulation.
Sham transactions: Schemes in which transactions give the impression of legitimate
transactions at higher prices. For example, a perpetrator sells assets at inflated prices to an
outside entity, and simultaneously buys assets at inflated prices from that same entity. These
transactions are particularly difficult to detect because they involve collusion with a
coconspirator outside the entity.

See also: Corporate shams and Shams.
Shams: An imitation or counterfeit purporting to be genuine. The perpetrator intentionally
gives a false impression in order to obtain money from the victims by various means.

See also: Commercial crime, Corporate shams, Ponzi schemes, and Sham transactions.
Short weighting or loading: Deliberate shorting of the volume or quantity of a cargo, or
other purchase, accompanied by a false claim (that is, invoice) demanding payment for the full
amount Such frauds are easiest to perpetrate where the goods involved are of such nature or
bulk that it is difficult for the receiver to detect shortages. The reverse of the short weighting or
loading fraud is often used as a modus operandi for diversions (that is, thefts) of cargo. In this
situation a transport vehicle is intentionally overloaded; the overage is not recorded (that is,
false statement by omission), and the overloaded amount forms the basis of kickbacks to
scheme operators by the recipients of the shipments (that is, often fences of stolen goods).
Manipulation of the size or volume of loads must always be accompanied by false claims or
false statements, since accompanying documentation or invoices do not reflect the fraudulent
changes in the load size.
This violation involves either a false claim to a customer, or a plain and simple theft from the
shipper. Because insiders are frequently involved, it will often involve commercial bribery,
kickbacks, and so on. It may also involve federal prohibitions on the interstate shipment of
stolen property.

See also: Weights and measures violations.
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Single family housing loan fraud: Misapplication of funds by a borrower who purchases
single family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality is purchasing rental
properties for resale.

See also: Loan or lendingfraud.

Siphoning funds: A scheme in which funds are siphoned in small amounts from a large
number of accounts. For example, pennies and portions of pennies (resulting from rounding
off) can be shaved from thousands of savings accounts. The money is then accumulated in a
single account that is accessed by the embezzler.
See also: Bankingfraud.

Skimming: A scheme in which cash is skimmed before it enters the accounting system. For
example, an employee accepts cash but never prepares a receipt, or prepares a receipt for less
than the amount received.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.

Smurfing: The use of couriers (also known as smurfs) to go to financial institutions to deposit
and withdraw cash or cash equivalents in amounts less than the reporting limit of the Internal
Revenue Service to avoid reporting requirements.
See also: Money laundering.

Staged accidents: A scheme in which fraudulent claims are made for nonexistent personal
injuries. For example, an individual purposely pulls out in front of an oncoming vehicle or gets
rear-ended in order to cause a collision.
See also: Casualty insurance fraud and Insurancefraud.

Staged death fraud: A scheme in which an insured fakes his or her own death in order to
collect benefits.
See also: Insurancefraud and Life insurance fraud.

Staged false theft: A scheme in which an insured hides property he or she owns, and reports
it stolen, or alternatively reports property stolen that was never owned.

See also: Insurancefraud and Property insurance fraud.
Stock market manipulation: A crime perpetrated by a stock promoter who artificially
influences the market price of shares in a company for personal gain at the expense of the
investing public.
See also: Commercial crime and Securities fraud.

Substituting personal checks for cash: A scheme in which an employee takes money from
the cash register and substitutes a personal check. In that way, the cash drawer is always in
balance, but the employee never submits the personal check for deposit to the company’s bank
account. Consequently, the employee receives free use of the cash.

Suspicion: A concern, which is backed by little, if any, evidence, that a party has or may have
committed fraud.
See also: Allegation.
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Talent agency schemes: See Self-improvement schemes or Vanity publishing schemes.
Tax violations: Frauds perpetrated with the intent to deprive a taxing authority of revenues to
which it is entitled, or of information it needs in order to make a judgment regarding revenues
to which it is entitled, or to avoid admission of involvement in illicit, though profitable, business
activities.

Tax frauds may be perpetrated through the filing of false returns, as in personal income tax
frauds; through the bribery of public officials, as may occur in property tax assessment frauds;
or in the failure to file appropriately, as with an organized crime-figure who may not be
concerned with avoiding tax liability but rather with revealing the sources of his or her taxable
income. Many white-collar crimes obligate the offender to commit tax fraud because of illicitly
obtained monies he or she does not wish to report, for example, assets resulting from bribes,
larcenies, kickbacks or embezzlements. Common crimes, especially of a business nature, may
also result in tax violations, for example, bookmaking and fencing of stolen goods; both could
be income and sales tax abuses.
Tax avoidance through false statements may be a component of otherwise legitimate business
enterprises, especially in areas of business and occupation taxes, inventory taxes, and sales
taxes. Individuals and businesses will also seek to avoid or evade excise taxes, for example, on
cigarettes or in the case of tanker trucks by substitution of low-taxed home heating oil for
higher-taxed diesel fuel.
See also Income taxfraud.

Theft of inventory for personal use: A fraud that is most likely to happen when the items
are small and easy to steal, and the items have value to an employee as a consumer. For
example, a laptop computer is more likely to be stolen for personal use because it has the
physical characteristics that make it susceptible to theft, plus the employee can use it
immediately.
See also: Inventory and warehousing cycle, Sales and collection cycle, and Theft ofinventory for sale.

Theft of inventory for sale: The theft of inventory of a company that doesn’t have value to
the employee as a consumer, because the goods won’t be used for personal use. Instead, the
employee then sells the goods to someone who has use for the stolen goods. For example, a
receiving department employee signs a report stating that one hundred units were received but
only ninety are stocked in the warehouse and ten are placed in the trunk of the employee’s car.
The missing units may not be discovered until the year-end physical inventory count. For
larger inventory items that are more difficult to transport, the receiving personnel may collude
with the vendor’s delivery personnel.
See also: Inventory and warehousing cycle, Sales and collection cycle, and Theft of inventory for personal
use.

Theft of scrap: Theft of scrap can be significant especially when the thief has the ability to
inappropriately designate saleable inventory as scrap. In most companies, inventory scrap is
not recorded or well controlled, which makes it easy to steal. For example, a hospital employee
was convicted of stealing used x-rays, and selling the silver reclaimed from the plates.
See also: Procurementfraud.
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Time-Day controls: Controls that restrict personnel access to computer systems to those
times when they are supposed to be on duty. An extension of this concept using automated
time-clock systems is to deny access and report a violation if access is attempted when an
employee is not shown in the time clock system as being authorized to be present.

See also: Computer access control.

Unauthorized instructions: Commands placed by a computer programmer into a computer
program so that the computer will perform unauthorized functions. For example, making
payments to a vendor not listed on an approved list.
See also: Computer crime.
Understating beginning inventory balances: A method used to conceal a fraud involving
inventory shortages or theft, or involving false financial reporting. The most common method
for understating beginning inventory is to overstate the allowance for inventory obsolescence.
For example, understating may be perpetrated when there has been a change in management
and current management wishes to report improved profitability.
See also: Falsefinancial statements and Inventory and warehousing cycle.

Unnecessary purchases: Inventory ordered specifically for personal use, theft, or scrap
proceeds. The embezzlements are then charged to inventory.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle, Inventory and warehousing cycle, and Procurementfraud.

Vanity publishing schemes: Schemes that involve eliciting fees from individuals on the
promise of promoting their creative talent (real or imaginary), or assisting them in the
development of said talent.

These frauds rely on the vanity of the victim (that is, his or her belief that he or she has a
creative talent that has not as yet been discovered). Generally these schemes relate to
creative endeavors in which clear performance standards regarding the talent are not
available and are often a matter of taste, such as literary publishing or song writing.
The scheme operator will imply a promise of national advertising, book reviews, distribution,
and special marketing services, but not so concretely that he or she will be held to any implied
promise. The victims usually invest heavily, and lose both their money and their hopes. They
are left with a few copies of a printed and scored song arrangement, or a number of copies of
books, which established book review publications have not troubled to look at because of their
publishing source.

See also: Self-improvement schemes.
Warehousing: A scheme in a stock market manipulation that places shares into the hands of
people who are friendly to the promoter—warehousing or parking—in order to maintain
control of the shares and continue to restrict and regulate the supply of shares available.
See also: Stock market manipulation.

Wash trading: A technique in a stock market manipulation process involving a large volume
of transactions that are conducted within the promoter’s group and used to encourage the
public’s interest and increase demand for the promoted stock.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
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Weights and measures violations: Abusive practices involving the cheating of customers by
failure to deliver prescribed quantities or amounts of desired goods. These violations usually
involve false statements or claims in which the victim has relied on the seller’s representation of
the delivered quantity when remitting a fraudulent higher payment. Examples of these white
collar crimes include:

• Gas pump meter manipulation to show more gas pumped than received by the
customer.
• A butcher’s thumb placed on the meat scale while weighing goods.
• Odometer rollbacks in auto sales.

These frauds are most successful when the victim cannot easily verify weights or measuring
devices, or when the victim has no reason to question the seller’s claim or statement, for
example, when the products sold are bottled or packaged.

See also: Short weighting or loading.

Welfare frauds: Abuses associated with government income and family subsidy programs.
Government welfare programs are often exploited by applicants who apply for benefits to
which they are not entitled, or continue to claim eligibility when they no longer meet the
established criteria for aid.
Receipt of monies from claimants by officials processing welfare claims represents another
dimension of this fraud area. The monies may be solicited as kickbacks in exchange for
inflated claims filed, as bribes to certify claimants who are ineligible or to avoid reporting
claimants’ ineligibility, or as extortion for processing claims to which a recipient is fully
eligible. In some cases nonexistent recipients (that is, ghosts) may be created to fraudulently
siphon money out of the programs.
See also: Frauds against government benefit programs.

White-collar crime: A nonviolent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception
by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional, or semiprofessional and
using their special occupational skills and opportunities; also nonviolent crime for financial gain
using deception and committed by anyone having special technical and professional
knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the person’s occupation.
See also: Commercial crime and Economic crime.

Work-at-home schemes: See Business opportunity fraud, Franchisingfrauds, and Self-improvement
schemes.
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IT SEEMS ONLY FITTING that the city founded by mobster Bugsy
Siegel in the 1940s has become the destination of choice for felons
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with a population of 1.3 million. It also welcomes about a half million
people a week, making it a seemingly ideal place to become lost in the
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“Sooner or later they all end up in Vegas,” Alfredo Cervantes, a
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Angeles Times. “Criminals, like everybody else, know they can get
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task force arrested 840 felons, the largest number by any of the 56
fugitive U.S. apprehension teams,” reported the Times. “In the same
period, the Los Angeles team netted 382 arrests, New York’s 301 and
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Among the apprehended fraudsters was a disgraced New Jersey
prosecutor who skipped bail after being arrested on corruption and tax
fraud charges. During his time in Las Vegas he may have taken in a strip
show performed by a New York drug dealer. She was arrested onstage
when task force officers noticed her tell-tale snake tattoos.
One of the more unusual arrests occurred last September, soon after a
restaurant cashier finished a Reader’s Digest article about Grant Warren
Beaucage, who was wanted in Canada for the murder of his wife. The
cashier put down the magazine and looked up at the man about to pay
for his meal. She recognized him as Beaucage, from the picture in the
article, and alerted hotel security. He was apprehended a short time
later.
Considering that fraudsters often have a large stash of money with
them, it seems likely that Vegas’ bright lights would be a particularly
compelling lure for them. And it might turn out to be a smart place to
hide. “Sorting through 700 warrants each month, [the Criminal
Apprehension Team] forsake embezzlers and scam artists for the more
violent elusive offenders,” reported the Times. But even if fraudsters do
gain freedom in Las Vegas, we can take some solace in assuming that
most of them will lose their ill-gotten gains in the casinos.
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Giving
Fraud the
Finger

Think only criminals have their fingerprints taken? Then you don't
know about biometrics security. You likely soon will.

PIN NUMBERS and other types
of security codes, passwords and
cards for banking and other
financial transactions will likely
become obsolete in the next few
years. “As we know, these systems
offer a limited level of security
from fraud,” says Dr. Edward
Cheng, VP of Public Relations
with SecuGen Corporation, a
global biometrics company located
in Silicon Valley, CA. “But a
fingerprint is unique to each
person. Even identical twins have
different fingerprints. So a
fingerprint cannot be stolen or
copied.”
Biometrics is the automated
method of using an individual’s
distinct biological features for
security purposes. This technique
can verify an individual’s identity
using physical measurements such
as fingerprints, palm size, facial
features, iris scans and voice
recognition.
SecuGen has recently begun a
pilot project with ING Direct,
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Canada using a fingerprint
biometrics security system for
ING’s Internet banking products.
ING Direct is a member of the
ING Group, one of the world’s
largest financial institutions, with
assets exceeding US$430 billion.
Under the project, about 500 of
ING’s customers will use a special
mouse developed by SecuGen,
known as EyeD Mouse II, that has
built-in fingerprint recognition
technology.
The users must first register their
thumbprint with ING (a one-time
enrollment done over the Internet).
When they log on to conduct a
banking transaction, for example,
their thumbprint is scanned by
their mouse (there is a small glass
section on the left side of the
mouse, known as a platen, where
the thumb of the right hand
typically rests) to confirm their
identity. The verification takes less
than a second.
“We’re already using this type
of system with other companies,

for things such as security access to
offices,” says Dr. Cheng. “But this
project, I believe is the first ever
with a financial institution.” He
says the system is highly accurate,
which was not necessarily the case
with earlier versions of this
technology. “A person’s unique
features are extracted and turned
into a 60-digit code number,” he
says. “The image is basically
distortion-free. ”
Less worrisome than the quality
of the technology is the question
about consumer response to having
their fingerprints stored in the
computers of a large corporation.
“The fear of ‘Big Brother’ is
certainly a concern with some
people,” says Dr. Cheng. “But
we’ve found that once they
understand how secure their
fingerprints are from misuse, they
are very happy to cooperate with a
system that protects them from
fraud.” ■
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Getting

Fraud detection goes high-tech as
many industries turn to software

programs to uncover scams.

4

THE 3-D COMPUTER graphic
swirled around and revealed a tall
tower with many strings attached.
It was a graphic representation of a
high-rise building on Toronto’s
Yonge Street and the strings
represented 167 people from that
address who had filed insurance
claims with a prominent Canadian
insurance company.
The next graphic showed that
130 people from a two-story
building outside Ottawa had all
made claims with the same insurer.
With a look of horror, an
executive from the insurance firm
scribbled down the addresses as he
suddenly realized both buildings
were office towers — not residential
locations, as the claims indicated.
It was a telltale sign the claims
were suspect.

In the very recent past those
fraudulent claims might not have
been uncovered. They would
likely have contributed to the $1.3
billion insurance losses a year,
which makes insurance fraud one
of Canada’s biggest white-collar
crime problems. But they were
detected, during an impressive
demonstration of a new software
program called “Fraud
Investigator” from InfoGlide Corp.
Fraud Investigator was run on
the insurance company’s computer
database. In a matter of minutes,
the software found serious
problems that the insurance
company’s existing fraud detection
methods had not discovered.
“We searched claims and
residential addresses and then had
the program visualize the
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addresses with the most claimants,”
says Lee Thistle of TSI Solutions
Inc., the Canadian distributor of
Fraud Investigator.
Most insurance computer
systems in Canada have little or no
ability to search their own
databases to find suspect claims.
But the patented “similarity search
engine” at the heart of Fraud
Investigator can detect any
possible interrelated data in
insurance claims.
Fraud-detecting software is a
recently new tool on the
marketplace. It’s of value to most
sectors that face large-scale fraud,
but particularly the insurance
industry, banks, telephone
companies and government health
insurance plans.

One Size Doesn’t Fit All
Report on Fraud set out to discover
what software was on the market
and how companies and
professionals can best judge what
will work for them. We quickly
discovered there is no “one size fits
all” solution.
Insurance industry chatter is
focused on Fraud Investigator
because it was the clear winner of
an informal fraud detection
software test run by the U.S.
National Insurance Crime Bureau
(NICB). (See sidebar on page 7.)
Fraud Investigator’s similarity
search engine can cross-search
multiple databases even if
they have different formats
and “dirty data” containing
numerous errors. It can
find names, addresses and
as many as 30 other identifiers,
even if criminals have carefully
changed the data to avoid
detection. As well, it can
incorporate other public records to
expand its own detection
effectiveness.
Scott Bothwell of the NICB says
it plans to use the Internet so that
insurance companies using Fraud
Investigator can access NICB’s
questionable claims database to
check to see if a person, or
someone similar to that person,
has filed multiple claims with
different companies. This would
allow them to conduct a search in
real time and approve or reject a
claim very quickly.
Another characteristic that
makes Fraud Investigator popular
is its ease of use. Field investigators

need only a day’s training and do
not require the assistance of
computer programmers.
InfoGlide is initially marketing
the software to the property and
casualty segment of the insurance
industry, but will soon target auto
and healthcare insurers. It says the
similarity search technology is also
being used by a U.S. intelligence
agency to help track terrorists.
Fraud Investigator may also
prove effective in combating some
forms of Internet fraud. InfoGlide
just signed a contract with the
leading Internet auction site, eBay
Inc., to help it attack identity fraud.
The problem of customers who
take money from purchasers and
then never deliver the goods has
plagued eBay. It will use InfoGlide
software to keep known fraudsters
off its network even if they change
their names and other identifiers.
In a test on eBay’s computer
system, the InfoGlide software
found one person posing as 345
others, the company says.

Tracking Telephone Fraud
A very different type of software is
being used to combat fraud in the
telephone industry. Most phone
companies use a form of neural
network technology that tracks
customer calling-patterns and flags
any unusual deviations.
An explosion of wireless and
Internet services has made the
telecom industry more prone to
fraud than ever. An estimated
$6-$8 billion a year is siphoned
from telephone revenue in the U.S.
Typical frauds include:
...continued
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• cloning cell phones — duplicating

transmitter codes of individual
phones and then using the code to
run up huge long distance charges
that are billed to the unsuspecting
cell phone owner. It’s a favorite
trick of Canadian telemarketing
fraudsters who target Americans
• dial-through fraud — hacking into
corporate PBX systems and then
making long distance calls
• calling card theft — stealing calling
card numbers and selling them on
the black market
• clip-on fraud — tapping into an
exposed telephone line outside an
office building and then selling
access to unlimited numbers of
people. It’s prominent in poor
ethnic communities where many
people lack the means to make
telephone calls home.
MCI Worldcom’s “Sheriff”
program and “Supersleuth” from
Nortel Networks are leading
solutions in the telecom industry.
Nortel developed its anti-fraud
software over the past decade in its
UK labs and commercialized it two
years ago. It’s based on neural
network artificial intelligence
technology that is modeled on
human thought patterns, says Walt
Shedd, Nortel’s vice president of
business development for North
America.
Supersleuth has been a hot seller
with German, Dutch and Central
American cell phone firms. As well,
four local exchange carriers in the
U.S. are using it, as are two
Canadian companies.
The rise of flexible, unified voice,
data and Internet networks has
increased the vulnerability to fraud.
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There are about 50 different forms
of fraud, including subscription
fraud, identity fraud, technical
cloning fraud in analog wireless
networks and clip-on fraud in
landline networks.
“We see different types of fraud
emerge almost on a daily basis and
a lot of times it may be just a
variation of an old scheme,” Shedd
says. “It takes awhile for people to
see it.”

With Supersleuth, he adds, “we’re
looking at 70 different events or
characteristics in any given record
and mapping that to known fraud
types. We’re also looking at what is
expected behavior within this
service being provided and we’re
tracking deviations from that
behavior. We’ve found that 100 per
cent of the time if a new fraud is
perpetrated it may not show up and
be recognizable as something we’ve
seen in the past. But it certainly will
show up as something that is not
expected.”
Supersleuth can work with any
type of computer network. It
reaches into a database and collects
records, analyzes them and
produces results so an analyst can
see if it’s a high priority alarm.
An independent study of 40
global wireless operators, each with

its own anti-fraud program, showed
they averaged one fraud analyst per
133,000 subscribers. Those using
Supersleuth averaged one analyst
for every 666,000 subscribers,
making the phone company’s “hair
and blood” costs substantially lower,
Shedd says.
As well, the hardware costs
associated with installing
Supersleuth were one-quarter to
one-half the cost of competitive
systems. Pricing for the software is
based on the size of a company’s
subscriber base, typically being less
for smaller companies and more for
larger.
Benefit to Banks
Banks are a prime target of
fraudsters. Stolen credit and debit
cards (see “Card Tricks” page 8) are
a multi-billion dollar a year problem
for banks and the outsourcing
industry that banks use to process
credit and debit card transactions.
As with telephone companies,
banks use neural networking
software to scan transaction patterns
and recognize any deviations from
established customer practices. For
instance, if a credit card is used
normally in a certain geographic
area, say Quebec, and then
suddenly is used in Mexico, the
software will flag the transaction. A
bank analyst may then decide to
require an identification check of the
cardholder before the bank will
approve further charges.
International Neural Machines
Inc. (INM) of Waterloo, ON has
developed anti-fraud software for
Canadian and Mexican banks. The
data mining software searches the
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bank’s databases and analyzes
transactions, comparing them to
the past history of customers and
merchants to recognize potentially
fraudulent activity. Its software has
the advantage
of learning
from the data it
searches to
pick up new
tactics that
criminals may
develop, says
Oleg Feldgajer,
president of
INM. The
company
recently
received a contract from the World
Bank to install its hybrid software
in the Central Bank of Estonia
specifically to combat money
laundering in the country’s small
banking sector.
INM is also in discussions with
Canada’s new anti-money
laundering agency, FINTRAC, to
provide it with software to help
monitor cross-border financial
transactions including inter-bank
wire transfers to detect money
laundering. In time, the scrutiny
will be run via the Internet, making
laundering analysis much faster
and more effective. ■
Jock Ferguson is a Toronto writer.
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Tests
How do you decide which software is best for

your needs? Put them to the test.

OBVIOUSLY you can hire a
consultant to advise you of
your needs, but at the end of
the day there is only one
reliable method for selecting
anti-fraud software: have
competing software vendors
run a demonstration on your
company’s own computer
database.
That was the approach taken
last year by Scott Bothwell at
the National Insurance Crime
Bureau to evaluate anti-fraud
software technologies. He
salted the NICB’s database
with information from a
sophisticated Russian fraud ring
that it had stopped in 1998. He
gave the database to two
companies to see what they
could find.
In just three days InfoGlide
found the fraud ring while the
other software product found
nothing. The similarity search

engine was able to search
several dozen fields besides
names, addresses and vehicle
identification numbers to find
the clever criminal who had
changed data to avoid
detection. Fraud Investigator
found the Russian crime gang
material in the database “but it
also found things we weren’t
aware of in our own data,”
Bothwell says.
NICB is a non-profit
investigative agency supported
by more than 1,000 U.S.
property and casualty
insurance companies. Bothwell
advises any company to do
what NICB did — have various
vendors do pilot studies using
their own company data and
then judge the results. “Some
software packages are very
expensive so you want to make
sure what you buy will work,”
he says. ■
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Losses from credit card, debit card and ATM

fraud exceed more than a billion dollars
annually in the U.S. alone. But the problem is no

longer a national one, as an expert tells us. It’s
now become an international crime.

JOE MAJKA (pronounced Mykah) is a Regional Director for Visa
U.S.A.’s Risk Management Fraud
Control Department. He has over
24 years experience in corporate
security and criminal investigations,
specializing in the area of financial
crime, and is certified by the
American Society of Industrial
Security as a Certified Protection
Professional. During his career,
Majka has been Director of Security
for Eurekabank and Corporate
Security Manager for Homefed
Bank, in San Diego. He holds a
Bachelor’s degree from California
State University, Hayward and a
lifetime teaching credential from the
University of California at Berkeley.

ROF: From Visa’s perspective, how
serious a problem is fraud?

JM: It’s very serious. Overall, fraud
increased last year, from the
previous year, by approximately

8

14 per cent. However, I should also
say that for Visa, in terms of fraud
to sales volume, fraud only
represents 6 cents for every one
hundred dollars in sales volume, or
.06 per cent.

ROF: Many of the crimes related to the
fraud losses have some kind of
international connection.
JM: That’s exactly right. From a
banking and law enforcement
perspective, if you are still thinking
locally you are behind already,
because the crooks are thinking
globally. And, to no surprise, the
Internet is bringing them to you. In
the past, a merchant was used to
doing business locally or maybe
state wide. Most customers would
walk into the business to conduct
their transactions. The Internet
takes that all away. Today, you can
be doing business with somebody
in the UK or Russia or Latin

America. They don’t have to walk
into your store any more. And the
criminals are using that to their
advantage.
ROF: Can you give an example?
JM: A Wisconsin merchant
received an order from Belarus,
part of the former Soviet Union, for
50,000 pentium chips. The guy in
Belarus gave a credit card number
that he’d obtained from a fraud
program available on the Internet
called CreditMaster. The merchant
called his bank and got
authorization and shipped the stuff
out. Now you and I might be a little
suspect about sending a first order
of 50,000 chips to someone in
Belarus that you’ve never done
business with before. But the
merchant wasn’t. After it was too
late, it was discovered that the card
number, which was from Canada,
had been stolen.
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ROF: How did that happen?
JM: CreditMaster, which anyone
who surfs the Net can find, was
developed in 1992 by a group of
hackers who decided to have fun
with the financial industry. It’s in
version 4.0 now. This program
allows you to generate credit card
and debit card account numbers.
The way it works best is to take
one good account number, which
can be obtained off a receipt. They
know that the first four to six
numbers identify whether it’s a
Visa, Mastercard, American
Express or Discovery number.
They put the number into a
program and ask it to give them
999 account numbers, half above
and half below the good number.
The program then generates a
number, usually 13-16 digits, that
meet a very simple algorithm used
in the banking industry to create a
credit card number. It’s that simple.

remember a few years ago, crooks
were stealing credit card numbers
by copying them off a restaurant
receipt, for example. To combat
that, the industry put this little
three-digit number on a card’s
magnetic stripe, which didn’t show
up on the receipt. If it wasn’t on an
authorization, the transaction was
refused. But the crooks now have a
device that we call a wedge. It can
be as small as a pack of cigarettes
or a pager. If they take your card,
typically at a restaurant, and swipe
it through the device, it stores
everything on the card: your name,
number and the three-digit code.
They then download that onto their
computer and transfer it onto a
counterfeit card. You still have your
card in your wallet. It hasn’t been
stolen or lost but the crooks can use
it. Often somewhere far away.
ROF: Where have stolen U.S. card
numbers turned up?

JM: No they don’t. But if a bank
issues their numbers sequentially,
which many of them do, chances
are they’re going to come up with a
lot of good numbers. Then what
they do is test the number out. For
example, they call AOL and if they
can open up an account with that
number, then it’s good. Or, they
transfer the number to a piece of
plastic and go to a gas station
where you can pay at the pump
with a credit card. And, as one of
my colleagues likes to say, if it
passes gas then they know they can
go ahead and commit fraud.

JM: The crooks often email the
numbers outside the country. We
have found numbers skimmed from
a restaurant in Virginia on some
suspects arrested in Taiwan. They
were linked to individuals selling
skimming devices in Japan,
Malaysia, Korea and the U.S.
Interestingly, they used the Royal
Bank logo on all their plastic.
Another example was a little
Chinese restaurant in Wilson,
Oregon. Within three to five days
after skimming customers’
numbers, those numbers showed
up in Beijing, China. Months later
we saw the same numbers in
Chicago and Latin America.

ROF: How else are numbers stolen

ROF: As a recent case in Canada

these days?

revealed, skimming also takes place at
ATM machines.

ROF: But they don’t know if the
numbers are legitimate.

JM: The most current method is
something called skimming. If you
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Russian nationals arrested in
Sweden had equipment on them
that they would lay over the PIN
pad of an ATM machine. When
you entered your PIN number it
would capture it. They also put a
device on the face of the machine
that would capture everything on
your card.
ROF: Are mostly amateurs or
organized criminals involved in this?

JM: Both, but increasingly we see
international organized crime. And
they’re using the profits from this
type of fraud to fund other
activities, such as drugs and guns.
About two years ago in southern
California, a highway patrolman
was shot and killed when he made
a routine traffic stop. In the trunk
of the car were counterfeit
travellers’ cheques. The person who
shot and killed him was a member
of an Asian organized crime group.
That’s how serious this business is.
I met with the Secret Service
recently and they were telling us
everything lately involving these
kinds of frauds seems to come back
to Hong Kong, Vancouver and San
Francisco. There’s always that
connection there.

ROF: Can you stop this kind of
fraud?

JM: We can and we’re working on
ways right now. But whatever we
come up with, the crooks will likely
find a way to crack it. What we
hope to do is stay ahead of them
for as long as we can, and to keep
the losses down to as minimum a

JM: That’s right. Last year some
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"Fraud

for Fraud
by Jock Ferguson

IPs becoming an all too familiar

story: a high flying financial wizard
crashes down to earth amid

THE
LATEST
FALLEN hero is
Martin A. Armstrong,
the head of the Princeton
Economic Institute (located
in Princeton, NJ., but not
connected to Princeton University),
who was charged last fall by the
U.S. Attorney of the Southern
District of New York with “a
massive scheme through which
billions of dollars of promissory
notes were fraudulently sold to
Japanese corporate investors.” The
same day the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filed
a civil action and obtained an
injunction to freeze his assets, stop
him carrying on business and
appoint a receiver to take over his
companies. Armstrong is currently
out on $5-million bail.
Prior to the charges, the
Princeton Economic Institute billed
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itself as “perhaps
the largest global
advisory firm in the world
to major multinationals,
governments and institutions.”

Made His Stamp at Age 13
A child prodigy, Armstrong, now
49, began his career as a 13-yearold stamp dealer. The author of
several influential books on stamp
collecting, he was drummed out of
the philatelic community in 1972
after being accused of having sold
rare stamps that he didn’t own.
Undaunted, Armstrong
reinvented himself over the next
two decades as a financial guru,
establishing an impressivesounding legend. He claimed that
his $60-million artificial
intelligence forecasting system
correctly predicted crashes in the
U.S. stock and bond markets in
1987 and 1994 respectively. He

also boasted how he had correctly
forecasted the steep downturn in
the Japanese economy in 1989,
and more recent fluctuations in the
value of the yen against the U.S.
dollar. His web site showed a
picture of him with former UK
prime minister Margaret Thatcher
in 1996.
His stellar reputation as an
economic forecasting guru
attracted well-heeled institutional
investors, particularly from Japan.
In the last half of the 1990s they
gave his Tokyo office more than $3
billion to manage.

Ponzi Scheme
The breaks were applied to
Armstrong’s wild ride when he was
charged with criminally
masterminding an international
Ponzi scheme that defrauded his
Japanese corporate investors of
close to US$1 billion.
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allegations of wrongdoing.

Documents filed in criminal and
civil proceedings show a vast
chasm between appearance and
reality, a gulf that is embarrassing
for professional advisors and
executives deceived in the scam, as
there is little evidence of thorough
due diligence by investors. The
case illustrates vividly the inherent
dangers of entrusting money with
people who promise greater
returns than those being offered by
most of the market.
Investors thought Armstrong
had unique economic forecasting
expertise that other money
managers lacked, giving them an
advantage that would produce
higher returns. His crystal ball
skills, he claimed, had produced an
average annual return of 28 per
cent for six consecutive years, a
performance that would double
investors’ money in just three
years. At the time, Japanese banks
were paying zero interest.
Armstrong promised a minimum
of four per cent annual return with
an upside potential for much more.
A key to the facade were regular
reporting letters sent to investors
that falsely claimed they were
earning large returns. In fact, for
almost two years Armstrong’s
trading activity produced dramatic
losses of at least $500 million.
The greatest losses were in the
18 months prior to his arrest. As
the yen grew stronger and
stronger, Armstrong became more
desperate. Still convinced of his
own forecasting rhetoric, he bet
the U.S. dollar heavily against the
yen. It was a dreadful mistake.
Most investors bought into his
deals in U.S. dollars and were to
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be paid back in yen. This
significantly compounded
Armstrong’s problem. Deals that
had a stated interest rate of four
per cent were in fact owed over
twenty per cent with the rise in the
value of the yen against the dollar.
It’s fascinating to go back and
look at Armstrong’s published
views on the Japanese yen during

“Someday I want to be
rich. Some people get so

rich they lose all respect for
humanity. That’s how rich
I want to be. ”
- Rita Rudner

those 18 months in 1998 and 1999.
He appeared to have used his
writings to try and stem the yen’s
downward flow. In July 1999, for
example, Armstrong engaged in
some self-serving warning that if
the yen closed below 110.65 yen to
the dollar, then it could “result in
an economic catastrophe. Such a
decline in the dollar will wipe out
any sign of economic recovery and
plunge Japan into yet another
massive round of deflation. This
would most likely impact the
entire Asian region and at the
same time perhaps push China
over the edge.” But in the end, it
was Armstrong who fell.

When the FBI raided
Armstrong’s Princeton office they
found records showing obligations
to repay between $700 million and
$ 1 billion at a time when there was
only $46 million left in the kitty.
They also found that many early
investors had been repaid with
funds raised from recent investors,
the classic hallmark of a criminal
Ponzi scheme. Investigators found
at least 113 separate investment
accounts under Armstrong’s
umbrella and one company, Alps
Electric Company, could lose as
much as $185 million this year,
Bloomberg News reported. It’s not
yet been determined how much
Armstrong pocketed in
management and performance fees
or where that money is located.

Says He’s a Scapegoat
Armstrong strongly denies the
criminal allegations. His lawyer
was quoted as saying that
Armstrong is being made a
scapegoat for “honest non-criminal
trading losses.”
No matter how the criminal and
civil proceedings resolve, it is
obvious that many investors —
including upward of 80 Japanese
companies — put their blind faith
in Armstrong’s self-proclaimed
genius. Just as there are too many
stories lately of financial gurus who
may be anything but, there are
even more examples of supposedly
sophisticated investors who failed
to look beneath the surface to
determine whether a deal that
seemed too good to be true was in
fact just that. ■
Jock Ferguson is a Toronto writer.
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A Really Sick Fraud
Bobby Heaton fleeced five
investors of $6,100 late last year
from a scam he ran out of his
hospital bed. Heaton, who used a
fake name, pretended to have had
a heart attack to get into St.
Joseph’s Hospital in Houston.
Then he convinced a pastor’s wife,
who counseled the ill, to get her
friends to invest in a scheme that
promised them a 600 per cent
return on their money. Heaton not
only fled with their money, but left
without paying his $41,000 medical
bill.

Soccer Fraud Balls-Up
Twenty-two football players with
Newcastle United were double
crossed by a scalper last December
after they tried to sell their
complimentary FA Cup Final
tickets, with a face value of £36,
for £450 each. When reserve
goalkeeper Peter Keen, who was
the plan’s mastermind, returned
from handing over the tickets to
the scalper, he discovered the
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payment envelope contained only
Monopoly money. According to
The Mirror, some of the players,
many of whom earn thousands of
pounds a week, wanted the money
to pay for vacations with their
girlfriends.

Send Him to Sing Sing
Ever thought of filling out more
than one of those offers from
music companies that send you up
to a dozen CDs for the price of
one? David Russo, 33, of New
Jersey sure did. Over a four-year
period, Russo opened 1,630 fake
accounts with BMG Music
Services and Columbia House. He
used the 22,260 CDs, worth about
$350,000, to stock his flea-market
booths. Russo, who paid about
$50,000 for the CDs that he had
sent to post-office boxes under
false names, was charged with mail
fraud.

Get Your Money
Smelling Pacific Ocean
Fresh
How can Nauru, an eight-squaremile coral island in the Pacific
Ocean near Australia, have one of

the highest per capita incomes in
the world? By doing laundry for
the Russian Mafia. According to
The Sunday Times ofLondon, the
Russian mob washed about US$70
billion worth of dirty money
through the island’s 200 banks last
year. Nauru’s inhabitants were
already wealthy from the island’s
fossilized, phosphate-rich bird
droppings. They are now even
better off, thanks to a different
kind of deposit: proceeds from
drug trafficking, prostitution and
people smuggling. ■
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